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Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to look at the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, with
particular emphasis on the processes of how banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities and
create new value strategies. The research process focuses on understanding (1) how banks implement
e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-banking
capabilities have been built, and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic direction of
banks. This requires understanding of a variety of aspects (i) the value created by e-banking products
and services within different banks, (ii) the process of e-banking development within the different
banks, (iii) how banks approach e-banking products and services, and (iv) how the banks align the
demand and supply factors surrounding e-banking products and services.
The theoretical approach blends inputs from different disciplines relevant to understand and deal with
the subject matter of this thesis, including value creation and capability-building literature, technology
implementation literature, with particular emphasis on the processes of implementing network
technologies and e-businesses, as well as literature on process approaches. The methodological
approach makes use of the case study strategy (Yin 2003) as research strategy, a multiple-case
embedded design, as research design strategy, and three sources of evidence: (1) a survey distributed
to all Saudi Arabian banks, (2) semi-structured interviews, and (3) archival records of e-banking
transactions. The main fieldwork is longitudinal and takes place during three rounds: September-
October 2003, December 2003-March 2004, and December 2005-January 2006.
The thesis investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at six Saudi Arabian banks: Samba
Financial Group (Samba), AlRajhi Bank (AlRajhi), Saudi Investment Bank (Saib), Saudi Hollandi
Bank (Hollandi), National Commercial Bank (AlAhli), and Riyad Bank (Riyad). This is followed by
an investigation of the emergence and evolution of electronic securities trading systems at the Saudi
Capital Market (i. e., Tadawul), providing an external view of the emergence and evolution of e-
banking in Saudi Arabia.
The analysis of the empirical material implements the theoretical propositions strategy via utilisation
of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical
tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005). The aim is not only to use the approach to reveal how banks
build their e-banking capabilities and create new value strategies, but also to test critically the
applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tools for
understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building strategies.
The overall result of the investigation conducted by this thesis suggests that the Saudi Arabian e-
banking' constituency-building process shows distinctive processes of sociotechnical alignment by
each one of the specific Saudi banks' e-banking constituencies in the study. In addition, the use of
Molina's "alignment web" to assess the state of each of the specific e-banking constituency-building
processes helps identify the areas of strengths and weaknesses in these processes of sociotechnical
alignment. The distinctiveness of development by each sociotechnical constituency is also highlighted
by the application of the Molina's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), showing that each
constituency has its own combination of strategic ingredients.
Although this thesis demonstrates strengths in the areas of logic replication, narrative writing, and
validating procedure, in future studies it would be interesting to enhance its theoretical background,
chronological structure, and quantitative assessment. This thesis contributes to providing a rich insight
into the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, particularly at six of eleven Saudi
banks as well as the technological systems of the Saudi Capital Market. Such contribution may be
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The aim of the thesis is to look at the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, with
particular emphasis on the processes of how banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities and
create new value strategies. Questions have been raised about the banks1 efficiency in utilising the
unique features of e-banking for improving their competitive positions and images. There is a growing
concern that e-banking is not yielding the anticipated results (Frei & Harker 1999; Amit & Zott 2001;
Simpson 2002). This has thrown a spotlight onto the problem of change from one particular delivery
channel to another. In practice, an appropriate mix of delivery channels will be determined by a
number of factors on the supply and demand sides of the market (Daniel 1999; Lang & Colgate 2003;
Bughin 2004). This process is the concern of the thesis.
1.2 Questions of the thesis
The research starts with a broad area of inquiry related to understanding and providing an account of
the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. The inquiry, next, is inductive and aims to
explore and describe the actions of those banks based on what they are doing rather than verifying any
hypotheses. The research starts the inquiry with an open mind rather than a closed one. The literature
that it reviews before the fieldwork helps to view the empirical world more effectively.
The research process focuses on understanding (1) how banks implement e-banking to build their
capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-banking capabilities have been built,
and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic direction of banks. This requires
understanding of a variety of aspects (i) the value created by e-banking products and services within
different banks, (ii) the process of e-banking development within the different banks, (iii) how banks
approach e-banking products and services, and (iv) how the banks align the demand and supply
factors surrounding e-banking products and services.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The aim of this section is to briefly explain the way the thesis is structured to respond to its questions.
The thesis is organised into twelve chapters, with Chapter 1 dedicated to introducing the thesis.
Chapter 2 looks at literature relevant to understanding and dealing with the matter of this thesis, that is
the emergence and evolution of e-banking with particular emphasis on (1) how banks implement e-
banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-banking
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capabilities have been built, and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic direction of
banks.
The literature review covers a wide range of material on the subject and is believed to be
comprehensive and up-to-date. It defines the term "e-banking" and looks briefly at the emergence,
evolution, nature, products, and services of e-banking. The review then explores the focus of e-
banking research through distinguishing among factors influencing the adaptation of e-banking into
supply and demand side factors. The demand side factors of e-banking research includes marketing,
acceptance, usage, quality, and trust while that of supply side includes competition, resources,
implementation, efficiency, and productivity.
This is followed by a discussion on the theoretical foundations of value creation and capabilities
building in e-banking. It briefly discusses some views on value creation and capabilities building
according to Schumpeter's conventional theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942), resource-
based view of the firm (Penrose 1959), transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), value-chain
analysis (Porter 1985), dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al. 1997), strategic network theory
(e.g., Dyer & Singh 1998), and accelerating capability building (Hagel & Brown 2005). This is
followed by a discussion on a group of emerging theoretical value creation frameworks in e-business
(e.g., Willcocks & Plant 2001; Amit & Zott 2001). The section concludes the discussion by looking at
the applicability of these theories in the context of e-banking (e.g., Colgate 1998; Mole 1999;
Hensmans et al. 2001), which will enable us to provide answers to the key questions raised by this
thesis regarding how banks create e-banking value.
The discussion, next, looks in details to the technology implementation literature, with particular
emphasis on the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. It discusses the
term "implementation" and looks briefly at the relation between implementation, innovation and
diffusion, the dynamics of the implementation process, and its different stages/phases. It also looks at
the implementation challenges, success and failure, implementers' responsibilities and broad
implementation approaches, before ending with a brief review of empirical studies related to the
implementation of e-banking products and services, as well as a case study on the implementation of
the EFTPOS in the UK during the late 1980s.
The findings of the implementation literature provide the background for the identification of
structured process approaches useful to analyse in detail and comparatively the emergence and
evolution of concrete e-banking experiences in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Chapter 2 continues with
a discussion on the sociotechnical approach with particular focus on the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) that seems to offer a more structured framework to
organise the comparative study of concrete e-banking experiences, particularly through its associated
analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005).
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The aim is not only to use the approach to reveal how banks build their e-banking capabilities and
create new value strategies, but also to test critically the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools (Molina 1995; 2003;
2005) for understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building. Accordingly, Chapter 2
provides a brief positioning of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) in
social theory and a review of early "social theory" approaches stressing the interaction between social
and technical factors during the development of technology. This is followed by (a) comparing the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) with such theoretical approaches and
(b) introducing a group of studies that have attempted to use the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993). A justification to the potential applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to analysing the emergence and evolution of e-banking
in Saudi Arabia concludes the critical analysis, before proceeding to the introduction of the
"alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), the recent
give the most recent conceptual instruments of the "sociotechnical constituency" approach (Molina
1990; 1993).
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology and the path the research process will follow in
conducting the empirical work and analysis. The discussion highlights the research strategy, which is
the case study strategy (Yin 2003), together with the reasons for choosing such a strategy among other
research strategies (e.g., experiment). Such reasons are (1) the questions posed by the thesis are "how"
and "why" types of questions, (2) the research process would not be able to control behaviour, and (3)
the thesis needs to focus on a contemporary event.
Chapter 3 also discusses the research design to develop the logic that linked the data to be collected to
the questions posed by the thesis. The thesis questions lead to favouring the e-banking sociotechnical
constituency-building process (a case) as the primary unit of analysis, and the bank as the secondary
unit of analysis. The research design also uses a multiple-case embedded design as a case-study
design. Looking at several units of analysis would help not only in understanding the dynamics in
operation (Hammady 1999), but also in enhancing insights to the single case (Yin 2003). The data
analysis strategy concludes Chapter 3. In Yin's (2003: 33) words:
"The use of theory, in doing case studies, is not only an immense aid in defining the
appropriate research design and data collection, but also becomes the main vehicle
for generalising the results of the case study."
The data analysis strategy of this thesis implements the theoretical propositions strategy via the
utilisation of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated
analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005). The data analysis strategy also utilises a group of
methodological strategies and techniques, including pattern-matching, explanation building, logic
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models, coding, pattern coding, cross-case synthesis, and stacking comparable cases. Such
methodological combinations will help to draw sound findings.
To provide insights about the possible approaches to the thesis, the research process conducts two
pilot studies during August 2003 in Saudi Arabia with AlRajhi Bank (AlRajhi) and Riyad Bank
(Riyad). These pilot studies are initial and of an exploratory role. The findings of the pilot studies are
critically important in formatting the data collection process, in particular, and the entire research, in
general. The findings lead to the use of three sources of evidence: (1) a survey to be distributed to all
Saudi banks, (2) semi-structured interviews, and (3) archival records of e-banking transactions
provided by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). The main fieldwork takes place during
three rounds: September-October 2003, December 2003-March 2004, and December 2005-January
2006.
The structure of the thesis then moves to investigating the emergence and evolution of e-banking at
six Saudi banks as well as an inter-bank technological system at the Saudi Capital Market, providing
an external view of the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. This makes up a total
of seven case studies, with each case study making up a single chapter (i.e. Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10) and following a largely common structure.
Such common structure starts with a brief overview of the organisation (e.g., the bank) and some of
the key events shaping the organisation's developments since inception. It then looks at the particular
development of e-banking at the organisation through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis is a two-layered intra- and inter-
organisational diamond, given that important features of the organisation's e-banking constituency-
building process are the result of inter-organisational interactions between the organisation and other
organisations. A section with policy implication concludes each of the seven chapters.
Following such systematic structure, Chapter 4 investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking
at Samba Financial Group (Samba). The discussion distinguishes two distinctive periods in the
evolution of the Samba e-banking constituency. The first period goes from the beginnings of Samba to
the late 1990s when the merger with the United Saudi Bank (USB) occurred. This is followed by the
second period that extends until today and in which the Internet plays a major role. To highlight the
differences between the two periods, the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) is applied separately
to each of the two periods.
Chapter 5 investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlRajhi. The discussion
distinguishes three phases in the evolution of AlRajhi e-banking constituency: origins (1987-1995),
development (1996-2000), and present state (2001-2006). To highlight the differences between the
three phases, the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), is applied separately to each phase. Chapter
6 investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at the Saudi Investment Bank (Saib). The
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discussion briefly assesses the state of Saib's e-banking constituency prior to the implementation of
Saib's business and IT strategy (BIT). It then focuses on the implications of the implementation of
BIT, which goes from the late 1990s to today.
Chapter 7 investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at the Saudi Hollandi Bank
(Hollandi). The discussion focuses on the evolution of the Hollandi e-banking constituency as well as
its implications for Hollandi today. Chapter 8 investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking
at the National Commercial Bank (AlAhli). The discussion focuses on the evolution of the AlAhli e-
banking constituency as well as its implications for AlAhli today. Chapter 9 investigates the
emergence and evolution of e-banking at Riyad. The discussion focuses on the evolution of the Riyad
e-banking constituency as well as its implications for Riyad today.
Expanding the discussion toward an inter-bank technological system and the implications it has on the
sociotechnical constituency-building process in Saudi banks provides an external view of the
emergence and evolution of e-banking at Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Chapter 10 investigates the
emergence and evolution of the trading, clearing and settlements system of securities in the Saudi
Capital Market (i.e. Tadawul). This case provides more insights as the Tadawul constituency involves
important constituents spread across all Saudi banks.
The emergence of the Tadawul constituency finds its historical origins in the Electronic Shares
Information System (ESIS) constituency that developed during the 1990s. Therefore, it is necessary to
assess the build-up of the ESIS constituency before looking at the particular development of the
Tadawul constituency, which goes from the late 1990s until today, through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). Again, the diamond selected for the analysis is a two-layered
intra- and inter-organisational diamond, given that important features of the Tadawul's constituency-
building process are the result of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between Tadawul and
other organisations.
Following the investigation of the emergence and evolution of e-banking at each of the six Saudi
banks as well as at the Saudi Capital Market, the thesis next looks at, in Chapter 11, an integrative
picture of Saudi e-banking. The discussion compares and contrasts the emergence and evolution of e-
banking among the seven case studies. The discussion makes use of conceptual tools associated with
the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993), namely, the "alignment web"
(Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) of e-banking constituency-
building processes. The discussion also takes a comparative perspective, highlighting differences and
similarities among the seven case studies.
It starts with the application of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) to analyse quantitatively the
current state of the process of sociotechnical alignment for each of the Saudi e-banking constituencies.
This assessment is related to the more qualitative assessment conducted in the previous chapters with
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the case studies. It is indeed complementary since the content of the "diamond of alignment" table
(Molina 1995) is developed by the author as a summary interpretation of the constituency-building
story, while the markings of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) are given by key players in each of
the e-banking constituency-building processes.
This is then supplemented by the application of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina
2005) in the case studies of three e-banking constituencies (i.e. AlAhli, Riyad, and Tadawul). The
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) is however applied only to the current phase of
development of the e-banking constituencies of the three e-banking constituencies. The combined use
of the tools produces a detailed assessment of the current state of the process of sociotechnical
alignment for each of the e-banking constituencies.
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis by highlighting its empirical contribution, strategy-policy
recommendations, and assessment of the thesis. In addition, Chpater 12 provides the results of testing
the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tools for
understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building, as well as suggestions for further
research.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to look at literature relevant to understanding and dealing with the matter of
this thesis, that is the emergence and evolution of e-banking with particular emphasis on (1) how
banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2)
how e-banking capabilities have been built, and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the
strategic direction of banks.
The literature review covers a wide range of material on the subject and is believed to be
comprehensive and up-to-date. Respectively, sections 2.2 and 2.3 defines the term "e-banking" and
looks briefly at the emergence, evolution, nature, products, and services of e-banking. Section 2.4
explores the focus of e-banking research. It distinguishes between factors influencing the adaptation of
e-banking into supply and demand side factors. The demand side factors of e-banking research include
marketing, acceptance, usage, quality, and trust while that of the supply side include competition,
resources, implementation, efficiency, and productivity.
Section 2.5 aims to look at the theoretical foundations of value creation and capabilities building in e-
banking. It briefly discusses some views on value creation and capabilities building according to
Schumpeter's conventional theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942), resource-based view of
the firm (Penrose 1959), transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), value-chain analysis (Porter
1985), dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al. 1997), strategic network theory (e.g., Dyer & Singh
1998), and accelerating capability building (Hagel & Brown 2005). This is followed by a discussion
on a group of emerging theoretical value creation frameworks in e-business (e.g., Willcocks & Plant
2001; Amit & Zott 2001). The section concludes the discussion by looking at the applicability of these
theories in the context of e-banking (e.g., Colgate 1998; Mole 1999; Hensmans et al. 2001), which
will enable us to provide answers to the key questions raised by this thesis regarding how banks create
e-banking value.
Section 2.6 looks in details to the technology implementation literature, with particular emphasis on
the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. Such literature would help
providing intellectual background for the discussion on the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993), discussed in details in Section 2.7, for understanding
the potentials of e-banking value creation and capabilities-building.
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The section starts with clarifying the term "implementation" and looks briefly at implementation from
the lens of innovation and diffusion. Then, the section discusses the nature of the implementation
process, as well as its different stages/phases. Next, the section flows the discussion toward
implementation challenges, strategies to achieve success and avoid failure, implementers'
responsibilities and different implementation approaches. The section concludes the discussion by
introducing a group of empirical work related to the implementation of e-banking products and
services, as well as a case study on the implementation of the EFTPOS in the UK during the late
1980s.
The thesis utilises the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its
associated analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina
2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005). The aim from conducting such large
deployment from a single theoretical field is not only to reveal how banks build their e-banking
capabilities as well as create new value strategies, but also to test the applicability of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tools for understanding the
potentials of e-banking value creation and capabilities-building.
Accordingly, Section 2.7 continues the review of literature by discussing the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tool of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995). It also critically assesses the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) for understanding the potentials of e-banking value
creation and capabilities-building. This thesis makes use of instruments associated to the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) namely, the "alignment web" (Molina
2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) of e-banking constituency-building
processes. The "alignment web" (Molina 2003) is based on the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995) while the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) is based on mapping and
supporting strategies of processes of innovation or development of products and services. The tool is
associated with the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) insofar as processes
of product or service innovation are understood as the evolutionary building-up of "sociotechnical
constituencies" (Molina 1990; 1993). The last parts of Section 2.7 introduce the "alignment web"
(Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005).
2.2 Definition of e-Banking
The term "e-banking" has been used in the literature in many different ways. While some literature
restricted the use of the term to information provision, as Daniel (1999: 72), for instance, "the
provision of information about the bank and its products via a page on the World Wide Web
(WWW)", others limited the term "e-banking" to retail banking, as Aladwani (2001: 214), for
instance, "several types of services through which bank customers can request information and carry
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out most retail banking services, such as balance reporting, inter-account transfers, bill-payment, etc.,
via a telecommunication network without leaving their homes or organisations".
The Basel Committee Report on Banking Supervision (1998: 3) defined "e-banking" as, "the
provision of retail and small value banking products and services through electronic channels. Such
products and services can include deposit-taking, lending, account management, the provision of
financial advice, electronic bill payment, and the provision of other electronic payment products and
services, such as electronic money".
Simpson (2002: 316) included corporate banking in addition to retail banking, "e-banking is a new
electronic way for customers of banks and financial institutions to access their accounts, pay their
bills, manage their money, and use various other services." Liao et al. (1999: 36) focussed on the
process of providing e-banking, "the provision of banking services through electronic media, such as
ATM, telephone, personal computers and/or Internet".
Buzzacchi et al. (1995: 157) provided details about e-banking components, e-banking refers to "a
cluster of product innovations ... [that] include: the [cash dispenser] (CD), which allows the user to
withdraw cash from his (her) accounts in different banks thanks to the connection to the inter-bank
network; the ATM, which provides the user with a broader range of teller services;... the point of sale
(POS), an automatic device located in retail outlets for debiting purchases; and remote banking (RB)
services, functioning via a network from the user's place of residence and divided, according to the
type of user, into two categories, home banking (HB) and corporate banking (CB)".
Not only has each definition been stated from a different angle, but it has also been fabricated to
furnish specific needs. For example, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision limited e-banking
to retail banking when it produced its report on retail banking supervision. Accordingly, based on such
different definitions of e-banking as well as for the purpose of this thesis, the term e-banking refers to
the provision of banking products, services, and platforms through electronic channels (e-channels) to
furnish all customers' segments (e.g., retail, corporate, governmental agencies).
Next I look at a brief overview of e-banking products and services.
2.3 A brief overview of e-Banking
No doubt if one seeks to understand e-banking, then one needs to take into account the full spectrum
of issues related to its growth (Centeno 2004). This section not only looks briefly at the emergence
and evolution of e-banking, as Centeno suggested, but also highlights different taxonomies of e-
banking products and services. The emergence and evolution of e-banking can be traced back to the
1950s. According to Smith (1985), the first computers were brought into banks during the mid-1950s.
Computers started with accounting functions, performing calculation tasks. Then, their roles were
developed to be used for voucher sorting. The development story has continued until today with the
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involvement of computers in all of the new forms of self-service banking, such as automatic teller
machines (ATMs), point-of-sale (POS) terminals and Internet. Table 2.3.1 provides the major





Voucher sorting for clearings 1963-1968
Branch online date collection 1965-1975
Cash dispensing machine 1966-1971
Electronic fund transfer (EFT) 1968-1973
Counter terminal systems for transaction processing 1971-1976
Automated telling machine (ATM) systems for cash 1972-1976
dispensing and self service banking
Terminal systems for non-cash self-service banking 1977-1980
Electronic fund transfer at the point of sale (EFTPOS)'s 1980-
systems for transactions
Home banking systems for self-service banking 1980-
Branch information systems 1982-
Table 2.3.1 Banking systems based on electronic technology (Smith 1985: 37)
Buzzacchi et al. (1995) distinguished banking technology into "mass automation" and "smart
automation" regimes. The "mass automation" regime focused mainly on the mechanisation of back-
office procedures in the 1960s and 1970s. The "smart automation" regime, however, originated from
the introduction of distributed data processing and network technologies, and centred on the supply of
e-banking. One important implication of the change in technological regime is that discontinuation
largely cancelled out the cumulative effects associated with the path previously followed by
technology.
The evolutionary path of e-banking has been influenced by the nature of e-banking itself. BIS (1998)
suggested two fundamental aspects of e-banking. The first is the nature of the delivery channels
through which activities are pursued. This aspect is the means for customers to gain access to those
channels. Rayport and Sviokla (1995) highlighted three differences between the virtual market space
and the physical marketplace. The first is that pricing at the virtual market space should be based on
value rather than cost as most services have little marginal cost. The second is that customers are
unlikely to return to the marketplace after experiencing the benefits of the market space. The third is
that suppliers can easily offer additional products and services to customers in the market space.
Mols (2001) pointed out that e-banking is interesting for many reasons. The first is that the new e-
channels can offer customers better service output in the form of a broader and deeper assortment, less
waiting time, and a higher market decentralisation. The second is that e-channels are more cost-
effective than other conventional channels (e.g., branch), resulting in lower prices for the customers.
The third is that e-channels may change the way in which banks interact with their customers and may
facilitate direct marketing, relationship marketing, and mass customisation and thus increase customer
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loyalty. The fourth is that the number of customers demanding e-channels is likely to increase in the
future.
In addition to the nature of e-banking itself, its development process usually approaches many stages.
Conger and Mason (1998) suggested that the process of developing e-banking products or services
proceeds through three generic stages: pre-development, development, and post-development. The
pre-development stage refers to the period before producing an e-banking product or service. At this
stage, the idea of adopting e-banking emerges, and the benefits of initiating e-banking become
discernible for the bank. The development stage refers to the actual development or implementation of
e-banking. The development process of an e-banking product or service involves several managerial
and technical issues that need to be addressed adequately. The post-development refers to the period
after terminating the actual production process of e-banking. At this stage, the bank needs to
understand transfer and maintenance issues to ensure the future success of the project.
Parsons et al. (1996) suggested another classification for the development process. Organisations go
through four main stages in adopting the Internet. The first stage involves the initiative to launch a
basic on-line presence mainly to present information to the customers. The second stage sets a small
full-time technical group of staff to establish and maintain the Internet site. The third stage develops
the structure of such group though separating marketing from technical. The fourth stage features the
core business re-definition and transformation.
The emergence and evolution of e-banking have brought many types of e-banking products and
services. Based on the supply side of e-banking, BIS (1998) distinguished e-banking products and
services according to its technical platform into "closed" and "open" e-banking. While the "closed"
restricts access to participants bound by agreements on the terms of membership, the "open" has no
such membership requirements. Swierczek and Shrestha (2003), however, based their taxonomy on
the demand side of e-banking rather that the supply side. They divided e-banking based on the users'
segment rather than the technical platform into two categories: "retail" and "corporate" e-banking
products and services. Daniel (1999) classified e-banking products and services, according to its
technology, into PC banking, Internet banking, managed network banking, and TV-based banking.
The quality and variety of services offered via each product or service are different from one to
another.
Next I look at the focus of e-banking research.
2.4 Focus of e-banking research
2.4.1 Introduction
The discussion on the emergence and evolution of e-banking as well as the different taxonomies of e-
banking products and services shows that offering e-banking products and services is a demanding
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task. Devlin (1995: 19) distinguished among factors influencing the adoption ofe-banking into supply
and demand side factors:
"The appropriate mix of delivery systems for financial services institutions is
determined by a number of factors on both the supply and demand sides of the
market. On the supply side, factors, such as regulation, technology and the resultant
changes in market structure, will influence the chosen methods of delivery for
financial services firms, while on the demand side consumer preferences and
expectations are obviously of prime importance."
The aim of this section is to explore e-banking research from Devlin (1995)'s lens on e-banking
adoption factors. Some of the articles investigated more than one topic. A few even studied as many
as four different aspects. The review of e-banking literature categorises demand side factors of e-
banking research into five factors: marketing, acceptance, usage, quality, and trust. Supply side factors
are also categorised into five factors: competition, resources, implementation, efficiency, and
productivity.
2.4.2 Demand-side focus
The review of e-banking literature categorises the demand side factors of e-banking research into five
factors: marketing, acceptance, usage, quality, and trust.
2.4.2.1 Marketing and diffusion
A group of literatures has investigated the role of marketing e-banking products and services. The
general aim of such literature is to look at possible tactical approaches that can be used by banks or
financial institutions to ensure successful diffusion of e-banking products and services among target
customers. Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggested that relational marketing-establishing, that is
developing and maintaining successful relational exchanges, constitutes a major shift in marketing
theory and practice. After conceptualising relationship marketing and discussing its forms, Morgan
and Hunt theorised that successful relationship marketing requires relationship commitment and trust.
They also model relationship commitment and trust as key mediating variables, test this key mediating
variable model using data from automobile tyre retailers and compare their model with a rival that
does not allow relationship commitment and trust to function as mediating variables.
The relationship between e-banking marketing and competitive advantage has been searched in many
literatures. For example, Armstrong and Hagel (1996) argued that businesses that can satisfy both
relational and transactional needs will reap the benefits of greater customer loyalty and may gain
important insight into the nature and needs of their customer base. In the long run, however, such
businesses are likely to create value via usage fees, content fees, transactions and advertising, and/or
synergies with other parts of their business. Colgate (1998) looked at the interface between IT and
sustainable competitive advantage from a marketing perspective in the retail banking industries in the
UK and Ireland. Specific question addressed are; can or have marketing functions in retail banks
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utilise the opportunities that IT provides to create sustainable competitive advantage; or have they
already done so? The overall result was that the success in e-banking implementation is highly linked
with powerful marketing activities.
Mols (1998: 2000) argued that the diffusion of e-banking is determined by technological
development, customers, and banks' managers. More customers are likely to be attracted to and
develop a preference for e-banking if the technology becomes cheaper and more user-friendly. In this
case, the inter-relationship between the technological development and the customer behaviour is
likely to promote e-banking. Equally important are the managers' perceptions of and expectations
towards e-banking. If they primarily regard e-banking as a self-service channel, fewer resources will
be allocated to its development than if it is viewed as an important media for communication between
the banks and their customers and a possibility for building close relationships and practicing one-to-
one marketing.
Daniel and Storey (1997) looked at drivers for UK banks to select the Internet as a delivery channel.
Levy (1998) distinguished between technology-driven and market-driven innovations. Whereas, the
impetus for technology-driven innovations is assumed to come from the availability of new
technology or a combination of new technologies, market-driven innovations are meant to be a
response to a perceived customer need. The former argument found support in the assumption that
organisations "do not invent themselves their technology but import them from the environment"
(Scott 1998: 229).
Mols (2000) examined various aspects of the motives, perceptions, and expectations connected with
the introduction of Internet banking in Danish retail banking. One of the interesting results is that
Internet banking will become more important in the future, whereas all other distribution channels are
predicted to become less important. Bughin (2004) analysed the factors driving e-banking customer
conversion and acquisition for a large sample of Western European banks. Bughin found major
differences between the market dynamics of customer acquisition and own bank customer conversion.
While customer acquisition is mostly linked to pull factors, own bank customer conversion is mostly
linked to aggressive organisational strategies.
Other literatures, however, look at the relationship between marketing e-banking and customers'
preference. Wisner and Corney (2001), for instance, evaluated the feedback capabilities of banks in
Las Vegas, Nevada with respect to their customer feedback characteristics. Findings showed that
many banks lack the most basic methods of feedback collection although most of them employ a
number of value-enhancing customer feedback characteristics. A similar angle has been found in the
study of Sohail and Shanmugham (2003). The authors examined the customers' preference for e-
banking and the factors which they considered influence the adoption of e-banking in Malaysia. The
study found that Internet accessibility, awareness, attitude towards change, computer, and Internet
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access costs, trust, security concerns, ease of use and convenience are the major factors affecting the
adoption of Internet bank services.
2.4.2.2 Acceptance and adoption - psychology and other literature
The issue of customers' acceptance for e-banking is another issue that has been studied deeply in
psychology literature. Such works have mainly focused on factors influencing customers' acceptance
of e-banking. Moreover, psychology literature has paid more attention to customers' acceptance of e-
banking rather than other works through grounding the research on psychological frameworks, such as
the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) and the theory
of planned behaviour (TPB)1 (Ajzen 1991). Davis (1989) and Davis et al. (1989) proposed a model,
entitled "technology acceptance model (TAM)2," that has been adapted from TRA. The TAM is
specific to information system usage whilst the TRA is a general theory of human behaviour (Luarn &
Lin 2005).
Luarn and Lin (2005) proposed a model that can provide useful information to e-banking
practitioners, while at the same time maintaining TAM's theoretical and psychometric rigor. Liao et
al. (1999) investigated how different e-banking products and services are adopted or perceived and
whether TPB is capable of predicting the adoption intention of retail bank customers. Theoretically
grounded on TAM, Sundarraj and Wu (2005) looked at customer attitudes towards banking
1 The theories of reasoned action (TRA) and planned behaviour (TPB) are comprehensive theories of
many behaviours that specify a limited number of psychological variables that can influence a
behaviour, namely (a) intention; (b) attitude towards the behaviour; (c) subjective norm; (d)
perceived behavioural control; and (e) behavioural, normative and control beliefs (Albarrac et al.
2001). TRA asserts that one's intentions influence overt behaviour. However, TRA has some
limitations. One of the limitations is that TRA only applies to behaviour that is consciously thought
out before hand. TPB has been extended from TRA to overcome TRA's limitations. According to
TPB, an individual's behaviour can be explained by his or her behavioural intention, which is
jointly influenced by attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. Attitude refers to
an individual's positive or negative evaluation of the performance effect of a particular behaviour.
Subjective norms refer to an individual's perceptions of other people's opinions on whether or not
he or she should perform a particular behaviour, whilst perceived behavioural control refers to an
individual's perceptions of the presence or absence of the requisite resources or opportunities
necessary for performing behaviour (Luarn & Lin 2005).
2 The technology acceptance model (TAM) shows that a user's adoption of a new information system
is determined by that user's intention to use the system, which in turn is determined by the user's
beliefs about the system. TAM further suggested that two beliefs - perceived usefulness and
perceived ease of use - are instrumental in explaining the variance in users' intentions. Perceived
usefulness is defined as the extent to which a person believes that using a particular system will
enhance his or her job performance, while perceived ease of use is defined as the extent to which a
person believes that using a particular system will be free of effort. Among those beliefs, perceived
ease of use is hypothesised as a predictor of perceived usefulness. The TAM is not without
limitations. It includes the omission of a trust-based construct in the context of electronic or mobile
commerce and the assumption that there are no barriers preventing an individual from using an IS if
he or she chooses to do so. A detailed discussion about TAM can be found, for instance, in Luarn
and Lin (2005), Taylor and Todd (1995), Tan and Teo (2000), and Sundarraj and Wu (2005).
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technologies (i.e. Internet and telephone banking) in the Canadian banking sector from the IS
perspective that they are all rooted in the IS literature as well as the relationships amongst them.
Taylor and Todd (1995) proposed a model, entitled "decomposed TPB." According to Tan and Teo
(2000), the model is based on both TPB and diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers 1983). The
model assumes that a person's intention to technology is determined by attitude, subjective norms and
perceived behavioural control. Built on Taylor and Todd (1995)'s work, Tan and Teo (2000) looked at
the attitudinal, social, and behavioural control factors that are significant in explaining intentions to
adopt Internet banking services in Singapore.
Chang (2003) examined the behaviour of banks and their customers in the event of Internet banking
introduction in Korea. The results imply that the internet banking adoption is dominated by social
norm effects. Grounded on a combination of qualitative (i.e. focus groups) and quantitative (i.e.
questionnaire survey) research, Waite and Harrison (2004) looked at young adults' expectations and
perceptions of online retail banking information in UK. The study rendered bank Web sites as an
ineffective aid for customer's decision making. Pikkarainen et al. (2004) looked at the factors that
influence the acceptance of online banking in the light of TAM. The study found that information
about online banking services and its benefits are a critical factor influencing the acceptance.
In addition to psychology literature, other literature did pay attention to the issue of customers'
acceptance of e-banking. For example, Marr and Prendergast (1993) investigated variables influencing
customers' acceptance of retail e-banking. The study was grounded on a Delphi study with New
Zealand's leading experts in the area of retail e-banking. This was followed by a comparison between
the themes from the literature and the results of the Delphi study. In an exploratory study, Brown et al.
(2003) examined the factors that influence the adoption of cell phone banking in South Africa, as a
means of understanding how to possibly increase the rate of adoption. Bhattacheijee (2001) made use
of a cross-sectional field survey of American e-banking users to look at the salient determinants of IT
continuance intention with the aim of determining the influence of the dependant variable (e.g., user
satisfaction).
Likewise, Kaijaluoto et al. (2002) examined factors that influence the formation of attitudes towards
e-banking and their relation to the use of e-banking products and services in Finland. Kaijaluoto et al.
stressed banks' need for providing education targeted not only to guidance in using the Internet, but
also to provide more a extensive education in the whole field regarding computers. Grounded on a
case study from the Nigerian banking sector, Anandarajan et al. (2000) examined the factors
motivating individuals in less-developed countries to accept as well as use IT. The study revealed that
incorporating IT without regard to local culture (e.g., social pressure, national culture) could lead to
detrimental results.
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Some studies looked at the importance of organisational and environmental factors during the
development of e-banking. For example, Rao (1999) suggested that a firm that needs to thrive in a
networked economy should, first, have a dynamic and flexible organisational structure rather than the
way around. Hwang et al. (2004) examined organisational, environmental and project planning factors
affecting the adoption of data warehouse technology and the current status of adopting data warehouse
technology in the Taiwanese banking sector.
In a conceptual study, Flier et al. (2003) investigated exploration actions3 of incumbent firms with
their environments. The study aimed to answer (1) how do incumbent firms and environments co-
evolve and how are firm-level adaptation and selection at industry level inter-related? And (2) can
large established organisations renew themselves to adapt to their environment? The study was
theoretically based on the theories of institutional theory, managerial intentionality, and a co-
evolutionary perspective.
In turn, Currie (2000) suggested a group of business drivers that stimulate the introduction of e-
banking. Such drivers are ranged from enhancing the competitive position to meeting consumer
demands, creating new distribution channels, improving business image, or reducing costs. Morrison
and Roberts (1998) looked at the determinants of consideration of new means of distribution for
existing services in terms of preference for the service, preference for the distribution vehicle, and the
fit between the service and the distribution method, as viewed by customers.
Frambach et al. (1998) suggested that Internet adoption is influenced by many variables acting on the
adaptation decision of both suppliers and adopters. On the supplier side, both marketing strategy (e.g.,
positioning, risk reduction, market support, and information) and innovation development (e.g.,
perceived customisation, expertise supplier) influence the adoption decision. While on the adopter
side, variables, such as perceived innovation characteristics (e.g., relative advantage, complexity,
compatibility, and uncertainty), organisation's characteristics (e.g., size, centralisation, age,
receptiveness), network participation both within and outside the industry, competitive environment
(e.g., intensity of both competition and innovative activities) and information, influence such decision.
However, the introduction of e-banking is not without limitations. Morrison and Roberts (1998)
pointed out that the adaptation of e-banking is surrounded by two barriers. The first is that the relative
advantage of innovative telecommunications media is yet to be established. The second is the
perceived fit between banking and the use of new telecommunications services. In a discussion of the
3
Exploration actions are defined as "strategic renewal actions that add new activities to the current
repertoire of the organisation and/or that increase the geographic scope of the firm. Examples are
banks entering insurance, or the expansion into a new geographic region. The latter often requires
new competencies to cope with new business practices, knowledge about clients, etc" (Flier et al.
2003:2170).
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emergence of multimedia banks4, Johnson and Ott (1995) stressed the need for geographic presence to
collect and disperse payments as well as the expectation that the transition to multimedia banking will
occur via three waves, each representing the point where technological capability meets consumer
acceptance: ATMs and telephones, PCs and online services, and e-cash and interactive video.
2.4.2.3 Customers' usage
The relationship between the approaches used by e-banking customers and the success or failure of e-
banking products and services is another issue that has been tackled in the literature. The general aim
of such literature is to assess actual customers' usage approaches and investigate possible
enhancement techniques for improving chances of success. Buck (1996) provided a taxonomy of
payment mechanisms in the real world that classifies number of proposals for payment mechanisms
on the Internet. Buck also suggests that myriad proposals for Internet payment mechanisms fall into
one or other of these classifications. The first proposal is credit mechanisms, such as credit cards or
pre-arranged accounts with billing in arrears. The second proposal is the debit mechanisms, such as
debit cards, cheques, or pre-paid accounts. The third proposal is the pre-paid tokens, such as
traveller's checks, bank drafts, or telephone cards. The fourth proposal is the tangible assets, such as
cash.
Filotto et al. (1997) conducted a study on Italian bank customers to investigate demographic
characteristics of ATM users and non-users. Chan (1997) conducted a similar study on cardholders in
Hong Kong with the aim of examining the demographic and attitudinal differences between active and
inactive credit card holders. Al-Ashban and Burney (2001) pointed out that income levels and
education play a vital role in the adoption and usage of e-banking. The study aimed to look at the
impact of customer characteristics on adoption and use telephone banking in Saudi Arabia.
Grounded on TAM, Suh and Han (2002) looked at determinants of customers' behaviour towards
Korean Internet banks. The study found that trust, as other beliefs in addition to ease of use and
usefulness, has an impact on the acceptance of Internet banking. Li et al. (2004) tested profiles of bank
customers based on their history trials of transactions with the aim of formulating an architecture that
provides personalisation services to them. The study proposed a dynamic intelligent three-layer multi-
agent distributed architecture and tested on an online banking application. Jayawardhena and Foley
(2000) reviewed UK Internet banking web sites to analyse customer expectations and evaluate the
Internet banking web sites.
4 Multimedia banks are virtual banks that give easy access to a wide variety of financial services
which includes credit cards, bill payments, insurance, investments, and brokerage in a single
integrated account (Johnson & Ott 1995).
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On a discussion of the feasibility of branch, call centre, and PC distribution channels, Frei and Harker
(1999) suggested that focusing on sales at the expense of service can actually reduce sales. The main
premise of the study was that when firms design their service delivery channels from the perspective
of customer interactions, they are better able to anticipate the changes in customer behaviour that will
eventually affect their cost structure throughout all of their channels. A similar study can be found in
Durkin and O'Donnell (2005).
Durkin and O'Donnell looked at appropriateness in the balance offered between personal and remote
delivery for bank retail customer segments (i.e. high and low net worth and Internet-registered and
non-registered) regarding communication preferences. The study was grounded on a larger study of
customer satisfaction within a large retail bank with an extensive branch network in the UK and
Ireland. The study found that while both groups see Internet banking as important irrespective of their
relationship status; neither group surveyed (i.e. high and low net worth and Internet-registered and
non-registered) shows a desire to replace face-to-face interaction with e-banking solutions.
Aimed at looking at reasons for customers using e-banking, Mantel (2000) made use of surveys and
results of several e-banking studies to propose a theoretical framework. The framework includes three
primary factors that explain customer e-banking usage, namely (1) household wealth, (2) personal
preferences (e.g., convenience, budgeting, control, incentives, involvement, security), and (3)
transaction specific factors (e.g., dollar size, variability of dollar amount, offline versus online
location, etc.). Howcroft et al. (2002) examined customer's actual and preferred delivery channel
usage when purchasing a range of selected financial services, and factors which they consider
important in encouraging and discouraging the adoption of telephone and Internet banking. The study
revealed that the branch network is still the most popular delivery channel in the acquisition of current
accounts, credit-based and investment-based services.
In a study of customer attitudes toward the usefulness of and willingness to use e-banking in
Singapore, Liao and Cheung (2002) pointed out that individual expectations regarding accuracy,
security, transactions speed, user friendliness, user involvement, and convenience were the most
important quality attributes in the perceived usefulness of Internet-based e-retail banking. Palmer
(2000) looked at the patterns and problems associated with Internet use for business in Bahrain. Based
on the Office of Technology Assessment's (OTA) model of technology Infusion (Coates 1977) to
investigate two major questions: What are the patterns of Internet use among business subscribers in
Bahrain? And, what problems confront business subscribers to the Internet in Bahrain?
2.4.2.4 Quality
The quality of e-banking products and services and the role it plays in the development of e-banking
have received great attention in the literature. Joseph et al. (1999) used the Importance-Performance
Grid (Hemmasi et al. 1994) to investigate the role that technology plays in Australian banking and its
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impact on the delivery of perceived service quality. Yang et al. (2004) empirically examined the
construct of e-banking's quality in the context of business-to-consumer. The study was based upon the
quality concepts of customer service, IT, portfolio management, and online service quality. It also
made use of an ethnographic content analysis to customer reviews of online banking services to
identify online service quality dimensions.
The provision of information varies among the different stages of e-banking development. For
example, the provision level varies among Parsons et al. (1996)'s Internet adoption stages or Conger
and Mason (1998)'s development stages. According to Waite and Harrison (2004), banks can perform
a variety of functions ranging from the provision of basic information to full transactional capability.
For Internet in particular, Knight et al. (1999) identified four separate levels of information provision.
At the most basic level, an Internet presence merely provides information about the financial
institution, with no interaction between the institution and customer, other than a possible e-mail link.
The next level allows the institution to receive information, such as an electronic loan application. The
third level offers the customer the opportunity to share information, such as account balances or
transaction details. The highest level identified allows the customer to process information.
Frost (1999) provided similar stages to that of Parsons et al. (1996). Frost (1999) suggested that the
commercialisation of the Internet proceeds in three stages. The first stage is information publishing,
where businesses create their web sites to give information and advertise their products. The second
stage is transaction based systems, which support organisations and their customers in selling and
buying. The third stage is the mass customisation of messages and in more advanced cases, the
customisation of products and services.
According to Frei and Harker (1999), the lessons of PC banking and the need to integrate new
channels seamlessly into the existing methods of interacting with the customer become even more
important in the movement toward Internet banking. As all of the changes in the industry have
demonstrated, the Internet will not replace the other channels of interaction with the customer, just
like videocassette recorders (VCRs) did not replace the experience of going to the movies. Rather, the
Internet will enable entirely new services to be offered as well as increasing the sheer volume of
interaction with the customer, if done right. The need to take a holistic approach to channel/process
management will only increase as we move towards e-banking.
Aladwani (2001) looked at the perceptions of banks' executive, IT managers, and potential customers
with regard to the drivers, development challenges, and expectations of online banking in Kuwait.
Groth et al. (2001) examined the effects of the type of service mechanism as well as the mode of
service delivery on perceived service quality and customers' attributions of service quality. Kardaras
and Papathanassiou (2001) explored e-banking opportunities for improving corporate customer
services in the Grecian banking sector. The study was drawn on the "customer resource life cycle"
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(CRLC) framework (Ives & Learmonth 1984) and it integrated CRLC with customer satisfaction and
service quality issues.
Lang and Colgate (2003) investigated the impact of IT in a relationship marketing context in New
Zealand, particularly on how customers use a combination of IT channels to interact with their bank
and how this interaction affects the relationship quality between the customer and the bank. The study
suggested that banks which fail to provide channels that their customers seek and value will find it
more difficult to forge strong relationships with their customers. In a preliminary study, Ibbotson and
Moran (2003) undertook a study to provide some insight into the state of the relationship between
Northern Ireland banks and their small business in what is a mainly "branch-based" banking
environment at present.
Colonia-Willner (2004) examined the performance of ATMs' customers in action during the
challenging moments of a bank merger. Overall, the findings suggest a large unused potential of self-
service systems as well as help generate recommendations for the design of such systems that
recognise each customer profile and pace the machine responses to meet the customer's needs.
Gonzalez et al. (2004) suggested that satisfying and exceeding the requirements of e-banking
customers can be achieved through linking such requirements with the internal procedures of the
bank. The suggestion was based on a case study on introducing e-banking in the National Bank of
Spain (NBS).
Focusing on banking web sites, Bauer et al. (2005) looked at services and characteristics that
transform a web site into a portal as well as into the dimensions that determine the customer's
evaluation of the portal's service quality. The study was grounded on an online questionnaire
presented to e-banking portals of German users. The study validates a measurement model for the
construct of web portal quality based on security and trust, basic services quality, cross-buying
services quality, added value, transaction support, and responsiveness. Such identified dimensions can
reasonably be classified into three service categories: core services, additional services, and problem-
solving services.
2.4.2.5 Trust
The issue of customer's trust has been investigated deeply in e-banking literature. The general aim of
such studies is to look at factors that can enhance the adaptation of e-banking products and services.
At this stage, it is worth to defining the meaning of trust. Yousafzai et al. (2003: 849) defined
customer's trust on e-banking as:
"A psychological state which leads to the willingness of customer to perform
banking transactions on the Internet, expecting that the bank will fulfil its
obligations, irrespective of a customer's ability to monitor or control bank's
actions."
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Buck (1996) suggested that electronic marketplace is becoming a significant component of the world
economy only if the problem of making payments a secure mechanism that can cost-effectively
support transactions in a distributed environment is addressed. Accordingly, Buck identified the key
commercial requirements that successful use of the Internet will impose on a payment mechanism,
and evaluated the different types of proposed mechanisms against the requirements to determine
which are really suitable for electronic commerce.
According to BIS (1998), the most important risk categories for most e-banking activities, especially
for diversified international banks, are operational, reputational, legal, cross border-risks (e.g.,
different regulatory requirements), and other risks (e.g., interest rate risk). Moreover, some of the
specific problems cut across risk categories. For example, a breach of security allowing unauthorised
access to customer information can be classified as an operational risk, but such an event also exposes
the bank to legal risk and reputational risk. Even though these different types of risks may result from
a single problem, appropriate risk management may require several remedies to address each of these
different risks.
Tyler and Stanley (2001) examined the human relationship between banker and corporate customer
with the aim to evaluate corporate banking services and relationships. Tyler and Stanley argued that
the banks are operating in such a way as to undermine personal relationships, even as they try to
market them. They further argue that if the banks genuinely wish to support and bolster the human
relationship at the heart of corporate banking, they must seek to put the relationship manager back at
the core, rather than the margin of service arrangement and delivery. Built on the work ofMorgan and
Hunt (1994), Rexha et al. (2003) investigated the impact of satisfaction, trust, and the use of e-
banking on commitment towards current banks in Singapore and Australia. The study developed a
framework for the measurement of security levels of any e-banking product or service.
In a study investigating the security of e-banking, Claessens et al. (2002) pointed out that e-banking
products and services should be developed to address general security requirements, including
confidentiality, authentication, data authentication, and non-repudiation5. Kim and Moon (1998)
evaluated a systematic methodology for the design of customer interfaces that explicitly aim to
generate certain target feelings in the customer while interacting with e-banking. The study focuses on
the feeling of trustworthiness that the interface of an e-banking product or service should draw in
customers carrying out financial transactions.
5 Data authentication (i.e. data origin authentication and data integrity) allows one to detect
manipulation and replay of data, by unauthorised parties. Data manipulation includes insertion,
deletion, and substitution. Non-repudiation prevents an entity from denying previous commitments
or actions (Claessens et al. 2002).
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Mukherjee and Nath (2003) conceptualised trust in e-banking from the lenses of the commitment-trust
theory of relationship marketing (Morgan & Hunt 1994). An important contribution concerns how
trust is developed and sustained over different levels of customer relationship in online banking. The
study proposed a conceptual model of trust in e-banking, entitled "trust in online relationship
banking," that looks at trust from the perspective of shared value, communication, opportunistic
behaviour, and commitment.
In a similar study, Yousafzai et al. (2003) looked at the elements of trust and risk in e-banking within
the context of the marketing of financial services. The study proposed a theoretical model for trust in
e-banking with two dimensions: perceived security and perceived privacy. The model is not all
embracing in a sense that it does not attempt to capture every possible antecedent of trust. Rather, it
focused on capturing the most significant set of trust antecedents and presenting them as an integrated
entity. Further, Yousafzai et al. (2005) examined the effectiveness of potential trust-building strategies
for e-banking and their impact on customers' perceptions. This suggested that banks need to use a
portfolio of strategies to build the customer's trust.
2.4.3 Supply-side focus
The review of e-banking literature categorises supply side factors of e-banking research into five
factors: competition, resources, implementation, efficiency, and productivity.
2.4.3.1 Competition
A great deal of literature has investigated the role of e-banking products and services in increasing the
intensity of competition among banks. Some of the articles looked at tactical approaches that banks
use to ensure successful diffusion of e-banking products and services. Others investigated distinctive
attributes for e-banking products and services that can give a competitive advantage. A few even
studied as many as three or four aspects of competition in the e-banking arena.
One such aspect is the issue of organisational-informational fit. Through a case study of major
Australian banks, Broadbent and Weill (1993) constructed an alignment model that emphasises the
interdependence of firm-wide and information systems-alignment factors to look at organisational
policies and practices that enhance the business and information strategy alignment. Nelson (1999)
addressed trends and patterns surrounding the interface between the marketing and information
services functions within the banking industry. The author suggested that many banks lack alignment
between their marketing and information service functions, stressing the need for improving such
cross-functional interface as it may lead to more effective use of information technology to support
the marketing function in many banks.
Bauer and Colgan (2001) reviewed the relationship between the generic and Internet strategies of
retail institutions in the financial services industry and, thus, determine whether there exists an
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alignment between them. The corporate strategy was conceptualised through Porter (1985)'s generic
strategies. For the Internet strategy, the three generic strategies translated into certain actions in the
marketplace and in the adoption of specific information technologies. Daniel and Storey (1997)
identified the strategic responses of UK retail banks to e-banking with the aim of identifying the
different approaches UK banks are taking towards e-banking, understanding the strategies behind
these approaches, and identifying the problems and concerns managers have in this area. Frambach et
al. (1998) assessed the influence of different variables over which banks have control on the adoption
of e-banking in the Dutch banking sector in addition to adopter-side variables. The study corroborates
that not only adopter-side variables significantly influence innovation, but supply-side variables as
well.
Accordingly, Rao (1999) suggested that banks should work with their customers to create and
improve e-banking products and services while working cooperatively with their suppliers and
partners to create high-quality e-banking products and services. As boundaries between these
traditional constituents blur, it is important for banks to continuously evaluate their position in, and
contribution to, the segment of the value chain they compete in. It is also important to constantly scan
the environment and the competitive landscape to look for opportunities and be willing to change and
deliver products and services in new ways.
Courchane et al. (2002) examined the optimal exercise of strategic real options to invest in Internet
banking technology within a two-stage game: parameterised by the distribution of bank size and
uncertainty over the profitability of investment, and empirically tests the results. Courchane et al.
found that both market concentration and a bank's market share strongly influence the probability of
bank investment in an Internet banking site. Bensebaa (2004) examined the strategic actions
underlying the reputations of some successful e-business models. Accordingly, Bensebaa proposed an
approach that links reputation-building and more generally the development of intangible assets to
Smith et al. (1992)'s concepts on the "competitive dynamic trend", concepts used to examine the
rivalry between firms and competitive positioning.
Nellis et al. (2000) assessed the potential for the development of a pan-European banking model and
the likelihood that there will be a subsequent drift towards the emergence of long-term globalisation
strategies. Yakhlef (2001), through a study of four Swedish banks, examined the changes in the way
banks conduct their businesses in implementing the Internet and how these changes affect the bricks-
and-mortar distribution channels of banks. Willcocks and Plant (2001) looked at strategies that
leading business-to-consumer corporations harness the Internet to acquire new customers and increase
their market share.
Altinkemer (2001) discussed the way many companies are joining forces with others to round up their
offerings. The study reviewed the practice of bundling in the e-banking context and it suggested that
many possibilities for new services exist, but these services must initially be subsidised until the
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critical mass is achieved, and customers become accustomed to the convenience. In a conceptual
study, Hensmans et al. (2001) looked at the challenges which emerged from changing the business
models of incumbent banks as consequences of the emergence of 'clicks' entrances. Gurau (2002)
investigated and analysed the present situation of e-banking in Romania, and the appropriate strategies
for the successful implementation and development of e-banking services.
Bauer and Colgan (2001) suggested three mutually exclusive technological options for retail banks
opting for an Internet banking solution: proprietary, open, and denial. For proprietary, software is
custom-made for the requirements of the institution and becomes the single point of access via the
Internet. Retail banks looking for a proprietary strategy will implement their own Internet applications
and data interfaces. However, for open adoption of an open standard provides customers with a choice
of customer software, such as Internet and/or popular personal financial management. Denial of online
delivery and concentration on traditional distribution channels avoids competing on the Internet.
Retail banks that choose not to offer online transactional services over the Internet will most likely
still operate a small Web site with some information for advertising and public relation purposes.
Finally, Barrutia and Echebarria (2005) proposed a conceptual framework, entitled "Internet,
consumer power and consumer value," to measure the impact of the Internet in Spain's retail banking
sector. The framework suggests that the Internet (1) increases the bargaining power of customers, (2)
reduces barriers to entry, and (3) increases the threat of substitute products or services. As a
consequence of these three drivers, rivalry among existing competitors increases. The competitors,
therefore, must define a new competitive strategy, taking into consideration their new business
capabilities. The new competitive strategy of the companies and growth in consumer bargaining
power creates more value to customers.
2.4.3.2 Resources and capabilities
A group of studies looked at different approaches followed by banks to acquire resources and
competences for the development of e-banking products and services. While some articles stress on
human resources, others were more towards technical resources. The general trend of such studies is
to stress the importance of resources and competences acquisition in the development of e-banking
products and services. Yoffie and Cusumano (1999) suggested that banks should create a compelling,
living vision of products, technologies, and markets that are tightly linked to action while at the same
time hiring and acquiring managerial and technical experiences.
Smith (1985) discussed changes in technology within UK and French banking sectors in the context of
information security and accordingly, suggests that IT people should work more closely with the top
management of their banks. Lymperopoulos and Chaniotakis (2004) construed an analytical
framework to investigate branch employees' attitudes towards e-banking adoption in Greece and
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whether these attitudes vary in relation to respondents' personal characteristics and those of their
employers.
In a case study ofMeridian Bancorp, Banker and Kauffman (1991) proposed a method for measuring
the business value of IT, entitled "business value linkage (BVL) impact analysis." The study
constructed management science models to gauge the impact of ATMs on branch teller labour
productivity and retail deposit market share. Morisi (1996) discussed the impact of computer
technology on the business operations of commercial banking in the United States. The author argued
that although technology provides banks with all such features, it eliminates jobs.
Literature on e-banking has investigated the acquisition approaches not only of human resources, but
also technical competences and capabilities. Such competences and capabilities are categorised into
three categories according to their degree of functionality (Pennathur 2001; FDIC 2000). Category 1
includes systems that allow the transmission of publicly available information (e.g., non-sensitive e-
mail). Category 2 includes systems that allow customers to share sensitive information with banks
(e.g., online loan application). Category 3 represents the highest degree of functionality and it includes
systems that allow customers to interact with banks (e.g., funds transfer).
Colgate (1998) gathered information on all IT applications that have the potential to impact on the
sustainable competitive advantage rather than just IT applications that are widespread within the
industry. Chen (1999) applied the critical success factor (CSF) approach to identify the appropriate
CSFs underlying three types of strategy in the banking industry. Results suggested four composite
CSFs: bank operation management ability, bank trademark development ability, bank marketing
ability, and financial market management ability. Frei and Flarker (1999) suggested that banks need to
understand the interactions among e-banking products and services.
Nellis et al. (2000) pointed out that three major factors can be identified as representing the most
important forces that have been driving, and will continue to drive the European banking industry over
the next decade. The first force is the impact of the 1986 European Commission's programme aimed
at producing a single market in financial services. The second force is the depth of integration and
globalisation of financial markets. This is creating an environment where institutional investors are
successfully challenging the semi-monopoly positions of commercial banks in deposit gathering and
loan financing facilities. The third force involves the potential for still furthering innovation in both
the technical delivery of financial products and services through information technology and product
development, with special implications for the areas of derivative instruments and securitisation.
2.4.3.3 E-Banking Implementation
The matter of e-banking implementation is another issue that has received a great deal of attention in
the literature. The general aim of such literature is to propose theoretical tools that enhance the
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success of e-banking implementation. However, Section 2.6, technology implementation literature,
looks in details to the empirical work under this category.
2.4.3.4 Efficiency
"Banking must do three things in order to capture the potential of using new
technology. First, operations must be recognised as a separate function and the
strategy of operations must be tied to the bank's overall business strategy - either
cost leadership or differentiation. I believe in order for the above events to take
place the bank must be at least at internally supportive of operations. Increasing
emphasis is being placed on the operations manager to upgrade and supply more
information. Yet, if the operations manager does not have a direct strategy tied to
the overall business plan, investments in technology will not be wise. Bankers must
realise that technology in and of itself will not provide the competitive advantage.
Banking has been a staid industry for a very long time. Competition is something
new that a lot of bankers are trying to counter by throwing money at technology.
The successful banks will be the ones that will recognise the potential of operations
as a strategic weapon." (Gupta et al. 2001: 781)
Devlin (1995) pointed out that developments in IT may reduce the cost of entry into certain retail
financial services markets, in particular retail banking, by reducing the dependence on the existence of
a branch network to distribute product offerings. Rao (1999) examined the impact of the Internet on
the value chain of three industries that have been either radically altered by the Internet, or that are
facing tremendous challenges as they head into the future: (a) retailing, (b) banking, brokerage and
financial services and (c) the music. Hancock et al. (1999) investigated the potential effects of
consolidation on future banking operations through looking at the experience of the Federal Reserve
in consolidating its Fedwire electronic funds transfer operation.
Frei and Harker (1999) discussed efficiency aspects among PC banking, branches, and call centres.
Khiaonarong (2000) illustrated the experiences undertaken in the reform of rudimentary payment
systems in an emerging economy (i.e. Thailand). The study looked at issues relevant to payment
systems and it showed that the payment system has become a key component that underpins economic
development. Benaroch and Kauffman (2000) illustrated the value of applying real options analysis in
the context of a case study involving the deployment of point-of-sale (POS) debit services by the
Yankee 24 shared e-banking network of New England. Moreover, they also attempted to use real
options analysis concepts by examining claimed strengths of this analysis approach and balancing
them against methodological difficulties that this approach is believed to involve.
Lee and Whang (2001) suggested that the success in e-business is linked with the companies' ability
to deliver the goods and services at a reasonable cost. Such mechanism can be achieved through
making good use of information and leveraging existing resources to co-ordinate order-fulfilment
activities. Lee and Whang (2001) suggested two core concepts for making e-fulfilment efficient:
making more use of information flows than physical flows, and capitalising on current physical
pipelines and infrastructures as much as possible for the last mile of delivery. Such two-core concepts
are linked to five strategies: logistics postponement, dematerialisation, resource exchange, leverage
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shipments, and the brick-and-mortar model. Accordingly, Lee and Whang (2001) suggested that
choosing the right e-fulfilment strategy for a particular company depends on both the company's
business environment and the characteristics of its products.
Saini and Johnson (2005) examined drivers of company performance in e-commerce from a
capabilities perspective. The study conceptualises three firm capabilities that are critical for superior
company performance in e-commerce: IT capability, strategic flexibility and trust-building capability.
The extent and nature ofmarket orientation is conceptualised as a platform for leveraging e-commerce
capabilities. The study found that IT capability and strategic flexibility affect performance, given the
right market orientation. Pennathur (2001) looked at the current issues in e-banking and the banks' risk
management techniques regarding several new and old banking risks. The study was mainly grounded
on a review of publications of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Mols (2001) explored why some retail banks, more than others, are vigorous in their promotion of and
success in changing their distribution channel structure by introducing e-banking. Mols found that
management support, orientation towards the future, the willingness to let old channels be
cannibalised by new channels, and company size are important factors when companies want to be
effective in the introduction and exploitation of the new e-channels. Thus, the management team
seems to face the painful and difficult task of abandoning or destroying old deserving ways of doing
things, and instead, embracing new technologies and building new routines.
In addition, Mols (1999) pointed out that according to the economic distribution channel theory, the
"ideal" distribution system can be determined by answering three questions: (1) what do customers
want in terms of service output from the distribution channel and how much are they willing to pay
for a given service level? (2) How can the wanted services be provided to them? And (3) what are the
costs of the alternative distribution channels? Mols suggested that the answers to these questions
would determine the most efficient distribution channel that meets customers' needs.
Gupta et al. (2001) discussed how new technologies are being employed by various banks to
streamline their operations and creating sustainable competitive advantage. The study used a
conceptual operations strategy framework consisting of four elements: mission, distinctive
competence, objective, and policies to discuss the managerial implications of new technologies
employed by various banks. Humphrey et al. (2006) looked at the variation over time in payment
costs and ATM and branch service delivery expenses. Using cross-country panel data, the study
searched for the production function that relates six payment and service delivery output




A great deal of literature has investigated the issue of productivities in e-banking. While some studies
looked at new approaches that increase the productivity, others examined the existing productivity
tools implemented by banks. Canals (1993) recognised that the concepts of value chain and bank
configuration could be employed to develop a bank's competitive advantage. The study identified four
sources of a bank's competitive advantage: manpower, financial management, asset base, and
intangible assets. Devlin (1995) illustrated how the main influences on e-banking products and
services have developed during the past three and a half decades.
Humphrey (1995) provided a conceptual model of a typical payment cycle. The principles of payment
systems involve the discharge of financial obligations between two or more payment participants.
Gupta and Collins (1997) evaluated the contribution of IT to various productivity and efficiency
measures in banks in the state of Florida, USA. The study suggested that traditional measures of
productivity (e.g., decrease in operating costs, increase in profits) continue to be the most popular
measures of efficiency and return on investments although such measures may not be suitable for IT
and technologies.
Jayawardhena and Foley (2000) suggested many advantages for banks from utilising the Internet as a
delivery channel. Such advantages include saving costs, enlarging customer base, improving
marketing and communication, and enabling mass customisation, innovation, and non-traditional
banking areas (e.g., insurance, stock brokerage, etc.). Rangan and Adner (2001) suggested that the
Internet increases the gap between profitable growth and its achievement because many e-businesses
allow what is technologically feasible overshadows what is strategically desirable. Managers aiming
to capitalise on the Internet to achieve profitability growth need to understand the full implications of
the strategies they choose.
Gupta et al. (2001) argued that bank operations management plays an important role in e-banking as it
converts inputs (e.g., employees, facilities, etc.) into outputs (e.g., loans, deposits, etc.). Accordingly,
Gupta et al. suggested some guidelines that bank operations managers should follow during such a
transformation system. Banks must decide on what business strategy they will use (e.g., cost
leadership, product differentiation, etc.), perform a careful analysis of external (e.g., competition,
customers, etc.) and internal (e.g., resources, skills, etc.) forces to allow the banks strategy to define
the intention to compete. Based on what business strategy banks choose, the operations strategy must
be aligned with the business strategy.
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Siegel and Carvalho (2002) emphasised the factors relating to business models and the financial return
that adoption of account aggregation6 technology can bring. The study identified business models for
adoption, proposed a method for calculating the return on investment related to the adoption of this
technology and applied the proposed method to estimate the return for various business models. In a
longitudinal case, Samiotis and Poulymenakou (2002) examined the claim that knowledge
management is rooted in the foundations of contemporary strategic management and, more
specifically in the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991).
Swierczek and Shrestha (2003) analysed the impact of IT on the productivity of commercial banks in
Japan compared to that of other banks in Asia-Pacific countries (i.e. Australia, Bangladesh, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and
Thailand). Shu and Strassmann (2005) looked at IT productivity paradox in the banking industry with
the aim of measuring IT contributions to the banks' corporate profit. The study suggested that IT,
when it is compared with interest expense, non-interest expense, staff cost, and operating expense, is
the only input variable that provides more dollar value than the input cost on the margin.
2.4.4 Conclusion
The review of e-banking literature provided much insight into both demand side factors that include
marketing, acceptance, usage, quality, and trust, and the supply side factors that include competition,
resources, implementation, efficiency, and productivity. According to Mukherjee and Nath (2003) and
Aladwani (2001), most of the extant research on e-banking can be summarised by three
characteristics. First is that the research mostly lends qualitative insights, exploring e-banking as a
phenomenon and logical process rather than as a model with a set of determinable inputs and outputs.
Second is that the research has been mostly very specific, dealing with best practice case studies.
Third is that most of the research has been anecdotal, with little theoretical background.
Next I look at the theoretical foundations of value creation and capabilities building in e-banking.
2.5 Strategic perspectives on value creation
2.5.1 Introduction
As we enter the twenty-first century, [e-business], with its dynamic, rapidly
growing, and highly competitive characteristics, promises new avenues for the
creation of wealth. Established firms are creating new online businesses, while new
ventures are exploiting the opportunities the Internet provides... The increase in the
number of e-business transactions at major web sites ... highlights the extraordinary
6 Account aggregation is a tool that allows individuals to view all their financial, credit, reward
programs and other online accounts at different institutions from one site on the Internet (Siegel &
Carvalho 2002).
growth and transformation of this new global business landscape," (Amit & Zott
2001:493-494).
E-banking, as any other form of e-business, has the potential to furnish customers and banks with
tremendous advantages. For customers, e-banking has the potential to reduce costs in accessing and
using the banking services, increase comfort and time-saving, increase the transaction's processing
time, and promote better administration of funds. For banks, e-banking has the potential to improve
market image, reduce transaction costs, provide better and quicker responses to market evolution,
increase market penetration, and constitute new advertising and selling channels (Bauer & Colgan
2001; Aladwani 2001; Gurau 2002; Yousafzai et al. 2003).
The potential advantages that e-banking furnish customers and banks influence the future distribution
channel structure. According to Mols (1999), the Internet influences the future distribution channel
structure in two ways. The first way is that the Internet is, in itself, a new distribution channel for
financial services. Not only are the costs of using it different from those of other available distribution
channels, but also the service output it provides is different from the service output provided by
traditional distribution channels.
The second way is related to the relationship between new distribution channels and customers. Many
customers invest time and resources in becoming PC-literate and in getting to know the Internet.
Others do not become PC-literate and do not get familiar with the Internet. These two customer
segments are not likely to have the same wants and thus will not be willing to pay the same price for
e-banking. The changes in these two elements are then input to a change process where the structure
of the distribution channel is adopted to the new environment.
Given such large advantages as well as the structural changes in distribution channels, the question
now is whether conventional theories, such as the value chain framework (Porter, 1985) and
Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942), of how value is created can fully
explain the value creation potential of e-banking? The driver behind this question, according to Amit
and Zott (2001), is that the characteristics of e-businesses combined with the enormous reduction in
operational costs allow for critical changes in the way companies operate and in how economic
exchanges are structured. They not only open new opportunities for value creation, but also challenge
conventional theories of how value is created. The value creation potential in conventional theories,
the applicability of these theories in the context of e-banking, and the emerging theoretical value
creation frameworks in e-business are the concerns of this section.
2.5.2 Conventional perspectives on value creation
According to Amit and Zott (2001), there are several conventional theories that make valuable
suggestions about possible sources of value creation in a company. This section focuses on how value
is created within the theoretical views of Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter
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1942), the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Barney 1991), and transaction costs economics
(Williamson 1975), the value chain framework (Porter 1985) and its associated concepts of generic
(Porter 1980) and positioning strategies (Porter 1996), strategic network theory (e.g., Dyer & Singh
1998), and accelerating capability building (Hagel & Brown 2005). This section provides a brief
summary of how value is created within these theories as well as the applicability of these theories in
the context of e-banking.
2.5.2.1 Schumpeterian innovation
Schumpeter (1934) pioneered the theory of economic development and new value creation through
the process of technological change and innovation. Schumpeter viewed technological development as
discontinuous change and disequilibrium resulting from innovation. Schumpeter identified several
sources of value creation, including the introduction of new goods or new production methods, the
creation of new markets, the discovery of new supply sources, and the reorganisation of industries. In
Schumpeter's theory, innovation is the source of value creation. Schumpeterian innovation
emphasises the importance of technology and considers novel combinations of resources, and the
services they provide, as the foundations of new products and production methods. Such foundations
and methods lead to the transformation of markets and industries, and hence to economic
development.
As innovative entrepreneurs exploit new opportunities for value creation, the evolution of the resulting
e-businesses can be described in terms of Schumpeter's model of creative destruction. However, e-
banking, as any other form of e-business, broaden the notion of innovation since it spans bank and
industry boundaries, involves new exchange mechanisms and unique transaction methods rather than
merely new products, or production processes, and fosters new forms of collaborations among firms.
An example of such transformational impact of e-banking on banks, industry, and the economy can be
seen from the lens of Freeman's "taxonomy of innovations" (Freeman 1985; 1988) that categorises
technologies into incremental innovations, radical innovations, changes of "technology systems," and
changes in "techno-economic paradigm."7 Furthermore, whilst innovation is certainly a major driving
force of the economic development of new and established markets, it may not be the only source of
value creation in e-banking (Amit & Zott 2001; Passiante & Elia 2003).
2.5.2.2 Resource-base view of the firm
One of the conventional approaches about business strategic management is the resource-based view
of the firm. The approach traces back to Edith Penrose's classic The Theory of the Growth of the Firm
(Penrose 1959). It sees the firm as a collection of resources and capabilities that include all of the
financial, physical, human, and organisational assets used by a firm to develop, manufacture, and
7 The concept of techno-economic paradigm was first developed by Carlota Perez (see Perez 1985).
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deliver products or services to its customers (Penrose 1959; Prahalad & Hamel 1990; Barney 1991;
Peteraf 1993; Amit & Schoemaker 1993; Wernerfelt 1997).
The approach assumes that resources and capabilities are heterogeneously distributed across
competing firms (Barney 1991). Such distribution makes firms different in terms of the resources they
have and capabilities they control (Amit & Zott 2001). These differences can be long lasting and can
explain why some firms consistently outperform other firms (Barney 2001). Indeed, Dyer and Singh
(1998) argue that differential firm performance is fundamentally due to firms' heterogeneity.
Therefore, positioning and uniquely merging a set of complementary and specialised resources and
capabilities is a path to competitive value creation (Barney 1991).
However, a firm's resources and capabilities are valuable if, and only if, they reduce a firm's costs or
increase its revenues compared to what would have been the case if the firm did not possess those
resources (Passiante & Elia 2003). Since this is a dynamic situation, Teece et al. (1997) has articulated
the dynamic capabilities approach. The crucial issue in this recent approach is the way in which the
firm comes to terms with the continuous emergence of novel circumstances caused by rapid
technological change. Accordingly, creating new productive knowledge and coordinating the
cumulative process of knowledge development and creation are the firm's central strategic problems
(Loasby 1999; Knudsen & Madsen 2002).
E-banking, as any other form of e-business, presents a challenge from the point of view of both the
resource-based view of the firm and the dynamic capabilities approaches. On one side, information-
based resources and capabilities tend to have a higher degree of mobility than other types of resources
and capabilities (Passiante & Elia 2003). On the other side, as such resources and capabilities increase
in their importance within firms, value migration is likely to increase, and the sustainability of newly
created value may be reduced. Therefore, the problem of value preservation or sustainability is
important for value creation (Amit & Zott 2001).
2.5.2.3 Transaction costs economics
Transaction costs include the costs of planning, adapting, executing, and monitoring task completion
(Williamson 1983). Transaction cost economics looks at drivers behind companies internalising
transactions that might otherwise be conducted in markets (Coase 1937). The main theoretical
framework was developed by Williamson (1975; 1979; 1983). Williamson suggested that "a
transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface.
One stage ofprocessing or assembly activity terminates, and another begins" (Williamson 1983: 104).
Transaction cost economics identifies transaction efficiency as a major source of value, as enhanced
efficiency reduces costs. It suggests that value creation can derive from the attenuation of uncertainty,
complexity, information asymmetry, and small-numbers bargaining conditions (Williamson 1975).
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Moreover, reputation, trust, and transactional experience can lower the cost of idiosyncratic exchanges
between companies (Williamson 1979; 1983).
The transaction cost approach provides more insights about value creation in e-banking. E-banking, as
any other form of e-business, implies reduction in transaction costs. Such costs include either direct
cost, such as communication and travel, or indirect cost, such as adverse selection and moral hazard.
This may result from an increased frequency of transactions, a reduction in transaction uncertainty,
and a reduction in asset specificity. The small-numbers bargaining condition may be relieved in e-
banking as there is a possibility for large numbers of previously unconnected parties (e.g., buyers and
sellers) to interact.
2.5.2.4 Value-chain analysis
The value chain analysis is a method of decomposing a firm into strategically important activities and
understanding the impact of such activities on cost and value (Stabell & Fjeldstad 1998). It suggested
that supernormal returns are primarily a function of a firm's membership in an industry with
favourable structural characteristics (Dyer & Singh 1998). Such method includes defining the strategic
business unit, identifying critical activities, defining products, and determining the value of an
activity. Associated with Porter (1980), the value chain analysis has been integrated in a theoretical
view called the industry structure view (Porter 1985).
Porter defines value as "the amount buyers are willing to pay for what a firm provides them. Value is
measured by total revenue ... A firm is profitable if the value it commands exceeds the costs involved
in creating the product" (Porter 1985: 38). Analysing value creation at the firm level, the value chain
analysis suggested that value can be created by differentiation along every step of the value chain,
through activities resulting in products and services that lower buyers' cost or raise buyers'
performance. Therefore, sources of value creation are policy choices, linkages, timing, location,
sharing of activities among business units, learning, integration, scale, and institutional factors (Porter
1985; Amit&Zott 2001).
The value chain analysis seeks to answer two main questions: (1) what activities should a firm
perform and how, and (2) what is the configuration of the firm's activities that would enable it to add
value to the product and to compete in its industry (Amit & Zott 2001). The approach suggested that
firms can achieve a sustained competitive advantage by erecting barriers to entry. Accordingly, firms
should continue to raise these barriers through reinvestment of earnings if they are to successfully
deter entry by potential competitors and mobility by existing competitors across the industry is
strategic groups (Lado et al. 1992).
The discussion on value chain analysis is linked with the discussion of Porter's concepts of generic
(1980) and positioning strategies (1996). Porter (1980) argues that a firm which optimally positions
itself within its industry by leveraging its strengths can generate superior returns. Porter provides a
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positioning map of where a firm positions itself within its industry and argues that a firm's strengths
ultimately fall into one of two headings: cost advantage or differentiation. By applying these strengths
in either a broad or narrow scope, three generic strategies result: cost leadership, differentiation, and
focus.
Cost leadership strategy aims to be the low cost producer in an industry for a given level of quality.
The firm sells its products either at average industry prices to earn a profit higher than that of rivals, or
below the average industry prices to gain market share. Firms that succeed in cost leadership often
have (1) access to the capital required to make a significant investment in production assets, (2) skill
in designing products for efficient manufacturing, (3) high level of expertise in manufacturing process
engineering, and (4) efficient distribution channels.
Differentiation strategy aims to develop a product or service that offers unique attributes that are
valued by customers and that customers perceive to be better than or different from the products or
services of the competition. The value added by the uniqueness of the product may allow the firm to
charge a premium price for it, hoping that the higher price will more than cover the extra costs
incurred in offering the unique product. Firms that succeed in a differentiation strategy often have (1)
access to leading scientific research, (2) a highly skilled and creative product development team, (3) a
strong sales team with the ability to successfully communicate the perceived strengths of the product,
and (4) corporate reputation for quality and innovation.
Focus strategy concentrates on a narrow segment and within that segment attempts to achieve either a
cost advantage or differentiation. The premise is that the needs of the group can be better served by
focusing entirely on it. A firm using a focus strategy often enjoys a high degree of customer loyalty,
and this entrenched loyalty discourages other firms from competing directly. Firms that succeed in a
focus strategy are able to tailor a broad range of product development strengths to a relatively narrow
market segment that they know very well.
The generic strategy followed by a firm is correlated with the way it is positioned in the market. Porter
(1996) suggested that strategic positioning emerges from three distinct bases: variety, needs, and
access. Such sources are not only mutually exclusive and often overlap, but also the position emerging
from any of the sources can be broad or narrow. However, whatever the basis, variety, needs, access,
or some combination of the three, positioning requires a tailored set of activities because it is always a
function of differences on the supply side, that is of differences in activities.
Variety-based positioning is based on producing a subset of an industry's products or services. It is
called variety-based positioning because it is based on the choice of product or service variety rather
than customer segments. Variety-based positioning makes economic sense when a firm can best
produce particular products or services using distinctive sets of activities. Needs-based positioning
means serving most or all the needs of a particular group of customers. It comes closer to traditional
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thinking about targeting a segment of customers. It arises when there are groups of customers with
different needs, and when a tailored set of activities can serve those needs best. Access-based
positioning means segmenting customers who are accessible in different ways. Although their needs
are similar to those of other customers, the best configuration of activities to reach them is different.
Porter (2001) suggested two fundamental factors that determine profitability: industry structure, and
sustainable competitive advantage. For the industry structure, via examination of a wide range of
industries in which the Internet is playing a role reveals that the net negatively affects the industry's
structure. For the competitive advantage, however, the successful deployment of the Internet needs a
sustainable competitive advantage that can be reached only through operational effectiveness, or
strategic positioning.
Porter (2001) also suggested that gaining competitive advantage in the Internet does not require a
radically new approach to business. Rather, it requires building on the proven principles of effective
strategy as the Internet makes sources of competitive advantage more valuable. Accordingly, Porter
(2001) stressed the need for companies to distinguish themselves through strategy as the Internet tends
to weaken industry profitability without providing proprietary operational advantages. Porter
suggested that the winners will be those that view the Internet as a complement to, rather than a
cabalism of traditional ways of competing.
E-banking, as any other form of e-business, presents new opportunities for creating value. The value
creation opportunities may result from new combinations of information, physical products, and
services, innovative configurations of transactions, and the reconfiguration and integration of
resources, capabilities, roles, and relationships among suppliers, partners, and customers. The value
chain analysis fails to capture such opportunities (Amit & Zott 2001; Passiante & Elia 2003).
2.5.2.5 Strategic networks
Another conventional approach about business strategic management is the strategic networks
approach. This approach focuses less on capabilities within the firm and more on opportunities to
achieve competitive leverage by mobilising resources outside the firm. Strategic networks are
cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to improve their competitive position and
performance by sharing resources (Ireland et al. 2002). According to Amit and Zott (2001), the
strategic network approach to value creation seeks to answer four main questions: (1) why and how
strategic networks of firms are formed? (2) What is the set of inter-firm relationships that allows firms
to compete in the marketplace? (3) How firms create value? And (4) how do firms' differential
positions and relationships in networks affect their performance? The approach suggests that
productivity gains in the value chain are possible when trading partners are willing to make relation-
specific investments and combine resources in unique ways. Thus, idiosyncratic inter-firm linkages
may be a source of value creation (Dyer & Singh 1998).
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E-banking, as any other form of e-business, presents a challenge to the strategic networks approach as
this only partially explains the value creation potential of firms based on new business models. Giving
that e-business is characterised by unprecedented reach, connectivity and low-cost of information
processing power, it opens up entirely new possibilities for value creation through the structuring of
transactions in new ways. Such ways are not fully captured by the strategic network approach (Amit
& Zott 2001; Passiante & Elia 2003).
2.5.2.6 Accelerating capability building
Many scholars have argued that neither the resource-based view of the firm, nor the strategic networks
approach is a complete approach that can fully explain value creation. Accordingly, they call for an
integrated approach from both approaches. For example, Gulati (1999) and Afuah (2000) emphasised
the importance of resources and capabilities of network partners for a firm's performance. Lavie
(2006) extended the resource-based view of the firm to incorporate the network resources of
interconnected firms. Alwis (2004) adapted and extended Glynn (1996)'s model for intelligence and
innovation8 and built upon four major theoretical streams (i.e. a resource-based view of the firm,
innovation theory, intellectual capital theory and organisational capabilities). Hagel and Brown (2005)
argued that both the resource-based view of the firm and the strategic networks approaches are
incomplete approaches although they provide distinctive opinions for value creation.
On one hand, the resource-based view of the firm emphasises the need for companies to develop a
tight focus on areas of specialisation and to be aggressive in seeking to deepen these over time. On the
other hand, the strategic networks approach emphasises the important of inter-companies environment
for value creation. Therefore, companies may lose opportunities from paying more attention to one
side than the other. Consequently, Hagel and Brown (2005) stressed the need for integrating and
extending both of these approaches, with firms amplifying the value of its distinctive internal
capabilities by creatively and aggressively harnessing complementary capabilities from other
companies.
To fill such a gap, Hagel and Brown proposed a more dynamic view of value creation, accelerating
capability building. The approach integrates and extends the thought of both the resource-based view
of the firm and the strategic networks into a united approach. The main premise of the approach is that
a lot of the potential for capability building occurs when companies with very different specialisations
8
Glynn (1996) developed a framework as an initial step toward the build up of a theory that explains
the cognitive foundations of organisational innovation. The central idea of the framework,
"intelligence and organisational innovation", is that intelligence is embedded in organisations and
operates both through individual agents and institutionalised systems to affect organisational
innovation. Organisational innovation is based on individual and organisational intelligences that
are moderated by contextual factors. Thus, the question of how to make firms more innovative
involves the question of how to make firms more intelligent.
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seek to collaborate around common business objectives. Accordingly, distinct capabilities remain the
basis of strategy, but must rapidly evolve among collaborators to remain a source of value. "So, rather
than concentrating on dividing the economic pie, participants (whether employees within a single
company or firms uniting around common business initiatives) can start focusing on opportunities to
enlarge the pie overall," (Hagel & Brown 2005: 19).
2.5.3 Emerging perspectives on value creation
According to Amit and Zott (2001), each theory discussed earlier makes valuable suggestions about
possible sources of value creation. However, each theory has limitations when applied in the context
of e-businesses. This section continues the literature review of approaches of relevance for
understanding value creation by looking briefly at a number of emerging value creation frameworks in
e-business.
According to Frambach et al. (1998), two types of diffusion models are distinguished. The first group
of models aim to gain understanding of diffusion processes as a whole. These models are analytical
representations of a diffusion process at the aggregate level. They are often referred to as diffusion
models. The second group of models has the objective to gain insight in the determinants of the
individual adoption decision. These models take a disaggregate perspective and are generally referred
to as adoption models. Here I look at a various adoption models for e-business, generally, and e-
banking, in particular.
2.5.3.1 Value-creation in e-business
McFarlan and McKenney (1983) suggested the "strategic grid" that aims to give insight to the role IT
plays in organisations. The "strategic grid" distinguishes IT systems within organisations into two
types: existing IT systems and under development IT systems. Moreover, it classifies the relative
degrees of impact and importance of such systems on operations into two degrees: high and low.
Accordingly, the "strategic grid" differentiates organisations into four categories strategic, turnaround,
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Figure 2.5.1 Strategic grid (McFarlan and McKenney 1983, modified)
In the role of IT within organisations, the first quadrant, "strategic", is essential for executing current
strategies and operations, and the new IT applications in development are crucial for future
competitive success. The second quadrant is "turnaround". Some organisations receive considerable
IT support for operations, but are not absolutely dependent on the totally uninterrupted, fast-response
time and cost-effective functioning of IT to achieve operating objectives. Their new IT operations,
however, are absolutely necessary to enable the organisation to achieve its strategic objectives.
Organisations that exist within the third quadrant, "factory", are heavily dependant on cost-effective,
totally reliable IT operational support to enable internal operations to run smoothly. Firms in the
factory quadrant are using IT to enable critical, time-dependant operations to function smoothly; but
the IT applications under development, although profitable and important in their own right, are not
fundamental to the organisation's ability to compete. For the organisations in this category, even a
one-hour disruption in service or deterioration in response times has severe operational, competitive,
and financial consequences. For organisations that exist within the fourth quadrant, "support", the
strategic impact of IT on operations and future strategy is low, and the strategic impact of IT
applications in development, viewed realistically, is quite limited (Applegate et al. 1998).
Nolowidigdo (1984) distinguished strategic information systems into internal systems and external
systems. Internal systems have direct benefit to the organisation and external systems that have direct
benefits to the organisation's customers, but which indirectly benefit the organisation. Accordingly,
Nolowidigdo (1984) proposed a model, entitled "Information systems as a weapon to gain a
competitive edge," (see Figure 2.5.II)
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Figure 2.5.II Information systems as a weapon to gain a competitive edge (Nolowidigdo 1984,
modified)
Although Nolowidigdo (1984) specified "information intelligence delivery" as offering a competitive
advantage to corporations, Ives and Learmonth (1984) illustrated that there are many instances where
"Information Intelligence" provided directly to the customer can also result in a significant
competitive advantage. Accordingly, Ives and Learmonth proposed a model entitled "customer
resource life cycle - (CRLC)," that can be used to identify new applications or to map existing
applications into settings.
In the context of Porter's generic strategies (1980), the CRLC focuses on the relationship between the
provider of goods or services and the customer. It is here that the primary competitive strategy
evolves: Will management elect to differentiate the firm from its competitors in the eyes of the
customer, try to become the low-cost producer or seek a special niche in the market? The
"mechanisms" shown in Nolowidigdo (1984)'s model (e.g., service delivery, product delivery)
provide a useful starting point for identifying specific strategic applications, but are still too general to
be of direct applicability (see Figure 2.5.III).
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IBM stage Extended model Description
Requirements Establish requirements To determine how much of resource is require
Specify To determine a resource's attributes
Acquisition Select source To determine where customers will buy a resource
Order To order a quantity of a resource from the supplier
Authorise and pay for To transfer funds or extend credit
Acquire To take possession of a resource
Test & accept To ensure that a resource meets specifications
Stewardship Integrate To add an existing inventory
Monitor To control access and use of a resource
Upgrade To upgrade a resource if conditions change
Maintain To repair a resource, if necessary
Retirement Transfer/dispose To move, return, or dispose of inventory as necessary
Account for To monitor where and how much is spent on a resource
Figure 2.5.Ill Four- and thirteen-stage customer resource life cycle (CRLC) (Ives & Learmonth
1984: 1198, modified)
According to Ives and Learmonth (1984: 1194), the "strategic grid" is used to prescribe an appropriate
type of management control system. For example, McFarlan and McKenney (1983) argued that it
makes more sense to change for computer resources in the "factory" quadrant than it does in the
"turnaround" quadrant. The "strategic grid" is also useful for evaluating a portfolio of alternative
information system investments although it offers little assistance to the firm that wants to identify
new competitive applications of information systems.
Willcocks and Plant (2001) proposed a model, entitled "business-to-consumer e-strategic grid", for the
evolution of the Internet within bricks-and-mortar companies. The framework has two dimensions,
marketing focus, and information focus, dividing the framework into four crucial strategic quadrants:
technology, brand, service, and market. In practice, laggard companies never made it past the
technology quadrant. Because they had no business model governing their use of Web technology,
they became mired in debates about whether Web technology was a silver bullet or a passing fad.
Thus, profits and market share remained elusive. Leading and medium-performing organisations, on
the other hand, quickly moved beyond their starting points. They migrated towards a market strategy
by concentrating either on a brand strategy or service strategy. Few migrated directly to a market
strategy. Interestingly, there emerged both more progressive and less progressive ways of operating























Figure 2.5.IV Business-to-Consumer E-Strategic Grid (Willcocks & Plant 2001: 54, modified)
McLaughlin et al. (1983) hypothesised that organisations vary in the extent to which information
systems can add value through technology and also in the capabilities of their information systems
departments. This relationship is depicted in what is named "quality of information systems resources
vs. value-adding potential of business." An organisation with high value-adding potential but weak
systems resources is vulnerable to competitors with better IS technology (1ST) resources. On the other
hand, if value-adding potential is high and the systems group is strong, the organisation may be in a







Quality of information systems' resources
Figure 2.5.V Quality of information systems resources vs. value-adding potential of business
(McLaughlin et al. 1983, modified)
Grounded on a discussion of the strategic opportunities presented by IS technology (1ST) with top
executives and technology managers in two dozen companies, Benjamin et al. (1984) proposed a
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model, entitled "strategic opportunities matrix." The model is based on two questions: (1) Can 1ST be
used to make a significant change in the way a company does business so as to gain a competitive
advantage? And (2), should a company concentrate on using 1ST to improve its approach to the
marketplace, or should it centre its efforts on internal improvements? According to Ives and
Learmonth (1984), the internal versus external dimension assumes that the uses of an information
system need not be directly related to customers being strategic. In the structural change dimension,
the adoption of some 1ST requires significant modifications to current business practices (see Figure
2.5.VI).
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Figure 2.5.VI Strategic opportunities matrix (Benjamin et al. 1984, modified)
Barua et al. (2001) provided an operational model of e-business value creation that is backed by
substantial research. The model's premise is that the achievement of e-business' operational
excellence will lead to improved financial performance. The central task of senior management then
lies in understanding what drives operational excellence in the e-business realm. Therefore, Barua et
al. provided eight drivers encompassed into three areas: e-business processes for customers and
suppliers, IT applications for customers, suppliers, and internal operations, and the e-business
readiness of customers and suppliers.
Such drivers would help managers carry out the task of understanding what drives operational
excellence in the e-business realm. Barua et al. suggested that by incorporating these tools into day-to¬
day activities, companies can reap the Internet opportunities. In addition, Barua et al. discussed the
central components of e-business' operational excellence: online revenue, online procurement, new
customers, existing customers, and customer service (see Figure 2.5.VII).
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Figure 2.5.VII e-Business value model (Barua et al. 2001: 42, modified)
Tjan (2001) argued that much of the market and industry data that underpin traditional portfolio
analysis are unavailable for the Internet space. Thus, Tjan (2001) suggested that the analysis of
Internet initiatives must rely on more qualitative information. Therefore, rather than using market
position and industry attractiveness as main factors for such analysis, Tjan suggested replacing such
measures with business viability and business fit. Accordingly, Tjan (2001) proposed a simple matrix,
entitled "Internet portfolio map (IPM)," to evaluate individual Internet initiatives, and create a balance
portfolio that raises the probability of achieving an attractive return on overall investment.
The IPM was grounded on traditional thinking about portfolio strategy. Its vertical axis indicates the
level of viability, while its horizontal axis indicates fit. By dividing the matrix into four quadrants, a
company gains a rough guide to the best strategic course for each initiative: invest more in it, redesign
it, sell it or spin it out, or kill it. For example, an initiative that rates high on viability but low on fit is
an obvious candidate to spin out, while one that rates high on fit but low on viability may warrant a

















Figure 2.5.VIII Internet portfolio map (IPM) (Tjan 2001: 80, modified)
Amit and Zott (2001) looked at the theoretical foundations of value creation in e-business. Amit and
Zott observed that in e-business new value can be created by the ways in which transactions are
enabled. They argued that a firm's business model is an important locus of innovation and a crucial
source of value creation for the firm and its suppliers, partners, and customers. Amit and Zott (2001)
developed a model of the sources of value creation. The model was grounded on the received theory
in entrepreneurship and strategic management as well as an examination of value creation strategies of
59 American and European e-businesses.
The model suggests that the value creation potential of e-businesses hinges on four interdependent
dimensions, namely: efficiency, complementarities, lock-in, and novelty. As said earlier, Amit and
Zott (2001) also argued that no single entrepreneurship or strategic management theory can fully
explain the value creation potential of e-business. Rather, an integration of the received theoretical
perspectives on value creation is needed (see Figure 2.5.IX).
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Figure 2.5.IX Sources of value creation in e-business (Amit and Zott 2001: 504, modified)
Focusing on business-to-consumer markets, Barnes (2002) examined how value is added in the stream
of activities involved in providing mobile-commerce to the consumer. As such, it analyses the key
players and technologies that form part of the mobile-commerce value chain, providing a foundation
for future strategic analysis of the industry. The result is a detailed value chain analysis; entitled "a
framework for mobile-commerce" that provides a foundation for understanding the concept of mobile-
commerce. The basic model of the framework consists of six core processes in two main areas: (a)
content (i.e. content creation, content packaging, and market making) and (b) infrastructure and
services (mobile transport, mobile services, delivery support, and mobile interface and applications)
(see Figure 2.5.X).
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Figure 2.5.X The mobile-commerce value chain (Barnes 2002: 93, modified)
2.5.3.2 Value-creation in e-banking
The question on whether value creation in e-business can be employed with e-banking is a challenge.
Many emerging value creation perspectives exist in the literature with different perspectives of value
creation in e-banking. According to Ives and Learmonth (1984), recent changes in the banking
industry illustrate the use of the McFarlan and McKenney (1983)'s Strategic Grid. Prior to
deregulation, banks typically fell into the Factory Quadrant with respect to their usage of information
systems technology (1ST): Information system support was critical for day-to-day transaction
processing, but applications under development were not likely to help a company to achieve a
significant competitive advantage. After deregulation, successful banks progressed through the
turnaround Quadrant to the Strategic Quadrant, acting aggressively to get new information-based
products to market. This marked a clear shift of 1ST from a back-office support role to an important
instrument of competitive strategy.
Looking at the interface between IT and sustainable competitive advantage from a marketing
perspective in the retail banking industries, Colgate (1998) proposed a model that highlights the
desirable components and linkages of a sophisticated marketing information system for retail banks.
Colgate's model, entitled "marketing information system (MkIS) and its sources," was based on three
main sources.
The first source is the knowledge and experience gained in visiting banks with sophisticated
marketing information systems. The second source is the documented analysis obtained from case
studies, in particular what banks hoped their MkIS will look like in the future. The third source is the
academic literature which presents a myriad of models on what an MkIS is, in particular, the work of
Lucey (1987), Mitchell and Sparks (1988), Sisodia (1992) and Talvinen (1995). Colgate suggested
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that the model enables the understanding of the IT components (MIST) found within a sophisticated
MklS. Colgate also suggested that the model is not a prescription to managers, but an insight into
what a sophisticated MklS within a bank may look like (see Figure 2.5.XI).
Figure 2.5.XI Marketing information system (MklS) (Colgate 1998: 82)
Mols (1999) proposed the "distribution channel strategies grid" and accordingly identified four pure
distribution channel strategies and a dual strategy for financial services industry and illustrated the
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. The discussion on those five strategies with its
advantages and disadvantages as follow (see Figure 2.5.XII):
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A limited number of densely
located branches
Figure 2.5.XII The Internet and the banks' strategic distribution channel decisions (Mole 1999:
298)
The local/national branch banking strategy is a relatively dense branch network in a limited
geographical area in one nation characterises it. The problem connected with this strategy is that it
leads to a decreasing number of customers and the closing of branches. In a short and intermediate
range, it can be a profitable strategy if the banks are able to keep costs low, but it will be unpopular
among many bank managers because it is a non-growth strategy.
The international branch banking strategy is characterised by a relatively dense branch network in a
large geographical area, covering two or more nations. The driving force behind the expansion has
often been the wish to serve the largest corporate customers with effective cash management
offerings. The problem with this strategy is that it is resource-intensive and, for most banks, it leads to
a declining number of customers. The most likely solution for the banks therefore, is to pursue a dual
strategy offering both branch and Internet banking services.
The local/national Internet banking strategy only requires one single branch as all normal routine
transactions are handled through the Internet. It has the advantage that it aims at serving the fastest
growing customer segment. Thereby it becomes a means to gain a larger market share. In addition, it
is a low cost strategy because the Internet is a much cheaper distribution channel than the traditional
branch network. The disadvantage is that it is difficult for Internet banks to differentiate their
offerings, thus, the market is more transparent and the competition is fiercer.
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In the international Internet banking strategy no further branches are needed compared to the
local/national Internet banking strategy and it aims to capture as many Internet banking customers as
possible in several countries. There will be a number of competitors for such banks, so the
competition will be fierce and it can be difficult to earn an acceptable profit. Another problem might
be to convince new customers that they can trust the bank, despite the fact that it is not very well
known in a number of countries and has no significant physical presence.
The dual channel strategy or the hedge strategy is a combination of a branch network and Internet
banking. However, it is likely to lead to conflicts between Internet banking departments and branch
banking departments, and it can be difficult to motivate the front personal to promote the Internet
banking services, when they know that it will lead to their unemployment.
Hensmans et al. (2001) suggested a simple conceptual framework describing how new entrants and
incumbents in the financial services industry influence each other and can evolve reciprocally to
create the future online financial services industry. The framework, entitled "generic click legitimacy












Figure 2.5.XIII e-Strategies of 'bricks' & 'clicks' (Hensmans et al. 2001: 234)
Organisations in the first type, the complementary clicks, are existing players in industries external to
financial services who form partnerships, alliances, or joint ventures with incumbents. An example of
this type of entrant is the software companies Microsoft and Intuit, which co-operated with
incumbents like Royal Bank of Scotland to build standardised customer interfaces. Autonomous clicks
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are the autonomous external ventures of incumbents, such as Egg, the UK-based Internet banking
division of Prudential Banking.
Brand new entrant clicks are often the result of entrepreneurial efforts originating from outside the
traditional financial services industry. For example, Dublin-based First-e, backed by a consortium of
venture capitalists and technology firms. First-e aims to be the first Internet bank to balance the global
nature of Internet technology and the demands of customers for local presence on a European scale,
and has taken the step of allying itself with Spanish Uno-e, creating the Unofirst Group.
Southard and Siau (2004) proposed three paths for banks' future in a diagram named, e-banking
continuum. The continuum shows three possible paths for the future of e-banking. First, a company
can continue or attempt to grow itself into a mega-bank, like Citicorp or J.P. Morgan, marketing itself
to the financially sophisticated or low-cost-oriented customer. Second, it can use portals and bundling
to fill a market niche for customers who desire a home town atmosphere and services. The path of the
third group appears to lead either to outright purchase by a bank in one of the first two groups or to
oblivion as their customer base is gradually eroded.
Banks will need to focus their Internet technology strategy along this continuum. Movement along the
continuum is only towards the upper left. This restricted movement foretells the future of e-banking.
Banks will either maintain their positions or they will be forced, through acquisition or merger,
towards the upper-left segment of the continuum. The largest banks will continue to innovate in
bundling their services, finding new ways to offer those services, including the use of new
technologies. Wireless communication and mobile banking will continue to increase, making e-















Figure 2.5.XIV e-Banking continuum (Southard & Siau 2004: 101)
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Stamoulis et al. (2002) undertook a study in a bank faced with the challenge of assessing the value of
its main e-banking channel in operation. The study argues that the evaluation of an information
system should be seen as a form of communication. Therefore, the study proposes an information
system's evaluation model to assess the business value of e-banking distribution channels. The model
employs five different perspectives: customer perspective, marketing and sales perspective, financial
perspective, technology perspective, and strategic perspective. Each perspective has its own set of
metrics. These perspectives can be used to assess the business value along two viewpoints: (a) the
internal view, where the channel is considered as a resource whose utilisation must be maximised; and
(b) the external view, where the channel, as an interface to the bank's customer base, should enable
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Figure 2.5.XV An evaluation model for e-banking channels (Stamoulis et ah, 2002: 255)
Kollmann (1998) pointed out that the central task of an e-market is the coordination of supply and
demand. Kollmann suggested that the success of the coordinating function depends on two critical
points of success: the critical cost factor in which the transaction costs equal the costs of coordination,
and the critical performance point at which the costs of coordination equal the coordinating
performance. Accordingly, Kollmann provided a model, "the two-dimensional critical point of EM,"
for evaluating the performance of the coordination function. Moreover, Kollmann discussed some
problem aspects associated with the coordination function: chicken-and-egg, two-sided critical mass,
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This section looked briefly at the value creation potential in conventional theories, a group of
emerging theoretical value creation frameworks in e-business, as well as the applicability of these
theories in the context of e-banking. Each conventional theory and e-perspective discussed earlier
makes valuable contributions about the possible sources and processes of value creation.
Many scalars in the field of strategy formulation stress the need for an integrative framework that
captures the value creation and capabilities building potential of e-businesses. For instance, Amit and
Zott (2001: 516), having looked at five theoretical approaches (see Table 2.5.1), wrote:
"We observed that none of the received theories in and of itself could explain the
sources of new value creation in e-business. Rather, the value-drivers model
suggests that an integrative perspective to value creation is needed, a perspective
that draws on the extensive research on value chains, Schumpeterian innovation, the
resource-based view of the firm, interfirm strategic networks, and transaction cost
economics. We suggest that research on e-business and, more generally, on
competition in highly networked markets, will benefit from an integrative approach
that combines both strategy and entrepreneurship perspectives".
Each dimension of Amit and Zott (2001)'s value-drivers model (i.e. efficiency, complementarities,





Schumpeterian innovation Low Low Low High
Resource-based view of the firm Low High Medium Medium
Transaction costs economics High Low Medium Low
Value chain analysis Medium Medium Low Medium
Strategic networks Medium Medium High Medium
Table 2.5.1 Theoretical anchoring of sources of value creation in e-business (Amit & Zott 2001:
511)
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Moreover, the work of Gulati (1999), Afuah (2000) and Hagel and Brown (2005) integrated the
resource-based view of the firm with the strategic networks approach. Lavie (2006) extended the
resource-based view of the firm to incorporate the network resources of interconnected firms. Jones et
al. (1997) integrated the transaction cost economics with the strategic networks approach. Also, Alwis
(2004) adapted and extended Glynn (1996)'s model for intelligence and innovation and built upon
four major theoretical streams (i.e. a resource-based view of the firm, innovation theory, intellectual
capital theory, and organisational capabilities).
In a similar vein, Martinez-Hernandez (2003) proposed a new framework, "the value cube", to
describe how organisations should align and manage their operations, resources, capabilities, and
competencies with their value propositions to create value. Werner (2003) integrated a number of
guiding principles for entrepreneurship and value creation within the context of fast-changing
operating contexts to develop a dynamic model for value creation.
Next I look at the technology implementation literature, with particular emphasis on the processes of
implementing network technologies and e-businesses.
2.6 Technology implementation
2.6.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to look at the technology implementation literature, with particular emphasis
on the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. Such literature should help
provide an intellectual background for the discussion on structured processual approaches useful to
analyse in detail and comparatively the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. The
present section starts with clarifying the term "implementation" and looks briefly at implementation
through the lens of innovation and diffusion. Then, the section discusses the dynamics of the
implementation process, as well as its different stages/phases. Next, the section looks at the
implementation challenges, success and failure, implementers' responsibilities and broad
implementation approaches. The section ends by introducing a group of empirical studies related to
the implementation of e-banking products and services, as well as a case study on the implementation
of the EFTPOS in the UK during the late 1980s.
2.6.2 Definition of implementation
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term "to implement" means "to complete, perform,
carry into effect, to fulfil, to carry out, execute, to fulfil, satisfy, to complete, fill up, supplement, to
provide or fit with implements".
In the context of technology, the process of implementation has become recognised as a key aspect in
the overall development of technology (Leonard-Barton & Kraus 1985; Voss 1988, Rhodes & Wield
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1985; Fincham et al. 1994). Technology implementation means "getting [technologies] up and
running in daily operations," (Leonard-Barton 1988: 251). This definition looks at implementation
from two interrelated angles: implementation as a decision-making activity and implementation as a
process of technological-organizational adaptation.
A great deal of technology implementation literature looks at implementation as a decision-making
process that converts a design idea into an operating reality so as to provide value to the client
(Hetzner et al. 1986; Swanson 1988; Dean et al. 1990; Goodman & Griffith 1991; Fincham et al.
1994; Tyre & Orlikowski 1994; Klein & Sorra 1996). This definition highlights that implementation
involves choice situations and decisions, may be distinguished from design, seeks to produce an
operating reality that provides value to the client, and whose responsibility often falls upon a
particular person or group within an organisation (Swanson 1988: 2). Dean et al. (1990: 130) stresses
the decision-action dialectics in his view that implementation "consists of a series of decisions and
actions, in which each decision necessitates actions which involve still more decisions". In turn,
Goodman and Griffith (1991: 262-263) draw attention to the importance of institutionalisation along
with the adoption decision.
"Implementation [is] bounded by the adoption decision and institutionalisation. The
adoption decision refers to the processes by which a new piece of technology is
selected for the organisation.... Institutionalisation refers to the process by which a
structure persists over time... Technology refers to a system of components which
act on or change an object from one state to another. The components include
hardware, software, and programs to transform materials or information from one
state to another."
In addition, the group of related decisions in implementation is characterised by time (Hetzner et al.
1986; Fincham et al. 1994) and organisational level (Hetzner et al. 1986) as implementation not only
represents a "transition period during which targeted organisational members ideally become
increasingly skilful, consistent and committed in their use of an innovation," (Klein & Sorra 1996:
1057) but, also, is "concerned with the influence of managerial action on the end-user's adoption
decision," (Yetton et al. 1999: 55).
Indeed, Tyre and Orlikowski (1994: 113-114) suggested that "the decisions and directions taking
during a short period following initial installation are major determinants of how the technology will
be used by the organisation over the longer term." Fincham et al. (1994: 190) pointed out that
implementation is "the prime locus in which decisions regarding technology take shape." Klein and
Sorra (1996: 1057) suggested that implementation is "the critical gateway between the decision to
adopt the innovation and the routine use of the innovation within an organisation." In other words, it
is the process in between the decision to adopt and the routine use of a technology in an organisation.
Implementation as a process of technological-organisational adaptation is a major theme in the
technology implementation literature (e.g., Leonard-Barton 1988; Goodman & Griffith 1991; Fleck
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1994; Fincham et al. 1994; Griffith 1996; Klein & Sorra 1996; Yetton et al. 1999; Fleck & Howells
2001). Implementation is "the process through which technical, organisational and financial resources
are configured together to provide an efficiently operating system," (Fleck 1994: 640; Fincham et al.
1994: 190). It is "the process through which technology is concretely deployed" (Fincham et al. 1994:
190), with the aim of "getting technologies, especially complex ones, to work as commercially
successful operating systems," (Fleck 1994: 637). Also, "implementation is a dynamic process of
mutual adaptation between the technology and its environment" (Leonard-Barton 1988: 252), while
Williams (1997) proposed that implementation problems for packaged solutions thus often reflect lack
of fit between the social relations in the firms in which a system was initially developed, which
become embedded in the software, and the actual circumstances of the user. Finally, Fleck and
Howells (2001: 528) suggested that "the problems of implementation occur after new artefact
installation, when, typically, productivity falls throughout the shop floor".
2.6.3 Implementation, innovation and diffusion
Whatsoever the definition adopted, implementation is usually linked to innovation and diffusion.
Thus, implementation is innovation being put into use (Van de Ven 1986; Rogers 1987; Nord &
Tucker 1987; Leonard-Barton 1988; Voss 1988; Fincham et al. 1994; Fleck 1994; Yetton et al. 1999;
Linton 2002), where innovation is "a technology being used for the first time by members of an
organisation, whether or not other organisations have used it previously," (Nord & Tucker 1987: 6).
For Voss (1985: 267), implementation is "the process of adoption of process innovations", which
"includes both pre-installation and post-installation factors," (Voss 1988: 59).
This involves "all activities that occur between making an adoption commitment and the time that an
innovation either becomes part of the organisational routine, ceases to be new, or is abandoned,"
(Linton 2002: 66). Leonard-Barton (1988: 252) argued that the "initial implementation of a new
technology is an extension of the invention process," whereas Fleck (1994: 650) argued that
"innovation during the process of implementation is to be expected in the development of working
configurations of [Computer Aided Production Management] CAPM, as an outcome of "learning by
trying".
The deep relation between implementation and innovation is also underscored by other authors. For
instance, implementation is "one of the last steps in user-based and dual-process models of the
innovation process" (Linton 2002: 65), as not only it "identifies and explains the impacts of the
innovation on the end-user's task at the group level of analysis," (Yetton et al. 1999: 55) but, also, it is
considered as "a crucial process as far as strategic innovations are concerned," (Fincham et al. 1994:
190). Thus, argues Linton (2002: 65) "to understand implementation, one must place it in the context
of the entire innovation process".
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Implementation is also usually linked to technology diffusion (e.g., Adler & Borys 1989; Cooper &
Zmud 1990; Goodman & Griffith 1991; Yetton et al. 1999). Diffusion refers to the effort by which
technology is extended to other parts of the organisation (Cooper & Zmud 1990; Goodman & Griffith
1991; Yetton et al. 1999). This effort covers "the organisational and managerial resources expended
on activities designed to promote novel behaviours among end-users and to diminish the forces
opposing successful implementation," (Yetton et al. 1999: 55). Goodman and Griffith (1991: 272)
suggested that "the effect or consequence of diffusion in implementation is to facilitate the
development of normative and value consensus throughout the organisation with respect to the new
technology."
As new technology spreads throughout the organisation, a social environment is created for the
emergence of normative and value consensus. The widespread introduction of a new technology
within an organisation not only signals the legitimacy of the technology, but also leads to the
development of an infrastructure to support the technology, which further legitimises its existence
(Goodman & Griffith 1991). In Adler and Borys's (1989: 177) words:
"Aggregate diffusion of new technologies is influenced by firm implementation and
vice-versa. But the goals and capabilities of a management mediate the diffusion-
implementation relationship at all points. First ... management actively mediates
relations between the firm's equipment base and vendors, between its materials and
suppliers and between its labour force and the broader labour market. Second, the
factors of production and the product characteristics are a function of the resources
management brings into the production process, management's ability to orchestrate
this process, and management's expectations regarding the profitability of its
operations. Third, [there is] a direct linkage between management and some specific
environments, such as the regulatory environment and the broader context of
societal values."
Finally, Fleck's (1994) concept of user innovation during implementation has important consequences
for the traditional concept of diffusion as a sequence to the process of innovation. Thus:
User innovations "refer to the important incremental improvements that flow from
progress up the learning curve (learning by doing) and from progressive
modifications to an already functioning technological entity (learning by using). As
such, they represent improvements made after a functioning entity is achieved.
Moreover, such micro-processes of innovation during implementation have
correlates at the macroeconomic level. As a consequence of such processes, overall
development does not follow a linear pattern in which innovation is followed by
diffusion of the same technological entity in essentially unchanged form across a
sector or the economy as a whole, a pattern adequately described by the general
class of epidemiological diffusion models," (Fleck 1994: 638).
2.6.4 The dynamics of the implementation process
Various scholars have discussed the dynamic aspects of the implementation process (e.g., Leonard-
Barton 1988; Tyre & Orlikowski 1994; Yetton et al. 1999; Majchrzak et al. 2000; Edwards 2000).
Tyre and Orlikowski (1994: 98) argued that "the process of technological adaptation is not gradual
and continuous ... but is instead highly discontinuous," where discontinuities occur during brief
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windows of opportunity which open the constraint set. In contrast, Majchrzak et al. (2000) suggested
that Leonard-Barton proposes that adaptations occur continuously in response to misalignments,
gradually leading to a successful alignment.
Majchrzak et al.'s (2000) own view is that the adaptation process may be neither inherently
discontinuous nor continuous but rather responsive to changes in structural malleability, whenever
that may occur. Adaptations are in response to the scale and frequency of discrepant events which will
occur throughout a team's lifecycle. In the case of technological configurations, as Fleck (1994)
makes clear, "the specific implementation/innovation process ... is a matter of learning through the
struggle to get the overall system to work, i.e. a process of "learning by trying": improvements and
modifications have to be made to the constituent components before the configuration can work as an
integrated entity," (Fleck 1994: 638).
Furthermore, "implementing technology is much like leading a horse to water - although a technology
is provided, whether the user will accept the technology is a function of motivation," (Griffith 1996:
32). In this line, Goodman and Griffith (1991) distinguish five processes critical to implementation:
socialisation, commitment, reward allocation, feedback and redesign and diffusion. Socialisation
refers to the processes by which individuals acquire knowledge and skills, affective and/or evaluative
orientations about the new technology. Commitment refers to the binding of the individual to certain
behavioural acts relevant to technology. Reward allocation refers to the allocation of different types of
rewards relevant to the implementation of new technology. Feedback and redesign refers to the
process by which data are collected about a new technology and redesign activities are initiated to
enhance the operation of the new technology.
2.6.5 Implementation stages/phases
Fleck (1994) argued that implementation is not straightforwardly linear, but involves feedback and
iterative interaction, especially between the design and preliminary realisation phases. Such argument
highlights the existence of different phases in the implementation process, each of which requires
consideration at certain times in the overall development cycle (Voss 1988; Fincham et al. 1994).
Indeed, Fincham et al. (1994) suggested that the implementation process has four broad, interrelated
common features: uncertainty, time, organisation, and work.
Thompson (1969) viewed all technology transfer efforts as consisting of a sequence of three
processes: initiation, adoption, and implementation, each of which must be considered if
implementation success is to occur. Zmud and Cox (1979: 35) viewed implementation as a series of
five related activities: initiation, strategic design, technical design, development, conversion and
evaluation, each not only involves quite different tasks and specific techniques, but also have evolved
for accomplishing these tasks.
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Schierer (1983) classified all activities in a total IT transfer process into seven stages: basic research,
technology development, diffusion of information, adoption, implementation, outcome assessment,
and institutionalisation. The first four phases deal with pre-implementation activities, whilst the last
two evaluate the post-implementation operations. Pelz (1985) suggested that the implementation
process of complex innovations tend to have more overlap between stages making the process seem
more muddled. Voss (1985) divided implementation into four areas; organisation, technical planning,
business strategy and management.
Kwon and Zmud (1987) concurred with Thompson's perspective, but argued that the 3-stage model
may have overlooked the importance of a post-implementation evaluation process. They proposed a
six-stage model by decomposing the implementation stage into adaptation, acceptance, use and
incorporation (Lai & Mahapatra 1997). In turn, Voss (1988) proposed a life cycle model of the
process of implementation that views the process as three phases: pre-installation, installation and
commissioning and post-commissioning. To quote Voss (1988: 59):
"The pre-installation phase includes factors prior to installation that may have a
positive or negative impact on the final outcome. While it finishes with the
evaluation and the proceeding toward implementation, the installation and
commissioning phase finishes when the process of implementation is working
successfully. In the post-commissioning phase further technical improvement is
likely to take place as well as further activities needed to move beyond technical
success to business success."
Coates (1977) proposed a conceptual framework, entitled "Model of Technology Infusion (MTI)."
According to Palmer (2000), the MTI Model describes the processes that organisations undergo
during three stages as they adopt and apply new technologies: substitution, adaptation, and
transformation. At the substitution stage, new technology replaces an older technology (e.g., e-mail
replaces telephone). Such changes can have effects on productivity, size of work force, job content,
workers' skills, and other variables. With substitution, however, institutional structures, culture,
operating procedures, and management expectations still reflect the old workflow and processes.
At the adaptation stage, the organisation begins to adapt to new ways of doing things. Adaptation
might be planned or unplanned, such as formal reorganisation, adjustments in responsibilities or shifts
in power relationships. The transformation stage occurs when the organisation develops new
activities, products, or services made possible by the additional capabilities of the technology. Some
organisations can begin to engage in transformational activities as soon as they implement the new
technology. Transformational developments can radically restructure the related industry or industries
of which the organisations are a part. Organisations that fail to reach the transformation stage risk
obsolescence and failure.
Leonard-Barton (1988) suggested that the initial implementation stage, the period during which the
technology is first removed from its laboratory setting and introduced into the user environment, is
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especially critical. The differentiation of phases/stages, however, does not mean to forget Fleck's
(1994) point that implementation is not straightforwardly linear, but involves feedback and iterative
interaction. Indeed,
Griffith's (1996) point that implementation follows adoption does distinguish changes made to a given
technology from adoption and acknowledges that assumptions are made about implementation (i.e.,
outcomes of implementation success) during the adoption period. Likewise, Meyers et al. (1999)
suggested that separating implementation from adoption does not preclude the possibility that some
overlap can occur between the two activities. It also does not mean that implementation is irrelevant
for the adoption decision or vice versa. In other words, "the traditionally well-defined phases of trial,
adoption, and implementation may be quite fuzzy," (Meyers et al. 1999: 297).
Goodman and Griffith (1991) acknowledge the same fuzziness with regard to their distinction
between implementation and institutionalisation and suggest that the concept of learning curve may
help in this delineation. Thus, during the implementation of a new technology, some type of learning
curve should be observed. As one moves up the learning curve, equilibrium should be reached. It is
the persistence of this dynamic equilibrium that would reveal the presence of institutionalisation.
Given, the overlapping, feedbacks and fuzziness between phases, Swanson (1988: 39) is right to argue
that implementation "must be understood in the context of the development process as a whole, over
the full life course of the system".
2.6.6 Implementation challenges
The discussion on the dynamics of the implementation process draws attention to the challenges
surrounding technology implementation. Indeed, the process of implementation is not easy. It usually
faces many challenges that prevent implementers from realising benefits. Different authors place the
emphasis on different tasks as the main challenge of implementation.
Thus, Goodman and Griffith (1991) suggest that during implementation, the emphasis would be on
knowledge and skill acquisition, with later emphasis on affective and then evaluative orientation. In
turn, Dhillon (2005) argued that adequate technological benefits can only be realised if commensurate
changes are instituted in the business. Klein and Sorra (1996: 1058) argued that the fundamental
organisational challenge of implementation is to gain targeted organisational members' use of an
innovation: to change individuals' behaviour. Accordingly, they proposed a model of the determinants
of the effectiveness of organisational implementation. The primary premise of the model is that
"implementation effectiveness - the quality and consistency of targeted organisational members' use
of an adopted innovation - is a function of (a) an organisation's climate for the implementation of a
given innovation and (b) targeted organisational members' perceptions of the fit of the innovation to
their values," (Klein & Sorra 1996: 1056).
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Van de Ven (1986) argued that innovations must not only adapt to existing organisational and
industrial arrangements, but they also transform the structure and practices of these environments. The
strategic problem for institutional leaders is one of creating an infrastructure that is conducive to
innovation and organisational learning. To quote Zmud and Cox (1979: 35):
"The major objective in implementation an [IT system] is to realise the intended
benefits of [that IT system]. The difficulty associated with achieving this aim tends
to be directly related to [that IT system] complexity, which is comprised of technical
and organisational aspects... Generally, [for technical aspects], the larger the [IT
system] and the more system interfaces required, the greater the technical
complexity... [For organisational aspects], as responsibilities rather than procedures
are affected by the [IT system], and the higher up the organisational hierarchy the
individuals are that are directly affected by the [IT system], the greater the
organisational complexity."
Cooper (1994) argued that technology that conflicts with an organisation's culture can foster
resistance of organisational members to a degree that implementation fails or results in less than the
desired organisational change. From a management perspective, this culture-IT implementation link is
an important factor that may need to be controlled during implementation. In the same line, Cooper
and Zmud (1990: 124) argued that "a major concern ... [during organisations' understanding and
managing their implementation processes] is the recognition by management of the critical issues to
be raised and resolved throughout the implementation process".
Afuah (2003) pointed out that an organisation faces several economic and organisational roadblocks
in technology implementation, including fear of the loss of revenues, lack of incentive to invest in the
innovation, fear of being stranded in a smaller network, larger exist costs, obsolescence of existing
capabilities, the organisation's dominant logic, political power coalitions, emotional attachment to the
old innovation and fear of losing a competence builder in the old technology. An organisation's
innovation strategy, organisational structure, systems and processes and people can help overcome
these problems and help the firm successfully implement the decision to adopt.
Gopalakrishnan and Bierly (2001) suggested that while the implementation of simple technologies
tends to be more orderly, that of complex technologies tends to be charged with multiple, cumulative,
convergent, parallel, and divergent streams of activity. This makes the implementation of complex
technologies more costly than simple innovations. Nevertheless, the higher the organisational level at
which managers define a problem or a need, the greater the probability of successful implementation.
At the same time, however, the closer the definition and solution of problems or needs are to end-
users, the greater the probability of success (Leonard-Barton & Kraus 1985).
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Fleck and Howells (2001) pointed out that modern technologies are obviously more complex at the
level of the artefact and they proposed the concept of "technology complex"12, defined as follows:
"The technology complex is a list of the distinctive 'elements' that comprise the
disciplinary sub definitions of technology and it orders this list of elements from the
'physical' to the 'cultural'. The principal point of this ordering is that in every
definition of technology, there is an artefactual component which is embedded into
a specified pattern of human activity and organisational or social context. While this
changes between particular definitions, there are none that isolate the artefact from
such a context," (Fleck & Howell, 2001: 524-525).
Cooper (1994: 19) argued that IT that conflicts with an organisation's culture can foster resistance of
organisational members to a degree that implementation fails or results in less than the desired
organisational change. From a management perspective, this culture-IT implementation link is an
important factor to take care during implementation.
The issue ofmisalignment between technology and organisation is another challenge. Leonard-Barton
(1988: 255) defined the term implementation misalignments as "mismatches between the technology
and the organisation recognised at the time of initial or trial use." She argued that:
"The adaptation process is necessary because a technology almost never fits
perfectly into the user environment ... [generating] ... misalignments (poor fits)
between the technology and: (a) technical requirements, (b) the system through
which the technology is delivered to users, or (c) user organisation performance
criteria. These misalignments must be addressed if the implementation is to
succeed.... These misalignments can he corrected by altering the technology or
changing the environment - or both. These alterations (termed "cycles of
adaptation") vary in magnitude - both for the technology and the user environment -
and elicit different levels of effort and resources." (Leonard-Barton, 1988: 252)
Accordingly, Leonard-Barton (1988) categorised implementation misalignments into three types:
technical: the technology with its original specifications or with the production process into which it is
introduced; delivery system: the technology with user organisation infrastructure, supporting
hardware, software or educational programs; and value: the technology with job performance criteria
in the user organisation. Leonard-Barton (1988) argued that technology transfer requires conscious,
ongoing dedication to the process of change and the conscious development of mutual adaptation
because the technology will never exactly fit the user environment.
Slaughter (1993) suggested that the specification of the connections among components involved in
the implementation process will emerge as an increasingly critical area. The specificity of the
12
According to Fleck and Howells (2001), the technology complex was developed as an aid in
teaching technology management by Professor James Fleck at the University of Edinburgh in 1987.
It derived from work on the development of factory automation under the ESRC Programme of
Information and Communication Technologies (PICT).
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application and the fit to site requirements may become more difficult to manage as components are
produced in many different locations around the world, and as production in manufacturing moves
towards smaller and more customised batches. Recognising the interdependence of the integration of
components with the specific information it requires can reshape the assignment of resources and
responsibility in technology development.
The case is much more complicated with the implementation of inter-organisational systems, such as
e-business. To quote Barrett (1986: 7):
"As [inter-organisational systems] functions become integral to existing information
systems, whether automated or manual, the importance of understanding their
potential impact becomes a critical success factor. First, each firm exists in a
complex socio-technical system where changes in technology may significantly
alter the underlying "social" relationship. Second, the most desired outcome of an
[inter-organisational systems] strategy is positive synergy between internal and
external productivity improvement. While generally thought of as positive, it is
possible to have negative synergy.... In an [inter-organisational systems] context,
negative synergies may arise from legal or social (internal or external) spillovers
such as anti-trust action."
Indeed, inter-organisational systems take a great deal of effort over substantial periods of time to exist
to the point where they can be used effectively in day to day operation (Fleck 1994) and, more
importantly, to the point where they can secure some forms of competitive advantage (Fincham et al.
1994). It has been argued that existing organisational arrangements, particularly the existing
knowledge base of the organisation and the prevailing distribution of available expertise, have an
important shaping effect on the development of technology itself (Fleck et al. 1990; Fincham et al.
1994). In this regards, Gremilliom (1980) suggested that managers should ascertain whether the
expertise to perform the evaluation and design strategy is available, and be prepared to expend
resources in doing these activities before ordering standardised computer based systems.
2.6.7 Implementation success/failure
"The understanding of the process of implementation and the factors leading to
successful technical and business implementation will lead not only to more
effective implementation for future adopters of advanced manufacturing technology,
but also to improved information and methods for planning and selecting advanced
manufacturing technology," (Voss 1985: 270).
A great deal of literature has discussed the success or failure of technology implementation (e.g., Van
de Ven; 1986; Voss 1988; Meyers et al. 1999; Dhillon 2005). A number of generic technology success
models have been developed and tested in recent years (e.g., Davis 1989; Seddon 1997; Rai et al.
2002; Umble et al. 2003; King & Burgess 2006). However, it is very important at this stage to define
the meaning of technology implementation's success or failure. In Voss' (1988: 58) words, "what
constitute success (or failure) in implementation?"
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Voss (1988) argued that full success can only be considered to have been realised if the benefits being
looked for are realised, and ideally realised in the market place through increased competitiveness.
Voss (1985) proposed two levels of success in implementation: technical success and business
success. The later includes productivity increase alone, productivity increase plus realisation of other
benefits and translation of the above into real competitive advantage in the market place. Dean et al.
(1990: 131) suggested a critical aspect of success, "the extent to which [technical, economic, and
political] objectives are met is a critical aspect of project success, as technical performance is the sine
qua non of effective implementation."
In a similar fashion, Goodman and Griffith (1991) suggested that one sign of successful
implementation is the emergence of the normative and value consensus with respect to a particular
technology. Swanson (1988) suggested that success in information system implementation is a matter
of stabilising a fit among a number of important factors, among which are user involvement,
management commitment, value basis, mutual understanding, design quality, performance level,
project management, resource adequacy, and situational stability." Meyers et al. (1999: 297) defined
success as "a broad range of favourable outcomes during, and as a result of, implementation, such as
time- and cost-efficiency and effectiveness, full utilisation of innovation capacity and capabilities,
increased productivity, and reduction of process errors."
Klein and Sorra (1996: 1058) conceptualised "implementation effectiveness as an organisation-level
construct, describing the overall, pooled, or aggregate consistency and quality of targeted
organisational members' innovation use." Whereas Dhillon (2005) pointed out that success should be
experienced and defined by the stakeholders within the wider environment of the system. It will be
encountered or defined neither from within the IT system itself nor from within the formal system
which the IT system supports.
In a converse angle, Klein and Sorra (1996: 1055) have focused on the meaning of failure in
technology implementation. Thus, "an organisation's failure to achieve the intended benefits of an
innovation it has adopted may thus reflect either a failure of implementation or a failure of the
innovation itself... Implementation failure [is] the case ofmany organisations' inability to achieve the
intended benefits of the innovations they adopt." In addition, these authors argue that implementation
failure occurs when employees use the innovation less frequently, less consistently, or less
assiduously than required for the potential benefits of the innovation to be realised. Griffith (1996: 32)
follow a similar view stating that "a user may not need the technology, a user may not think the
particular technology suits his or her needs, or a user may think that if use is made of the technology,
noxious events are likely to result." For this author, technology implementation will succeed when it
is perceived by the participants to be in their best interest.
A number of studies have suggested approaches to enhance the chances of success in technology
implementation (e.g., Alavi & Henderson 1981; Voss 1988; Cooper & Zmud 1990; Fincham et al.
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1994; Majchrzak et al. 2000; Gopalakrishnan & Bierly 2001; Fleck & Howells 2001; Linton 2002;
Umble et al. 2003; King & Burgess 2006). For instance, Voss (1988) suggested that the factors likely
to influence the success or failure of implementation at the "pre-installation" phase are technical
planning, strategic links, acquiring skills and top management support while that at the "installation
and commissioning" phase are links and suppliers, project management, implementation by cross-
functional team and start-up management. Changing the organisation, managing the learning process,
appropriate operational control, high performance orientation, and changed accounting system are
factors likely to influence during the "post-commissioning" phase.
Goodman and Griffith (1991) propounds that feedback and redesign is a necessary process for
successful implementation as the intended functionality of the technology and actual functionality
initially are likely to be different. Accordingly, they proposed constituencies as important components
in the conceptualisation of implementation success:
"To understand the effectiveness of any new technology requires delineating the
relevant constituencies. The function of the constituency is to generate standards
and referent points. A standard could be the accuracy or ease of use of an
information based technology. The referent refers to the point on the standard which
is acceptable or unacceptable," (Goodman & Griffith 1991: 277).
The importance of the role of organisational culture in technology implementation is stressed
McDermott and Stock (1999), They contended that organisations' emphasis on one set of cultural
characteristics might attain operational benefits, while emphasis on a different set of cultural variables
might more effectively obtain competitive benefits. Dhillon (2005: 503) stressed something similar,
arguing that "although the choice of an appropriate methodology is important in ensuring project
success, it is not the only factor. It is equally, if not more, important to examine the organisational
context that the information system is being developed for." Linton (2002) proposed linking five
factors to obtaining a successful implementation process: organisational structure, technology, project
management, divisibility, and social interactions.
The provision of incentives to personnel is addressed by Griffith (1996) who suggested that
negotiation strategies can be used to create integrative solutions in which incentives to use the
technology are explicitly addressed and distributed most effectively. In a related view, Yetton et al.
(1999) proposed that end-user adoption is influenced by an evaluation of two sets of innovation
characteristics - task relevance, the extent to which the end-user perceives the innovation is relevant to
his/her task and role, and task usefulness, the extent to which the end-user believes it enhances task
performance.
An additional theoretical input to enhancing the chances of successful implemenation comes from the
adaptive structuration theory of DeSanctis and Poole (1994). They portray the process by which
technologies are adapted as consisting of structures, appropriations, and decision outcomes. According
to Majchrzak et al. (2000), DeSanctis and Poole (1994)'s model describes three sources of structures
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as pre-existing conditions that form the context in which the technology is implemented and, as such,
affect appropriations, which in turn affect decision processes and outcomes. Technology structures
include the restrictiveness, sophistication, and comprehensiveness of its features as well as the
technology's "spirit," the general intent of the technology with regard to values and goals. Task and
organisational environment refers to the nature of the task and the organisational setting such as
hierarchy, corporate information, and cultural beliefs. The group's structure includes the interaction
patterns and decision-making processes of its members.
Majchrzak et al. (2000) define appropriations as the immediate, visible actions that evidence deeper
structuration processes. Assessment of appropriation processes is at the heart of the adaptive
structuration theory framework, by documenting exactly how technology structures are being invoked
for, or constrained in use in, a specific context. Appropriations can be analysed for their faithfulness,
their instrumental uses, or the users' attitudes. One hypothesis proposed by DeSanctis and Poole
(1994) is that the more faithful the appropriation - i.e., the more that appropriations align with the
technology's initial intent - the more likely the team's decision processes will lead to successful
outcomes.
2.6.8 Implementation and implementers (managers) responsibilities
The critical role of the implementer in the success of implementation process has been clearly
highlighted in the literature. For instance, for Swanson (1988: 11):
"The position of the information system implementer is necessarily existential,
situated within a context of commitments and expectations established by the
designer on behalf of the prospective user.... The fundamental responsibility of the
implementer is to tend to the fitness of the system under development; health is
systemic, and specific problems are often only symptomatic... The role of the
implementer is basically that of an intermediary in the system realisation process."
In turn, Leonard-Barton (1988) sees managers as playing the role of implementers. She argued that
the successful management of technology transfer from developers to users requires that managers
recognise and assume responsibility for both technical and organisational change. Dean et al. (1990)
suggested that managers must consider three types of objectives - technical, economic, and political
(TEP) - in making implementation decisions. The technical objective requires that the system be
successful in meeting the technical performance requirements associated with the manufacturing
process in question. The economic objective requires that the firm be in a stronger financial position
after a technology is implemented. The political objective requires that the new system satisfy its
sponsors and users by helping them to achieve their respective goals, and to enhance or at least
maintain their organisational status.
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The central role of championing has long been recognised in the innovation literature. In a well-
known British study called Project SAPPHO13, conducted between 1968 and 1971, the characteristics
of the innovation process were studied in great detail (Parker 1974). The results of SAPPHO indicated
that the business innovator's power, responsibility, status, and experience were particularly important
correlations on innovation success. It also confirmed a correlation between the presence of a product
champion and innovation success. Champions should begin with an appreciation of the physiological
limitations of human beings to pay attention to non-routine issues, and their corresponding inertial
forces in organisational life (Van de Ven 1986). The more specialised, insulated, and stable an
individual's job, the less likely the individual will recognise a need for change or pay attention to
innovative ideas.
Griffith (1996) suggested that implementers approach the technology change process as they would a
negotiation, by looking at the variety of interests and motivations for those involved in the
implementation. Implementers can uncover information regarding participants' needs to create
integrative solutions that result in tacit agreement and technology use. These solutions may include
information dissemination, creating different reward structures, or changing the way the technology is
used. If implementers also engage in express negotiations with participants, even greater value may be
uncovered and commitment may be created as well. Yetton et al. (1999) suggested that managers need
to distinguish between the individual level and group level impacts of IS innovations.
2.6.9 Broad implementation approaches
Boland (1978) has identified two broad implementation approaches: the traditional approach and the
change approach. The traditional approach identifies the systems analyst as the major force in
implementation. Directing each of the implementation stages, the systems analyst engages in learning,
analysis, and synthesis activities while the intended user of the MIS is only passively through
responding to specific inquires by the systems analyst. The change approach emphasises the joining
together of the systems analyst and the user as a problem solving team to discover an appropriate
solution through mutual teaching and criticism. The choice between these approaches is subject to
interpersonal, political, sociological, and psychological factors (Zmud & Cox 1979). In other words,
the traditional approach is appropriate when the IT system being implemented aims to automate a
well-defined procedure, is independent of other organisational systems and results in little
organisational change. In turn, the change approach is appropriate when the organisational activity
13
According to Curley and Gremillion (1983), the basic idea of the study was to substantiate or refute
generalisations about technical innovation by systematic comparison of pairs of successful and
unsuccessful attempts to innovate in the scientific instrument and chemical industries. Off the 200
measurements considered, only a small number differentiated clearly between organisations which
had succeeded and those which had failed. Among the most important was the role played by key
managers and technologies in the innovation process. Four specific roles were identified, include
technical innovator, business innovator, product champion and chief executive.
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involved is ill-defined, the MIS must interface with other organisational systems, and, most
importantly, substantial organisational change is expected.
Another pair of alternative strategies: evolutionary and traditional, is proposed by Alavi and
Henderson (1981), who investigated the implementation of Decision Support Systems (DSS). The
evolutionary approach utilises judgement modelling as a means to create felt need, to provide insight
into the decision process and the implied weighting of decision variables and to establish a learning-
based, participatory implementation strategy. In contrast, the traditional approach is characterised by a
problem solving orientation wherein the DSS is portrayed as providing a valuable product that can be
theoretically justified. The results of Alavi and Henderson's (1981) investigation suggested that a
process-oriented evolutionary implementation strategy is more effective when implementing an
analytical model.They also indicated that the relationship between an individual IT system (e.g, DSS)
design, implementation, and individual learning processes is important and hence should be explicitly
considered. Howells (1993: 170) suggested that "where there is a shifting political-commercial
environment, the evolutionary approach to technical decision making is probably more appropriate
than the big-bang approach."
Elsherif and Elsawy (1988) provided a different approach for managing the design and delivery of
information and decision support systems for strategic decision making. The distinctive features of the
approach include a focus on issues rather than decisions, a distinction between information support
services and decision support services, prototyping the management of delivery as well as design and
a dynamic tracking back-end.
2.6.10 Some empirical work on e-banking implementation
The aim of this section is to look at some of the theoretical issues of technology implementation
discussed in the earlier sections in the empirical setting of e-banking. Consoli (2005) suggested that
banks implemented and developed IT to enhance their processing capacity, expand the range of
services, and be able to capture a larger share of customers. In turn, Fincham et al. (1994) contended
that in the financial services sector in general, implementation represents the key process through
which strategic technologies are socially constructed.
The matter of e-banking implementation is an issue that has received a great deal of attention in the
literature. The broad aim of such literature is to propose theoretical tools that enhance the success of e-
banking implementation. An example is the work of Buzzacchi et al. (1995) on the Italian commercial
banks. The study proposed a conceptual model to analyse innovations originating from the diffusion
of information technologies in the banking sector. The model emphasises the crucial role played by
demand-pull variables in stimulating innovative behaviour under the "smart automation regime."
Southard and Siau (2004) looked at the differences between very large banking organisations and
smaller community banks in the utilisation of e-banking, and, in what ways each group of banks is
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utilising e-banking technology. The study proposed an "e-banking continuum," that distinguishes the
different strategies followed by banks in utilising e-banking. Accordingly, the study suggested that
small banks focused more on external portals, while large ones focused on maximising internal
information and services.
Bauer and Colgan (2001) suggested that moving towards e-banking offers both banks and customers a
sharp reduction in costs, new types of services (e.g., real-time trading) and the convenience of
anytime, anywhere banking. Gurau (2002) suggested similar advantages. Online banking furnishes
banks with many advantages, including improving market image, reducing transaction costs,
responding more quickly to the market evolution and increasing market penetration. Akamavi (2005)
examined activities of a financial service innovation process through a critical analysis of the
operational process of opening a Lloyds TSB Student Account at a local branch.
Centeno (2004) looked at the level of supply, level of adoption by customers, drivers, and barriers for
development, and potential private/public policy options for Internet banking adaptation in European
Union countries (EU15) and in European Candidate Countries (ACCs). The study proposed a model
of adoption factors that includes access technology and infrastructure, and sector specific retail
banking aspects. The model indicated that adoption is influenced by a complex set of different factors
related to access technology and infrastructure and to the specific retail banking sector. Yakhlef
(2001) suggested that in implementing the Internet, firms go through different levels of exploitation,
ranging from a marketing approach, involving information presentation, interactivity, transactions,
and dynamic customisation, to a strategic approach which is pertinent to redefining and transforming
the business model.
Johnston and Yetton (1996) looked at strategies for the effective integration of IT divisions for the
success of a merger of two Australian banks. The study incorporated Mintzberg's (1979)
organisational typology into the elements of the MIT'90s schema (Scott Morton 1991) to propose a
framework for analysing the fit of two IT configurations implemented at the two banks. The authors
argued that an understanding of organisational and strategic fit at the level of the IT organisation can
contribute to effective management of IT integration.
Daniel (1999) tried to quantify the current provision of electronic services by retail banks in the UK
and the Republic of Ireland. The study suggested five factors affecting the provision of e-banking:
organisational culture of innovation, market share, or strength of the organisation, organisational
restrictions, and limitations, prediction of customer acceptance, and vision of the future.
Simpson (2002) investigated the risk, efficiency, and rate of progress in the implementation of e-
commerce in a sample of banks from USA and a sample of banks from developing and emerging
markets. Lymperopoulos and Chaniotakis (2004) found 14 potential implications of e-banking
adoption identified in the literature review. These are cost reduction; image improvement, innovator's
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advantage, queue minimisation, increase of sales, customers' alienation, customer service and
satisfaction, employees reduction, competition with foreign and non-banks, price competition, service
differentiation, market transparency and increased risk.
2.6.11 The case of EFTPOS network in the UK
Howells and Hine (1993a) reported a case study about the development of EFTPOS network in the
UK during the late 1980s. The case is relevant to the discussion on e-banking implementation as it
demonstrates, among other issues, the development challenges, as well as the changes in competitive
structure that may result from collective exploitation of IT. The case study was grounded on a
theoretical analysis of interview transcripts and concerned "network decisions" and the perceived
relationships between "technical" and commercial" influences on EFTPOS design choices (Howells
1997).
Before discussing the challenges and the changes in competitive structure, it is important to take a
snapshot to the EFTPOS network in the UK during that time. Fleck and Howells (2001: 530)
positioned the EFTPOS network in the UK within their "technology complex", suggesting that the
design and implementation of EFTPOS is a social process of implementing a complex technology (see
Figure 2.6.1).
Physical science
Equipment suppliers such as IBM make decisions on how to deliver functionality through artefact
design. Physical science knowledge is incorporated into the microchip components that they
assemble. These 'supplier decisions' influence the decisions of the banks via the functionality of the
alternative artefact designs made available to the banks.
Material/artefact
The artefact component is obvious: the computers, the communications links and terminals. As these
vary in their characteristics between suppliers, the choice of artefact components requires expertise on
the part of the banks.
Topology/layout
Artefacts and software are 'shaped' by decisions on the topology of the network. For example, it was
possible for terminals in retailers to stand alone, or to be integrated into the retailers' own equipment.
The decision depended on whether the banks could override the retailers' preference for an integrated
solution. Another example—individual banks may process transactions collected directly from retailer
terminals, or they may agree to process transactions in a jointly-owned processing centre; the choice is
between different ownership structures, location of processing equipment and degrees of competition
in the provision of a service to retailers.
Procedures/software
There is a choice of procedures to be embedded in software. An example concerns the level and form
of security the network will provide; one possibility is to encrypt electronic messages. There are many
ways of designing encryption into a network, each alters the time of processing, the degree of security,
the cost ofprocessing.
Organisational location of technical expertise - knowledge/skills
The banks had to decide on how to source the necessary expertise that would inform their network
design strategy. Should it reside within the (banks') organisation, in external consultant firms, or in IT
supplier companies? The banks tried each of these arrangements in turn.
Hybridisation of expertise
Another issue was whether the banks should attempt to 'hybridise' the technical expertise with
commercial banking knowledge, so that a more powerful form of expertise was available to the banks.
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The banks did not attempt to do so.
Work organisation
The process of network design may be conducted by external (to the banks) consultancies, by hybrid
organisations owned by the banks and consisting of seconded-in technical experts, or by the IT
departments of the banks. The banks tried each of these organisational regimes in turn.
Management techniques
The banks recognised that project management experience was an essential component of the design
of large networks like EFTPOS; they were impressed that other organisations had experience of this
technique while they did not; this encouraged them to contract out this work. An alternative strategy
would have been to bring such expertise in-house.
Organisational structure
The banks began with a jointly owned company to commission a network design and manage its
construction. They would eventually devolve responsibility for the design and implementation to their
IT departments.
Cost/capital
The cost of IT networks is large, the returns depend on the speed with which paper-based systems can
be closed down. There is a role here for sophisticated financial evaluation techniques, but the banks
did not use financial evaluation for EFTPOS. The impetus for the technology derived from inter-bank
competition rather than cost of capital calculations.
Industry structure
The banking industry is an oligopoly and this allows a range of cooperative or competitive approaches
to large scale projects. The banks began by cooperating fully in their approach to EFTPOS, but
cooperation broke down. One subgroup developed the Switch debit card service, other banks utilised
the VISA system to deliver a debit card service.
Social/legal relations
In 1986 the UK government passed legislation that allowed Building Societies to compete with banks.
This helped prompt the breakdown of the banks' cooperative approach to network design.
Culture
Bank 'culture' was evident when the banks used their past experiences with each other and with IT to
structure EFTPOS technology. On past IT projects technical people were treated as peripheral to the
core business and tended to be kept either outside the organisation or in a separate department - the IT
department. Past experience of government led the banks to expect the Bank of England to regulate
the sector and to signal its approval or disapproval of bank strategies. On the EFTPOS project some
banks continued to wait for Bank of England guidance, some interpreted Bank of England statements
as signalling approval of disapproval; late in the project most banks agreed there was no longer the
close supervision of earlier years.
Figure 2.6.1 EFTPOS technology as an example of the technology complex (Fleck & Howells
2001: 527: reproduced from Howells 2005: 5)
Fleck and Howells (2001) found that a complex set of choices of artefacts and social arrangements
were available to be defined by the banks and that these can be categorised by the full range of
elements in the "technology complex". Accordingly, Fleck and Howells (2001: 523) argued that
"there is not an "either-or" issue between the social and the technological influences on change since
the terms are not distinct: "technology" always includes some aspect of the social". "Decisions in
these categories served to define the IT network that was eventually implemented," (Fleck & Howells
2001: 526; Howells 2005:4).
The technology of EFTPOS as a network technology comes under the umbrella of configurational
technology. This suggested that the EFTPOS network has a variety of design typologies rather than an
optimal one. Such variety meets a variety of social and organisational criteria that must be set by the
participants (e.g., banks and retailers) (Howells & Hine 1993c). The first challenge emerged during
the design stage of the EFTPOS network was that the design of the network changed repeatedly. In
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reality, the design was ultimately shaped by the desire of some banks to develop strong inter-bank
alliances around different designs although the EFTPOS network started to enhance money
transactions processes. Accordingly, the problem of using a variety of reference markets emerged. The
first design concept to be proposed was the use of the established automatic machine (ATM) network
to inform design of the EFTPOS network. Such proposed design was build on the assumption that the
patterns of use of the EFTPOS network would be similar to the use of the ATM network (Howells
1997).
The origins of such changes in the competitive structure go back to the collective exploitation by
banks of IT systems. UK banks acted individually before 1985 to introduce commercially and
technically distinct EFTPOS networks. However, the banking sector perceived the need to collaborate
to introduce a common infrastructure for sophisticated EFTPOS network and share its development
cost. The EFTPOS aimed to help banks reduce the transactions cost of paper-based money, such as
cheques. The collaboration between the banks turned to competition within the EFTPOS UK Ltd, the
company established by the banks to introduce the national EFTPOS.
However, Barclays, as the biggest merchant acquirer, feared that its dominance on the clearing
business would be eroded by the proposed EFTPOS. Barclays issued the UK's first credit card in 1966
and, a few years later, the ATM network (Consoli 2005). Accordingly, Barclays introduced its Visa
Connect Scheme. Lloyds took a similar step through the introduction of its Visa Debit Card. In order
to counteract the two initiatives, an alliance between Midland, NatWest, and the Royal Bank of
Scotland formed the Switch Card Scheme. These initiatives resulted in the termination of EFTPOS
UK Ltd.
The development of EFTPOS in UK also met with the typical uncertainty affecting configurational
technology development. In Howells and Hine (1993b: 58-59)'s words:
"Throughout the development of EFTPOS the banks were learning how technical
and commercial considerations could be related and were trying to establish and
control the end game which would result from their competitive behaviour. In
comparison with the period of relatively stable technology predating EFTPOS, the
new technology can be considered to carry the uncertainty which renders the
strategic decision-making process so uncertain. This uncertainty arises because
hardware - terminals, telecom links and host processors - can be linked to social
and commercial relationships in many ways. As part of this process the banks play
strategic games based on an imprecise knowledge of the effects of their actions, a
partial understanding of the implications of their technical choices and of the
positions of other banks. The technology generates this uncertainty as there is no
predetermined, optional way of building the network and the commercial
framework which links into it. The network is built as technical components are
chosen which fit a bank's commercial position, but as it physically takes shape the
technical components alter the commercial reasoning of other banks and hence the
environment of the implementing bank."
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Despite the apparent advantages of cooperation in such a large project, disagreements between the two
competing sub-groups undermined the realisation of a unique EFTPOS network (Consoli 2005).
According to Fincham et al. (1994: 28), "the launch of the EFTPOS network foundered partly because
the parties (banks and large retailers like supermarkets) could not agree on processing costs. The
development shifted from collaborative to competitive mode, and eventually was abandoned, as it was
unclear who was getting the savings and who should cover the costs of processing. Also, the financial
returns on the intermediary role mean that many services are provided free of charge." Arguably, "this
failure in coordination reflected the changing structure of a banking market which was moving away
from the former oligopolistic structure and in which the influence exerted by new entrants had become
progressively stronger," (Consoli 2005: 470).
2.6.12 Conclusion
This section has looked in details to the technology implementation literature, with particular
emphasis on the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. It has clarified the
term "implementation" and looked briefly at the relation between implementation, innovation and
diffusion, the dynamics of the implementation process, and its different stages/phases. It also looked
at the implementation challenges, success and failure, implementers' responsibilities and broad
implementation approaches, before ending with a brief review of empirical studies related to the
implementation of e-banking products and services, as well as a case study on the implementation of
the EFTPOS in the UK during the late 1980s.
This review has revealed the complex nature of the processes of implementation of e-banking, with
technological and organisational aspects deeply interacting in a process that shows a non-linear
dynamics and a fundamentally socio-technical nature. These findings of the implementation literature
provide an excellent background for the identification of structured process approaches useful to
analyse in detail and comparatively the emergence and evolution of concrete e-banking experiences in
Saudi Arabia.
Next I discuss the sociotechnical approach with particular focus on the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) that seems to offer a more structured framework to
organise the comparative study of concrete e-banking experiences, particularly through its associated
analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005).
2.7 "Sociotechnical constituencies" approach
2.7.1 Introduction
Yin (2003) suggested that analysing case study evidence requires a general analytical strategy. Yin
proposed three strategies; relying on theoretical propositions, setting up a framework based on rival
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explanations, and developing case descriptions. Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggested that the use of
theoretical propositions in analysing case study evidence helps to frame the research and give possible
interpretations ofwhat is observed.
This thesis utilises the theoretical propositions strategy to analyse the case studies on the Saudi
Arabian e-banking via the adoption of a sociotechnical approach, particularly the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
(Molina 2005). The aim is not only to use the approach to reveal how banks build their e-banking
capabilities and create new value strategies, but also to test critically the applicability of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools
(Molina 1995; 2003; 2005) for understanding e-banking value creation and capabilities-building.
Accordingly, this section looks first at the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) and its associated analytical tool of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). Next, the
section assesses critically the potential of applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) to analysing the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. This is
followed by the introduction of the recent analytical tools associated with the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993): "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005).
2.7.2 "Sociotechnical constituencies" approach
The sociotechnical tradition is usually traced back to the work of Trist and Bamford (1951) from the
Tavistock Institute. In the 1980s, a number of "social theory" concepts (some of which we shall look
at later on) came to enrich the sociotechnical approach to the understanding of technology. These
included, the social studies of technology (SST), social construction of technology (SCOT) (Pinch &
Bijker 1984), actor-networks (ANT) (Callon 1986; Latour 1988), sociotechnical constituencies
approach (Molina 1990; 1993), and later sociotechnical ensembles and frames (Bijker 1993). All these
approaches share the fundamental premise that technological processes involve the integration of
social and technical actors or constituents, but they differ in the specific concepts they propose to deal
with the integration of the social and the technical.
The "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993), in particular, offer conceptual
instruments that seem useful to carry out a more structured analysis and evaluation of various
dimensions of sociotechnical processes such as the emrgence and development of e-banking in Saudi
Arabia. Fort this reason, the discussion of this section is constructed around the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993), addressing other "social theory" approaches
particularly in the context of the critical analysis of "sociotechnical constituencies" (Molina 1990;
1993).
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Molina (1990) argues that all processes of innovation and technology development imply the
construction of "sociotechnical constituencies". In Molina's (1999: 8) definition:
"[Sociotechnical constituencies are] dynamic ensembles of technical constituents
(e.g. machines, instruments) and social constituents (e.g. institutions, interest
groups) which interact and shape each other in the course of the creation, production
and diffusion of specific technologies". ... Thus, the term "sociotechnical
constituencies" emphasises the idea of interrelation and interaction in innovation
and technological development. It makes it possible to think of technical
constituents and social constituents, but always stressing the point that in the
technological process, both kinds of constituents merge into each other."
Indeed, as we have seen, successful implementation is precisely a matter of establishing a fit among a
number of important factors, among which are user involvement, management commitment, value
basis, mutual understanding, design quality, performance level, project management, resource
adequacy, and situational stability (Swanson 1988).
Figure 2.7.1 shows Molina's original diagram published in Research Policy in 1990 and created to
illustrate one possible inter-organisational sociotechnical constituency in the field ofmicroprocessors.
It is most likely that "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) focused on ICT-
based innovations in areas such as e-banking, will differ in the mix of institutional constituents, and
there will be many forms and sizes depending on the specific type and institutional level of the
innovations. Some may be confined to one bank, others to the entire banking system; some may be
national or regional in scope; some may involve networks of finance institutions, research centres,
government departments and so on, virtually ad infinitum.
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Figure 2.7.1 Institutional representation of a possible sociotechnical constituency (Molina 1990:
311)
According to Molina (1990: 311-312; 2005: 3-5), there are, however, certain essential features
common to all sociotechnical constituencies. The sociotechnical constituency shown in Figure 2.7.1
has four circles.
The (T) letter at the centre of Figure 2.7.1 indicates the focus of the "constituency-building" approach.
This is "the process of development of technological capabilities and innovation, visibly manifested
through elements, such as better services, tools, skills, products, standards and ultimately users'
value," (Molina 2005: 3). The letter (T) at the centre of Figure 2.7.1 also represents the technology
being created, produced, diffused, or implemented (Molina 1990; 2005). For example, in the case of
EFTPOS network in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), the "T" will represent the EFTPOS network.
The small arrows represent the direction of influence. As such the arrows are double-ended, indicating
that the flow of influence may be bi-directional, flowing from the inner circle of technology (T)
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towards the outer circles and vice-versa (Molina 1990; 2005). In the case of the EFTPOS network in
the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), the double-ended arrows would indicate that the influence goes from
the EFTPOS network towards the UK banking sector.
Moving outwards, the second circle "physical opportunities and limits" indicates that technological
processes and their results are shaped not only by the opportunities (and threats) existing in the
physical world, but also by the nature and state of the art of the pertinent technology at any given time
(Molina 1990; 2005). In the case of the EFTPOS network in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), for
instance, the development of standards during the design stage challenged the realisation of a unique
EFTPOS network difficult (Consoli 2005).
The third circle indicates that technologies and innovation are the result of an integration of many
resources, including time, space, human, material, and financial. Such resources are not static. Rather,
they evolve continuously as the sociotechnical constituency evolves. For example, "a single new idea
generated by an individual has the potential to change the constituency," (Molina 1990: 312; 2005:
4).The case of e-banking is a good example of how a new concept and its consequent development
through resource integration can change the development of an entire sector, taking its present and
future evolution beyond the limitations of physical bank branches. In the case of the EFTPOS network
in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), for example, Barclays integrated its financial capabilities as both
the dominant player on the clearing business and the issuer of the UK's first credit card (Consoli
2005) with its ATM network to create it Visa Connect Scheme.
The fourth circle shows that the process of resources integration happens through the institutions
housing and controlling the resources. Consequently, these institutions shape the development of a
given technological process or innovation in according not only to their own interests and concerns,
but also with their relative weight within the constituency (Molina 1990; 2005). In the case of the
EFTPOS network in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), for example, Midland, NatWest and the Royal
Bank of Scotland (i.e. social constituents) integrated their network technical resources (i.e. technical
constituents) to form the Switch Card Scheme and compete with Barclays' Visa Connect and Lloyds's
Visa Debit Card schemes, a process that led to the termination the EFTPOS UK Ltd (Ghuloom 1997).
Having described the four circles constituting the sociotechnical constituency shown in Figure 2.7.1,
the question is whether the vision and objectives of the sociotechnical constituency building process
are well defined from the beginning? Molina (2005: 5) answers:
"Despite their perception of benefit, institutions participating in a
sociotechnical constituency do not invariably have a clear idea of where their
specific interests lie in relation to a given innovation. Nor does the
development of this innovation invariably follow the intended path or yield the
results expected by the constituents. Often, unpredictable and possibly
unidentifiable factors have unintended consequences which make the
difference between success and failure. This uncertainty is inherent in
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technological processes, particularly where constituents are trying to break
completely new technological ground," (Molina 2005: 5).
Going back to the case of EFTPOS network in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), for example,
uncertainty emerged as the development process evolved. This was due to the fact that UK banks did
no have a well-defined mechanism of how they would cooperate with EFTPOS UK Ltd. to build such
a strategic IT system. They presumed that the objective of the project was basically technical.
However, as the design and implementation processes took place, such objective revealed its strategic
economic importance, leading a repositioning against each other.
Finally, the outermost circle of Figure 2.7.1, illustrates that the sociotechnical constituency interacts
with other sociotechnical constituencies. To quote Molina (Molina 1990: 312; 2005: 5):
"... A given technology is not simply the result of an insular, intra-constituency
process. It is also the result of that sociotechnical constituency's interaction
with other sociotechnical constituencies, within its particular historical setting.
It is influenced, for example, by legislative, technical and market trends which
are themselves the result of interaction between sociotechnical constituencies.
Thus, technical and market trends, to take two examples, are not external to
constituencies: sociotechnical constituencies themselves create and alter them
according to the extent of their relative strengths, dynamism, and growth,"
(Molina 1990: 312; 2005: 5).
In the case of EFTPOS in the UK (Howells & Hine 1993a), the EFTPOS sociotechnical constituency
failed to create a single constituency and eventually could not survive the inter-constituency battle
between the Switch Card constituency supported by Midland, NatWest and the Royal Bank of
Scotland, the Visa Connect constituency supported by Barclays Bank and the Visa Debit Card
constituency supported by Lloyds Bank.
2.7.2 Sociotechnical alignment process
The "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) defines the process of
sociotechnical alignment as "the process of creation, adoption, accommodation (adaptation) and close
or loose interaction (interrelation) of technical and social factors and actors that underlies the
emergence and development of an identifiable constituency" (Molina 1997: 604). Molina proposes
that sociotechnical alignment is what social constituents try to do when they are building a
sociotechnical constituency, for instance, by promoting the development of a specific technology
either intra-organisationally, inter-organisationally, or even as an industrial standard. The basic
aspects of the process of sociotechnical alignment can be illustrated through the use of the "diamond
of alignment" (Molina 1995) ofFigure 2.7.II.
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Figure 2.7.II The diamond of alignment in sociotechnical constituency building (Molina 1999b:
303, modified)
This particular diamond has two levels: intra-company level and industrial/market (mter-
organisational) level. Molina (1997) explains that the shaded areas (I-Ii) and (II-IIi) represent the
sociotechnical constituency in its state of development at the time under study (i.e. products, services,
people, resources, reputation, etc.); the areas (1 -1 i), (2-2i), (3-3i) and (4-4i) represent aspects of
critical influence to the success or failure of the process of constituency-building, reflected for
instance, in the market success of the constituency's products/services. Table 2.7.1 describes the
content of each one of the aspects in the diamond. Molina (1997) argues that the success of the
constituency's product/s depends critically on the effectiveness of the alignment, or management of
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(I-Ii) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
This dimension relates to the present state of the constituency's resources: the type of
organisation, people, material, and financial resources, knowledge, expertise, experience and
reputation and other elements, such as current perceptions, goals, visions, and strategies. In
short, what the constituency is at a given point in time.
(II-IIi) Nature and maturity of the technology
This dimension highlights the importance of the nature and maturity of the constituency's
technology for strategy. Constituencies' strategies must be aligned with the strategic
opportunities and limits implicit in the particular characteristics of technologies. It is a simple
fact that the nature of e-banking is different from that of hammers or drugs, and a 'universal'
approach will not do.
Alignment (1-li) - Organisational governance
This dimension highlights the importance of alignment of the constituencies' technologies with
the governance and strategic directions of organisational, industrial and market environments.
In an intra-organisational context, this means, on the one hand, that the market or objective
addressed by the technology is perceived as highly significant to the organisation's
performance; on the other hand, it means a simultaneous perception that the potential technical
and market solution is promissory and viable so as to merit allocation of resources and market
demand.
Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
This dimension relates to the people and organisations the constituency is seeking to enrol
behind its technology. This includes alignment of perceptions and goals between the
technology developers and potential or 'target constituents' in the organisational, industrial and
market environments, including users, suppliers, and other relevant organisations, such as
independent developers.
Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
This dimension highlights the importance of alignment between the capabilities of the
constituency and the technical requirements of envisioned products/services and markets (e.g.,
target functionality and cost). This includes alignment between the technology and widely
recognised technical and market trends and standards in the target industrial area (see
alignment 4-4i). In short, to avoid 'failure', constituencies must have the technical capacity to
deliver appealing products/services within available resources and in competitive time.
Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
Commonly, technologies emerge in an organisational, industrial and market environment
populated by other technologies. This dimension relates to the type of interaction and relations
established with these other technologies in the pursuit of success. It also includes alignment
between the technology and technical/market trends (see alignment 2-2i),
Table 2.7.1 An overview of aspects of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1999a: 10)
A constituency-building process has two major paths to facilitate alignment. The first path is that the
space for co-existence of different goals, encompassing interactions between collaboration and
competition, except in the special case in which completely antagonistic goals destroy the entire
process or lead to the withdrawal of at least one of the contending parties. The second path is that the
changeable nature of goals and perceptions, potentially allowing for the generation of alignment
where, initially, there was none (Molina 1995).
2.7.3 A critical assessment of the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach
This section aims to assess critically the potential of applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to understanding of the processes of emergence and
development of e-banking value creation and capabilities-building in Saudi Arabia. The section starts
with a brief positioning of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) in social
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theory and a review of early "social theory" approaches stressing the interaction between social and
technical factors during the development of technology. This is followed by (a) describeing briefly
some early approaches in social theory, (b) comparing the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) with such approaches, and (b) introducing a group of studies that have attempted
to use the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993). A justification to the
potential applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to
understanding of the processes of emergence and development of e-banking value creation and
capabilities-building in Saudi Arabia concludes the section.
2.7.3.1 The position of "sociotechnical constituencies" in social theory
A good work to start with is Russell and Williams (2002). These authors produced a glossary of a
selection of key theoretical concepts to help not only researchers compare and contrast such concepts,
but also guide external audiences unfamiliar with the different key concepts of the social theory. The
glossary defines 44 concepts, indicates representative authors using each concept, provides a
definition to each concept, and lists related concepts to the one being described. They pointed out that
the choice between comparable concepts is a judgement about how each concept allows making sense
of empirical material in a way consistent with other principles of explanations.
Russell and Williams (2002: 55) positioned the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina
1990; 1993) within the theoretical group of "complex, contingent, local dynamics of innovation
processes for policy and intervention". They suggested that work under this group has stressed the
contingency and predictability of sociotechnical change as well as the plurality of actors involved. The
process of alignment is an important issue in this work. The frameworks tend to stress the protracted
process of alignment, the difficulty of achieving technological change, and the extent to which it is an
accomplishment. In addition to the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993),
Russell and Williams (2002) identified the following key theoretical concepts as falling under this
group as they are popular for analysing alignment: the notion of network (Freeman 1991), path
dependence (e.g., Arthur 1989), network externalities (e.g., David 1986) and entrenchment (e.g.,
Collingridge 1980).
Russell and Williams (2002: 63) also identified a different theoretical group to the one above and
called it "structure and constraint approaches". The work under this group emerged during the 1980s
with a focus on structure and constraint rather than dynamics and choice. Such work attempts to
capture the regularities and patterning in technological development, and cognitive and institutional
structures and mechanisms that produce them - that favour specific outcomes and exclude others.
Russell and Williams (2002) clustered the work under this group into three categories. The first
category includes concepts that describe regularity in the development of technological devices or
systems. Such concepts include trajectories, envelops, avenues or corridors and product cycles. The
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second category includes concepts that conveys with varying emphases the social, political, legal,
cultural or cognitive means by which those directions and constrains are produced and reproduced.
These concepts stress the routine and rule-bound character of much technical work, and suggest that
options are ruled out before they are conceived. Such concepts include paradigms, regimes, frames
(Bijker 1995), traditions, and styles. The third category identifies elements of a frame or paradigm and
includes concepts such as guiding principles, norms, roles, product standards, production routines, use
practices, instrumentations, dominant problem definitions, do-able problems, focusing devices, guide-
posts, and modes of satisficing.
2.7.3.2 Brief review of early social theory approaches
This section describes briefly some early approaches in social theory using Williams and Edge (1996)
as the main reference source. The first early approach is the social shaping of technology (SST).
Williams and Edge (1996: 866) argued that "a variety of scholars, with differing concerns and
intellectual traditions, find a meeting point in the SST research. They are united by an insistence that
the "black-box" of technology must be opened, to allow the socio-economic patterns embedded in
both the content of technologies and the processes of innovation to be exposed and analysed. The SST
research could, it was hoped, identify opportunities to influence technological change and its social
consequences, at an early stage - moments at which accountability and control could be exercised".
Williams and Edge (1996: 868) explained that the SST research investigates the ways in which social,
institutional, economic, and cultural factors have shaped: (1) the direction as well as the rate of
innovation, (2) the form of technology, the content of technological artefacts and practices, and (3) the
outcomes of technological change for different groups in society.
Another early approach is the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Accroding to Williams and
Edge (1996: 869), the SSK "consists of studying the development of a scientific field, and identifying
points of 'contingency' or 'interpretative flexibility', where, at the time, ambiguities are present." The
approach has been extended toward the study of technological artefacts (Williams & Edge 1996).
They have sought to identify instances where technologies could be designed in more than one way,
with choices between different technical options, and to explain why one way of designing the artefact
triumphed. This is rarely a simple "technical" issue, but is patterned and shaped by the particular
"selection environment": in other words, social factors enter into such explanations. Williams and
Edge (1996: 870) argued that "SSK has often been taken ... to be synonymous with the SST
approach".
The third early approach is the social construction of technology (SCOT). According to Williams and
Edge (1996: 870), the analysis from the SSK proceeds outwards, from the technology to the context
shaping it. This approach has been presented as offering a "new sociology of technology", summed up
by the phrase social construction of technology (SCOT) (Pinch & Bijker 1984). According to Russel
and Williams (2002), the SCOT brought insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge to bear
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on technological development. Adopting constructivist principles from the SSK, the SCOT treated
technological success and failure systematically, insisting on the same sort of explanation for both. It
followed the process by which closure is achieved among "relevant social groups" between competing
interpretations of the available technological options, so that a particular design becomes taken for
granted as the essence of the technology (Bijker 1987; 1993; 1995; Bijker & Law 1992; Bijker et al.
1987). The SCOT approach tends to have difficulties in accounting for closure. The possibilities of
interpretative flexibility (i.e. of "choice") seem endless," (Williams & Edge, 1996: 870).
The sociology of industrial organisations (SOIO) is another field of research under the umbrella of the
social shaping of technology. According to Williams and Edge (1996: 870), the SOIO, in contrast to
SCOT, has focused on an arena of technological change characterised by clear, and often conflicting,
socio-economic interests. The starting point here is not a particular technological field, but a particular
social context within which technical change takes place. The analysis proceeds "inwards": the social
processes, interests, and goals typical of the context are identified, and attempts are then made to trace
their influence on evolving technology.
One of the well-know early approaches in the social theory is the actor network theory (ANT). Indeed,
the SCOT writers not only adopted constructivist principles from the SSK, but were also strongly
influenced by actor network theory (ANT) (Williams & Edge 1996). The ANT, developed by Callon,
Latour, Law, and others, is another example of theoretical approaches stressing the interaction of
different social and technical factors in explaining the characteristics and results of innovation and
technology implementation processes.
According to Russel and Williams (2002), ANT followed the strategies and actions of central actors as
they attempt to marshal the resources necessary for the project, particularly by enrolling other actors
and appropriating the right to speak for them. A technology was conceived as an emerging and
increasing stabilised network of material and non-material elements. The nature of the project and the
identities and interests of the actors involved are transformed as the network takes shape. However,
"studies on ANT remain sceptical about the nature and influence of broader social and economic
structures of power and interests, insisting that actors create the world anew (Latour, 1983, Latour,
1986, Latour, 1988), and implying that technologies (and social systems generally) are highly
malleable to local actors," (Williams & Edge, 1996: 870).
Recall from the discussion on technology implementation that Leonard-Barton 1988: 252) sees
implementation as "a dynamic process of mutual adaptation between the technology and its
environment." In the same vein, Desanctis and Poole (1994: 125) suggested that the sociotechnical
systems theory argues that the impacts of advanced information technologies depend on how well
social and technology structures are jointly optimised; technology adoption is interpreted as a process
of organisational change.
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On a wider scale, at the level of an industry or society in general, this mutual adaptation can be seen in
terms of changes to "technological frames" or transformations through an actor-network (Bijker
1995). Savory (2006) suggested that ANT stresses that the various stakeholders using a technology
will each modify or hybridise knowledge as the technology is applied and re-applied. Hybridisation of
technological knowledge is an inevitable and desirable process, without which, crossovers of
technology to new domains would rarely occur.
One of the examples illustrating ANT is the design and implementation of Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI). EDI relates to the conduct of business communications among computer systems
of different organisations with the aim of exchanging business documentation (Emmelhainz 1993;
Graham et al. 1995; Williams 1997). Graham et al. (1995) addressed the build-up process of EDI and
the strategies followed among participants during the design and implementation processes. They
pointed out that although EDI technology can be seen as being bounded by the extent of the trading
community within which electronic transactions occur, the formation of such communities will
involve a wider network of actors.
Accordingly, Graham et al. (1995) have seen that the build-up process of such networks includes not
only potential users of EDI, but also representatives of telecommunications, consultancy, software
suppliers, and employees of national and regional governments. These networks "are heterogeneous in
so far as the system builder must grapple with all aspects of the technology; not just those which are
viewed as 'technical', such as standards development, but also those which are 'social, such as gaining
the support of particular agencies or governments," (Graham et al. 1995: 5).
2.7.3.3 Brief comparison between "sociotechnical constituencies" and other "social
theory" approaches
This section presents a brief comparison between the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) and some of the key concepts discussed earlier. The ANT, according to Kinder
(2003: 507), "avoids the pitfalls of systems theory (input-transformation-output), by focusing on
social and technological outcomes in addition to the processes shaping these outcomes". ANT has also
analysed the means by which actors use stable entities, or inscribe their intentions into technologies, to
obtain remote actions they require of other groups.
ANT proponents' however, insist that the analysis should avoid prior theorisations of the social setting
and of the interests and power of actors, dissolve distinctions of scale, and demonstrate the
constitution of entities in the process of interaction. ANT has developed a distinctive vocabulary to
describe these processes and distinguish its concepts (Akrich & Latour 1992; Bowker 1987; Callon
1991; Law 1992).
In ANT, the technological process involves the formation of a network through the enrolment of
actors and the translation of their interests. The "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina
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1990; 1993) involves building an alliance of interests around a project at an intra- and inter-
organisational level.
ANT is sometimes seen as an alternative to the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina
1990; 1993) in the analysis of how technological and social factors interact in networks to shape
technologies and their implementation processes. The argument here is that ANT and the
"constituencies" are not alternative approaches. Rather they suit different purposes. While the ANT is
particularly suited to networks which are looser in the sense of being less directed towards a
designated outcome, the "constituencies approach" is more suitable to analysing the processes of
innovation where a particular outcome is privileged (Kinder 2003).
Although both the ANT and the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993)
provide insights about change processes, Gilbert et al. (2001) have argued that systematic efforts using
concepts such as the ANT or the "constituencies" approach, have provided initial, if rather static
analyses, but do not allow one to study and understand the dynamic behaviour of innovation networks.
This judgement however is based on early work (e.g., Molina 1993) and does not make reference to
Molina's process of sociotechnical alignment (Molina 1995).
The process of alignment also can be seen from the view of SCOT framework. Here, the process of
alignment is the process of achieving closure among relevant social groups over the meaning of an
artefact. While the analysis of closure is fruitful, it is widely accepted this is only one mechanism by
which directions of development might be settled. Consensus over the meaning and value of a
technology is unlikely. It will retain different meanings for the groups which use it or are affected by
it (McLaughlin et al. 1999; Russel & Williams 2002). Disco and van der Meulen (1998) stress the
variety of modes of coordination involved in establishing and maintaining such alignments.
Next to social shaping, according to Geels (2004), there is also technical shaping, something that ANT
finds difficult to elaborate. Molina (1999a) suggested that technical possibilities and scientific laws
constrain the degree to which interpretations can be made. He also developed a taxonomy of
technologies to deal with the role of the technical in processes of constituency-building.
Ultimately, all these analyses tend to stress the protracted process of alignment, the difficulty of
achieving technological change, and the extent to which it is an accomplishment (Badham et al. 1997;
Russel & Williams 2002). They can also provide insights into the limits of change in existing
alignments and the way in which these may need to be broken up to reorient a field (Elzen et al.
1996). As we shall see, however, the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) is
distinctive in the fact that it offers specific tools to structure the analysis of technological innovation
and implementation processes.
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2.7.3.4 Brief review of the use of the use of the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach
Various studies have attempted to use the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993). The following paragraphs introduce a selection without the intention to diminish the value of
other studies. Simply those selected are sufficient to illustrate the points raised by the use of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993).
Kinder (2002b) provided Table 2.7.II that contains studies using the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993). According to Kinder (2002b), these studies contain common threads
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Table 2.7.II PAs and successful ICT innovations showing key alignments (Kinder 2002b: 389)
In turn, Klaes (1997) used the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to foster
dialogue between sociological approaches to the study of innovation and microeconomic theory. The
aim was to demonstrate an interdisciplinary approach consisting of the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and a game theoretical analysis of competitive alignment between the
dominant constituents of technological innovation in the market for recorded music in Britain.
Kinder (1999) used the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to structure an
assessment of recent debates around an economic development strategy for West Lothian, Scotland
which challenge some of the original formulation of absorptive capacity, and update other aspects,
contributing to current theoretical, and policy debate on learning regions. Molina and Gregson (2002)
used the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to analyse the implementation
of an evolutionary evaluation methodology used as a learning instrument in the evolution of Connect
Scotland, a major enterprise support network in the UK.
Kinder and Molina (1999) examined the potential for a sustainable multimedia capability in Scotland,
through an understanding and characterisation of the depth, breath, dynamism and purpose of a
possible multimedia clustering process. Kinder and Molina (1999) used the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to analyse networking within a cluster or, more
generally, the nature, state of development and dynamism of a cluster. The empirical ground was the
Scottish's multimedia cluster. Scottish Enterprise (SE), the industrial agency of Scotland, was
considering the development of multimedia clustering as one of its strategic lines of action. The case
surrounds the issue that multimedia is rather recent and the challenge is more how to stimulate
multimedia clustering. Kinder and Molina (1999: 271) argued that "there is a spectrum of inter-
organisational relations whose quality is differentiated by the depth of the relationship (i.e. how well
the knowledge flows and common purposes interrelating organisations are integrated)".
In turn, Kinder (2000) applied the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) with
the associated "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) to analyse a case study on the introduction of
smart housing in West Lothian, Scotland. Within "sociotechnical constituencies" approach, Kinder
(2000) employed Nicoll (1995)'s contextual usability conceptual approaches to deeply explore the
alignment of user requirements and provider parameters. The process examined in this research is one
of translating general ideas of smart housing, into a successful implementation meeting the variegated
goals of an innovating constituency, their development partners, the users of residential services, and
their formal and informal carers. Accordingly, Kinder (2000) highlighted the value of the
"constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) as a conceptual instrument able to guide the design
and innovation ofmature technology into complex circumstances.
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In addition, Kinder (2002a) integrated the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) with the concept and ingredients of business plan such as intermediation, re-intermediation,
virtual supply chains and Internet communities to analysing three case studies: EQL, an e-learning
software development company specialised in developing learning solutions in accounting, finance
and business related disciplines, EmFinance, an e-commerce financial services company, and Real
Time Engineering (RTE), a software and IT systems company. Kinder (2002a) argued that combining
the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) with the concept and ingredients of
business plan lays the foundations for a dynamic approach to business models for networked SMEs
using e-commerce. This approach is termed evolutionary business planning. One of the values of
Kinder (2002a)'s work was the illustration of the possibility of business modelling in the evolutionary
and holistic manner.
In a further study, Kinder (2002b) used the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) to analysing the introduction of computers into secondary classrooms in Rome, Italy and West
Lothian, Scotland from a technology innovation perspective. He argued that the introduction of
networked technologies into the multiple-goal learning environment of schools cannot be understood
in terms of predetermined recipes. Rather, these are processes of sociotechnical alignment informed
by particular knowledge domains and flows of knowledge, using particular instructional techniques
embedded in software and curricula design and supported by specific mixes of technology.
Concerned with the development of sustainable industrial capabilities, Molina and Kinder (2002)
integrated the fundamental insights of industrial clusters (e.g., Porter 1990) and national systems of
innovation (NSI) approaches (e.g., Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993) with insights of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) to analyse the depth and sustainability of Scotland's
electronics clustering experience. Molina and Kinder (2002) show that many of the elements of the
NSI/cluster diamonds are present in the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), and the latter's
layered approach permits their systematic macro-micro decomposition from industrial/cluster
capabilities to technological activities inside the organisation.
Finally, Howells et al. (1993: 89) looked at the case study on the design and implementation of the
EFTPOS network at the UK discussed earlier through the lens of the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993). Howells et al. (1993: 89) suggested that there was a sociotechnical
constituency that managed the design and implementation of the EFTPOS network. The core of the
problems was "the definition and agreement on the needs of the groups in the [sociotechnical]
constituency and their management, so that a single configuration that meets many of these needs can
be implemented," (Howells et al. 1993: 89). The process of implementation was "a major
technological project which required the skilful building of an alliance between banks, retailers, and
suppliers," (Howells et al. 1993: 89). However, the key relationship in this sociotechnical constituency
"was a disaster. It is difficult to imagine how it could have been hostile or more damaging to the
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process of implementation and its influence is shadowed only by the interbank, competitive
manoeuvrings," (Howells et al. 1993: 89).
As new technology spreads tliroughout the organisation, a social environment is created for the
emergence of normative and value consensus. The widespread introduction of a new technology
within an organisation not only signals the legitimacy of the technology, but also leads to the
development of an infrastructure to support the technology, which further legitimises its existence
(Goodman & Griffith 1991). According to Howells and Hine (1993: 220c), the issues of competition,
cooperation, or both still exist, suggesting a need for an operational strategy that can balance between
the different norms of competition and cooperation. Such strategy would suit the need of banks only if
it the technological options and their implications are understood by the individual banks.
The banks admit they learned a great deal from the EFTPOS experience, in particular, about how to
deal with retailers and how to behave competitively. "We would say that they should focus on
managing the technology within the sociotechnical constituency; this requires the development of an
integrated understanding of organisational, competitive, and technical issues related to a particular
network technology," (Howells & Hine 1993c: 220).
All in all, the work just reviewed has demonstrated the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) in highlighting practical issues and choices facing
policy makers and implementers in terms of the alignments necessary for the deployment of
innovation. However, the work utilising the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) has been primarily concerned with its strengths in dealing with processes of technology
innovation and implementation, and has not sought to identify weaknesses in the approach or its
applicability.
For instance, as seen earlier, Gilbert et al. (2001) argued that systematic efforts using concepts such as
ANT (Callon 1986; Latour 1988) and the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) do not allow one to study and understand the dynamic behaviour of innovation networks. This
judgement however did not make reference to Molina's (1995) work on the processes of
sociotechnical alignment. This suggests the need for a more serious critical assessment of the
approach and its application. Filling such gap in the literature is one of the aims of this thesis. It will
test the applicability of the approach to the understanding of technology implementation, in general,
and e-banking value creation and capability-building, in particular, through its application to the
analysis of a range of case studies of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. The results of this assessment will be
provided in the conclusion chapter of this thesis.
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2.7.3.5 Justification for this thesis' use of the sociotechnical constituencies approach
This section provides the reasons for this thesis's use of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) in the understanding of the processes of emergence and development of e-
banking value creation and capabilities-building in Saudi Arabia.
The first reason is that the "sociotechnical constituencies" (Molina 1990; 1993) approach has been
successfully used in a variety of innovation and implementation studies by both Molina and other
authors. As said earlier, it has been found particularly useful for systematically analysing the
interaction of different social and technological factors, for instance, due to its suitability in analysing
the processes of implementation where a particular outcome is privileged (Kinder & Lancaster 2001).
Also, the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) does not give prominence to
any particular level of analysis, distancing itself from methodological reductionism or holism (Klaes
1997). The "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) acts as a conceptual
instrument for the understanding and guidance of processes of innovation and implementation (Kinder
2000), making it an analytical tool appropriate for understanding e-banking implementation and
dynamic capability-building. This differentiates the "socitechncial constituencies" approach (Molina
1990; 1993) from the ANT approach, in the same way as it does the "socitechncial constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993) elaboration of the role of the technical dimension of constituency-
building processes.
These characteristics seem to provide the "socitechncial constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) with the processual analytical capability necessary to deal with the emergence and development
of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. In this respect, the "socitedchncial constituencies" approach (Molina
1990; 1993) complements many insights from the literature review on value creation and capability-
building perspectives, implementation process, and "social theory" frameworks, which identify value-
creation and capability-building as complex technological and organisational processes.
The second reason, as anticipated already, is that the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) is distinctive in the fact that it offers specific tools to structure the comparative
analysis and evaluation of processes of technological innovation and value-creation strategies. These
tools are the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003), and "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), which help to organise the way of thinking about
sociotechnical processes as well as the structure of the case studies. They also help to present in a
consistent visual way the state of alignment harmony of the value creation and capability-building
processes. Such visual capability allows an immediate understanding and communication of the
strengths and weaknesses of specific value creation and capability-building process; highlighting
those strategic areas requiring greater attention to secure the success of the constituency-building
process.
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The last part of this chapter introduces the conceptual instruments of "alignment web" (Molina 2003)
and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) that give the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach (Molina 1990; 1993) a distinctive advantage in dealing with problems such as the emergence
and development of e-banking. As said earlier, however, this thesis will test the potential of these
instruments in the analytical and comparative treatment of the concrete e-banking experiences of
Saudi Arabia.
2.7.4 Alignment web
In order to increase the understanding of e-banking implementation and dynamic capabilities-building,
this section goes to a deeper level of specificity through discussing the "alignment web"14 (Molina
2003), a conceptual tool based on the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), (see Figure 2.7.III). The
"alignment web" (Molina 2003) helps to visualise the alignment gap during the e-banking
constituency-building process. It aims to provide a detailed (quantitative) assessment of the current
state of the process of sociotechnical alignment for a constituency. The "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995) has been positioned into a "spider web". Each one of dimensions 1, 2, 3 and 4
interacting with the "constituency" (dimensions I and II) in the e-banking development process
enables the identification of a range of aspects with distinctive influence in the success of the
alignment process.
Figure 2.7.Ill also lists the range of aspects with distinctive influence in the success of the alignment
process. Such aspects can be used to focus the enquiry and assessment of the overall constituency-
building process. Each aspect has been given a marking from 1 to 10, depending on the strength of the
state of alignment (e.g., mark 1 indicates strong alignment while mark 10 indicates no-alignment).
This was followed by averaging the marks of the aspects of each dimension.
14 This section relies heavily on Molina (2003).
Constituents'perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Main dimension Sub-dimension Mark
Alignment (1 -1 i) • Flat decision-making structure
-Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork
• Developers' collaboration and teams
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods









Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency
Very important to bank
Highly motivating to leaders/innovators
Very important to banks' developers and customers
Well inside space and time resources available
Well inside Financial/material resources available
Average
• Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system
• Easy with displacement of obsolete practices
• High presence of required complementary technologies
• High presence of useful complementary technologies
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies
Average
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Next I introduce the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), a complementary tool that
permits a deeper quantitative assessment of the strategic priorities of the Saudi e-banking
constituencies.
2,7.5 Dynamic strategy mapping
This section presents the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005)15, a tool for mapping and
supporting strategies of processes of innovation or development of product and services. This tool
enables the identification of the combination of specific ingredients making up the value-creation
strategies of different constituency-building processes. It also enables an assessment of the different
priorities given to these specific ingredients in the value-creation strategies. This detailed assessment
is important because the broad understanding of strategy approaches reveals directions but not the
many specific aspects that make up the broad strategy in each particular e-banking constituency. A
wide range of sources have been consulted during the construction of the "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM) (Molina 2005).
The "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) distinguishes multiple strategic ingredients,
in clustered multi-level dimensions, to facilitate a holistic and evolutionary understanding of value-
creation strategies in ICT-based innovation processes. The "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
(Molina 2005) seeks to stimulate a systematic approach to multiple clustered aspects that in their
totality help reveal the state of product/service constituency-building strategies pursued by
organisations. Most importantly this exercise can be conducted as often as deemed necessary, thus
helping to generate snapshots of the evolution of the "strategy" in the constituency-building process.
The result is the availability of a dynamic view of the strategy process and, consequently, the
opportunity to take well-informed steps that enhance the consistency and effectiveness of an evolving
strategy.
Figure 2.7.IV shows the major dimensions making up the first layer of strategy-mapping for a
constituency's product or service. Table 2.7.Ill describes the content of each of these dimensions. The
plus signs following each of the four dimensions indicate that each of them contain further layers of
strategy-mapping elements.




Features that give competitive advantage to the
product/service
Technology used to realise the creation process
Possible tactical approaches to try to ensure successful
diffusion ofproduct/service among target user population,
including defensive and offensive approaches to maintain
existing gains and/or to secure new gains
Possible dimensions of distinctive value offered by
product/service (one or multiple) to users
Approaches followed by the constituency to acquire resources
and competences or capabilities for the creation process
Written and unwritten "rules" governing the behaviour and
practices of individuals and groups in the creation process
Sectors or segments of the population intended to become
users of the product/service. Present and desired situation











Figure 2.7.V and Table 2.7.IV take the dimension "distinctive product/service attributes" and expands
it into more detailed layers that show six sub-dimensions with their corresponding clusters of more
sub-dimensions or elements. The entire set offers a menu of alternative possibilities for mapping a
constituency's existing or future strategy from the point of view of a product/service's distinctive
































Quality Design: look and feel
Performance: e.g., speed, power
Reliability: performance without or minimal break downs
Durability: long-lasting
Usability: ease of use
Functionality: single or multiple functions
Content Richness: rich in information, resources and
interactivity
Evolutionary Stable: unchanged product/service
Continuous improvement: in constant evolution with enhanced
versions
Unique: exclusive
Limited: rather small number
Commodity: mass market
Stand-alone: single independent product
Family: platform with several related variants
Dependent: depends on another product/service to deliver value
(obligatory complementarily) (e.g., software)
Compatible: work well with other products/services but does
not depend on them (non-obligatory complementarily)
Proprietary Own Closed (not available to others)
Available (e.g., licensable)
Others (property of others)
Free and Open (e.g., free and open source software)
Table 2.7.IV Possible distinctive attributes of products/services (Molina 2005: 9)
In similar fashion, Figure 2.7.VI and Table 2.7.V take the dimension "Process Technology" and
expands it into four sub-dimensions ("competitive character," "intellectual property," "cost" and
"techniques") with their corresponding clusters of more sub-dimensions or elements. This time the
menu of alternative possibilities concerns a constituency's existing or future strategy from the point of






Figure 2.7.VI Menu of possibilities for process technologies in sociotechnical constituency
strategy (Molina 2005: 10)
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Dimension Description
Competitive Distinctive or key: technology giving the organisation a distinctive
Character source of competitive advantage in creation
Basic or enabling: technologies fundamental to an organisation's
operation but not a source of competitive advantage since they are
available to all
Strategic or pacing: technology in early stages of development but
with good potential to evolve into a distinctive source of competitive
advantage
Mature external: older technologies available for sale and supplied
by other companies
Intellectual Proprietary Others (property of others
Property Own Closed (not available to others)
Available (e.g., licensable)




Techniques Brainstorming: systematic idea generation, including critical
problem identification
Screening: systematic sifting and grouping of ideas
Assessment: evaluation and prioritisation of ideas
Communication: presentation and communication of ideas
Collective learning: sharing and appropriation of ideas among people
in the organisation
Knowledge management: systematic gathering, warehousing,
mapping, accessing, sharing and stimulating diffusion, learning and
use of information, codified and tacit knowledge for action as well as
for the generation of new knowledge
Stimulation resource environment: Rich environment of all sorts of
multimedia resources useful to stimulate creativity, including brain-
teasers, audio-visual libraries, activities, challenges, etc.
Table 2.7.V Menu of possibilities for process technology (Molina 2005: 9-10)
Figure 2.7.VII and Table 2.7.VI take the dimension "Tactical Market Techniques" and expands it into
10 sub-dimensions with their corresponding clusters of sub-dimensions or elements. This time the
menu of alternative possibilities concerns a constituency's possible tactical approaches to try to ensure

























Targeting same product at new markets. It includes demand-
reinvigoration for mature products
Targeting different products Related: Different products are related
at different markets Unrelated: Different products are
unrelated
Targeting new products at the same market
Targeting the same product/service more intensely at the same market.
It includes demand-reinvigoration for mature products
Frequency of product/service launches due to
major or minor advances
Tacit or explicit (e.g., contractual) arrangements
with other organisations relating to diffusion of
product/service
Tactical Pricing Temporary or variable prices
Physical/Virtual
Defensive
Operating in the physical and/or
internet worlds
Making it difficult for potential
substitutes to enter and gain market
share by fortifying entry barriers
and applying other defensive











Dumping: at a loss







Increase switching costs by
enhancing direct or indirect
desirability.
Direct: increase value for money
by increasing value or reducing
price or both
Indirect: VIP treatments,
supporting causes dear to
customers (corporate social
responsibility)
Promote, reinforce lock-in by
both increasing bundling,
establishing long-term contracts,
or, preventing compatibility of
potential substitute
Raising legal barriers: Use
patents and copyrights to mount
















Offensive Possible tactical approaches to try
to secure new gains, and also to
defend existing gains. Defensive
tactics above also apply.
Mobilise allies in any relevant
sphere of life, for instance,
government to introduce
favourable rules (e.g., tariffs) by
crying "unfair competition," etc.
Or, influential users to make
favourable statements
Diversion: Force competitor to
lose focus
Real: Launching actions in one
area to scare or force
competitors to divert resources







Frontal attack: all out short-term
confrontation to gain market
share often in the form of a price
war
Flank attack: exploit weakness
or vulnerable position of
competitor by better value offer.
Existing weakness: in response




alignment through a new better
value offer
Attrition: Long-term campaign




to weak flanks of competitors
Reducing entry barriers: Seek to
weaken or erode entry barriers
protecting incumbent competitor
Target competitors' allies
seeking to weaken strength of
alliance
By attacking vulnerable
competitors' allies to create
confusion
By neutralising competitor's
allies away from existing
alliance and into a neutral
position
By co-opting competitor's allies
away from existing alliance and
into one's own constituency
Table 2.7.VI Menu of possibilities of "tactical techniques" for market diffusion (Molina 2005:
12-13)
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Figure 2.7.VIII and Table 2.7.VII illustrate a menu of possibilities regarding the "distinctive value to
users" offered by a constituency's product/service. Nine sub-dimensions are identified with their
corresponding clusters of sub-dimensions or elements. The entire set helps to map a constituency's














Creation of highly distinctive image and identity for particular
supplier of product/service
Positioning relative to competition and in Lower
consideration of appropriate profit margin, Average
related, for instance, to profit maximisation Higher
or market-share growth Premium: first-in-the-
market price
Excellence in customer support services, including information,
training and after-sale maintenance, servicing and care
Distinctive and appealing look and feel, including packaging
Specific area of activity served Multi-purpose: several areas







Unrelated: independent and not
related
Degree of power or excellence with which the product/service
executes its functions (e.g., speed, energy consumption, etc.)
Ease and speed of access to product/service
Specific product/service
capacities or functions enabling
specific effect, results or actions
Selling two or more products
together
Table 2.7.VII Menu of "distinctive value" possibilities for products/services (Molina 2005: 13-
14)
Figure 2.7.IX and Table 2.7.VIII take the dimension "Resource and Competence Acquisition" and
expands it into 9 sub-dimensions with their corresponding clusters of sub-dimensions or elements.
This time the menu of alternative possibilities concerns a constituency's existing or future strategy to


































Contracting out to another organisation complete or partial Total
creation ofproduct/service, including Partial
Buying creation resources available in the market
Collaborative relations with other
organisations in various forms
Acquiring right to exploit another
organisation's product/service through
buying license
Joint venture: Separate jointly-owned
organisation
Long-term contracts: Long-term
contractual relation with supplier
Joint Project: Contractual collaboration
with another organisation in single
project
Other alliances:
Unlimited: right to all upgradings and
new versions in the future
Limited: limited to one version and/or
specified time
Complete in-house learning and development of creation resources and competence
using freely available knowledge
Attending training related to creation process skills
Resources made available for a period of time, for instance, by a government agency
or educational institution. In the case of financial resources, financial institutions
would be involved.
Resources donated by all kinds of donors, including individuals
Funds or in-kind contributions made internally by the organisation or by external
sources in exchange for future return
Table 2.7.VIII Menu of possibilities for resource and competence acquisition (Molina 2005: 15-
16)
Figure 2.7.X and Table 2.7.IX focus on "Governance (In-house)," one of the richest dimensions of
STC strategy with four sub-dimensions and corresponding clusters of multiple sub-dimensions or
elements. This time the menu of alternative possibilities concerns a constituency's existing or future
strategy from the point of view of the "rules" governing the behaviour and practices of individuals and








User-driven: Product/service is driven by user needs (e.g., market pull)
Product/service driven: Emphasis is on supplying the product/service (product push)
assuming a demand
Cost driven: Product/service shaped
primarily by cost considerations
Time scope: envisaged life-cycle of the
product/service in relation to market
dynamics
Breakthrough type: Nature and degree
of innovativeness of product/service.
Helps reveal magnitude and complexity
of the competitive challenge
Lower: lowest or lower cost compared
with competing product/services





New-to-the-world: entirely new to the
organisation and to the market
Line extension or Derivative: Products
derived from other existing products.
New to the market, not new to the
organisation
Me-too: new to the organisation, not
new to the market
Enhancement or Incremental: Minor
changes in existing products
Platform: Form the base for a product
family
Radical or Architectural: New
technology that departs from established
products and systems of production.
Associated with the creation of new
industries.
Revolutionary or Competence-
destroying: Applied to existing markets
and customers, disrupting and rendering
established technical and production
competence obsolete.
Design for production: product is created with reference to production capabilities
of an organisation
Simultaneous engineering: product/service is created with simultaneous inputs from
production and marketing
Path-dependency: product/service continues evolutionary path defined by previous
versions
Hierarchical: several layers of
coordination. Present in virtually all
complex systems
Heterarchical: flat or horizontal. Focus
on coordination rather than control.
Reliance on coordination by mutual
adjustment. Individuals in multiple
organisational roles.
Democratic (circular organisation):
everybody participates in decision
making (commonly through
representation) and no one is the
ultimate authority
Autocratic: centralised authority with
every layer exercising power over
subordinate layers
Project-based: specific projects of
limited duration, undertaken by closely
interacting teams in flexible
coordination.
Adhocracies: experts collaborating in
non-routine modes, typically in
multifunctional project teams. Little
exercise of authority and specialists are
valued for their expertise.
Virtual networks: Horizontal
124
coordination supported by the
information and communications
technologies (e.g., Linux and Apache).
Hollow: organisations that outsource
most if not all the functions (e.g.,
broker)
Competitive Offensive: Introducing products ahead of the competition (first mover)
attitude Defensive: Early adoption of technology
Imitative: Follow the leader, not necessarily closely
Dependent: Accepting a subordinate role to stronger firms
Traditional: Remain with traditional often craft-based products
Opportunistic: Identifying a new market opportunity for basically the same
technology




Table 2.7.IX Menu of possibilities for governance (In-house) (Molina 2005: 16-17)
Finally, Figure 2.7.XI and Table 2.7.X take the dimension "User (Market) Target" and expands it into
8 sub-dimensions with their corresponding clusters of sub-dimensions or elements. This time the
menu of alternative possibilities concerns a constituency's existing or future strategy regarding sectors






























































First: first among other
significant players
Among leaders: One of a number of leading players
Significant share: Noticeable presence but not among top
product/services
Mass: large commodity market
Multi-segment: large market made
up of distinctive segments
Fragmented: market with many
small niches
Few segments: two or three
segments
Niche: Specialised single segment
Customised: Single individuals
Embryonic: in state of gestation as
distinctive (market) grouping (e.g.,
space tourism)
Emerging: in early stages of
development as distinctive
grouping. Not yet clearly defined
Youthful: defined, dynamic, great
deal of competition and
competitors, low entry barriers









Local: user population in place of location (e.g., region,
country) of product/service supplier
International: user population in various countries








Early adopters: first adopters of new product/service
Influential adopters: Represent large market
Personalities (famous)
User-innovator: users actively contributing to improvement
of product/service
Table 2.7.X Menu of possibilities for "user (market) target" (Molina 2005: 20)
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Figure 2.7.XII brings all the dimensions of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005)









Figure 2.7.XII Integrated menu of possibilities for "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) of a
constituency's product/service (Molina 2005: 21)
As we have said, the development of e-banking can be treated as the rise of sociotechnical
constituencies bringing together a wide range of technologies and institutions to deliver successful
ICT-based banking services to customers. E-banking is a particular expression of these ICT-based
services. For example, in their study that looked at strategies that leading business-to-consumer
corporations harness the Internet to acquire new customers and increase their market share, Willcocks
and Plant (2001) found that among 15 "leaders," 25 "laggards" and 18 "medium-performing"
organisations, leaders shared generic characteristics that distinguished them from other companies.
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However, leaders also followed distinctive routes. Although they may have started with strategies
based upon the idea of technology leadership, they migrated through interim stages to a market
strategy. Only then were they capable of yielding sustainable, consistent e-business profits. Leaders
were the fastest and most focused at moving from an "e" that stands for electronic to an "e" that
represents earnings. The integrated "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) presented
above is particularly appropriate for mapping the existing and/or future strategies of e-banking
constituencies.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the emergence and evolution of e-banking with particular emphasis on how
banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value-creation
strategies. It defined the term "e-banking" and looked briefly at the emergence, evolution, nature,
products, and services of e-banking. The chapter also explored the focus of e-banking research and
looked at the theoretical foundations of value creation and capabilities building in e-banking. It briefly
discussed some views on value creation and capabilities building (i.e. Schumpeter 1942; Penrose
1959; Williamson 1975; Porter 1985; Teece et al. 1997; Dyer & Singh 1998; Hagel & Brown 2005).
This was followed by a discussion on a group of emerging theoretical value creation frameworks in e-
business (e.g., Amit & Zott 2001). It also looked at the applicability of these theories in the context of
e-banking16.
The chapter also conducted a selective review of the technology implementation literature, with
particular emphasis on the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. It has
clarified the term "implementation" and it looked briefly the relation between implementation,
innovation and diffusion; the dynamics of the implementation process, and its different stages/phases.
It also looked at the implementation challenges, success and failure, implementers' responsibilities
and broad implementation approaches, before ending with a brief review of empirical studies related
16 In addition to the empirical contribution to knowledge, this thesis attempted to make a theoretical
contribution by seeking to integrate a number of concepts into a consistent conceptual instrument,
entitled the "taxonomy of strategic approaches to constituency-building". These concepts are:
Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942), resource-based view of the firm
(Penrose 1959), transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), value-chain framework (Porter
1985), dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al 1997), strategic network theory (e.g., Dyer &
Singh 1998), accelerating capability building (Hagel & Brown 2005), generic and positioning
strategies (Porter 1985; 1996), firm's innovation strategies (Freeman 1985; 1988), and process
technology strategies (Ford 1988). The proposed purpose of the taxonomic instrument was to help
provide an evolutionary view of the broad value-creation and capability-building strategies in e-
banking in Saudi Arabia. However, the process of developing the instrument met with theoretical,
methodological, and empirical limitations that prevented it from achieving a solid scientific result.
The existing result may therefore be taking as a pointer in need of greater theoretical,
methodological, and empirical work. Consequently, the claim that this thesis has made a theoretical
contribution to knowledge has been entirely eliminated and the entire taxonomic effort as it stands
today has been placed in Appendix V.
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to the implementation of e-banking products and services, as well as a case study on the
implementation of the EFTPOS in the UK during the late 1980s. This review has revealed the
complex nature of the processes of implementation of e-banking, with technological and
organisational aspects deeply interacting in a process that shows a non-linear dynamics and a
fundamentally sociotechnical nature.
The findings of the implementation literature provided an excellent background for the identification
of structured process approaches useful to analyse in detail and comparatively the emergence and
evolution of concrete e-banking experiences in Saudi Arabia. The thesis identified the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
(Molina 2005), as the most suitable for its research problem, since it offers a more structured
framework to organise the comparative study of concrete e-banking experiences. However, the aim of
the thesis is not only to use the approach to reveal how banks build their e-banking capabilities and
create new value strategies; it is also to test critically the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools (Molina 1995; 2003;
2005) for understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building.
Accordingly, the chapter provided a brief positioning of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) in social theory and a review of early "social theory" approaches stressing the
interaction between social and technical factors during the development of technology. On these basis,
the chapter provided justifications for the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) to analysing the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, before
proceeding to its final part: the introduction of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), the most recent conceptual instruments of the




This chapter discusses the research methodology and the path the research process will follow in
conducting the empirical work and analysis. This process is emergent, as will be discussed in the
coming sections. The chapter discusses the research strategy, the research design, the task of
collecting data, and the task of analysing the data.
3.2 Research strategy
In doing social science research, surveys, histories, experiments, the analysis of archival information,
and case studies represent different research strategies. Each strategy has its own logic, its own way of
collecting and analysing evidence, and its own advantages and disadvantages. Researchers need to
appreciate these differences in order to get the most out of using each strategy. Shavelson and Townes
(2002) distinguished these different research strategies through arraying them hierarchically. They
suggested that surveys and histories are suitable for the descriptive phase, experiments are suitable for
doing explanatory or causal inquiries, and case studies are suitable for the exploratory phase of an
investigation.
However, Yin (2003) questioned the hierarchical view and suggested that experiments with an
exploratory purpose have certainly always existed, the development of causal explanations has long
been a serious concern of historians, and case studies are far from being only an exploratory strategy.
Therefore, Yin (2003: 5) suggested that:
"The type of research question posed, the extent of control a researcher has over
actual behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to
historical events are three conditions that distinguish the research strategies."
Using Yin's (2003) classification of different research strategies (see Table 3.2.1), because the focus
of this research is on "how" and "why" question, this leaves us with three strategies: experiment,
history, and case study. Moreover, since the research process will not be able to control behaviour,
this leaves two strategies: history and case study. Finally, because the research needs to focus on a
contemporary event, this leaves only the case study strategy. Therefore, the case study strategy is most
suited to this research. In this respect, the remainder of this section gears the discussion towards the
case study research and the mindset to undertake it.
Strategy Form of research Requires control Focuses on
question of behavioural contemporary
events? events?
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History How, why? No No
Case Study How, why? No Yes
Table 3.2.1 Different research strategies (Yin 2003: 5)
3.2.1 Case study research
Authors of case study research prefer to advance it as a unique research strategy rather than a
qualitative method. Hartley (1994), for instance, expressed the case study as a research strategy
instead of a method. This is obvious from the fact that different methods could be used within a single
case study, be it quantitative as a mail survey, or qualitative as an in-depth interview. The aim is to
examine the phenomena in its context, especially when the distinction between the context and the
phenomenon is sometimes hard to observe (Yin 1981).
In general, although it has been described as a separate research strategy, the case study research does
show a lot of similarities to qualitative methods. Bryman (1988)'s work on the characteristics of
qualitative research suggested that such research is, first of all, devoted to study events through the
eyes of the people being studied. It is contextual in nature, and events have to be understood in their
wider societal and historical background. It is a flexible and open research strategy. Secondly, theories
and propositions act as guides rather than formalised models.
The case study research, in Eisenhardt's (1989: 534) words, "... focuses on understanding the
dynamics present within a single setting". Bonoma (1985) suggested that case studies have to be
structured to be sensitive to the context in which management behaviour takes place. Hussey and
Hussey (1997: 65) defined the case study research as "an extensive examination of a single instance of
a phenomenon of interest and is an example of a phenomenological methodology". Yin (2003)
provided the most integrated definition for the case study research as a research strategy. To quote Yin
(2003: 13):
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident. ... The case study inquiry copes with the
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of
interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence,
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis."
Within the case study research, there are four types suggested by Scapens (1990):
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□ Descriptive case studies: In such studies, the objective is restricted to describe current practice.
□ Illustrative case studies: In such studies, the research attempts to illustrate new and possibly
innovative practices adopted by particular companies.
□ Experimental case studies: In such studies, the research examines the difficulties in
implementing new procedures and techniques in an organisation and evaluating the benefits.
□ Explanatory case studies: In such studies, the research uses existing theory to understand and
explain what is happening.
The different types of case study are not well delineated and one type may be combined with or
merged into another (Hussey & Hussey 1997). In general, using case study research remains one of
the most challenging of all social science endeavours. As a research strategy, the case study is used in
many situations to contribute to the knowledge of individual, group, organisational, social, political,
and related phenomena (Yin 2003). Case study is a method not to be wasted on issues that are
unimportant. Its real power is in part a function of the uses to which it is put (Gillham 2000).
3.2.2 Criticisms of case study strategy
Although case study research can be a very satisfying research strategy, there are some weaknesses. In
case study research, the researcher usually does not follow systematic procedures, or allow ambiguous
evidence or biased views to control the direction of the findings and conclusions. Therefore, one
weakness of the case study research is a lack of rigor, a lack that is less likely to exist when using
other research strategies. Yin (2003) in defence of this argument, explained that what is often
forgotten is that bias can also enter into the conduct of experiments and the use of other research
strategies. The problems are not different, but in the case study research, they may have been more
frequently encountered and less frequently overcome.
A second weakness of the case study research is that it may provide little basis for scientific
generalisation. Yin (2003) rejected this argument through arguing that the case study research is
generalisable to theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes. In Yin (2003: 33)'s
words:
"The case study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sample,' and in doing a
case study, your goal will be to expand the generalise (analytical generalisation) and
not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)" (p. 10). "You should avoid
thinking in such confusing terms as 'the sample size of cases' or the 'small sample
size of cases,' as if a single case study were like a single respondent in a survey or a
single subject in an experiment."
A third weakness of case study research is that it may take too long and result in massive, unreadable
documents. Yin (2003) in clarifying this argument suggested that this argument may be appropriate,
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giving the way the case study research has been done in the past. However, this is not essentially the
way case study research must be done in the future, nor does it need a long time. This incorrectly
confuses the case study research with a specific method of data collection, such as ethnography, which
requires long periods of time and emphasises detailed evidence, or participant-observation, which
requires such a similar time as with ethnography, but still assumes a large investment of field efforts.
In addition to the above weaknesses of the case study research, Hussey and Hussey (1997) mention
other weaknesses. Access to an appropriate organisation is frequently not easy to negotiate and the
process of the research can be very time consuming. It is also not easy to decide upon the limitations
of the study. In other words, where the research is going to position the boundaries? Although the
research may focus on a particular organisation or group of individuals, they do not exist in a vacuum,
but interact with the rest of society.
3.3 Research design
The research design stage basically aims to develop the logic that will link the data to be collected to
the initial questions of the research. It involves the development of logically convincing plans that can
effectively collect the required data to answer the research questions. This section discusses issues
related to the research design. Firstly, it discusses and determines the units of analysis. Secondly, it
discusses the type of the research design used.
3.3.1 Units of analysis
Hussey and Hussey (1997: 66) defined a unit of analysis as "the kind of case to which the variables or
phenomena under study and the research problem refer, and about which data is collected and
analysed." A unit of analysis can be an individual, a company, a group of workers, an event, or a
process. The case study research involves gathering detailed information about the unit of analysis,
often over a very long period of time, with a view to obtaining in-depth knowledge. Yin (2003)
suggested that the tentative definition of the unit of analysis is related to the way the initial research
questions have been defined.
An important issue that needs to be considered in this matter is that the unit of analysis will have a
history and a future, which will influence the understanding of the present. Therefore, it might be
difficult to understand the events in a particular period of time without knowledge ofwhat went before
and what may follow (Hussey & Hussey 1997). In this research, it is possible to have different units of
analysis. However, the research questions lead to favouring the e-banking sociotechnical
constituency-building process (a case) as the primary unit of analysis, and the bank as the secondary
unit of analysis. Looking at several units of analysis would help not only in understanding the
dynamics in operation (Hammady 1999), but also enhancing insights to the single case (Yin 2003).
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3.3.2 Types of research design
The case study research has four basic designs: single-case (holistic) designs, single-case (embedded)
designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case (embedded) designs. The main difference
among these four designs is the number of cases being studied and the number of units of analysis
being implemented. Yin (2003) developed a 2X2 matrix that differentiates such designs of case study
research (see Figure 3.3.1). The matrix shows that every design contains the desire to analyse
contextual conditions as well as single and multiple case studies mirror different design situations,
which can be a single unit or multiple units of analysis.
Figure 3.3.1 Basic types of case study design (Yin 2003: 40)
Yin (2003) suggested that a single case study design is suitable when the case symbolises a significant
text of existing theory, an uncommon or sole circumstance, or a representative or distinctive case, or
when the case provides a revelatory or longitudinal purpose17. Yin has favoured the multiple-case
design over the single-case design for two reasons. First, analytical conclusions arising from the
multiple-case design will not only be more powerful than those arising from the single-case design,
but will also have greatly extended the external generalisability of the findings. Second, if the
17 Yin (2003) pointed out another state in which the single-case study may be used as a pilot case that
is on the first of a multiple-case study. However, such case studies cannot be considered as a whole
study on its own.
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subsequent findings support the hypothesised contrast, the results symbolise a strong start toward
theoretical replication.
Whatever the case study design, the case study may contain a single unit (holistic) or multiple units
(embedded) of analysis. Implementing the earlier design is recommended when logical sub-units
cannot be identified or where the relevant theory underlying the case is itself, of a holistic nature. The
entire case study may be conducted at an abstract level, or shift during the course of the study,
therefore, Yin (2003) recommended the use of the embedded design to overcome such problems.
However, the embedded design also has its own pitfalls. The case study may focus only on the sub-
unit level and fail to return to the larger units of analysis.
This research attempts to present seven case studies. This leaves us with either the multiple-case
(holistic or embedded) designs. Although conducting multiple case study design requires extensive
resources and time, this research is looking to have more powerful conclusions that can strongly
support the external generalisability of the findings. Moreover, this research focuses on multiple-units
of analysis. Although the primary unit of analysis is the e-banking sociotechnical constituency-
building process (a case), another unit of analysis, as the bank, was included in the study. Therefore,
this research makes use of the multiple-case embedded design as a case study design.
3.3.3 Saudi banks typologies
All Saudi banks serve the same target group of customers and provide similar products and services.
This research attempted to analyse the cases according to the different groups of Saudi banks.
However, Al-Duhkeil (1995) provided the only typology that divides Saudi banks, according to their
total assets, into three groups: large, medium, and small. The typology is based on historical analysis
rather than on empirical data. Al-Duhkeil's typology only gives financial indicators, such as, total
assets, as the sole pattern that distinguishes Saudi banks.
This research developed two different typologies based on indicators other than the financial ones.
Based on historical records, the first typology divides Saudi banks in accordance with the ownership
entity, assuming that owners of a bank would influence its general strategic direction. It divides Saudi
banks into four groups. The first group is the national banks which include banks owned totally by
Saudis. The second group is the joint venture banks. These banks are owned by both Saudis and
international banks. The third group is the foreigner investment banks which are owned by Saudis and
non-Saudis. The fourth group emerged in 2001 after liberalising the Saudi banking sector. These
banks are owned entirely by non- Saudis (e.g., Emirates Bank, Deutsche Bank).
The second typology, however, is based on the empirical data gathered during the data collection
stage of this research and deploys the main type of customers being served by a bank as the separation
factor. The typology assumes that the type of customers being targeted by a bank influence its general
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strategic direction. Accordingly, the typology separates Saudi banks into two groups: retail and
corporate banks.
3.4 Data collection
Collecting case study evidence is a critical and time-consuming task. It requires a lot of attention to
every aspect surrounding the case being studied. This section discusses issues related to the data
collection task during the empirical part of the research. Firstly, it discusses the pilot studies as well as
the main fieldwork. Secondly, it discusses sources of evidence used for doing the case studies.
Thirdly, the section discusses issues surrounding the semi-structured interviews, the main source of
evidence. Lastly, the section gears the discussion to the principles used during the data collection task.
3.4.1 Pilot study
Zikmund (2003: 41) defined a pilot study as "any small-scale exploratory research technique that uses
sampling, but does not apply rigorous standards." It collects data from the ultimate subject of the
research to serve as a guide for the larger study (Zikmund 2003) and can cover both substantive and
methodological issues (Yin 2003). The responses and comments received from pilot studies help in
assessing whether the questions are clear, understandable, unambiguous and the like (Arksey &
Knight 1999). They also help to refine the data collection plans with respect to both the content of the
data and the procedures to be followed (Yin 2003).
The research process conducts two pilot studies during August 2003 in Saudi Arabia with AlRajhi and
Riyad. The main criteria for selecting the pilot cases were convenience and access. The first pilot
study involved interviews with CIO, Head of e-Commerce, and Manager of Technical Support, whilst
the second pilot study involved an interview with the Executive Vice President of IT. Moreover, all
interviews followed an in-depth style based on the interview guide18, portrayed below in Table 3.4.1.
The points discussed were not usually in order, allowing the interviewees to explore into the areas that
they found most interesting or important. Nonetheless, throughout all the interviews, theses points
have been addressed in one way or another.
18
I wish to express my deep thanks to the members of the Institute of Banking (IOB), SAMA, who
piloted the pilot studies' interview guide, the survey and the semi-structured interview guide (next
sections). I am thankful to Mr. Omar Al-Abdullatif, Management Training Consultant, Dr. Ziyad
Naji, Head of Management & Marketing Studies Unit, and Dr. Rajappa Prakasam, Director of
Applied Research and Information Centre.
137
General Topic Specific Issues
Position & Role The formal position
The roles & functions undertaken
Perception to Banking Technologies The important of them
Attitude toward them
Investments & plans
Perception of e-Banking The important of it
Attitude toward it
Investments & plans
Strategic Position Intra-bank level
Inter-bank level
Beyond the banking sector
Challenges Banking technologies challenges
E-banking challenges
Strategic challenges
Remarks & Suggestions Perceptions about the interview
Perceptions about the study
Other issues to discuss
Table 3.4.1 Pilot studies' interview guide
These pilot studies are initial and of an exploratory role. The findings of the pilot studies are critically
important in formatting the data collection process, in particular, and the entire research, in general.
The findings lead to the following decisions:
1. To focus on the Saudi market and discard other markets, such as the UK market.
2. To survey all of the existing ten Saudi banks at that time.
3. To use three sources of evidence:
a. A survey to be distributed to all Saudi banks19 (see section 3.4.3 for more details).
b. Semi-structured interviews with interviewees from all Saudi banks and other related
organisations (see section 3.4.3.3 for more details).
c. Archival records of e-banking transactions provided by SAMA (see section 3.4.3.1
for more details).
3.4.2 Main field work
The main fieldwork takes place during three rounds: September-October 2003, December 2003-March
2004, and December 2005-January 2006. The first round (1) distributes the survey to all Saudi banks,
and (2) places a contact at each Saudi bank. The second round (1) conducts semi-structured interviews
19 These banks are AlJazira Bank, AlRajhi Bank (AlRajhi), Arab National Bank (AlArabi), Banque
Saudi Fransi (AlFransi), National Commercial Bank (AlAhli), Riyad Bank (Riyad), Sabb Bank
(Sabb), Samba Financial Group (Samba), Saudi Hollandi Bank (Hollandi) and Saudi Investment
Bank (Saib).
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with all Saudi banks, and (2) obtains the archival records of e-banking transactions from SAMA. The
third round conducts the markings for (1) the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) with six Saudi banks
and Tadawul, and (2) "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) with two Saudi banks and
Tadawul. In this respect, it can be said that the research applies a longitudinal approach as this helps
provide the information necessary to evaluate phase models of strategy development (Schneider &
Sodian 1997).
Separating the main fieldwork into three rounds has its advantages and disadvantages. The first
advantage is that it facilitates a better validation of the findings and strength of the conclusion. The
second advantage is that the questions in the semi-structured interview can, to some extent, be made
more precise following the responses received in the survey. The third advantage is that the second
round becomes an opportunity not only to conduct semi-structured interviews, but also to seek further
clarification and verification on issues mentioned in the survey20. The fourth advantage is that the gaps
between the rounds help to develop trust with the interviewees, a crucial requirement for having
successful interviews (Walsham 1995).
On the other hand, the main pitfalls of separating the main fieldwork into three rounds are time and
cost. Longitudinal studies are costly, time-consuming, and difficult to implement (Schneider & Sodian
1997). In addition, to increase the number of contacts further invites loss of subjects (Murray &
Erickson 1987). The entire fieldwork took about nine months and required travelling to Saudi Arabia
three times.
3.4.3 Sources of evidences
Gillham (2000) and Yin (2003) suggested six sources of evidence that are most commonly used in
case study research: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant
observation, and physical artefacts. Each single source has strengths and weaknesses and no one
20 Indeed, I faced interesting methodological issues on two occasions. The first occasion occurred with
Riyad Bank. Prior to publishing a first version of the qualitative analysis of the Riyad's e-banking
constituency (In Proceedings of the 5th IBIMA Conference on the Internet and information
technology in modern organisations, Cairo: Egypt, 13-15 December 2005, 320-345, see Appendix
V), I received a direct contact from Riyad's Vice CEO criticising the conclusion of the study. The
discussion led to an interview with Riyad's Vice CEO during January 2006 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
to re-assess the initial conclusions of the study. The re-assessment is forthcoming in Soliman, K. S.
(ed.). e-Business impact on supply chain and business process: Analysis and Best Practice, IBIMA
Press: New Your (see Chapter 9 & Appendix V). The second occasion occurred with Saudi
Investment Bank (Saib). Prior to publishing the qualitative study of Saib's e-Banking constituency
(In Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference WWW/Internet. Lisbon: Portugal, 19-22
October 2005, Vol. 1, 118-129, see Appendix V), I received a phone call from Saib's CEO
criticising the interpretation of the role of Saib within the Saudi Arabian banking sector. Such
comments are reflected in the final version of the qualitative study of Saib's e-Banking constituency
(Chapter 6). Such occasions not only helped to clarify many issues, but also supported the validity
of the findings and strength of the conclusion.
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source has a complete advantage over all the others. Therefore, in Yin (2003: 97)'s words, "a major
strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence." In
this research, three relevant sources of evidence have been used: archival records, survey, and semi-
structured interviews. A discussion on collecting such sources follows.
3.4.3.1 Archival records
Gillham (2000: 21) defined archival records as "the things that go back in time, but may provide a
useful longitudinal fix on the present situation." They are either public, usually prepared for some
audience, or private, prepared for private audiences (Berg 1995). Yin (2003) recommended using
archival records in conjunction with other sources of evidence in developing a case study. In such a
situation, care must be taken to determine the circumstances under which they were produced as well
as their accuracy. In Yin's (2003: 89) words, "most archival records were produced for a specific
purpose and a specific audience, and these conditions must be fully appreciated in interpreting the
usefulness and accuracy of the records."
This research attempts to use archival records of e-banking transactions provided from the Banking
Technology Department, SAMA21. SAMA operates all inter-bank technological networks, such as the
Saudi Payments Network (SPAN) and the Saudi Arabian Riyal Inter-bank Express (SARIE). Records
related to transactions performed over such networks are kept with SAMA for settlement and auditing
purposes. The research attempts to use such relevant archival records in conjunction with both the
survey and the semi-structured interviews in doing the case studies. It is believed that using such a
combination will enrich the analysis of case studies and support the accuracy and the validity of the
findings.
3.4.3.2 Survey
A survey is "a positivistic methodology whereby a sample of subjects is drawn from a population and
studied to make inference about the population" (Hussey & Hussey 1997: 63). The development of a
survey research design involves creating a questionnaire, determining the list of questions, and
designing the exact format of the questionnaire (Zikmund 2003). It is normal to collect data about
each member of the population in the case of a small population. However, with a large population, it
would be too time consuming and costly to gather data about every member, and therefore only a
sample of the whole population is used (Hussey & Hussey 1997).
A survey might be used in a case study to obtain quantitative and qualitative data as part of the case
study evidence. According to Yin (2003), this approach would be appropriate, for example, if the case
21 I wish to express my deep thanks to the members of the Banking Technology Department, SAMA. I
am particular thankful to Mr. Ibraheem Al-Sayari and Mr. Ibraheem Al-Saleh for co-operation with
archival records of e-banking transactions.
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study is about an organisation's project and the researcher surveyed a group of workers or managers
about the project. This research uses a survey technique as a part of its sources of evidence. The
research develops a long survey, titled "emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia," to
survey the main divisions and departments at each Saudi bank, such as Retail Banking, Corporate
Banking, Investment and Technology.
The survey aims to gather related information to the emergence and evolution of e-banking at each
Saudi bank. It contains thirteen sections where each section aimed to receive responds from different
divisions or departments. The SAMA's Banking Supervision Department distributed and collected the
survey during October-December 200322. The co-operation with SAMA may raise the argument that
such co-operation would prevent banks from accurately responding to the survey's questions. In
defence of this argument, the research proves that without the co-operation of SAMA, it would not be
possible to not only to access all Saudi banks, but also to obtain such large amounts of evidence.
The development of the survey took place during August-September, 2003. The survey involves a lot
of questions, both closed and open ended questions, about many aspects associated with e-banking
products and services. Moreover, to assess its scope, the survey has been piloted to a group of banking
consultants from the Institute of Banking (IOB), SAMA, during October, 2003. Arthur and Nazroo
(2003) suggested that piloting a survey is significant in reassessing whether the survey's questions
address clearly the full and logical account of the central issues of the study. In general, although
some banks preferred to not answer some of the survey sections/questions, the overall response is very
high, adding more values to the sources of evidence. An electronic copy from the survey has been
placed in Appendix I.
3.4.3.3 Semi-structure interviews
The semi-structured interview is a qualitative data gathering technique, used to gather information
about people's views, opinions, ideas, and experiences (Arksey & Knight 1999). It is placed between
the structured and unstructured interview and involves the use of a number of pre-determined
questions, which are usually asked in an organised and consistent way, and interviewers are allowed
freedom to digress (Berg 1995). According to (Gillham 2000), it is the most important form of
interviewing in case study research. However, Gillham suggested that researchers should not use it
until they become clear about what the research's key issues are, and what will best be answered in a
face-to-face interview.
221 wish to express my deep thanks to the members of the Banking Supervision Department, SAMA. I
am particular thankful to Mr. Ahmed A. Al-Alsheikh and Mr. Saleh M. Al-Sultan for distributing
and collecting the survey.
This research constructs a semi-structured interview guide to guide the discussion. The guide
consisted of four main sections, namely e-banking department, e-banking products and services,
competition and governance/legal aspects, and each section has from six to nine questions organised
in a systematic and consistent order. The guide has been developed after receiving the responses from
the above survey. Therefore, it was not only limited to its predetermined questions, but has also
flexible to seek clarifications and verifications about some critical issues that have been poorly
answered in the survey. Reasonable verifications for the sources of evidence have been gained
through using such techniques. An electronic copy from the guide has been placed in Appendix II.
Prior to the interviews, the research process did not know the optimal interviewees to discuss with
issues related to the emergence and evolution of e-banking. To overcome such challenges and
nominate appropriate interviewees at each bank, the following technique has been implemented. The
guide has been sent to the contact persons to ask them to nominate at least two appropriate
interviewees for the interview. Then, the guide has been sent to the nominated interviewees asking
them to arrange an interview, advising them to be aware of the questions and topics of the interview
prior to the interview. Such techniques helped the research process to make the interview more
focussed on to the predetermined issues.
Most of interviewees are operations and technology people, whilst some of them are strategic people
(see Table 3.4.II). The research process experienced trust development with some interviewees,
relationship free, as suggested by King (1994). These interviewees were usually going beyond the
questions to give an insight into the topic being explored. However, the research process could not
achieve such relationship in other situations. In such situations, the interviewees usually:
"... seek to get the interview over as quickly as possible, with enough detail and
enough feigned interest to satisfy the researcher that he or she is getting something
of value but without saying anything that touches the core of what is actually
believed and cared about in the research ..." (Easterby-Smith et al. 2000: 77).
Interviewees' organisational levels Bank
Strategic AlAhli, Riyad, AlFransi, Hollandi,
Saib, CMA, SAMA, Tadawul
Operational Riyad, AlRajhi, Samba, Saab,
AlFransi, Hollandi, AlArbi, Saib,
AlJazira
Technological AlAhli, Riyad, AlRajhi, Samba,
Saab, Hollandi, AlArbi, AlJazira
Other AlRajhi
Table 3.4.II: Interviewees' organisational level
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3.4.4 Transcribing the interviews
Transcribing is a part of the organisation and management of the data. It is the production of a written
record of the interview. However, many social scientists would deny that there is one real version of
reality to be captured. Accordingly, a transcript is one interpretation of the interview, and no more
than one interpretation. Consequently, "transcription is neither neutral nor value-free. What passes
from tape to paper is the result of decision about what ought to go on to paper" (Arksey & Knight
1999: 141).
Transcribing may be partial or full transcribing. Partial transcribing is where the researcher keeps full
interview notes and has only key sections of the tape transcribed. If the purpose is to use the
interviews to get an understanding of the range of ideas used, then this may be acceptable. Full
transcribing, however, as the name indicates is a full transcribing of the interview. However, such
transcription is expensive (Arksey & Knight 1999). Hart (1987) reported that transcribing an hour of
the interview would require four hours whilst Pidgeon and Henwood (1996) reported that it would
take from eight to ten hours to transcribe an hour of a tape.
Having transcribed the interviews, the interviewer needs to check the transcripts for accuracy and
suitability, which can be time consuming. Arksey and Knight (1999) suggested two approaches for
checking accuracy. The first approach, the faster, is to read the transcript and if it makes sense, leave it
at that, correcting only the obvious errors. The second approach, the slower, is to read the transcript
whilst playing the tape. The decision about which approach to follow "depends on how much it
matters if the faster approach misses points that the slower approach would pick up" (Arksey &
Knight 1999: 146).
In this research, the transcription process was very labour intensive work. Transcribing the interviews
followed the full transcribing approach for transcription and the slower approach of checking for
accuracy suggested above. The reason for that, basically, was to gain full understanding of the cases
being studied. Overall, it took around eight to thirteen hours to transcribe an hour of a recorded semi-
structured interview. The interviewee accent was an important factor in determining the speed of
transcribing. For example, the interviews have been conducted with Saudis, Arabs, British, Dutch,
Americans, Indians, and Chinese. The hardest and most time-consuming to transcribe were those with
a Chinese accent.
The interviews have been recorded with a good quality tape recorder, with a built-in microphone,
sensitive enough to pick up interviewee responses and filter away any background noise. This
investment paid off by providing good quality recorded interviews, which eased to some extent, the
quality of transcribing. Moreover, of the 26 interviews that have been conducted, 22 were taped whilst
the remaining 4, which interviewees refused permission or appeared uncomfortable in its presence,
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relied on note taking. Although notes have been edited immediately after the end of each non-taped
interview, tape recording provided more accurate rendition than note taking.
3.4.5 Triangulation
Ritchie (2003: 43) defined triangulation as "the use of different methods and sources to check the
integrity of inferences drawn from the data." Triangulation assumes that the use of different sources of
evidence helps to confirm and to improve the clarity of research findings (Lewis & Ritchie 2003).
Triangulation has been widely adopted and developed by qualitative researchers as a mean of
investigating the convergence of both the evidences and the findings derived from them. It is also
often quoted as one of the fundamental ways of validating research evidences (Ritchie 2003).
Patton (2002) suggested four different types of triangulation:
1. Method triangulation: comparing data generated by different methods (e. g. qualitative and
quantitative).
2. Sources triangulation: comparing data from different qualitative methods (e. g. observations,
interviews, documented accounts).
3. Analysts' triangulation: using different observers, interviewers, and analysts to compare and
check data collection and interpretation.
4. Theory triangulation: looking at data from different theoretical perspectives.
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that the aim here is to select triangulation sources that have
different biases and strengths, allowing them to complement each other. Denzin (1970) argued that
using different methods adds more reliability than using a single one.
There is a debate about whether triangulation should be used in validating data or in deepening the
understanding of a subject (Lewis & Ritchie 2003). Ritchie (2003) brought two concerns in this
matter. First, there is no single reality of the social world to determine, and trying to do so through the
use of multiple sources of information is useless. Second, all methods are unlikely to generate
perfectly concordant evidence because they have a specificity in terms of the type of data they yield.
However, several authors, according to Ritchie, now argue that the value provided by triangulation
attempts to give a fuller image ofphenomena and not necessarily a more convinced one.
Yin (2003) suggested that the use of multiple sources of evidence is more expensive than collecting
data from a single source, and each researcher needs to know how to implement different ranges of
data collection techniques. Hussey and Hussey (1997) added that the task is very complicated and
should aim to create a good research design rather than to fix a poor design. In general, the most
important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of
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"converging lines of inquiry". Findings based on several different sources of information are likely to
be more convincing (Yin 2003).
The triangulation strategy depended on the use of a multiple case study research design, the conduct
of interviews with different interviewees from each bank, and the attempt to inspect the three sources
of evidence. According to Stake (1994: 241), such technique could "clarify meaning by identifying
different ways the phenomenon is being seen." Moreover, the achievement in triangulation depended
on how co-operative the banks were. For example, four interviewees have been interviewed at some
banks but only one interviewee from one bank. Additionally, there was a challenge accessing strategic
documents at banks. Overall, the research invested in all available efforts to successfully strengthen
the strategy.
3.5 Data analysis
Data analysis involves examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or re-combining both quantitative
and qualitative evidence to address a study's questions (Yin, 2003)23. Robson (1993) suggested that
the main challenge to qualitative data analysis is that there is no clear and accepted set of rules for
analysis corresponding to those observed with quantitative data. Morse (1994: 23) added, "despite the
proliferation of qualitative methodology texts detailing techniques for conducting a qualitative project,
the actual process of data analysis remains poorly described."
Analysis of case study evidence is especially difficult because the strategies and techniques have not
been well defined (Yin 2003). This section discusses issues related to the data analysis task practiced
during the empirical part of the research. Firstly, it discusses the general analytical strategy. Secondly,
it discusses the deployed data analysis techniques. Then, it highlights the methods and the cross-case
analysis strategies that have been used. Lastly, the section gears the discussion to the computer-aided
program used to analyse the data.
3.5.1 Data analysis strategy
Case studies can be conducted from different sectors of the industry to capture the similarities and the
differences in the technological innovation process (Narvekar & Karuna 2006). However, the analysis
23 A lot of references have been made so far to Yin (2003). In fact, "the author is a prominent writer
on case study method and could be considered the authority on case studies" (Hammady 1999: 92).
His book, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, "has done more than anything else to
establish the case study as a legitimate more of research" (Gillham 2000: 103). Piatt (1992: 46)
stated that "what Yin has done, thus, is to redefine case study method as a logic of design, seeing it
as a strategy to be preferred when circumstances and research problems are appropriate rather than
an ideological commitment to be followed whatever the circumstances. The logic he uses is,
moreover, one generally accepted among contemporary methodologists more than an alternative
one; he has brought (his conception of) case study method into the mainstream intellectually, even
if this does not yet show in the general textbooks."
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of a case study is one of the most difficult and least developed tasks. This is because "there are few
fixed formulas or cookbook recipes to guide the novice. Instead, much depends on an investigator's
own style of rigorous thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and careful
consideration of alternative interpretations" (Yin 2003: 110). Consequently, to analyse case study
evidence, a general analytical strategy is needed. Yin suggested three strategies; relying on theoretical
propositions, setting up a framework based on rival explanations, and developing case descriptions. A
discussion of each strategy is below.
3.5.1.1 Theoretical propositions
This strategy simply builds the original objectives and design of the case study on theoretical
propositions. Such propositions would reflect a set of research questions, reviews of the literature, and
new hypotheses or proposition, shape the data collection plan, and give priorities to the relevant
analytic strategies (Yin 2003). Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggested that the use of theoretical
propositions in analysing case study evidence helps to frame the research and give possible
interpretations of what is observed. Yakhlef (2001), for instance, studied the Internet as a new locus
for value creation at three ventures - a virtual university, a restaurant, and a music store - via using
three value-adding strategies - content, context, and infrastructure.
3.5.1.2 Rival explanations
This strategy attempts to define and test rival explanations. The strategy is especially useful in doing
case study evaluations. Yin (2003: 113) suggested "the more rivals that the analysis addresses and
rejects, the more confidence you can place in your findings." An example of using the rival
explanation strategy in analysis, a case study is Rao's (1999) study on the impact of the Internet on the
value chain of three industries that have been either radically altered by the Internet, or that are facing
tremendous challenges as they head into the future - the retailing industry, banking industry, and the
music industry.
3.5.1.3 Case descriptions
This strategy attempts to develop a descriptive framework to organise the case study. It is a less
preferable choice than the other two strategies, but serves as an option when there are problems with
either of the other strategies. Yin (2003) suggested that this strategy is suitable when the original
purpose of the case study is a descriptive one, or when a descriptive approach helps to identify the
appropriate causal links to be studied. Aladwani's (2001) study of the perceptions of banks' executive
and IT managers, and potential customers with regard to the drivers, development challenges, and
expectations of online banking is an example of using the case description strategy.
Although using a general analytical strategy is very critical in the analysis of a case study, the creative
logic behind the entire process is the challenge. To quote Yin (2003: 111):
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"The strategy will help you to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling
analytical conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations.... Regardless of the
choice of strategies, a persistent challenge is to produce high-quality analyses,
which require investigators to attend to all the evidence, display and present the
evidence separate from any interpretation, and show adequate concern for exploring
alternative interpretations."
The thesis utilises the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its
associated analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina
2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005). As indicated earlier, the aim from
conducting such large deployment from a single theoretical field is not only to reveal how banks build
their e-banking capabilities as well as create new value strategies, but also to test the applicability of
the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools
(Molina 1995; 2003; 2005) for understanding the potentials of e-banking value creation and
capabilities-building. The markings for both "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy
mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) were conducted by a member of the constituency at each bank
through semi-structured interviews. Each member received a full version of the case study description
and was asked during the interview to evaluate the state of alignment.
One of the challenges emerged during the evaluation process is the availability of the same
interviewee who had been interviewed two years ago. For example, interviewees from Riyad were
interviewed during January 2004 have left the bank. During January 2006, a new interviewee has been
interviewed who has not only almost no background about the research, but also a different view
about the state of alignment during the e-banking constituency-building process. Another challenge
was the accuracy of the evaluation as there was only one evaluator from each bank, eliminating a
general view of the state of alignment process.
The overall result has generated a clear overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the different
alignments implied in the e-banking constituency-building process. It has also provided interesting
insights about the e-banking constituency-building process. The resulting pattern highlighted those
areas requiring greater attention to secure the success of the constituency, consequently, assisted in
devising strategic responses for the future.
3.5.2 Data analysis techniques
In the analysis of case studies, Yin (2003) suggested the following five techniques that can be
practiced to implement one of the data analysis strategies described above:
1. Pattern matching: This technique contrasts an empirically based pattern with single or
multiple predictions, hoping to find matching patterns that will strengthen the internal
validity of the case being studied.
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2. Explanation building: This technique aims to analyse the case study evidence through
building an explanation about the case.
3. Time-series analysis: This technique performs a time-series analysis that can pursue many
intricate patterns. The more intricate and accurate the pattern, the more technique will lay a
concrete base for the conclusions of the case study. In doing a multiple case study, the same
logic can be used, with different time series patterns suggested for different cases.
4. Logic models: This technique consists of matching empirically observed events to
theoretically predicted events. It specifies a complicated chain of events over time where the
events are dramatic in repeated cause-effect-cause-effect patterns.
5. Cross-case synthesis: This technique is only applied to the analysis ofmultiple cases and it is
particularly applicable if a case study involves more than one case.
This research attempts to use both the pattern matching technique and the explanation building
technique. The reason for that was to understand what was happing during the development of e-
banking products and services as well as what possible explanations to the questions can be drawn.
Moreover, the logic models strategy has been used to theoretically contribute to the propositions being
used. The cross case synthesis also has been used to value the findings at the multiple case level. The
argument here is that using multiple techniques in implementing the data analysis strategy is useful
and hoped by doing so, to draw findings that are logically convincing.
3.5.3 Data analysis methods
One of the few books giving helpful advice for analysing qualitative data is Miles and Huberman
(1994). They suggested qualitative data analysis methods that are useful during the early stages of a
study, often while data collection is going on. They also suggested that early analysis helps to cycle
back and fourth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new
data. What follows is a description for the two methods used in the research, namely coding and
pattern coding.
3.5.3.1 Codes and coding
Miles and Huberman (1994: 56) defined codes as "tags or labels for assigning units ofmeaning to the
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study". Coding involves how researchers
distinguish and merge the collected evidence and how they make reflections concerning such
evidence. Miles and Huberman suggested developing an impermanent start-list of codes prior to
fieldwork. Such a list comes from the theoretical framework being used, the list of research questions,
hypotheses, problem areas, and/or key variables that the researcher brings to the study. The list should
involve codes in a coherent way and definitions of what each code mean to the study. Table 3.5.1
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portrays the provisional start-list of codes. The codes were adopted from the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993).
Code ID Main Codes
CPGAR Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
NMT Nature and maturity of the technology
G Organisational governance
TCPP Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
NTP Nature of target problem
ITC Interacting technologies/constituencies
Table 3.5.1 Provisional list of codes
3.5.3.2 Pattern coding
Pattern codes are explanatory or inferential codes that identify an emergent theme, configuration, or
explanation. Pattern coding aims to filter a lot of data into more meaningful components. According to
Miles and Huberman (1994), it reduces large amount of evidence into a smaller number of analytic
units. It also gets the researchers into analysis during data collection and helps them to elaborate a
cognitive map, a more integrated scheme for understanding local events and interactions. For multiple
case studies, pattern coding lays the groundwork for cross-case analysis by surfacing common themes
and directional processes.
3.5.4 Strategies for cross-case analysis
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested two fundamental reasons for doing cross-case analysis. First, it
enhances generalisation, although it is argued that this goal is improper for case studies. Second, it
expands understanding and explanation. The implication is not that one or the other approach is better
for case study analysis, rather, the issue is one of making reasonable choices, alternating and/or
combining/integrating methods as a study procedure. Miles and Huberman (1994) discussed the
following analytical strategies that are appropriate when dealing with cross-case analysis:
□ Replication strategy: This strategy, sponsored by Yin (2003), used a framework to study one
case in depth, and then following cases are studied to find matching patterns with the
previous case.
□ Multiple exemplars strategy: This strategy, advocated by Denzin (1989), collected multiple
cases, bracketed them, and inspected them for critical elements or components. The elements
are then reconstructed into an efficient way and put back into the natural social context.
□ Types or families strategy: This strategy approaches the analysis through structuring types or
families and examines cases in a set to find out whether they emerge into clusters, which can
sometimes be ordered or sorted along some dimensions.
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□ Meta-ethnography strategy: This strategy involves using the findings of one study to predict
those of another study, looking at inconsistent cross-case findings, and constructing a
common interpretation based in the findings of separate studies.
□ Pattern clarification strategy: This strategy comes to sort such difficulty. The strategy
approaches the analysis through looking for themes that cut across cases.
□ Stacking comparable cases strategy: This strategy writes up first, each case via the use of a
standard set of factors, then uses matrices and other displays to analyse each case in-depth.
After a detailed understanding of each case, the strategy stacks the case-level displays in a
meta-matrix, which is then further condensed, allowing systematic contrasting.
□ Interactive synthesis strategy: This strategy, supported by Fischer and Wertz (1975),
approaches the cross-case analysis through writing individual case synopses, then by carrying
out a cross-case narrative with themes and a general condensation, followed by cycling back
to the case synopses to see how the condensation was exemplified there, and lastly writing a
general structure describing the process being studied.
□ Boolean analysis strategy: This strategy, provided by Ragin (1987), involves arraying binary
data on several variables for each of the several cases in a truth table and then identifying
alternative patterns ofmultiple conjunctural causations.
The above analytical strategies seem to provide useful scenarios and guides when there is a need to
perform a cross-case analysis. However, each strategy has its advantages and disadvantages and seeks
different requirements. Giving the aim of the cross-case analysis as well as the research questions, this
research attempted to use the stacking comparable cases strategy to guide the cross-case analysis.
Using such strategy would help clarify informative conclusions and confidently generalise the
findings. However, the research has been flexible in practicing other strategies when there was a need
to do so.
3.5.5 Computer aided approaches
There is much existing literature on computer-assisted methods for qualitative data analysis, which
charts the development of computer approaches and appraises the process and outputs they generate.
There have been several attempts within the literature to classify the different types of computer
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) that have come into existence since the early
1980s (Spencer et al. 2003). Miles and Huberman (1994) and Weitzman (2000) provided the most up-
to-date categorisation ofCAQDAS software, which categorises software into six types:
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1. Word processors: Word processors, such as MS Word, are basically designed for the
production and revision of text, and are useful for taking, transcribing, writing up, or editing
field notes, for memos, for preparing files for coding and analysis, and for writing report text.
2. Text retrievers: These programs facilitate the searching of large amounts of data for instances
of words or phrases. Examples of such programs include Metamorph, Sonar Professional,
and WordCrunche.
3. Text managers: These programs are data management packages that provide a route to the
data stored and are usually searched in a similar way to text retrieval programs. Examples of
such programs are FolioVIEWS, MAX, and ZylNDEX.
4. Code-and-retrieve programs: These programs allow the analyst to label or tag passages of
text that can later be retrieved according to the codes applied. Examples of code and retrieve
programs include Ethnograph, NUDIST, and NVivo.
5. Theory builders: These programs support the conceptualisation of data by the analyst and
may also have extended hyperlinking facilities, which allow the analyst to create links
between different aspects of the data set. Examples of such programs include AQUAD,
NUDIST, and NVivo.
6. Network builders: These programs facilitate the graphic display and investigation of
conceptual, cognitive, or semantic networks within a data set. Examples of network builders
programs are MECA, ATLAS/ti, and MetaDesign.
Within the existing literature, there is much emphasis placed on finding the optimal program for the
data analysis, rather than developing the structures and processes of a particular piece of software to
dictate how the researcher carried out qualitative analysis (Spencer et al. 2003). Therefore, Weitzman
and Miles (1995) suggested that the most important functions to investigate in a CAQDAS software
are coding, memos or annotation, data linking, search and retrieval, concept/theory development, data
display, graphic editing, flexibility, and user friendliness.
In comparison with manual methods, the main benefits of CAQDAS software are "the speed in
handling large amounts of data, the improvements in rigour or consistency of approach, the facilitation
of team research, the ability to assist with conceptualisation of data and theory building, and the
relative ease of navigation and linking of data" (Spencer et al. 2003: 207). However, according to
Spencer et al, there is a concern about the implications of different software types for analytical
process and output. Therefore, many researchers advocate the use of hypertext links that do not
segment text, and permit the analyst to browse and create complex pathways through data as an
alternative use of computers to aid qualitative data analysis.
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Overall, the use of CAQDAS software in qualitative data analysis should not obviate the crucial role
of the researchers within the analysis process (Spencer et al, 2003). Therefore, Weitzman (2000: 805)
asserted that "using software cannot be a substitute for learning data analysis methods". Coffey and
Atkinson (1996: 187) also stated that:
"None of the computer programs will perform automatic data analysis. They all
depend on researchers defining for themselves what analytic issues are to be
explored, what ideas are important, and what modes of representation are most
appropriate."
Among the above CAQDAS software, Ethnograph was the least sophisticated system and might have
been sufficient for this research's data management requirements (Ghuloom 1997). However, this
research used desktop applications, such as MS Excel and MS Access, to analyse the sources of
evidence.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the research methodology and the path the research process followed in
conducting the empirical work and analysis. The chapter discussed the aim of the thesis, the research
strategy, the research design, the task of collecting data and the task of analysing the data.
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Chapter 4: Samba Financial Group
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Samba24. It provides a brief
overview of Samba and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 25 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 4.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at Samba25.
Interviewee Date
e-Banking Analyst December 2003
e-Consumer Manager December 2003
IT Head December 2003
e-Banking Analyst January 2006
Table 4.1.1 Interviews conducted at Samba
4.2 Brief overview
Samba opened for business in 1980 after taking over the existing two branches of Citibank in Riyadh
and Jeddah. The initial capital of SAR 300 m was increased to SAR 600 m in 1988, to SAR 1,200 m
in 1992, and to SAR 2,400 m in 1995.
Samba's strategy is that "we will focus our efforts and resources in offering superior world-class
services and maintain our leadership in the banking arena," (Samba 2005). Its mission statement
reflects its scope (Samba 2004: 15):
"To provide the premier financial institution in Saudi Arabia, providing world class
solutions to our customers; not only meeting their needs but serving them beyond
their expectations; investing in people; benefiting the communities in which we
operate, delivering superior returns to our investors."
24An initial version of Samba's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2005a. The
emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia: The case of Samba Financial Group. In
Proceedings of e-Business Research Forum 2004. Tampere: Finland. 20-22 September. Vol. 1, 90-
106. An electronic copy from the paper is attached as a part of Appendix III with permissions from
both the publisher, Tampere University of Technology and Tampere University, and the co-author,
Professor Alfonso Molina.
251 wish to express my deep thanks to Samba's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions. Also, I wish to thank the Samba's Financial Control & Planning Group for
administering the survey, and all other groups and divisions who responded to the survey.
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Figure 4.2.1 goes deeper than the mission statements and provides Samba's core values that involve
customers, stag, improvement, corporate citizenship, and investors.
We are dedicated to our customers ...
A strong resolve and commitment to provide solutions
encompassing advice and choices, while consistently
delivering high quality services.
We are committed to our people ...
A work environment that embraces excellence as a
discipline ... attracts it... reward it... and protects it
We always look for ways to improve ourselves ...
Relentlessly focused on quality, encouraging innovation, and
initiative taking, communicating freely ... openly ... and
transcending business boundaries.
We stand for sound corporate citizenship ...
We never compromise our integrity ... active in community
programs ... respectful to laws and regulations.
We deliver superior returns to our investors ...
A business strategy that is responsive to market
Conditions with a long term perspective.
Figure 4.2.1 Samba's core values (Samba 2006)
During the mid-1980s, Samba started looking towards overseas expansion whilst focusing on retail,
corporate, and investment businesses in domestic banking. In the 1990s, "the bank has identified
leadership, in every facet of its banking activities, as the mission of the decade" (Al-Duhkeil 1995:
78). In line with this statement, Samba continued to offer innovative products and services, and kept
up the pace of technological upgrading. Since its inception, Samba embarked upon a conscious policy
of branch expansion based on the continuing evaluation of customer service needs. Both its structural
set-up and its organisation of activities continue to reflect its sense of the changing needs of various
customer segments, which "seems to be identifying rather too clos.ely with the elite class" (Al-Duhkeil
1995: 78) (see
Table 4.2.1).
For years ended December 31
(SAR millions) 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
No. of branches 5% 4% 4% 4% 5%
Total assets 9% 11% 14% 19% 15%
Total liabilities 9% 11% 14% 20% 14%
Share capital 21% 20% 11% 14% 16%
Shareholders equity 11% 11% 10% 18% 15%
Net income from operations 16% 20% 24% 24% 11%
Table 4.2.1 Samba's market share positions, 5-year periods, (Al-Duhkeil 1995; Tadawul 2006)
By 1997, Samba was providing traditional banking products and services through 43 branches across
Saudi Arabia, amounting to about 4% of the sector's working branches. Samba was the third largest
bank in terms of total assets and the second largest in terms of net income, at SAR 45,633 m and SAR
1,042 m, respectively. In terms of ownership and organisation, Citigroup held 30% of Samba's shares
and Saudi nationals, including two agencies for social welfare, held the remaining 70%. Citigroup
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managed Samba as a local Saudi subsidiary through its management team led by Mr. Mike de
Graffenried as the bank's Managing Director. Citigroup controlled the Board of Directors (BODs) and
defined the long-term policy and strategy of the bank. The organisational structure was similar to
other banks with the Consumer Banking Group being the biggest division, in terms of budget and
number of operations, followed by the Corporate & Investment Banking Group.
4.3 Some key events
Samba has faced many challenges since its inception. However, two key events required Samba not
only to restructure itself, but also to realign its strategy. The first key event was the merger with the
United Saudi Bank (USB) in 1999 and the second key event was the transfer of its management from
Citigroup to local management.
4.3.1 Merger with the United Saudi Bank (USB)
In 1997, the sector underwent a major development when two small banks, the United Saudi
Commercial Bank (USCB) and Saudi Cairo Bank (SCB), merged into a new medium-size bank
named the United Saudi Bank (USB). While USB was restructuring and recovering previous losses,
Samba merged with USB in 1999, forming one of the largest banks in the Middle East with a share
capital of SAR 4,000 m. The merger not only formed the most profitable and one of the largest banks
in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, it also created a dynamic institution that rapidly started
developing new products and producing better results. Table 4.3.1 portrays some key indicators before







Total assets (SAR) 45,633 m 11.95% 77,034 m 19.05%
Share capital (SAR) 2,400 m 11.89% 4,000 m 17.37%
No. of branches 43 3.75% 80 6.69%
No. ofATMs 108 6.39% 198 9.82%
No. of POS terminals 810 5.37% 1,341 8.00%
Table 4.3.1 Key indicators before and after the merger (Tadawul 2006; SAMA 2006)
4.3.2 Local management
The second key event which happened to Samba was the change in management in late 2003. Since its
inception, Samba had been a joint venture bank between Citigroup, the single largest shareholder with
initially 40% share, and Saudi nationals that owned the remaining 60%. Accordingly, the bank's name
was Saudi American Bank (Samba) and Citigroup managed it as a local Saudi subsidiary. Although
Citigroup's share had been reduced twice in the past - first in late 1991 when it sold a 10% stake (Al-
Duhkeil 1995) and then in late 1999 following the merger with USB - Citigroup continued managing
Samba until late 2003 when Samba concluded an agreement with Citigroup to complete the transfer to
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local management. According to Samba's statement after the announcement of the agreement (BME
2003):
"Citigroup staff currently account for less than 1 % of the bank staff, and in the years
since inception the bank has built a strong and independent credit process and an
independent technical infrastructure...that was autonomously developed in-house."
Because of the agreement, Samba renamed itself with its former acronym, Samba, and explained the
move by simply stating, "The name Samba reflects the close relationship between the bank and its
clients" (BME 2003). Moreover, Samba's BODs appointed a Saudi national, Mr. Eisa Al-Eisa, as the
new Managing Director to replace the American Managing Director, Mr. Mike de Graffenried. Samba
also modified its organisational structure by decentralising some divisions, such as Operations (see
Figure 4.3.1). According to Samba's officials, "the name change was a natural thing for the bank to do
in light of its change of ownership and management structure" (BME 2004). Following these changes,
Citigroup announced in May, 2004 that it had reached an agreement to sell its 20% share in Samba to
the Public Investment Fund (PIE)26 (Citibank 2004), thus making it a fully owned Saudi institution.
Figure 4.3.1 Samba's organisational chart (Samba survey 2003; Samba 2006)
26 The Public Investment Fund (PIF) is a governmental investment fund that was established by Royal
Decree No. (M/24), dated 25-6-1391H to provide financing for certain productive projects that are
of a commercial nature and are having a significant importance in developing the national economy,
which the private sector lacks as the ability to under take alone, either because of insufficient
experience or inadequate capital or both (MOF 2006).
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Today, Samba is competing with 11 other banks in Saudi Arabia, including two Arabian banks, while
keeping an eye on the new national Islamic bank, Bank AlBilad (AlBilad) as well as on a number of
international banks recently arrived due to market liberalisation.
In order to meet the growing demand for Islamic banking, Samba has also started to offer new Islamic
products and services, such as the AlSunbula Investment Fund and AlKhair card. Islamic banking,
however, is a viable banking system that mainly aims to achieve "social and economic development
through the delivery of financial services in line with the principles and teachings of Islam" (Metawa
& Almossawi 1998: 229), where "banks may perform most, if not all, of their functions provided that
they avoid the payment and receipt of interest" (Metwally 1997: 954).
Samba employs about 2,700 employees - of which 13% are outsourced employees - and operates
about 65 branches dedicated to serving about 500,000 retail and 600 corporate customers. Such a
customer base is no longer confined to the "elite class", as Al-Duhkeil (1995, 78) stated, since the
merger with USB and SCB opened access to new classes of customers, according to Samba's branch
manager. Samba increased its capital in 2005 by 50% (i.e. SAR 6,000) and today it is considered the
second largest in terms of total assets, SAR 79,038 m, although it ranks fourth from the point of view
of net income, with SAR 1,436 m (Tadawul 2006).
In terms of budget and number of operations, the Consumer Banking Group continues to be the
biggest division, followed by the Corporate & Investment Banking Group. As we shall see, the
provision of high-tech, specialised banking services is the cornerstone of Samba's achievements.
Currently, Samba operates 760 ATMs, 3,719 POS terminals, 3 global investment centres, and 28
speed cash centres. Samba has also launched its telephone, internet, and B2B banking services for
both retail and corporate customers.
4.4 The development of Samba e-banking constituency
Samba's executives are proud of an IT history that reflects a tradition and culture of innovativeness:
"One of the major strengths of our brand name is innovation. In the market and
according to our research over many years, the perception of the Samba brand name
is about innovation. We have always been counted as have as an advanced bank in
terms of technology. This is because we know how to leverage the technology to
serve our business needs and strengthen our strategic direction," (e-Consumer
Manager).
This section discusses the evolution of the Samba e-banking constituency by applying the conceptual
lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis is a two-
layered intra- and inter-organisational diamond given that important features of the Samba e-banking
constituency-building process are the result of inter-organisational interactions between Samba and
other organisations. The discussion also distinguishes two distinctive periods in the evolution of the
Samba e-banking constituency. The first period goes from the beginnings of Samba to the late 1990s
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when the merger with USB occurred. This is followed by the second period that extends until today
and, in which the Internet plays a major role. To highlight the differences between the two periods, the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) is applied separately to each of the two periods.
4.4.1 Origins and first phase of Samba e-banking constituency
This section looks at the development of the constituency in the first phase, which goes from the
beginnings of Samba to the late 1990s when the merger with USB occurred. The discussion follows
the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995).
4.4.1.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
Since its formation, Samba has embarked upon a conscious policy of technology and innovation that
saw the first developments of e-banking. Thus, in the early 1980s, Samba acquired and implemented
the core banking system of Citigroup, named DEFINE, after tailoring it to fit with the Saudi banking
context. DEFINE furnished the business needs of Samba until the early 1990s when SPAN went live.
In order to cope with the new technical features imposed by SPAN on all Saudi banks, Samba had to
shift DEFINE to an open-system platform and upgrade its entire hardware facilities in 1995. This
facilitated the integration of what was, until then, a largely fragmented IT system, with almost all
divisions and departments using different front-office applications, such as Bloomberg, a financial
markets information system, to handle its day-to-day operations.
During this period, Samba's general information and communication technology (ICT) literacy was
highly compared to Saudi competitors, although it was less developed compared to international
banks. The Technology & Operations Group (T&O) handled the technical and business aspects of
Samba's technology, and received technical assistance from Citigroup Technology Group (CTG) and
many external consultants. In the mid-1990s, CTG operated a network of 106 ATMs and 803 POS
terminals, and it was developing an e-business platform for e-banking products and services. It
launched a telephone banking service, SambaPhone, in 1996, and completed the linkage with SARIE.
Clearly, the Samba e-banking constituency developed substantially during the first phase, in a close
interplay between intra- and inter-organisational relations. Not only a great deal of ICTs expertise
came from outside. Also alignment with regulatory "standard" technologies, such as those of SPAN
and SARIE infrastructures, helped shape the characteristics and evolution of its e-banking technology
(see Alignment 4-4i).
4.4.1.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
Information technology evolves continuously and there is always a frontier of emerging technologies
and others that mature as their application becomes well proven. During the first phase, the Samba e-
banking constituency relied mostly on proven IT systems acquired or conforming to systems from
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external organisations. Thus, Citigroup's DEFINE system was followed by the open back-office
system.
The latter used standard mature technologies provided mainly by IBM. Its hardware components
involved a group of IBM servers running a group of specially developed applications. For Samba,
however, its implementation was technically demanding in terms of investment and training.
Therefore, the technical people were continuously training to gain the required new skills.
In terms of performance, the specifications of the open back-office system implied major
cost/performance improvements in relation to DEFINE. For example, the average response time of an
ATM transaction for a non-bank customer improved. Such performance enabled the bank's ATM
network to provide more services to non-bank customers.
4.4.1.3 Alignment (1 -1 i) - Organisational governance
During the first phase, the Technology Steering Committee (TSC) has influenced development of the
Samba e-banking constituency at the intra-organisational level. The IT decision-making process
involves balancing the demands of both a highly centralised organisation and a culture of participation
that follows a collaborative approach between IT and business. For any IT initiative to be approved by
Samba, the T&O has to make an Internal MEP, a business case that provides the rational, estimated
cost, proposed return and tools to measure the success of the initiative. The TSC, then, studies the
internal MEP and decides whether to accept or reject the initiative. While it still existed, CTG
influenced the initiatives as external consultant to the committee.
At the inter-organisational level, however, both SAMA and the Saudi Telecom Company (STC), the
sole telecommunications provider in Saudi Arabia, influenced the constituency. On the one hand, the
technical requirements of many proposed e-banking products and services should fit with the
capabilities of the national communications infrastructure. Whilst on the other hand, any product or
service has to meet certain criteria imposed by SAMA, which pursues, according to Al-Suhaimi
(1998: 63), "a collaborative rather than a competitive approach among Saudi banks to the
development of a common payments infrastructure ... ensuring a rational and consistent national
strategy for payment systems."
4.4.1.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
This dimension relates to the people and organisations Samba has been seeking to enrol behind its e-
banking products and services. During the first phase, Samba was offering only three forms of e-
banking: ATMs, POS terminals and telephone banking. In the intra-organisational environment, the
back-office system was migrating from one platform to another and the technical aspects of e-banking
were not yet completed. E-banking development was targeting a variety of constituents as it was
lacking knowledge, the right technical people, optimal technologies, and investment. In order to face
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such challenges, Samba built two strategic alliances with Indian IT firms to handle the development
process.
In the market, however, the achievements with target customers were not encouraging as Samba's e-
banking share was decreasing. On average, the bank's ATM and POS market shares decreased by
6.54% and 26.02% per year, respectively, during the first phase. This did not mean that Samba was
decreasing the number of ATMs and POS terminals in the market. Rather, competitors were rapidly
installing more ATMs and POS terminals than Samba was. All this meant a weakening of the
alignment of Samba e-banking constituency with dimension 2 of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995).
4.4.1.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
This dimension highlights the problem the constituency had set for itself through the vision and
objectives it was seeking to achieve. In the case of Samba, the vision behind the launch of e-banking
was "open, quick time to market, security, and high quality" (IT Head). The main objectives were "to
meet clients' needs, to improve the competitive position and image, to off-load transactions on
branches, and to retain existing clients and acquire new ones" (e-Consumer Manager).
The realisation of these objectives through e-banking, however, involved some important issues. First
was the "follower" approach taken by Samba, in using proven technology developed by others.
Closely associated with this was the issue of the build-up of internal knowledge and expertise required
by Samba. Samba was faced with a lack of knowledge as the optimal skills where not easily available
in the market. Samba, however, was all the time gaining the required knowledge to pursue its own
development later on.
Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
This dimension highlights how the environment of interacting technologies and standards affects the
development of the Samba e-banking constituency. Intra-organisationally, by 1997, the open back-
office system was well aligned with the legacy systems. In addition, Samba implemented continuous
training of its technical staff to align to the technical demands of the technology. It also implemented
software enhancements to smooth the synchronisation of data. In this respect, the constituency had to
respond to the problem of high training costs and lack of technical knowledge to deal with different
technologies.
Inter-organisationally, as anticipated already, the Samba e-banking constituency had to align with the
regulatory "standard" technologies, such as those of SPAN and SARIE infrastructures. SAMA "had
chosen a leadership role in establishing an integrated and comprehensive electronic payments
infrastructure while continuing to support traditional payment vehicles" (Al-Suhaimi 1998, 63). For
almost a decade, SAMA promoted several national initiatives, such as automated clearance house
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(ACH) in 1986, SPAN in 1990 and SARIE in 1997. The Samba e-banking constituency had to align
with all of these initiatives if it was to develop successfully within the increasingly networked Saudi
banking system.
4.4.1.6 Summary
During the first phase (i.e. before 1997), the Samba e-banking constituency-building process shows an
evolution of capabilities from an initial almost complete reliance on external technology sources to the
gradual development of internal capabilities through continuous training of Samba's own technical
personnel. In other words, the Samba e-banking constituency largely implemented a "follower"
strategy, with a fundamental role played by the inter-organisational dimension of the constituency-
building process.
4.4.2 The present phase of Samba e-banking constituency
This section looks at the development of the Samba constituency in the present phase, in which the
Internet and mobile telephony begin to play a key role in the provision of new e-banking products and
services. The discussion again follows the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995).
4.4.2.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
With the spreading of the Internet in Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, Samba started the development of
its e-business platform and a middleware application. The new platform required the bank to re-
upgrade its entire hardware facilities with very advanced and mature products. At the front-end, the
bank inaugurated its e-banking products and services. In November 1999, Samba launched its first
initiative over the Internet, Samba.com, comprising static web content that provided existing and
prospective customers with information about products and services.
In 2001, Samba launched its Internet banking service for both corporate, SambaAccess, and retail
customers, SambaOnline, and operated a short message service (SMS), SambaAlert, to update
customers via their mobile phones with their banking transactions. In 2002, the bank furnished its
customers with online national and international brokerage services, named SambaTadawul and
SambaDirect, respectively, as the first Saudi bank to offer such services. The year 2003 witnessed the
launch of SambaConnect, an Internet's payment gateway service between Internet shoppers and
merchants. The use of SambaConnect is open for both Samba's customers and non-customers. eCare,
an automated customer query-handling module, was another e-banking service introduced in 2004. In
2005, SambaTadawul has been modified to allow customers to trade at both Abu-Dhabi and Dubai's
stock exchanges of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The organisational structure is more decentralised than that of 1997 with the T&O being split into two
separate groups: IT Group and Operations Group. The IT Group continues to develop the e-banking
while the Operations Group operates the e-banking. The business aspects of e-banking, however, are
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done at the e-Banking Department, a new department created in 2001. The e-Banking Department has
two sections: e-Consumer with the Consumer Banking Group and e-Corporate/e-Investment with the
Corporate & Investment Banking Group. Each section handles the e-banking business development of
its group and transfers its needs to the IT Group for technical feasibility and automation (see Figure
4.3.1).
Although the IT Group is no longer receiving technical assistance from CTG, general ICT literacy has
improved significantly now that a new e-business platform, a new middleware system, new internal
applications (e.g., e-Procurement & Travel and Expense), upgraded hardware facilities, 247 ATMs,
and 2,132 POS terminals are in place. Since 2001, Samba has been launching almost all forms of e-
banking products and services (e.g., SambaOnline and SambaTadawul). The development of such
products and services absorbed a large portion of the IT Group's budget. Externally, the e-banking
collaborative approach imposed by SAMA on Saudi banks since the mid-1980s is now in place.
Moreover, SAMA has launched four new e-banking initiatives: Tadawul in 1999, eTrust Centre in
2002, SPAN2 in 2004 and SADAD, the national inter-bank checks payment and presentment system,
in 2005.
4.4.2.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
Currently, this dimension evolved since the creation of the e-Banking Department and the launch of
more e-banking products and services. The mission statement of the e-Banking Department reflects its
purpose (Samba survey 2003):
"Samba is online to enable people in Saudi Arabia to build their future based on
greater financial autonomy at an individual and social level - a future that is
modern, international, and distinctly Saudi. The online channel is the resource that
equips Saudi society with the financial products, services, tools, experience and,
most critically, the knowledge required to forge this strong new identity with
confidence."
E-banking products and services launched prior to 1998, such as SambaPhone and ATMs, continue to
run on the open back-office system while those lunched after 1998, such as SambaOnline and
SambaTadawul run on the new e-business platform. The characteristics and maturity of the e-business
platform help the bank to continue launching new products and services with transaction response
time being the major performance specifications. The platform uses a combination of different
standard mature technologies. It is also less dependent on IBM technologies than the open back-office
system as many of its technologies are provided from different software vendors.
The hardware structure of the e-business platform, however, consists of a group of servers provided
from different hardware vendors, such as Sun MicroSystem and SUNFIRE 15K server systems.
Although the e-business platform is not developing a new proprietary technology, in effect it is just
that, as the synchronisation among its different software, hardware and networking technologies
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constitutes a new one. However, the platform is technically demanding, as each technology requires
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Figure 4.4.1 Visualisation of Samba's e-business platform, web-based version (Samba survey
2003: Samba 2006)
Giving the characteristics and maturity of the e-business platform, the constituency seems to be
aligned with the strategic opportunities and limits implicit in the particular characteristics of
technologies. In this context, Samba's technology has achieved the ISO 9001 certification, a testament
to its high quality standards (Samba 2006). Samba highlights the importance of its technology in
protecting the competitive position:
"The accomplishment of the technology we use is crucially important in the
competition. It depends on the time to market. As quickly as we develop and launch
a product, as safely as we secure our competitive position," (IT Head).
4.4.2.3 (1 -1 i) - Organisational governance
The intra-organisational governance of the second (present) constituency building process, however,
has evolved since 1997. Citigroup Technology Group no longer influences the IT decision-making
process. Both the Technology Steering Committee and the new e-board, a virtual community, govern
the process of IT decision-making. The e-board:
"Contains the bank long-term strategies and objectives, and it involves the CEO and
all senior managers. All departments report to the e-board with regards to new
initiatives and plans. For any IT initiative seeking approval, the Operations, IT
Group, or both report to the e-board," (e-Consumer Manager).
The e-board adds value to the constituency building process as it works as co-ordination channel
among all involved parties of an IT initiative. In other words,
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"The business people knows exactly what are the new technologies and how to
better utilise them and, at the same time, technology people know exactly the
business goals and objectives and how effectively to achieve them," (e-Banking
Analyst).
However, the organisational structure of the e-Banking Department needs more power as it branches
between the Consumer Banking Group and the Corporate & Investment Group. Therefore, "to
effectively serve the business needs and leverage resources and capabilities, the position of the
department is one of the areas that need to be changed," (e-Consumer Manager).
At the inter-organisational level, however, SAMA continues its regulatory role through the
establishment of the eTrust Centre, performing e-banking examination, and issuing specific guidelines
regarding e-banking, such as Disaster Recovery Planning Guidelines, Internet Banking Security
Guidelines and SARIE Operating Rules and Regulations (CPSS 2003). Internet Banking Security
Guidelines, for instance, mandate the approval of any Internet banking product or service prior to its
lunch (SAMA 2001). Although SAMA makes all possible efforts for developing the e-banking
products and services, there is a crucial need for a legal framework that governs not only e-banking
transactions, but also all other e-business transactions.
4.4.2.4 (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The present constituency building process, however, developed as the creation of the e-Banking
Department and the offering of more e-banking products and services. Samba offers almost all forms
of e-banking, including Internet, mobile, and brokerage services. In the intra-organisational
environment, the technical aspects are completed and the necessary resources in terms of expertise,
funding, facilities, and people are in place. Moreover, the present achievements are encouraging: E-
banking is fully supported and accepted by all other groups, almost 16% of traditional transactions
have been transferred to e-channels, and the unit cost of a single transaction went down by 70% since
2002.
In the market, the constituency-building aspects of Samba's e-banking are going well. The e-banking
products and services reached encouraging achievements. E-banking channels account for nearly 90%
of total branch volumes. SambaOnline achieved 1700% increase in the average number of transactions
per day, and 300% increase in the average number of transactions per Customer in two years.
SambaAccess obtained the Global Finance Award for the best Saudi Arabian corporate Internet bank.
SambaDirect achieved a 300% increase in an average number of executed orders per day in two years.
SambaTadawul achieved a 122% increase in an average number of transactions per day and almost a
50% increase in a number of executed orders in two years (Samba survey 2003). Transactions of
SambaPhone grew by 41% over 2003. Samba was also the first bank to develop and offer the Saudi
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Riyal Thrift Plan Payment processing solution for Saudi Aramco27 (Samba 2005). Moreover, Samba
has kept a constant share ofATMs in the sector (see Table 4.4.1).
No. of No. of cards No. of transactions on
Year ATMs issued SPAN
Total Withdrawal
1999
No. 195 351,012 2,957,838 1,800,411
sector % 9.82 7.54 6.33 6.33
2000
No. 157 341,127 4,745,841 2,485,672
sector % 7.07 7.14 6.47 5.00
2001
No. 182 408,196 5,597,225 2,854,056
sector % 7.10 7.34 5.35 4.65
2002
No. 232 430,223 6,664,443 3,519,550
sector % 7.46 7.66 5.09 4.48
2003
No. 247 436,998 7,978,750 4,271,313
sector % 7.11 7.47 4.71 4.78
5-Year No. Ill 203 393,511 5,588,819
Average sector % 4,18 7.71 7.43 5.59
Table 4.4.1 Samba's ATMs statistics, 1999-2003 (BTC 2004)
However, customers' acceptance of e-banking products and services are still low as only 16% of retail
customers are banking via e-channels (e-Banking Analyst). Therefore, Samba modified its e-
positioning strategy to increase the rate of Customers' acceptance. Figure 6.3.IV portrays the key
aspects of such strategy.
27 Saudi Aramco is a fully integrated international petroleum company with the world's largest oil







Figure 4.4.II Visualisation of key aspects of the Samba's e-positioning strategy (Samba survey
2003; e-Banking Analyst)
In the sector, e-banking products and services are facing important competition from other banks,
especially AlRajhi and AlAhli. Although Samba, AlRajhi and AlAhli are the largest in terms of total
assets and retail customers, AlRajhi and AlAhli hold 27% and 23% of SPAN, respectively, while
Samba holds only 7%. Moreover, AlRajhi and AlAhli hold 20% and 17% of POS terminals whereas
Samba holds only 9% (SAMA 2004). However, Samba was the first to offer e-brokerage services in
the market (e.g., SambaDirect and SambaTadawul), and SambaOnline offers more services than that
of competitors. Such competition criteria highlight the different focus of e-banking offered by Saudi
Arabian banks. While AlRajhi and AlAhli focus on retail e-banking, Samba focuses on investment e-
banking28, a new value channel in the market.
e-Consumer Manager summarises Samba's strategy in tackling the e-banking competition:
"We have to keep running. We have to remain innovative. We have to keep
watching what others are doing. We have to learn from the best practices. We have
to look to the market trends. We have to be smart. We have to keep enhancing our
28 An example is the administration of the process of IPOs. In October 2004, Samba offered its e-
channels (e.g., SambaOnline) to its customers to participate in the shares floating of Etihad, a new
mobile phone company. The subscription process met with some technical challenges that many
customers' applications have not been executed. In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge
and understanding among the public in Saudi Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Strategies of
Saudi banks... via the future's or past's eye!!", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No. 4269, Date:
19/06/2005). The article assisted the process of administering IPOs via e-channels in Saudi Arabia.
See Appendix IV.
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strategies. We have to but all of the efforts to make it successful. We have always
looked for ways to measures our success. We have developed a keep performance
indicator and look to it every month to know our performance and trend."
4.4.2.5 (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
The development of Samba e-banking products and services involves some important issues. The first
issue is the approach taken by Samba. In some e-banking development cases, Samba followed the
practices of other banks, as was the case with SambaOnline. In other cases, however, the bank took
pioneering steps in the market when, for example, it launched SambaAlert and SambaTadawul as the
first Saudi bank to offer such services. The second issue is the development time. It differed from one
product to the other depending on the product's functionality and requirements. For example, while
the development of SambaTadawul took about 18 months, the development of SambaOnline took
only six months. The third issue is the knowledge required. At the initial stage, development was the
growth of knowledge, as the optimal skills were not easily available in the market. However, during
the span of the development, the bank gained the required knowledge.
Samba's e-banking received strong authority and support from many entities, including top
management, TSC, SAMA, Consumer Banking Group, and Corporate & Investment Banking Group.
As a result, the available technical capabilities, human and financial resources were well matched to
the envisaged objectives. Consequently, the benefits envisaged or promised by providing e-banking
were increased operational effectiveness, decreased branch loads, and increased staff capacity (Samba
survey 2003). For example, Table 6.3.Ill shows that Samba's ATMs provide other services than case
withdrawal. It also shows that Samba's customers are active in banking via ATMs as the percentage
of active e-cards is much higher than that of the sector.
Withdrawal/Total transactions





































5-Year Samba 54 1,265 95
Average Sector 60 1,553 77
Table 4.4.II Samba's ATM usage trend (BTC 2004)
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4.4.2.6 (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
Since 1997, the state of this dimension has evolved. Almost all applications and databases of e-
banking products and services have shifted to the e-business platform. The shift added value to the
operation of the constituency. Transactions are now more efficient than before, as they are executed
via the feature of straight-through processing. Moreover, the cost of development improved as the
training of technical staff was mainly on e-business technologies and the interacting technologies
turned out to be limited. Such results indicate that managing interacting technologies relies on the
number and compatibility of these technologies.
The constituency's behaviour following the expiry of the technical management agreement with
Citibank is an example. The scope of the behaviour included a wide range of dependencies that had
been built over the last two decades, such as correspondent banking and commercial agreements,
systems and networks and skill-based services. Examples include Citibank's proprietary tools and
processes, communication networks segregation, revision of risk management policies and processes,
and name change implications on forms, marketing materials, and documentation (Samba 2005).
4.4.2.7 Summary
Samba e-banking constituency-building process has clearly shown, during the present phase (i.e. after
1997), an evolution of capabilities from a gradual to a rapid development of internal capabilities
through continuous development of new proprietary technologies. In other words, the Samba e-
banking constituency has largely shifted to a "first mover" strategy, with a fundamental role still
played by the intra-organisational dimension of the constituency-building process.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Samba. It provided a brief
overview of Samba and some of the key events shaping its developments. It then looked at the
particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995). Samba's healthy performance in financial and technical terms reveals that the
strategies implemented are successful. The capabilities of Samba e-banking's constituency-building
process have evolved commencing the first phase. However, challenges at both the inter-
organisational dimension of the process, in particular the customers' constituent, and the intra-
organisational dimension of the process, in particular the rewards for ICT-based innovators'
constituent, still exist. This suggests further efforts have to be incorporated within the e-positioning
strategy (see Figure 4.4.II) with the objectives of re-aligning both areas of challenge.
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Chapter 5: AIRajhi Bank
5.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AIRajhi29. It provides a brief
overview of AIRajhi and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 25 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 5.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at AIRajhi30.
Interviewee Date
CIO August 200331
e-Banking Manager August 200332
User Service Department Manager August 200333
Information Security Consultant January 2004
e-Banking Manager January 2004
e-Banking Manager34 January 2006
Table 5.1.1 Interviews conducted at AIRajhi
5.2 Brief overview
AIRajhi opened for business as a joint stock company in 1987 out of the banking operations of
AIRajhi Company for Currency Exchange & Commerce (ARCCEC), one of the oldest money
exchanging businesses in Saudi Arabia. The initial capital of SAR 750 m increased to SAR 1,500 m in
1990 m, to SAR 2,250 m in 1998, to SAR 4,500 m in 2005 and finally to SAR 6,750 m in 2006.
Although the capital is 100% Saudi since inception, the AIRajhi family continues to hold a key share
in AIRajhi and provides for several of its senior executives (McAulay 2001). AlRajhi's objective is to
practice banking and investment activities as per its articles of association, basic system, banking
control regulations and the ministerial decision No. 1398, dated 15 November 1988. AIRajhi is
29 An initial version of AlRajhi's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2005b.
Toward Saudi Arabian e-banking: The case of AIRajhi Banking & Investment Corporation, in
Proceedings of the 4th IBIMA Conference on Information Management in Modern Enterprise.
Lisbon: Portugal. 5-7 July. 203-211. An electronic copy from the paper is attached as a part of
Appendix III with permissions from both the publisher, International Business Information
Management Association (IBIMA), and the co-author, Professor Alfonso Molina.
301 wish to express my deep thanks AlRajhi's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions. Also, I wish to thank the AlRajhi's Finance Group for administering the survey,




34 A different interviewee than that ofAugust 2003 and January 2004.
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practicing banking and investment for itself or on behalf of others within, or outside, Saudi Arabia
(AlRajhi 2006).
AlRajhi has furnished the market with innovative Islamic banking and investment products and
services that helped achieve better financial results than its rivals did. Accordingly, AlRajhi has not
only won many international awards, such as the award of the International Convention of Islamic
Banks for the world's best Islamic bank, but also awarded by the Bank Negara Malaysia an Islamic
banking license to open branches in Malaysia (BNM 2004). Currently, AlRajhi employs and operates
about 5,700 and 400 employees and branches, respectively, dedicated to serve about two million retail
customers and only 50 corporate customers. It furnishes customers with a comprehensive array of e-
channels, including telephone, mobile, Internet, and investment banking services as well as the largest
networks of ATMs and POS terminals that amount to about 1,300 and 8,000, respectively (see Table
5.2.1)
For years ended December 31
(SAR millions) 1988 1993 1998 2003
No. of branches 25% 30% 32% 33%
Total assets 7% 10% 12% 12%
Total liabilities 7% 9% 12% 12%
Share capital 26% 13% 16% 9%
Shareholders equity 8% 13% 16% 13%
Net income from operations 49% 17% 23% 17%
Table 5.2.1 AlRajhi market share positions, 5-year periods (Al-Duhkeil 1995; Tadawul 2006)
5.3 Some key events
In order to understand the evolution ofAlRajhi e-banking constituency, it is necessary to look at some
of the key events that started 65 years ago and shaped the present e-banking constituency. The review
distinguishes between two periods: before and after the formation of AlRajhi in 1987.
5.3.1 AlRajhi origins
AlRajhi origins started 65 years ago when Mr. Saleh AlRajhi formed a money-exchanging business in
Riyadh. The business expanded not only in terms of physical presence to cover the entire country,
including the pilgrim routes of Makkah and Madinah, but also in terms of operations to include gold
trading. In 1978 the business was transformed to ARCCEC (Al-Dukheil, 1995). In 1980, ARCCEC
opened an Islamic Division to provide banking products and services that would conform to Islamic
principles. The opening of the Islamic Division met with the formation of a parent company to
ARCCEC, AlRajhi Company for Islamic Investment Ltd, in London to provide advisory services for
ARCCEC. It took ARCCEC over two years to build an enormous portfolio of Islamic investments
amounting to over SAR 7,500 m (Al-Dukheil 1995).
ARCCEC's acceptance of deposits, despite operating as a money exchanging business for years,
caused concern in SAMA that decided to clamp down on ARCCEC. This was followed by a
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prolonged dispute as to whether ARCCEC, after its conversion to a bank, should offer Islamic
banking products and services. SAMA finally issued in 1983 a banking licence to ARCCEC. During
the first part of the 1980s, while the banking sector was facing a downturn in profits due to declining
margins in a more competitive environment and the creation of loan loss reserves (Banafe, 1993),
ARCCEC became a member of ACH (Al-Dukheil, 1995). ARCCEC had continued providing Islamic
banking products and services until 1987 when it was renamed AlRajhi. This was followed in 1988
with floating AlRajhi's shares for public subscription and it became a joint stock company with an
initial Saudi capital of SAR 750 m that increased gradually to SAR 4,500 in 2005.
5.3.2 Operations re-engineering project (ORP)
Although AlRajhi became a commercial bank in 1987, the money exchanging background of AlRajhi
continued shaping the business during the first part of the 1990s. AlRajhi expanded its investments
through trading and Murabaha35 contracts, and embarked upon an extensive policy of expanding the
number of branches, aiming to make a presence in "all level and in all geographical locations across
the Kingdom," (AlRajhi 1991: 9). By 1995, the branches network consisted of 341 branches, 28% of
the working branches in Saudi Arabia, and six regional offices. Such branches are characterised by
modest design compared to branches of other Saudi banks and existed in all areas, in particular, in the
centre of the country to target small depositors and low-paid manual workers (Al-Dukheil 1995;
AlRajhi 1995).
Externally, however, Iraq attacked Kuwait in August, 1990, leading to extreme pressure on the
liquidity of the banking sector. In one month, the sector's customers withdrew about 10% of the
liquidity, converted it into foreign currency, and transferred it abroad. Such challenge forced SAMA
to provide banks with access to additional liquidity through more liberal arrangements, placing
additional SAR and foreign currency deposits with them and selling foreign currency in large
volumes. Banks also coped well by liquidating their foreign assets (SAMA 1999).
The Gulf crisis was followed by a mini boom in the economy. The sector enjoyed a massive surge in
deposits and domestic loans and advances of about 200% and 900% during 1991 and 1990-95,
respectively. Moreover, other indicators, such as return on equity and return on assets, continued to be
very positive with many banks making record profits during this period. The sector was also enjoying
the expansion of the stock market's capital. During the first two years of the 1990s, banks used the
optimistic sentiment in the stock market to raise substantial amounts of capital, and 50% of them
35 Murabaha is an Islamic banking product defined as "the sale of goods at a price covering the
purchase price plus the profit margin agreed on by both parties concerned, which transforms a
traditional lending activity into a sale and purchase agreement, under which the lender buys the
goods wanted by the borrower for re-sale to the borrower at a higher price agreed on by both
parties," (Haron et al. 1994: 32).
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increased their capital. Banks expanded their branch networks, introduced stronger management
methods and new technologies, improved their profitability, and set aside large provisions for doubtful
accounts. Trends also were evolving toward expansion in banks' capital and the number of banking
institutions (Banafe 1993; SAMA 1999).
AlRajhi found that the future would be extremely unhealthy with the existing trends. Accordingly,
AlRajhi's BODs approved, in 1994, a plan for the largest project in the history of AlRajhi. The
project, Operations Re-engineering Project (ORP), aimed to enhance the operational effectiveness
through re-engineering the entire activities of the value-chain. The implementation of ORP took five
years commencing in 1995 and used external consultancy provided from A.T. Kearney, an American-
based management consulting firm (Al-Ghamdi 1999).
Al-Ghamdi (1999) lists the sequential progress of the ORP implementation:
□ Performing initial studies to gain more in-sight about AlRajhi's working environment.
□ Developing the corporate strategy for the first time in the history ofAlRajhi.
□ Implementing a service quality program in regional offices and branches.
□ Revising the role of the IT activity in the value-chain.
□ Re-engineering the organisational structure and work-flow process for many divisions and
departments.
□ Revising the human resource activity in the value-chain and creating staff rewards,
appraisals, and authority policies.
□ Developing an IT strategic alliance with Elsag, an IT Italian-based firm, to develop ATTAJ,
AlRajhi's value-chain automation project.
□ Planning for EBDAA-1, an extension of ATTAJ that aims to improve internal business
processes at some divisions within Head-Office (e.g., Operations Group) and regional
offices.
ORP implied changes not only in the operational effectiveness, but also in the governance of AlRajhi.
Mr. Saleh AlRajhi, the founder of ARCCEC, had been the Chairman while his brother, Mr. Sulaiman
AlRajhi, had been the General Manager and Managing Director. In order to carry out ORP, the BODs
appointed Mr. Abdullah AlRajhi, a young Saudi national who gradually took over many
responsibilities in AlRajhi for about 20 years commencing a branch representative, as the CEO to
replace his father, Mr. Sulaiman AlRajhi, who became the Chairman (see Figure 5.3.1).
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Figure 5.3.1 AlRajhi organisation chart (AIRajhi survey 2003)
5.4 The development of AIRajhi e-banking constituency
This section discusses the evolution of AIRajhi e-banking constituency by applying the conceptual
lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis is a two-
layered intra- and inter-organisational diamond given that important features of the AIRajhi e-banking
constituency-building process are the result of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between
AIRajhi and other organisations. The discussion also distinguishes three phases in the evolution of
AIRajhi e-banking constituency: origins (1987-1995), development (1996-2000), and present state
(2001-2006). To highlight the differences between the three phases, the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995) is applied separately to each phase36.
5.4.1 Origins of AIRajhi e-banking constituency (1987-1995)
This section looks at the development of AIRajhi e-banking constituency in the first phase, which
goes from the beginnings of AIRajhi to the mid-1990s when the re-organisation of AIRajhi occurred.
The discussion follows the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995).
5.4.1.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
AIRajhi developed gradually during this period. Inter-organisationally, key market share indicators
suggest that AIRajhi was a large bank. Market share positions amounted to 10% of total assets, 13%
of net income, 30% of branches, and 25% of workforce. Intra-oiganisationally, the BODs was
defining strict long-term policy and strategy that aimed to provide only Islamic banking products and
36 In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi
Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Re-engineering... AIRajhi as an example", at Aleqtisadiah
Newspaper (Issue No. 4631, Date: 16/06/2006). The article summarised some lessons from
AlRajhi's re-engineering project. See Appendix IV.
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services. Moreover, the fact that AlRajhi was a retail and investment bank, allowed both the Retail
Banking Group and Investment Department to command and play larger economic and strategic roles
than other groups and departments (Table 5.2.1; AlRajhi 1995; Al-Dukheil 1995).
Although AlRajhi was a large bank, the role of ICT was more modest. The long-term ICT policy and
strategy were defined by the Executive Committee37. The strategic priorities broadly concentrate on
improving internal efficiency and assist e-banking services to gain and sustain local market share by
saving customer's time and effort. This was to be achieved gradually and cost-effectively through the
implementation of proven technology (e.g., ATMs) and the improvement of AlRajhi's ICT capacity
(see Alignment 3-3i).
The Computer Centre was in charge of all technical aspects of e-banking products and services. The
task of applications' development was done either internally (e.g., the development of the Branch
Record Keeping & Recording System, BRKRS) or externally (e.g., the acquisition ofGLOBUS, an IT
system for improving investment services).
Externally, four different forms of e-banking products and services were in place: ATMs38 in 1991,
POS terminals in 1993, a non-automated share prices inquiry telephone in 1994, and a small number
of local share trading halls in 1995. Table x provides AlRajhi's e-market share positions during this
period. While ATMs were holding about 19% of the sector's ATMs, POS terminals grew from 4% in
1993 to 9% in 1995.
For years ended December 31










1990 268 27 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1991 289 28 87 19 NA NA 193,578 35
1992 308 29 121 19 NA NA 322,854 40
1993 327 30 145 19 51 4 389,633 38
1994 347 31 173 19 784 4 585,632 37
1995 350 31% 194 19% 1,089 8% 699,341 35%
Table 5.4.1 AlRajhi's e-market share positions during 1990-95 (SAMA, 2006)
5.4.1.2 Nature and maturity of the technology
AlRajhi's technological system was consisting of a larger number of mature technologies. Most of
such components were acquired from IT vendors while the remaining ones were internally developed
by the Computer Centre. The hardware components were involving a mainframe at the Head-Office
that were connected via a wide-area network (WAN) with six mini-computers located at the regional
37 The Executive Committee consists ofCEO and four members ofBODs (AlRajhi 1995).
38
AlRajhi's ATMs during the first part of the 1990s were cash dispensers (AlRajhi 1995).
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offices. 70% of branches were vertically connected via a telephone line to the nearest mini-computer
for data synchronising over night. The day-to-day operations at branches were performed via both
BRKRS and GLOBUS. In general, the system was technically demanding as most transactions were
processed manually. Such demand increased the risks to deliver in terms of both cost and time. In
order to cope with the technical demand, technical people were furnished with technical skills though
various audio and video training methods (CBT) located at the Computer Centre (AlRajhi 1995).
5.4.1.3 Alignment (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
In the early 1990s, the constituent general meeting of AlRajhi formed the Sharia'h Authority and
defined its rules and scope39. Since then, both the Sharia'h Authority and the Executive Committee
became main influencers on the e-banking constituency-building process. The Executive Committee
has to approve the development of IT projects while the Sharia'h Authority has to ensure that the
financial methods of transactions processing (e.g., calculations of return on investment) were
compatible with the principles of Islamic banking. Negotiations between the Computer Centre and
CEO were evolving to form more flexible ways than the case before for the IT decision making
process (AlRajhi 1995).
At the inter-organisational level, the e-banking constituency-building process influenced by both
SAMA and STC. On one side, any product or service had to meet criteria imposed by SAMA, which
pursues, according to Al-Suhaimi (1998: 63), "a collaborative rather than a competitive approach
among Saudi banks to the development of a common payments infrastructure ... ensuring a rational
and consistent national strategy for payment systems." On the other side, technical requirements of
many proposed e-banking products and services have to align with the modest capabilities of the
national ICT infrastructure.
5.4.1.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The business, technical and constituency-building aspects of AlRajhi e-banking constituency
improved gradually. Intra-organisationally, technical staff followed a strict training policy imposed by
the Training Higher Committee40. Training plans had to convince the committee that such proposed
training plans would add a value to AlRajhi. Approved training plans were mostly conducted at
39 The Sharia'h Authority was an independent entity consisting of a group of Islamic economists. Its
prime role is to ensure that all banking products and services provided by AlRajhi are compatible
with the principles of Islamic banking, which prohibit taking or receiving interest on deposits.
Members of the authority were working on a non-pay basis until the mid-1990s when the BODs
modified its organisational relationship with AlRajhi. The authority has been renamed to Sharia'h
Control Authority. Its members have become AlRajhi's employees, having all rights and duties,
including salaries and office premises (AlRajhi 1991; 1995).
40 Formed in 1994, the Training Higher Committee was an executive committee that was linked
organisationally to CEO. Its aim was to assess the feasibility of training needs of all divisions and
departments of AlRajhi (AlRajhi 1995).
175
AlRajhi's Training Centre. This centre provides computer-based training materials and short training
courses on technical aspects, such as ICT and e-banking services. Inter-organisationally, the process
has enrolled some retail and corporate customers into the constituency through some forms of e-
banking, such as ATMs. The enrolment also targets some IT vendors through acquiring hardware and
software components (AlRajhi 1995).
Performance in the e-banking market was healthy as AlRajhi kept holding a major share. For example,
on average AlRajhi held about 37% of the e-cards market. It also supplied about 70% of the branches
with PCs to host BRKRS. Although such gradual improvement was aligned with the IT policy in
terms of diffusion and efficiency, the modest national ICT infrastructure, especially in rural areas, was
a challenge to the constituency-building process (AlRajhi 1995).
5.4.1.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
Since its inception, AlRajhi embarked upon a conscious policy of expansion. The IT vision was "to
save customers' time and effort," and the IT policy had been "the concentration of gradual progress of
technologies adoption" based on cost-benefit criteria (AlRajhi 1995: 8). The case of buying the first
set of ATMs from Samba in 1991 highlights the implementation of such IT policy. Samba pioneered
ATMs in Saudi Arabia in 1989. When SPAN was operated in 1991, Samba preferred to replace its
ATMs with modern ones. Rather than buying new ATMs, AlRajhi negotiated with Samba to buy
Samba's used ATMs. AlRajhi bought ATMs for a competitive price. Such ATMs became operational
in 1991 and they have not only furnished the business needs, but also aligned with the cost saving
policy. Table 5.4.II provides a comparative profit and loss statement during 1997-99.
(%) 1997 1998 1999
Net Special Commission Income 0 0 0
Fees from Services 1.26 1.26 1.30
Exchange Income 5.79 9.42 7.38
Trading Income 0 0 0
Realised Gains on Investments, net 86.88 81.37 83
Dividend Income 0 0 0
Other Operating Income 6.07 7.95 8.32
Total Operating Income 100 100 100
Salaries and Employees Benefits 41.89 36*56 35.63
Rent and Premises 4.74 4.25 4.24
Depreciation 9.35 9.05 10.12
Other General & Admin Expenses 24.55 24.06 22.67
Provision for Credit Losses 23.04 26.08 27.34
Total Operating Expenses 41.14 45.82 46.81
Net Income from Operations 58.86 54.18 53.19
Table 5.4.II AlRajhi comparative profit and loss statement, vertical analysis during 1997-
99 (Tadawul 2006)
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5.4.1.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
Although the e-banking constituency had met with a conservative spending policy, the technological
system developed gradually during this period. The launch of local stocks trading service to meet
customers' need for investment mechanism was an example. AlRajhi furnished customers with a
stock trading hall at 17 branches in major cities. Each hall equipped with a screen for broadcasting
stock prices and a PC for processing stock trading orders. Both the screen and PC linked via a
telephone line with GLOBUS at the Share Trading Room of the Head-Office. In turn, GLOBUS
linked via a WAN with ESIS at SAMA. Alignment with interacting legacy systems was not without
challenges. Processing trading requests had sacrificed performance. The risks to deliver in terms of
cost were high, as technical people required continuous training to gain technical insight.
5.4.1.7 Summary
AlRajhi's e-banking constituency-building process clearly shows an evolution in all dimensions of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) during the initial phase (i.e. 1987-1995). Both the Executive
Committee and Sharia'h Authority played a major role in shaping the intra-organisational level. The
alignment with the regulatory standards of SAMA as well as the modest ICT infrastructure of STC
shaped the inter-organisational dimension.
The AlRajhi e-banking constituency also showed progress with "target constituents" (i.e. Dimension
2), although not as strong as that of the "governance" (i.e. Dimension 1). The constituency weakly
targeted both branches (e.g., a PC at 70% of branches) and technology developers (e.g., CBT
methods) although it significantly targeted retail banking customers (e.g., 37% e-Cards). Clearly, the
AlRajhi e-banking constituency was evolving at Dimension 2 with a great deal of action at the inter-
organisational level.
On the other dimensions, the progress of AlRajhi e-banking constituency was more mixed. Alignment
with "nature of target problem" (i.e. Dimension 3) of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) met
with some challenges. Not only did the rapid expansion of branches meet with more gradual
technological adaptation, but retail customers were also provided with used ATMs acquired from
Samba. Although acquiring used ATMs enabled AlRajhi to establish its presence on the e-banking
market, it only furnished customers with modest services as the ATMs were cash dispensers only.
A similar situation occurred in the "interacting technologies/constituencies" dimension (i.e.
Dimension 4) of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). On the one hand, the AlRajhi e-banking
constituency aligned well with the legacy systems in place. On the other hand, it slowly launched
local stock trading halls at 17 branches (i.e. 5.2% ofAlRajhi's branches) to make use ofGLOBUS.
5.4.2 The development of AlRajhi e-banking constituency (1996-2000)
This section looks at the development of AlRajhi e-banking constituency in the second phase (1996-
2000), where the implications of the re-engineering project played a key role in the provision of new
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e-banking products and services. The discussion, again, follows the dimensions of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995).
5.4.2.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
The market share of AlRajhi improved between 1993 and 1998, in particular, regarding net income
and total assets, which amount to about 23% and 12%, respectively (see Table 5.2.1). The BODs
continued drawing the long-term policy and strategy. The organisational structure became more
decentralised with the Retail Banking Group being the largest in terms of budget and operations. New
business lines, such as private banking and ladies banking, started to emerge. AlRajhi's products and
services, which are all compliant with Sharia'h, have faced competition as other Saudi banks started to
try such products and services. AlRajhi made an important effort to change the market perception of
AlRajhi as a money-exchange business through the refurbishment of many branches with modern
designs.
The results of the re-organisation project were also reflected in the technological aspects. Thus,
AlRajhi formed the Operations & Systems Group to replace the Computer Centre. The main task of
the newly born group was to automate the value-chain activities, ATTAJ (CIO). AlRajhi also
continued holding a key share of the sector's ATMs and POS terminals - about 23% and 14%,
respectively (see Table 5.4.1).
Such technical evolution produced a large IT system that required many divisions and departments to
make the technology to perform its day-to-day operations, thus improving the general ICT literacy at
AlRajhi. Plans were drawn to implement the new extension of ATTAJ, EBDAA-1, an IT system
aiming to improve internal business process at some divisions at Head-Office (e.g., Consumers
Finance Group), and regional offices (e.g., Jeddah Regional Office) (CIO).
5.4.2.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
AlRajhi's technological system showed radical improvement during this phase. A group of servers
connected to the mainframe at the Head-Office, while an upgraded WAN linked the bank's physical
places (e.g., branches and ATMs) with SARIE. ATTAJ, means in English 'crown', is an umbrella for
a group of IT applications that include, but is not limited to, branches' operations (SIB2000),
customer databases (CIF), Murabaha & finance, credit & guarantees, HR, and general ledger.
Such applications were standard, mature technologies provided by AlRajhi's IT contractor, IBM-
SBM. Their implementation brought about major improvements in general performance. For example,
Payroll, the SARIE constituent at AlRajhi and enhanced the processing time of a payroll transaction
from 28 days to 2 days. Similarly, performance improvements also occurred after the implementation
of DPS250, a cheque settlement and presentment system. Both systems reduced operational cost (e.g.,
staff) as they automated the processes (Al-Jalad 1999; Al-Ghamdi 1999; CIO).
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However, the trend in operational expenses rose. For example, the percentage of operating expenses to
the operating income grew from 41% in 1994, to 47% in 1999 (see Table 5.4.II). The system also
demanded continuous technical upgrading and training for both users and developers. For instance,
Payroll performed monthly about 30,000 transactions. Any delay in processing would most likely
force beneficiaries or customers to migrate to other banks (Al-Ghomlas 1999).
5.4.2.3 (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
Intra-organisationally, the BODs replaced the Sharia'h Authority with the Sharia'h Control
Committee. The Committee took responsibility for the macro Sharia'h control issues and was
organisationally linked to the BODs. The BODs also formed the Sharia'h Control Department,
directly linked to CEO. This Department took responsibility for micro Sharia'h control issues
(AlRajhi 1995).
Accordingly, both the Executive Committee and the newly born Sharia'h Control Department
influenced the e-banking constituency-building process. For each IT project, the Executive Committee
and the Sharia'h Control Department had to approve its economic feasibility and Sharia'h
compatibility, respectively. At the same time, the formation of the Operations & Systems Group and
the assignment of a Vice Managing Director to lead the group, gave central strategic importance to the
role of IT in the decision making and strategic planning processes.
Such combination positively influenced the short term development of the e-banking constituency-
building process. The long-term development however was positively influenced by the IT Team, a
new team formed during the mid-1990s to take an executive role in the re-engineering project, ORP. It
involved a group of executives from AlRajhi, A.T. Kearney, and IBM-SMB, and had authority from
the General Manager to supervise the project (Al-Ghamdi 1999).
At the inter-organisational level, SAMA continued its regulatory role of e-banking development in
both the sector and the market, while AlRajhi maintained close alignment with these regulations.
5.4.2.4 (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The focus during this phase was to build the intra-organisational capabilities with the aim to automate
the back-office operations. The prime objective of ATTAJ was to enhance the operational
effectiveness through automating the entire activities of the value-chain (Al-Ghamdi 1999).
The e-Banking Manager summarises AlRajhi's strategy of technological development ofATTAJ:
"The direction selected from the beginning was clean up your back yard, get your
back-end ready, move to the branch systems, then move to the e-banking products
and services, was very good and effective in eliminating many problems associated
with integration and development tools."
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At the intra-organisational level, AlRajhi's e-banking business and constituency-building aspects were
evolving positively. The degree of acceptance among the AlRajhi departments was increasing, such as
the use of DPS250 by regional offices or the use of SIB2000 by branches. One of the promotional
strategies used by the Operations & Systems Group to promote ATTAJ to target constituents was
AlRajhi's internal monthly magazine, AlRajhi World. For example, issue number 52 of 1999 was a
special edition about AlRajhi's technical achievements. One of the important resources the
constituency attracted during the process was the IT strategic alliances with IT firms, such as IBM-
SBM, Temenos Systems and Elsag.
In the market, AlRajhi's e-banking constituency was gradually attracting target customers. Table
5.4.Ill shows AlRajhi's e-market share positions during 1996-2000. Thus, in 2000, AlRajhi's share of
the sector's ATMs and POS terminals increased to 26% and 17%, respectively. On the other hand, the
share of active e-cards decreased to 92% in 2000. Moreover, AlRajhi started to take advantage of the
SARIE linkage by establishing e-agreements with some governmental agencies about payroll
transference, such as the agreement with the Ministry of Education in 1999. The reason for such
gradual progress was the strategic direction taken during this period: "clean up your back yard, get
your back-end ready, move to the branch systems, then move to the e-banking products and services,"
(e-Banking Manager).
ATMs POS terminals e-Cards
Year No. Sector % No. Sector % No. Sector %
1996 247 19.92 1,814 12.35 994,253 40.04
1997 344 22.6 2,141 14.3 1,049,419 37.54
1998 396 23.45 2,127 14.11 1,367,344 37.48
1999 450 22.67 2,283 13.9 1,664,849 35.45
2000 566 25.47 3,143 16.96 1,912,214 40.04
Table 5.4.Ill AlRajhi e-market share positions (1996-2000) (BTC 2004)
5.4.2.5 (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
Intra-organisationally, ORP was the dominant problem. It posed a significant challenge. ORP took
five years commencing 1995 and required significant changes in skills and re-training of staff on how
to use the new applications. The following quote shows that the objectives of ORP were not well
defined from the beginning as many objectives were overlapping:
"The objectives of the new organisational structure were to improve the productive
efficiency, to improve the administrative and banking performance and to achieve
the proper utilisation of human resources and thus raise the quality of services based
on the principle of separation of banking operations from the functional areas of
development and marketing of the banking and investment products and, at the
same time, to give branches a greater role in marketing of the banking and
investment products and, at the same time, to give branches a greater role in
marketing of banking services for customers and thus raise the quality of services
and enhance the Corporation's market share in the banking industry in response to
the continued development in the banking industry" (AlRajhi 1995: 8).
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ORP feasibility study recommended the development of a new system rather than to buy a ready-
made Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. This was due to the technology market's lack of
core banking systems that are compliant with Sharia'h. Therefore, AlRajhi outsourced the
development of ATTAJ to Elsag via IBM-SBM (Elsag Link 2004). The decision also helped
ALRAJHI to focus its efforts on the business aspects. "Since we outsourced everything to IBM-SBM,
we were not very much concerned about what was going on," (Information Security Consultant).
The User Service Department Manager summarises the formal mechanism between AlRajhi and Elsag
during the development ofATTAJ:
"When we wish to implement a new ICT application, we provide our needs to one
of our strategic partners. The partner develops the application that meets our needs.
During the development process, we perform gap analysis with our strategic partner
and customise the application to fit with the Saudi market."
During the development, ATTAJ received strong support and authority from top management, such as
the formation of the Systems & Operations Group and the IT team. This strong support, together with
the strategy to outsource the technical work to external developers translated into a successful
alignment between Dimension 3 (even if the exact definition of the problem was also achieved during
ORP) and the constituency's ability to deliver.
5.4.2.6 (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
During the first part of this phase, AlRajhi was re-engineering its existing activities while Elsag was
developing ATTAJ. Consequently, the technological system was blended with the legacy systems.
Because ATTAJ was planned to be lunched soon, AlRajhi had chosen to hold down enhancing the
existing legacy systems with new banking applications. An example of slow development was the
linkage with SARIE. Although SAMA launched SARIE in 1997, AlRajhi linked to SARIE in 1999.
This was due to lack of technical capabilities being able to interact with SARIE features, while
ATTAJ was under development.
In 1998, Elsag completed the development of ATTAJ and immediately displaced the legacy systems.
The implementation took place in the first place at the Head-Office and regional offices. In order to
operate the new applications provided by ATTAJ, AlRajhi employees were on continued training
courses to gain the required skills. ATTAJ brought about many improvements to AlRajhi's day-to-day
operations as well as to the Systems & Operations Group.
According to CIO, some of the implications ofATTAJ were that:
1. The Group has become a customer oriented and quality, focus player in the bank.
2. The automation of the value-chain activities improved the general ICT literacy.
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3. The customers' database (CIF) has been holding 70-80% of customers' records rather than
20-30%.
5.4.2.7 Summary
AlRajhi's e-banking constituency-building process during the second phase clearly shows an
evolution at all dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) with a major role played by
the intra-organisational level, in particular the re-engineering process (i.e. ORJP) that dominantly
defined the "nature of the target problem" (i.e. Dimension 3). For example, outsourcing ATTAJ to
Elsag via IBM-SBM fulfilled the technical requirements of the constituency even though it consumed
about 5 years of development. Externally, for instance, the constituency made its EFT operational 2
years after the launch of SARIE. These characteristics suggested a gradual development of the e-
banking constituency-building process from a modest role to a mainstream strategic role given to
ICTs in the bank's development.
During this second phase, the e-banking constituency made significant progress in the alignment with
Dimensions 1 and 4 of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "organisational governance"
and "interacting technologies/constituencies"). The former evolved a great deal at intra-organisational
level with the more powerful strategic role given to ICTs in the organisation, suggesting evolution
from a significant to a strong alignment. The latter evolved more at the inter-organisational level (e.g.,
the launch of EFT) than at the intra-organisational one.
The progress of the remaining dimension of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "target
constituents") during the development phase (i.e. 1996-2000) did not bring a significant improvement
on the original phase (i.e. 1987-1995). Despite the fact that the constituency-building process enrolled
some intra-constituents, such as regional offices via the implementation of DPS250, it faced
challenges with some inter-constituents, such as retail customers, as the percentage of active e-cards
decreased from 99% in 1999 to 92% in 2000.
5.4.3 The present state of AIRajhi e-banking constituency (2001-2006)
This section looks at the present state (2001-2006) of the development of AIRajhi e-banking
constituency, in which the implications of ORP played a key role in the provision of new e-banking
products and services. The discussion, again, follows the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995).
5.4.3.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
One of the prime issues during this phase is the international expansion of AIRajhi e-banking
constituency for the first time in its history. In October, 2004, Bank Negara Malaysia has awarded an
Islamic banking licence to AIRajhi to open branches and prove Islamic banking in Malaysia (BNM
2004).
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Domestically, AlRajhi continued opening branches, expecting to reach 480 by the end of 2005. Of
these 110 and 95 are devoted to sale centres and exclusive ladies banking, respectively (Khan 2004).
The modest design of branches suggested by Al-Dukheil (1995) during the early 1990s no longer
exists as most branches are characterised by modern design and customers' service representatives.
Such developments pressured on the net income. AlRajhi's sector share of net income went down
from 23% in 1998 to 17% in 2003 as a result of the increase in operating expenses (see Table 5.2.1).
Most importantly, the ICT function reached mainstream strategic role in the late 1990s when the task
of drawing its long-term policy and strategy moved from the Executive Committee to the BODs.
AlRajhi also launched two internal business process improvement systems: EBDAA-1 in 2001 and
EBDAA-2 in 2002. The names of such systems reflect a vision of creativeness as EBDAA, in English
means creativity. EBDAA-1 focuses on developing back-office applications (e.g., SIB2000) while
EBDAA-2 focuses on building up front office applications.
Additional organisational changes took place. In 2001, AlRajhi replaced the Operations & Systems
Group that supervised the development of ATTAJ, with the Shared Services & IT Group. This was
followed by the formation of the e-Banking Department, under the Retail Banking Group, with a
yearly budget of approximately SAR 2.5 m to handle business aspects of e-banking. Being under the
Retail Banking Group indicates that the e-banking development efforts focus on retail rather than
corporate banking (AlRajhi survey 2003).
Moreover, both the Retail Banking Group and Shared Services & IT Group, are headed by a single
Vice Managing Director who led the development of ORP during the mid-1990s, indicating "that this
banker should choose to shake up the bank's retail offering by means of technology solutions," (BME
2003). Figure 5.4.1 portrays the existing organisational relationships between the Shared Services &
IT Group, and e-Banking Department.
GeneralManager j
Figure 5.4.1 Organisational chart of Shared Services & IT Group (CIO; User Service
Department Manager)
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5.4.3.2 Nature and maturity of the technology
AlRajhi entered the decade with a similar technological system as of that used during the late 1990s.
The Mainframe is an IBM S/390 system and the Web site is hosted on an Intel Pentium Pro-Based
Windows NT 4.0 Server, equipped with HostFront and Microsoft's SNA Server. The SNA Server was
chosen for its security, scalability, reliability, and total integration with Windows NT (Farabi 2004).
Moreover, five IBM-EAX Servers and one IBM-Internet Security Systems (ISS) Centre connect the
Head-Office with the regional offices and branches via WAN and local area network (LAN)
technologies (Information Security Consultant). Standard mature technologies run a group of
applications under the umbrella of ATTAJ, EBDAA-1, and EBDAA-2. The technical specifications
gradually evolved as a requirement of the implementation of some new applications. For example, the
implementation of the anti-money laundry (AML) application in 2003 required upgrading SIB2000 to
its fourth version (AlRajhi survey 2003; AlRajhi 2006).
Although the development is mainly limited to either enhancing or upgrading the existing system,
such a largely fragmented IT system is technically demanding:
"Any system that is supposes to provide 24x7 availability demands a better
customer and technical support. On technical side a unit takes care of technical
support and on customer side increased volume of available agents and smart IVR
system," (AlRajhi survey 2003).
However, the risk of failing to deliver the system in terms of anticipated performance is under control
via the use of some risk management tools, such as Query Management System (QMS), an IT
application aims to improve customers' service through analysing customers' complaints, and
extensive training for technical staff (AlRajhi survey 2003; CIO).
5.4.3.3 (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
At the intra-organisational level, according to the e-Banking Manager, any e-banking initiative has to
follow a formal mechanism. The e-Banking Department initiates a project and develops a business
case. Such a case has to be approved by the Sharia'h Monitoring Department for the Sharia'h
compliance and the Audit Department for administrative feasibility. This is followed by the approval
of the Executive's Yearly Meeting. Commencing the development of an approved initiative, the top
management meets monthly within the initiative's host department to review the progress and take
decisions on emerging issues. This process adds a culture of participation in decision-making to
AlRajhi as "each department has to identify the impact of each strategic decision on its operation and
build its strategy accordingly."
Prior the launch of any product or service, AlRajhi assigned a managing team, which brings together
members from both the business (e.g., Retail Banking Group) and the Shared Services & IT Group, to
operate the product or service. The ATMs product, for example, has an owner form Retail Banking
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Group (Product Owner) and an owner from the Shared Services & IT Group (Channel Owner) (see
Figure 5.4.II).
Product Owner
Current Express Mutual Funds
Account Remittance





3 Telephone banking V V
Internet banking V S y
Figure 5.4.II AlRajhi Intra-departmental governance of e-banking products and services (User
Service Department Manager)
At the inter-organisational level, SAMA continues its regulatory role through the establishment of the
e-Trust Centre, performing e-banking examinations, and issuing specific guidelines regarding e-
banking, such as Disaster Recovery Planning Guidelines, Internet Banking Security Guidelines and
SARIE Operating Rules and Regulations (CPSS 2003). Internet Banking Security Guidelines, for
instance, mandate the approval of any internet banking product or service prior to its launch (SAMA
2001).
Although SAMA makes all possible efforts for developing e-banking products and services, the e-
Banking Manager highlights the challenge facing e-banking development in Saudi Arabia:
"We do not have a legal framework that governs the e-banking transactions... I
think the lack of the legal framework for e-banking transactions negatively affect
the growth and success in Saudi Arabia... In some cases, e-banking products and
services are playing the role of catalysers of change in the sector. They facilitate and
simplify the new changes in the bank. The bank believes now that it is very vital to
use e-channels."
5.4.3.4 (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The e-Banking Manager clarifies the evolution of the original vision and objectives of e-banking:
"The original vision and objectives were on course. However few things related
mainly to prioritisation of product and service offerings have been modified. For
example, we thought, as many other banks did, that [Wireless Application Protocol]
WAP technology would fly but eventually it did not. Therefore, we had to offer our
mobile phone banking earlier than its planned schedule."
During the 1990s, there was a continuous process of transformation of target constituents into
members of the AlRajhi e-banking constituency at both intra- and inter-organisational levels. The
mainstream strategic role achieved by ICTs at AlRajhi and the market growth of ATM and POS
services bear witness to this process (see Table 5.2.1). This process continued in the 2000s. The
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gradual lunch of e-banking products and services commencing 2001 gave AlRajhi many achievements
(e.g., the Private Sector e-Initiative Award of Arabian Business Magazine41). Table 5.4.IV lists major
e-banking milestones commencing 2001.
Launch Date Product/Service Description
May-01 AlRajhiPhone Telephone banking
Apr-02 AlMubasher e-Retail Internet banking, retail
Apr-02 WAP Service Mobile phone banking
May-02 e-Insurance Insurance bill payment
Jun-02 Tadawul Internet local brokerage
Jul-02 e-Funds Internet mutual funds
Oct-02 AlMubasher e-Corporate Internet banking, corporate
Nov-02 i-Tadawul Internet international brokerage
Aug-03 Bill payment gateway Telephone bill payments
Sep-03 e-Government Passport fee payments
Nov-04 e-Sahm SMS Mobile phone local brokerage
Jan-05 e-Government Traffic fine payments
Jan-06 G-Tadawul Internet brokerage at UAE's exchanges
Table 5.4.IV AlRajhi major e-banking milestones (AlRajhi survey 2003: e-Banking Manager:
AlRajhi 2006)
Intra-organisationally, the reputation of the new e-Banking Department is increasing although, in
terms of e-banking development resources, the department receives permanent expertise and facilities
from IBM-SBM rather than technical personnel and funding. From one side, e-banking is fully
accepted and supported by other groups and divisions. AlRajhi also migrated about 75% of its
transactions to e-channels by the end of 2003. The e-Banking Manager acknowledges the driver
behind such intra-organisational achievements:
"This is due to the very strong performance measure tools implemented by the bank
and aimed to ensure that projects are completed on time and within the given
budget. In short, whatever we budget, we cannot exceed it."
From the other side, the work-force at the department consists of only seven employees and the yearly
budget is approximately SAR 2.5 m (AlRajhi survey 2003). The acquisition of AlAhli's e-Banking
Analyst highlights one of the characteristics of AlRajhi's e-banking constituency in targeting
developers. According to AlAhli's Head of Remote Delivery Channels, AlRajhi suddenly acquired in
2002 AlAhli's e-Banking Analyst to lead the e-Banking Department. The aim of such acquisition was
mainly to furnish the market with the bill payment gateway as such project was initiated at AlAhli
with STC. Such acquisition has moved the chance of pioneering the market with a bill payment
gateway from AlAhli to AlRajhi. The reason behind loosing the chance was that AlAhli made a
mistake during the negotiation phase when it appointed a single employee to negotiate such a large
contract with STC.
41 Panel ofjudges are mostly from international IT firms (e.g., IBM, Microsoft, etc.) (AB 2004).
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During the development, the most important technical challenge faced by AlRajhi was to secure
transactions. However, out-sourcing the development to IBM-SBM helped in not only eliminating
such technical problems, but also acquiring technical requirements. According to the Information
Security Consultant:
"We were mainly concerned about information security. For integration with legacy
systems, this was a part of the applications development being done by IBM. Since
we outsourced everything to IBM-SBM, we were not very much concerned about
what was going on," (Information Security Consultant).
The case in the market is more mixed. Although AlRajhi offers distinctive e-banking products and
services, such as Salam, a pre-paid telephone card at telephone banking and ATMs, Watani, a
program for buying local stocks on instalments, and portable ATMs, ATMs installed on vans to
service customers during seasonal events, such as Hajj season, target customers who have not rushed
to accept the e-channels and hence, join the constituency. Of the total number of retail customers, 2%
use AlMubasher, 10-15% use Tadawul, and only 2 customers use WAP. Corporate customers also
have a low degree of acceptance, with only 10-15% using AlMubasher e-Corporate. The low degree
of acceptance has put pressure on AlRajhi as they compete with other Saudi banks, such as Samba and
AlBilad42. For example, the acceptance rate of SambaOnline and SaibNet, the retail Internet banking
service at Saib, as of 2003, is 25% and 35%, respectively. Indeed, AlRajhi tackles such competition
through "looking for opportunities to send services to customers rather than asking the customer to
come after them" (AlRajhi survey 2003). According to the e-Banking Manager:
"We always offer a product/service through all available e-channels, a strategy that
is not always available with our competitors... [The aim is] to furnish clients with
all their banking needs via their preferable e-channels.... We are focusing on
clients' retention more than attracting new clients. This is because Saudi clients
migrate from one bank to another for reasons other than the availability of new
products or services. The investment decisions of Saudi clients usually based on
recommendations received from their trusted colleagues or friends rather than
scientific reading and analysis of the market trends."
However, relations with external developers remained strong and the market share for ATM and POS
services continued to augment. The Information Security Consultant points out the importance of
AlRajhi technology for forming a competitive advantage:
"As far as creating competitive advantage through technology is concerned, we
might not have that much concern because, as a bank, we always implement the best
quality available in the market without looking to its cost... In Saudi Arabia, I
42 AlBilad Bank (AlBilad) is similar to AlRajhi as both are wholly Islamic banks. In order to advance
and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi Arabia, I published an
article, entitled "Path dependence... AlBilad as an example", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No.
4645, Date: 30/06/2006). The article assumed that AlBilad is following the same path of AlRajhi,
and accordingly, it compared AlBilad's developments with that of AlRajhi. See Appendix IV.
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believe that every one is using the same technology. This eliminates the importance
of the teclmology used to create competitive advantage."
5.4.3.5 (3-31) - Nature of target problem
At the beginning of the decade, AlRajhi developed its e-strategy, aiming to schedule the offering of
many e-banking products and services under the umbrella of EBDAA-2 (See Table 5.4.IV). The
vision behind the offering can be seen in the following quotes:
"We are a people's bank and would like to take whatever banking facility we can
much nearer to our customers hence, save their time and efforts to perform their day
to day banking needs. At the same time be involved in educating our customers in
new technology-based channels" (AlRajhi survey 2003). "Our vision is to move our
bank to the client's side instead of moving the client to our side. We aim to allow
clients to perform all their banking needs remotely" (e-Banking Manager).
The objectives were well defined from the beginning:
□ To reduce mounting queues at branches
□ To cut costs
□ To provide customers with new and convenient tools
□ To attract new customer base
□ To be a leader in the market
AlRajhi outsourced the development of e-banking products and services to its IT strategic partners
(e.g., Temenos Systems). Therefore, the role of the e-Banking Department has been identifying
business needs, co-ordinating the development process and implementing the applications that
occurred in conjunction with the Marketing Department. The development process received strong
authority and support from the top management, and it initially cost approximately SAR 2 m and took
about 6 months (AlRajhi survey 2003).
The e-Banking Manager summarises AlRajhi's approach in developing e-banking products and
services:
"Our e-banking development was based on a phase's modules approach rather than
a complete product approach. Based on such approach, our strategy was to develop
the infrastructure of the e-applications, build them, identify the products and
services offered by each application, identify the features of each product and
service, determine the percentage of transactions performed via e-channels to the
entire bank's transaction, and then convince clients to use the e-
applications...Frankly speaking, we always look to the best practices being done
and try to customise and tailor the optimal one that fits with the bank strategy."
188
Although the development process has been handled by IT strategic partners, it was not without
challenges. From the technical side, the development process faced gradual reliance on external IT
providers. The Information Security Consultant clarifies the relationship with one of the hardware
providers:
"When it comes to technology, we normally go for IBM. We are an IBM's shop and
we believe in IBM. They do not let us down...We believe that the best quality
available in the market is IBM because of its high quality technical support,
availability, and other related issues."
For the operational side the case also involved some challenges. For example, the sequential lunch of
e-banking products and services raised a concern at the Retail Banking Group on whether e-banking
would slow down the expansion of the branches network (AlRajhi survey 2003).
5.4.3.6 (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
EBDA-1 updated many branch applications and networking technologies (e.g., SIB2000). EBDA-2
installed new ATMs, POS terminals, kiosk terminals, and network switches. It also lunched new e-
banking products and services over many channels. The implementation of such projects led to a
largely integrated e-banking technological system. A mainframe at the back-office is linked via
networking technologies to an e-business layer that involves a group of different servers, a layer of
security fire-walls (IBM-ISS), and a group of front-office applications (e.g., e-Sahm, a stock trading
application via mobile phone).
The logic behind this structure is to decentralise data processing among different layers, thus
enhancing the response time and increasing the availability of front-office applications. Such
flexibility allows smooth accumulation of new e-banking applications even though it requires
continued training for technical staff to gain operational skills. The technical implications of building
such an e-banking technological system are presented in the case of bill payment gateway and CRM,
e-government, and AlMubasher.
At the intra-organisational level, the e-banking technological system faced some integration
challenges. For example, the implementation of AlMubasher required a linkage between the
mainframe and the host server to synchronise data. Such challenge required AlRajhi to use additional
tools (e.g., Farabi HostFront & HostFront Publishing) provided from an IT provider other than its
strategic partners (Farabi 2004). Another challenge was the deployment of Oracle's CRM, customer
relationship management, application during 2004. AlRajhi aimed during 2004 to improve the
customer service function through the deployment of Oracle's CRM application. However, the entire
features of Oracle's CRM work more efficiently if it operates within Oracle's e-Business Suite
(Oracle 2006). Accordingly, AlRajhi deployed Oracle's e-Business Suite although there was no
crucial need for the other applications within the suite, increasing the operational cost of the customer
service function.
189
The case of the e-banking technological system is technically less challenged at the inter-
organisational level. Many projects required a minimal level of integration due to the low number of
involved technologies. An example of success stories is the bill payment gateway with STC. The
project allowed AlRajhi to offer a sole service in the market and processed about 80% of STC bills.
Another example is the participation in the e-government framework through establishing a virtual
link with the National Information Centre (NIC). The project helped AlRajhi to furnish customers
with a payment vehicle ofmany governmental services, such as traffic fines (e-Banking Manager).
5.4.3.7 Summary
AlRajhi's e-banking constituency-building process during the present phase clearly shows an
evolution at all dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) with a major role played by
the intra-organisational level and shaped the characteristics of the present constituency.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlRajhi. It provided a brief
overview of AlRajhi and some of the key events shaping its developments. It then looked at the
particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995). AlRajhi's healthy performance in financial and technical terms reveals that the
strategies implemented are successful. The capabilities of AlRajhi's e-banking constituency-building
process have evolved from the initial phase. However, a challenge at the intra-organisational
dimension of the process still exists, in particular the constituent of effective mechanisms for
socialising new mixes of technologies.
On one hand, this suggests that further efforts have to be incorporated within AlRajhi's value creation
and capabilities building strategies with the objectives of re-aligning this area of challenge. On the
other hand, Porter (1996) suggested that an organisation needs to re-think its existing competitive
advantage strategy every ten years. The ORP has been in place since the mid-1995, accordingly
AlRajhi needs to reinvest its strategy in order to secure its competitive position. Giving that AlRajhi is
getting ready to expand internationally as in the case of the new branches in Malaysia. Moreover,
SAMA is deliberating the sector as a requirement to the Saudi Arabia's membership to the world trade
organisation (WTO), which started in 11th December 2005 as the 149th member of the WTO. The
future will carry new challenges that will surely influence the development ofAlRajhi. Learning from
the lessons presented in this case study would help AlRajhi's repositioning within the sector.
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Chapter 6: Saudi Investment Bank
6.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Saib43. It provides a brief
overview of Saib and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 30 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 6.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at Saib44.
Interviewee Date
e-Commerce Head January 2004
IT Group Manager January 2004
CEO October 2005
e-Commerce Head January 2006
Table 6.1.1 Interviews conducted at Saib
6.2 Brief overview
The origins of the national planed economic development in Saudi Arabia go back to the beginning of
the 1970s when the Saudi government implemented the first Five-Year Development Plan of 1970-75.
One of the objectives of the plan was to diversify the sources of national income though increasing the
share of the other productive sectors (Al-Dukheil 1995). Accordingly, the Saudi government
established a group of financial funds to finance privately owned development projects. These funds
are governmentally owned funds aimed to provide financing for productive projects that are having a




To provide soft interest-free loans to farmers to enable
them to secure the agricultural sector prerequisites.
1971 Public Investment Fund
(PIF)
To provide financing for certain productive projects that
are of a commercial nature and are having a significant
43 An initial version of Saib's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2005c. e-
Banking value creation strategies: The case of the Saudi Investment Bank. In Proceedings of the
IADIS International Conference WWW/Internet. Lisbon: Portugal. 19-22 October. Vol. 1, 118-129.
An electronic copy from the paper is attached as a part of Appendix III with permissions from both
the publisher, International Association for Development of Information Society (IADIS), and the
co-author, Professor Alfonso Molina.
44
I wish to express my deep thanks to Saib's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions. Also, I wish to thank the Saib's Financial Planning & Control Department for
administering the survey, and all other groups and divisions who responded to the survey.
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importance in developing the national economy.
1971 Saudi Credit Bank (SCB) To provide soft interest-free loans to citizens with
limited financial resources to help them overcome their
financial difficulties45.
1974 Real Estate Development
Fund (REDF)
To provide soft interest-free loans to citizens to help




To provide medium and long-term loans to industrial
investments along with technical, administrative,
financial and marketing advice to borrower enterprises.
Table 6.2.1 Governmental-owned funds (MOF 2006)
This was followed by the implementation of the second Five-Year Development Plan of 1975-80. The
development strategy of the plan was to lay the foundations of economic self-sufficiency in the future.
One of the requirements for the implementation of this plan was to increase the role of the banking
sector in the economic developments through providing loans and equity capital and increasing the
branches and the share of Saudi ownership in commercial banks (Al-Dukheil 1995).
One of the results of these developments was the establishment of Saib, formally Saudi Investment
Banking Corporation. Saib started operations in 1977 to provide investment banking and financial
services to the Saudi market. In particular, it arranges the financing of quasi-government, private
industrial sectors, trade finance products for imports and for the increasing Saudi exports. The initial
share capital of SAR 30 m increased to SAR 90 m in 1979, to SAR 180 m in 1994, to SAR 720 m in
1994, to SAR 792 m in 1998, to SAR 858 m in 1999, to SAR 1,000 m in 2000, to SAR 1,100 m in
2001, to SAR 1,375 m in 2004, to SAR 1,718 m in 2005, and finally to 2,406 in 2006, about 5.21% of
the Saudi banks share capital (Saib 2006).
The ownership structure helps Saib to establish the identity of a quality alternative to the larger banks.
It is 19% owned by three Saudi commercial banks: AlAhli, Riyad and Aljazira, 31.5% owned by two
governmental agencies: the Pension Fund (PF) and the General Organisation for Social Insurance
(GOSI), and 39.5% owned by Saudi individuals. The remaining 10% is owned by J. P. Morgan
International Finance Limited (JPMorgan) (7.5%) and Mizuho Corporate Bank Limited (Mizuho)
(2.5%) (Saib 2005). Such ownership structure rarely occurs in the Saudi banking sector as a bank
(e.g., AlAhli) owns a share in one of its rivals.
Currently, Saib has about 582 employees, and operates 16 branches throughout Saudi Arabia
dedicated to serve about 30,000 retail and 800 corporate customers (Saib survey 2003). It also
45 In June 2006, the Saudi government approved the proposed Saudi Bank for Credit and Savings
system. The system will extend the aim of the Saudi Credit Bank (SCB) to provide profit-free loans
for small and new enterprises and owners of handicraft businesses to encourage them to continue
running their works by themselves. Accordingly, not only its current share capital of SAR 959 m
will be expanded to SAR 6,000 m, but also it will be renamed to become the Saudi Bank for Credit
and Savings (SBCS) (SPA 2006).
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operates about 100 ATMs and 267 POS terminals. Table II provides a five-year period for Saib
market share positions. Although Saib's corporate policy has developed to provide retail banking
services, it is still concentrated on corporate banking services, and in particular, medium-term
financing (McAulay 2001).
For years ended December 31
% 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
No. of branches 1 1 1 1 1
Total assets 4 2 2 4 4
Share capital 6 3 1 6 4
Shareholders equity 2 1 1 4 5
Net income 1 0 1 2 3
Table 6.2.II Saib market share positions, 5-year periods (Al-Duhkeil 1995; Tadawul 2006)
6.3 Some key events
In order to understand the evolution of the Saib e-banking constituency, it is necessary to look at some
of the key events that started 30 years ago and shaped the present e-banking constituency. The review
focuses on the developments of Saib's corporate policy in creating and sustaining the competitive
advantages.
6.3.1 New focus
The corporate policy of Saib during the first ten years was being an assistant to the governmental-
owned funds (e.g., SIDF) confirmed to be economically invisible. For example, return on total assets
during the period of 1982-85 sharply declined from 0.74% to -0.33% (Al-Duhkeil 1995). In an
attempt to strengthen its market position, Saib modified its focus and started to provide a full range of
corporate banking products and services. The change indicated that Saib became a dual-competitor
against two different groups: government-owned funds in financing business and commercial banks in
corporate business.
Economic indicators at the end of the decade were not only very healthy but also proved that the
modification in the corporate policy was economically visible. For example, the return on total assets
during the period of 1985-1989 improved from -0.33% to 0.22% (Al-Duhkeil 1995). Although such
performance was below the sectoral average of 0.48% to 1.17%, it indicated a positive trend toward
more confidence.
Saib's chairman summarises Saib strategy in achieving such healthy results:
"Our emphasis throughout has been on breadth, consistency and predictability.
Through focusing on risk-averse fee earning activities, we were able to aggressively
build the aggregate of our total assets and off-balance sheet contra balances... We
have long recognised, however, that symbiotic to the creation of shareholder value
is the need to create value for our customers. In this regard, our challenge is
therefore to assure and sustain competitive advantage. This we have achieved
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through constantly re-aligning our business structure with a sharper focus to market
opportunities and requirements," (Saib 1991: 3-4).
6.3.2 Private banking
The second key event which occurred into Saib was the entry to the private banking business from the
door of its corporate banking business. Saib's chairman highlights the driver behind providing private
banking:
"Our excellent understanding of our clients' businesses enables us to tailor the most
effective solutions to their banking needs. This enhances and sustains profitability
by building long-term relationships with satisfied clients. We are determined a top
provider of quality banking in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia... In the pursuit of
excellence our relative small size has enable us to provide that extra level of
personal service and innovative prompt responses to customers' needs which typify
our business relationships at all levels," (Saib 1996: 8).
The strong-relationship that Saib built with many corporate banking customers was the basis for
providing private banking products and services. Saib started to produce private banking products and
services, such as personnel finance, and target the staff of corporate banking customers (e.g., an
Operations Manager of a corporate banking customer).
Although the strategy of targeting private banking customers through corporate banking customers
was not the case all the time, in reality, it did. The strategy helped Saib to secure the competitive
position in the private banking market against big players, such as Samba, as the corporate banking
relationship was a requirement to obtain private banking products and services. Consequently, due to
the fact that the need of a private customer for e-channels (e.g., an ATM) is less than that of a retail
customer, Saib always maintained a small provision rate for its e-channels (see Table 6.3.1).
Year Branches ATMs POS terminals e-Cards
No. sector No. sector No. sector No. sector
% % % %
1990 7 0.71 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A.
1991 8 0.78 5 1.09 N. A. N. A. 5,531 1.01
1992 9 0.85 8 1.24 N. A. N. A. 1,668 0.21
1993 9 0.82 9 1.17 0 0.00 1,837 0.18
1994 10 0.88 11 1.20 68 0.73 8,039 0.51
1995 11 0.99 12 1.17 117 0.89 16,233 0.82
Table 6.3.1 Saib e-market share positions, 1990-95 (BTC 2004)
6.3.3 Financial joint venture
The establishment of non-bank local financial institutions as a new investment approach was another
key event. Saib by all indicators is a small bank competing with large ones. Although financial
indicators were improving, Saib's size compared to other Saudi banks raised speculation during the
mid-1990s about its ability to survive in the sector. This suggested that Saib might merge or be taken
over by one of the larger Saudi banks (McAulay 2001). However, Saib dismissed the issue when it
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implemented a new approach to value creation through establishing two non-bank local financial
institutions.
In the retail banking market, in 1999 Saib established the Amex Saudi Arabia Ltd. (Asal), a joint
venture company equally owned by Saib and American Express. The company was to own and
operate the American Express Card and merchant business in Saudi Arabia. At the corporate banking
market, Saib partnered with Orix of Japan, the world's second largest leasing company, and
established in 2001 the Saudi Orix Leasing Company (Sole). The company aimed to provide medium
term asset financing to all productive sectors with particular emphasis to serving the needs of small to
medium size enterprises (SMSs). Saib's CEO highlights the objectives of the deal:
"We found that if you want to be successful in leasing, you need to look at the
smaller deals of a few hundred thousand riyals upwards... to do those deals would
be costly, and hard to integrate with the larger deals of our corporate business...Of
course with customers that do business with Orix, we also want them to do their
banking with us," (BME 2004: 13).
In the national investment market, Saib acquired Nairn Investments, a Saudi investment company
focused on investment in the Saudi share market, in 2005 to become Saib's division for investment in
the Saudi share market. The trend of establishing more joint ventures is going to continue. According
to Saib's CEO:
"You'll see this bank going into more specialised joint ventures with global partners
that we think can bring new products and way of doing things to the market. We're
looking at opportunities with an insurance company that either belongs to the bank
or that is a joint venture, a wealth management arm, and forfaiting and factoring,"
(Banker Middle East 2004: 14).
In summary, the focus on corporate and private banking businesses as well as the policy of
establishing joint ventures, has shaped Saib corporate policy in creating and sustaining a competitive
advantage since the mid-1980s (see Table 6.2.II). The question now is what are the implications of
Saib's business focus on the emergence and evolution of its e-banking products and services? The
following section aims to answer the question.
6.4 The development of Saib e-banking constituency
The role of Saib e-banking has always been to fulfil the business needs of Saib's divisions and
departments by technological means. The approach that has been followed is through acquiring
standard mature technologies from well-know IT vendors rather than developing new IT applications.
Saib's IT Group Manager highlights the reason for following this approach:
"The bank attempts to purchase integrated packages rather than developing new
ones. This is due to the cost/benefit in relation to the bank business objectives and
resources. However, this behaviour is not without risk. Integrating different
packages involves risk because different packages come from different vendors and
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neither have they understood the other they may not cooperate... We do not take
risk. We are talking about technology. If you would like to be in the leading edge,
this is probably not the right country to attempt to be in. Innovativeness is a huge
risk in the banking industry. We do not implement any thing unless it has been
proven that it works some where else."
In 1997, Saib developed its business and IT strategy (BIT) that aimed to fulfil the technological needs
of the bank's long-term objectives. The actual implementation of BIT started in 1998 through the
introduction of many technical and social changes (IT Group Manager). This section discusses the
evolution of the Saib e-banking constituency by applying the conceptual lens of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis is a two-layered intra- and inter-
organisational diamond given that important features of the Saib e-banking constituency-building
process are the result of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between Saib and other
organisations. Table 6.4.1 represents a brief assessment to the state of the Saib e-banking constituency
prior to the implementation of BIT.
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(I-Ii) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
A part from the Operations Group, the Computer Department operated MYDES,
the corporate core banking system of JPMorgan, and some ready-made
applications to handle day-to-day operations of Saib divisions and departments.
Externally, the department furnished private banking customers with an
automated brokerage hall at the Head-Office, ATMs, POS terminals and e-cards
(see Table 6.4.III).
(II-IIi) Nature and maturity of the technology
The ten branches were occupied with modest ICT infrastructure that included a
branch record-keeping application, PCs and a LAN. This connected via a VAN
to a mini-computer at the Head-Office. The mini-computer hosted all IT
applications, such as MYDES, ESIS, an electronic securities information
system, and ON2, a central ATM/POS system. Both ESIS and ON2 connected to
the inter-bank payment systems ofSAMA.
Alignment (1-li) - Organisational governance
JPMorgan provided MYDES with guidelines on how to customise it to fit in the
Saudi banking context. SAMA required Saib to provide ATMs and POS
terminals although such products are mainly designed for retail customers, a
different customers segment of Saib. Technological projects, such as hardware
upgrade, were based on a cost-benefit criterion in relation to the overall
corporate strategy and had to be approved by the General Manager.
Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The technical staff of JPMorgan provided an on-site operational assistance to
MYDES. Major departments (e.g., Finance, Operations & Administration) used
some financial software packages, such as IBMS, an international brokerage
management system. Private customers were furnished with ATMs and e-cards
that accounted for about 0.88% and 0.51%, respectively, of the sector share.
Unlike other banks, the provision of POS terminals was limited to the sites of
the bank's corporate customers (see Alignment 4-4i).
Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
The engagement of JPMorgan's technical staff had fulfilled the need for new
technical staff. It also helped in the implementation of the cost reduction policy
as the cost of such staff paid via a clearance method with JPMorgan's profit
share. Externally, there was a one-year delay in the provision of POS terminals
(see Alignment 4-4i).
Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
MYDES, ON2 and other applications formed a fragmented system that scarified
performance. This was due to the fact that each application was brought from a
different vendor. An example was the delay in the provision of POS terminals
(see Alignment 3-3i). Another example was that the use of ATMs had been
limited to Saib's customers as the functionality of ON2 can not support inter-
bank payment transactions (see Alignment 2-2i).
Table 6.4.1 The state of the Saib e-banking constituency prior to the implementation of BIT
Clearly, the origins of the Saib e-banking constituency developed gradually, in a close interplay
between intra- and inter-organisational relations. Not only a great deal of ICTs expertise came from
outside. Also, alignment with the corporate strategy of being a corporate bank influenced and shaped
the characteristics and evolution of e-banking technology. Table 6.4.1 presented a brief assessment to
the state of the Saib e-banking constituency prior to the implementation of BIT. The following is a
discussion on the implications of the implementation ofBIT, which goes from the late 1990s to today.
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6.4.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
One of the aims of BIT was to give ICT more autonomy in the development of the Saib's corporate
strategy. In 1998, the Computer Department split from the Operations Group and formed new IT
Group to handle the technical aspects of the e-banking development. The operational and business
aspects of e-banking are handled by the e-Commerce Department, a new department formed in 2002
as part of the Operations Group. Both of these two organisational entities fulfil the technical needs of




























Figure 6.4.1 Saib organisational structure (Saib survey 2003; Saib 2005)
The purpose of the IT Group is "to provide new products and services through the use of technology
and to automate the existing products and services being provided to the bank's customers," (Saib
survey 2003). The IT Group employs about 2% of the Saib workforce and acquires about 11% of the
Saib annual budget. The group also invested about 30-40% of its annual budget in e-banking
developments, such as ATMs and ALLOBank, Saib's telephone banking service (Saib survey 2003;
IT Group Manager).
The IT Group fulfils the technical needs of both Saib and its joint ventures, Asal and Sole. This
includes technology procurement, operating, maintaining, and training. Table 6.4.II provides ICT
related information about Saib's main departments. Although the Investment Banking is the largest in
terms of annual budget, its ICT literacy is less than that of other groups. Alignment 2-2i below
discusses the reason for such a low level of literacy.
Group Retail Corporate Investment Treasury
Purpose To service retail To service To manage









Workforce (%) 3 11 1 2
Budget (%) 11 20 31 15





ICT applications Equation, LETS, Equation, LETS, Reuters, Reuters,
IBMS, MIDS IBMS, MIDS Bloomberg Bloomberg
Relationship Strong Normal No relationship Strong
with IT Group
Table 6.4.II ICT related information for Saib main departments (Saib survey 2003)
The service agreements between Saib and both American Express and Orix of Japan specify that Saib
provides technical assistance to Saib's joint ventures, Asal and Sole. Throughout such agreements the
IT Group processes all merchants' credits and payments of Asal and Sole and integrates them into the
IT system of American Express and Orix of Japan, respectively.
Externally, Saib furnishes customers with many forms of e-banking products and services, including
ATMs, POS terminals, e-cards, e-bills payment, internet banking, and ALLOBank. They are mainly
characterised by customer orientation and efficiency enhancement. The main performance
specifications of these products and services are the cost of a transaction, volume of transactions and
level of customers' fulfilment.
In general, the formation of the IT Group and e-Commerce Department as well as the provision of the
IT Group outside the boundaries of Saib (e.g., Asal), evolved the role of ICT within the Saib e-
banking constituency. However, the strategic role of ICT is still lower than that of other Saudi banks
as the task of defining the long-term ICT policy and strategy is handled by the CEO rather than the
BODs (see Alignment 1-li) (Saib survey 2003; E-Commerce Head).
6.4.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
The implementation of BIT implied changes not only on the organisational aspect but also on the
technological one. "From this point, the bank has a technical infrastructure that can build on...Nearly
everything is being digital line," (IT Group Manager).
The mini-computer of the early 1990s has been replaced with a group of IBM-AS400 i-Series servers
and the underlying infrastructure became TCP/IP that works on a high speed WAN. Equation, an
integrated banking system provided from a British software company named Misys, replaced
MYDES. The main different between the two systems is that the older supports corporate banking
operations only while the newer supports retail, corporate and treasury banking operations within a
single platform. Moreover, the technical features ofON2 have been extended to allow future provision
of ATMs and POS terminals. To fulfil the business needs of divisions and departments, the IT Group
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also integrated many departmental systems to Equation (see Alignments 2-2i & 4-4i). Figure 6.4.11
portrays the structure of the Saib technological system.
"Equation: Core banking system
■TI: Letter credit system
•LETS: Local stocks trading system
"EBNS: International stocks trading system
■Amex; American Express's cards transactions system
•Orix: Orix lease approval system
• CRMS: Credit risk management system ■ON2: ATMs/POS system
Figure 6.4.II Saib technological system (IT Group Manager)
Figure 6.4.II shows that the main characteristic of this structure is to cluster transactions in accordance
with the beneficiary division or department. For example, TI, a letter credit system used by the Credit
Division, is isolated from other Equation's systems in order to minimise the traffic of transactions to
and from Equation. This clustering enhances the performance of data processing and fully optimises
Equation and its related hardware and networking components. Accordingly, it implies major cost-
performance improvements in relation to the previous systems and enables the provision of a
completely new service.
An example of performance enhancement from decentralising the structure is illustrated through the
case of the Internet banking technological sub-system (see Figure 6.4.III). The major performance
specification of the system is the ability to support a customer-base of up to 15,000 Internet banking
customers with sub-second response times. Although such performance specification does not imply
major cost-performance improvement as the internet banking service was not available on MYDES, it
does enable the provision of a completely new service. Customers now can manage their different











Figure 6.4.III Saib Internet banking technological sub-system (Saib survey 2003)
The build-up strategy of such decentralised fragmented technological systems is not without risks. For
example, Saib's Internet banking technological sub-system brought some financial and technical risks
although the specifications did not evolve in the course of the development. InfoSys, one of the global
IT vendors, delivered one of the technical components of the system four months behind the schedule.
This delay required the IT Group to pay an extra 20% of the system budget to cover the extension of
the contract with the IT developers. The system also required the IT Group to train its staff on new
programming languages, such as Java, and hire new staff.
6.4.3 Alignment (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
Saib CEO is proud of Saib governance that reflects its culture:
"As well as offering genuinely different products, there's also the matter of culture
and service. Sometime ago we adopted a simple, flat management structure, and we
are deliberately approachable for our customers. This culture adds huge value to the
bank in a society where personal relationships are so important... People don't like
officious banks. We found our approach really bore fruit when we launched into
retail lending, as [the entire] banks offer 20 or 24 times salary, all require salary
transfer, and all offer tenors of five to six years. But we saw our consumer loan
portfolio shoot up to SAR 2 billion in just 18 months," (BME 2004: 14).
The nature of Saib governance is positively reflected in the style of management. The decision¬
making process is a mixture of a highly centralised management and a culture of participation. The IT
Group reports directly to the CEO, eliminating any cultural difference either in the vision or
perception of the role of IT between the two parties (E-Commerce Head; IT Group Manager).
However, the task of defining the long-term ICT policy and strategy is handled by the CEO rather
than the BODs. The executive and the middle management are responsible for executing the policy
and strategy (Saib survey 2003; E-Commerce Head). This suggests that the strategic role of ICT is
lower than that of other Saudi banks (e.g., Samba, AlRajhi).
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The IT decision-making process on the other hand, follows a formal mechanism. In the event of an IT
initiative, in order to be approved by the CEO, the IT Group has to transfer the initiative to a business
case. This is followed by a business plan that identifies the aims, objectives, involved groups, delivery
times, and required resources. The CEO usually consults external consultants for advice and
recommendations prior to taking the final decision (see Alignment 2-2i). When the initiative is
approved, the CEO and involved groups (e.g., Corporate Banking Group), review the development
progress of the initiative with the IT Group through monthly management meetings and informal
discussions.
Although the IT decision-making process seems less complicated than that of retail banks, such as
AlRajhi, in such a way it has no BODs involvement, it is negatively influenced by the nature of the
corporate banking business. It forms a challenge to the success of an e-banking service as providing a
corporate service (e.g., corporate financing) requires approval from many departments (e.g., Credit
Control, Corporate Department) (see Alignment 2-2i). Consequently, it requires a virtual linkage
among all involved departments, which increase the cost of e-banking development (see Alignment 3-
3i).
The IT Group Manager highlights the different between the corporate and retail banking business:
"The corporate bank generally has multiple levels of authorisations before any thing
is executed. This is exactly the opposite of straight-through processing. From
cultural prospective, the introduction of straight through processing will be a
cultural change for much of the corporate operations. This means that they have to
quantify the conditions under which something can be automatically executed,
which they use not to do."
Inter-organisationally, the e-banking constituency-building process is influenced by Saib's joint
ventures, Asal and Sole, the national ICT infrastructure and SAMA's inter-banks payment systems
(e.g., SARIE, the national EFT network). For Saib's joint ventures, the operational agreement between
Saib and American Express on running Asal cards system, for instance, requires that any enhancement
to the feature of the system has to be approved by American Express. Similar agreement is also in
place with regards to Sole system. Such agreements negatively influenced the customisation of Asal
and Sole systems to fit with the Saudi market context (see Alignment 4-4i).
The second external influence is the national ICT infrastructure of the STC. Two years ago, for
example, Saib completed the development of an e-banking service. For information security purposes,
the service required a 2 G-bit bandwidth. The STC could not deliver such bandwidth although it had
such a product. The reason was because "STC could not organise its marketing and operations in
order to sell the line to us. The STC needs to improve its data communications infrastructure as well
as its marketing skills. It should also deliver huge amounts of bandwidth," (IT Group Manager).
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As of the case with other Saudi banks, Saib e-banking constituency-building process is also influenced
by the evolution in the Saudi banking sector. The Vice Governor of SAMA lists some recent
initiatives that aim to develop the Saudi banking sector46:
1. Introduction of new measures to enhance the growth of mortgage financing by commercial
banks.
2. Approval of the opening of a number ofGCC banks (e.g., Emirates Bank) and more licenses
to international banks (e.g., Deutsche Bank) are pending.
3. Introduction of the insurance law which provides the legal framework for the development of
this sector.
4. Introduction of the Capital Markets Law (CML) to facilitate the development of a corporate
bond market and other instruments as well as strengthen the operations and efficiency of the
stock market.
6.4.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The vision behind the lunch of e-banking was to modify the image of Saib as an innovative niche
financial institution. The BIT, which has been in place since 1999, draws four main objectives for
Saib e-banking products and services. First objective is to maintain the customers' base through
providing innovative banking solutions. The second objective is to increase profitability through
decreasing the operational expenses of physical channels (e.g., branches). The third objective is to
make e-banking a cross-selling channel for the products and services of Saib's joint ventures (e.g.,
Amex cards). The fourth objective is to provide products and services locally and internationally (Saib
survey 2003).
Saib has been building its sociotechnical capabilities since the late 1990s and the implementation of
BIT. Equation and its related components (see Figure 6.4.II), the e-Commerce Department, the IT
Group, and a group of e-banking products and services (e.g., ALLOBank and AswaqNet) are all
results of the constituency-building process. Nowadays the technical aspects of the e-banking products
and services are complete. Giving that Saib is mainly a corporate bank; the achievements are well
gained at the retail banking market as Saib has kept the same share of e-market since the early 1990s
(see Table 6.3.1 & Table 6.4.III).













1999 13 1.09 24 1.21 179 1.09 38,645 0.82
2000 13 1.1 29 1.31 221 1.19 9,882 0.21
2001 13 1.09 49 1.91 264 1.22 9,015 0.16
2002 15 1.25 74 2.38 286 1.18 28,899 0.51
2003 15 1.24 94 2.71 267 1.06 48,112 0.82
Table 6.4.III Saib e-market share positions, 1999-03 (BTC 2004)
Net income from the retail banking business is also healthy. Figure 6.4.IV shows Saib net income
(SAR in millions) by business segments for the last three years. Although Saib is focusing in
corporate and treasury banking, the net income from retail banking is rapidly increasing while that











Figure 6.4.IV Saib net income by business segments during 2003-05 (Saib 2006)
Table 6.4.IV and Figure 6.4.IV show that net income from corporate banking fluctuated during the
last three years. The reason for this challenge is related to the multiple levels of authorisations
surrounding the financing and investment decisions of corporate banking customers (see Alignment 1 -
li). Tackling this challenge was the reason for the 2-year delay in the provision of the corporate
version of Saib Internet banking47. The IT Group Manager illustrates a technical challenge occurred
during the development of the Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) for the Credit Control
Group:
"In fact, for corporate banking [straight-through processing] is very complex and
this is way we have Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) that attempts to
simplify this complex relationship and present 'go/no go' decision. So, if the CRMS
47 Retail Internet banking and corporate Internet banking have been offered in June 2002 and April
2004, respectively (E-Commerce Head).
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has all the information that is needed, it actually can do the 'go/no go' decision. But
the big risk is that does it have all the needed information? For retail banking, this
process is very simple and easy... So, the challenge is turning a formally manual
task to a fully automated straight-through process. This is the big challenge,
straight-through processing."
The business and constituency-building aspects are going well inside Saib. The provision of LCS and
LETS in 1999 helped the Credit Group to perform its day-to-day operations in an efficient way. The
launch of CRMS, Sterling and IBNS also helped other divisions, such as the Credit Finance Group to
increase the overall all performance (see Figure 6.4.II). Such applications indicate that e-banking
offerings are intra-organisationally well accepted and supported, and thereby enhance the reputation
of the IT Group among Saib's divisions and groups on the group's ability to fulfil the technological
needs of Saib (Saib survey 2003). The availability of the necessary resources in terms of people,
expertise, funding, and facilities that had been offered by BIT since 1999 helped the IT Group to build
such a strong internal image (see Alignment 3-3i).
The business and constituency-building aspects of Saib are evolving well in the market. Since the
launch of the services, the number of retail customers using ALLOBank and Internet banking has
grown substantially to 25% and 35%, respectively. However, the number of retail customers using
ATMs and POS terminals was the opposite (see Table 6.4.IV). The fluctuation between these two
trends reflects the type of Saib's retail customers segment. Most of Saib's retail customers are private
banking customers that use Saib as their investment agent rather than banking agent. Therefore, they
use ALLOBank and Internet banking channels to follow-up on the progress of their investment
portfolios, a service that is not available through Saib's ATMs. Although Saib has launch in
December, 2005 AswaqNet, Saib's e-brokerage service, the growing rate of ALLOBank and Internet
banking usage reflects the focus of Saib's corporate strategy in targeting private banking customers
(see Dimension I-Ii).
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Withdrawal to total Saib 61 54 65 58 91
transactions (%) Sector 61 68 59 60 53
Active e-cards (%) Saib 61 67 73 65 65
Sector 74 77 72 80 80
Table 6.4.IV Saib ATMs statistics during 1999-2003 (BTC 2004)
The promotional strategies and activities used recently by Saib helped to promote e-banking products
and services to customers. Marketing e-banking to customers depends mainly on using Saib's internal
resources. An example of such strategies is the co-ordination with the Retail Marketing Department to
conduct a one-to-one telephone or personnel contact with customers. The aim was to convince
customers to use e-banking products and services (Saib survey 2003). The main factor for this success
is the adequate use of personnel relationship; "This culture adds huge value to the bank in a society
where personal relationships are so important," (BME 2004: 14).
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Although the business and constituency-building aspects are going well in the market, the competition
is not that simple. Saib is facing competition mainly from AlRajhi and AlAhli, especially in the
service of bill payments. An interesting issue here is that AlAhli is considered one of Saib's
competitors although it owns 8% of Saib. This indicates an alignment challenge with the intra-
organisational governance of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (see Alignment 1-li). Saib is
tackling such completion through "continuous revision of plans, products, technology, and customer
needs to ensure modification of business plans and procedures," (Saib survey 2003).
6.4.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
BIT draw four main objectives from Saib's e-banking products and services (see Alignment 2-2i).
Although such objectives were well defined from the beginning, they evolved in response to the
change in Saib's corporate policy. The Head of E-Commerce clarifies how the objectives have
evolved:
"Our e-banking strategy has been modified to align with the change in the over all
strategy of the bank. We were mainly a corporate bank until the mid-1990s. After
that the bank entered to the retails banking market to make a present. Such change
in business force us to modify our e-banking strategy to meet the requirements of
the new clients segment, retail. Therefore, we expanded our ATMs and POS
terminals networks to capture some shares from the retail banking market."
Table VIII lists Saib's major milestones on the road to modern e-banking products and services.
Saib's approach in developing such an e-banking package was through either following the steps and
examples of other banks, such as the implementation of Equation by JPMorgan, or taking a pioneering
step with little existing precedent, such as the cross-selling channel of Amex cards (see Alignment 4-
4i). The initial estimated cost of development and implementation of e-banking was approximately
SAR 5 m and the initial estimated time of development and implementation was approximately 3
years commencing 1999.
Launch Date Product/Service Description
May 2001 ALLOBank Telephone banking
June 2002 Saib Internet Internet banking, retail
August 2003 e-bill payments Bill payments via ATM
April 2004 Saib Internet Internet banking, corporate
December 2004 Saib SADAD Checks payment & presentment service
December 2005 AswaqNet Internet local brokerage
Table 6.4.V Saib major e-banking milestones (Saib survey 2003; E-Commerce Head; Saib 2006)
The available technical capabilities and human and financial resources of Saib e-banking well
matched BIT's objectives (see Dimension I-Ii). However, as mentioned earlier, the actual cost and
delivery time exceeded the estimated cost and delivery time by 20% and four months, respectively.
The drivers behind the provision of e-banking were the CEO, IT Group and the Marketing
Department. The implementation of the bundle required substantial re-engineering of existing
activities. This was anticipated in the BIT through hiring technical staff with adequate experience,
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providing technical training and sharing the experience with other Saudi banks such Riyad and
AlAhli.
6.4.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
The migration of the Saib core banking system from MYDES, the former core banking system of
JPMorgan, to Equation in 1999 helped Saib to eliminate many integration challenges and enhanced
the performance of many divisions and groups. "From this point, the bank has a technical
infrastructure that can build on...Nearly everything is being digital line," (IT Group Manager).
The main characteristic of the technological system's structure is to cluster transaction processing in
accordance with to the beneficiary division or department (e.g., TI of the Credit Division). This
clustering enhances the performance of processing and fully optimises Equation and its related
hardware and networking components (e.g., IBM-AS400 i-Series). Accordingly, it implies major cost-
performance improvements in relation to the previous system, MYDES, and enables the provision of a
completely new service.
The Credit Risk Management System (CRMS) of the Credit Control Group is an intra-organisational
example. The CRMS increased the efficiency of the financing decision of "go/no go" and allowed the
group to respond to larger amounts of corporate banking customer's orders in a shorter time than that
of the late 1990s. Another example is the implementation of both LCS and LETS in 1999. Both
applications helped the Credit Group to perform its day-to-day operations in an efficient way. The
lunch of Sterling and IBNS also helped the Credit Finance Group to increase the overall performance
(see Alignment 2-2i).
An inter-organisational example that illustrates the relationship between the characteristics and
performance specifications of Saib's technological system is illustrated through the case of the
Internet banking technological sub-system (see Figure 6.4.III). The major performance specification
of the system is the ability to support a customer-base of up to 15,000 Internet banking customers with
sub-second response times. Although such performance specification does not imply major cost-
performance improvement as the Internet banking service was not available on MYDES, it does
enable the provision of a completely new service. Customers now can manage their different accounts
with Saib, Asal, and Sole though a single virtual channel.
In general, the implementation of BIT implied many changes from both skills/training and adoption.
From the skills and training aspect, the system required (1) skilled resources in the technologies and
presentation standards for end-users, (2) core systems to be adapted to a non-stop operation, (3)
operational staff to understand the nature of straight-through processing, and (4) legal staff to
understand technology-related customer agreements. From the adaptation aspect, the system
heightened awareness of straight-through-processing, legal agreements and customer visibility of core
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operations. It also increases the vigilance and skills in IT security aspects as well as the awareness of
customers' needs across remote channels (Saib survey 2003).
6.4.7 Summary
In summary, Saib e-banking constituency-building process has developed since the implementation of
BIT. Accompanied efforts from both intra- and inter-organisational levels held to shape the
characteristics of the present e-banking constituency.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Saib. It provided a brief
overview of Saib and some of the key events shaping its developments. It then looked at the particular
development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995).
The results indicate that Saib's e-banking constituency-building process has developed since the late
1990s with combined efforts at both intra- and inter-organisational levels which have shaped the
characteristics of the present e-banking constituency.
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Chapter 7: Saudi Hollandi Bank
7.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Hollandi48. It provides a brief
overview of Samba and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 75 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 7.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at Hollandi49.
Interviewee Date
e-Banking Head December 2003
Head ofCorporate Banking Group December 2003
Head of Technology Services Department (TSD) December 2003
e-Banking Head January 2006
Table 7.1.1 Interviews conducted at Hollandi
7.2 Brief overview
Hollandi, the first bank in Saudi Arabia, was founded in 1926 as the Netherlands Trading Society
(NTS), and was originally established with one office in Jeddah to serve the pilgrims from Indonesia.
For some time, as the only operating bank in Saudi Arabia, Hollandi served as the Saudi Arabian's
Central Bank, maintaining the gold stock of the country and processing the first oil-related
transactions. In 1964, Hollandi became a member of one ofABN AMRO.
48 The first initial version of Ilollandi's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A.
2005e. Strategic networks to create e-banking value: The case of a Saudi-European joint venture
bank. In Proceedings of the 5th IB1MA Conference on the Internet and information technology in
modern organisations. Cairo: Egypt. 13-15 December. 362-383. The second initial version of
Hollandi's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2006b. Strategic networks to
create e-banking value: The case of the Saudi Hollandi Bank. In Soliman, K. S. 2006. Advancing @
the speed of technology: e-Business strategies for modern corporations. IBIMA Press: New York.
Forthcoming. Fall 2006. Electronic copies from the papers are attached as a part of Appendix III
with permissions from both the publisher, International Business Information Management
Association (IBIMA), and the co-author, Professor Alfonso Molina.
49 I wish to express my deep thanks to Hollandi's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to
the research questions. Also, I wish to thank the Hollandi's Corporate Banking Group for
administering the survey, and all other groups and divisions who responded to the survey.
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Twelve years down the road, ABN AMRO was influenced like other banks in Saudi Arabia by the
decision of banks' Saudisation50. In 1976, Hollandi was formed by taking over the three branches of
ABN AMRO in Saudi Arabia and started operations on 1 August 1977. Hollandi's share capital was
increased from SAR 210 m to SAR 420 m in 1994, to SAR 630 m in 2000, to SAR 945 m in 2002, to
SAR 1,260 m in 2004, and finally to SAR 2,205 in 2006. ABN AMRO holds 40% ofHollandi's share
capital while Saudi nationals own the remaining 60%.
Since inception, Hollandi adopted a cautious branch expansion policy, with the main emphasis being
on streamlining the organisational structure and back-office computerisation. Despite a substantial rise
in treasury activities in the initial years of the 1980s, the principal accent of Hollandi's activities
remained within the domestic sector with an eye on the international capital market. The economic
slow-down in the mid-1980s had a negative effect on the profit position of Hollandi in the form of
substantial loan loss provisions. The cost of branch expansion and automation also had a dampening
effect on Hollandi's net income figures.
Hollandi initiated steps to streamline operations and rationalise administrative expenses, mainly in the
form of reduced staff expenses to meet the situation indicated above. However, it continued its
emphasis on technological upgrading in order to attain its aim of providing top-quality, fully
automated and reliable services to its customers. This has had a positive effect in boosting the
operating income of Hollandi. On the other hand, Hollandi has been rather slow to introduce new
products and services in order to capture new business opportunities. Moreover, too much emphasis
on an organisational control mechanism since Hollandi's formation may have adversely affected its
innovative instinct. Its pre-occupation with the problem loans and advances portfolio since the mid-
1980s finally resulted in innovation being relegated to the back seat in the management's list of
priorities.
At the beginning of the 1990s a new BODs took over. The board upon a complete reorganisation of
the management structure, revamped policies and procedures, and initiated a re-look into the future
needs for information technology. It intended to project a new image of Hollandi with a new name,
logo, and nature. Table 7.2.1 provides Hollandi's 5-year market share position commencing 1988.
For years ended December 31
% 1988 1993 1998 2003
Branches 3 3 3 3
Total assets 4 5 6 5
Share capital 7 2 3 4
Net income 3 4 4 5
50 The term Saudisation means localisation. In 1976, the Saudi government promoted a policy of
converting foreign banks' branches into publicly traded companies with the participation of Saudi
nationals (SAMA 1999).
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Table 7.2.1 Hollandi market share positions (%), 5-year periods (AI-Duhkeil 1995; Tadawul
2006)
7.3 Some key events
By 2003, Hollandi had evolved into a sustainable development organisation of ABN AMRO. This
was established in 2004 with a shared mission to incorporate sustainable development into the
working environment and business processes. Hollandi (2005: 12) highlights the aim of the new
organisation:
"To provide long-term value for our shareholders, clients, and employees and
contribute to society by protecting, sustaining, and enhancing human, natural, and
financial capital for the future... The pillars of our strategy for growth have
generated energy and enthusiasm throughout the organisation that are underpinning
a culture change that is translating into consistently improved results."
The sustainable development organisation required Hollandi to adopt the following agenda:
□ Raise staff awareness and build expertise related to sustainability.
□ Integrate sustainable development into the business processes through policy development
and implementation.
□ Develop products that address environmental, social, and ethical issues.
□ Encourage and promote the concept of sustainable development with external stakeholders.
Hollandi (2005) argues that sustainable development will have an impact on all areas of Hollandi "as
awareness is raised and employees and stakeholders believe in, and commit to, the idea of preparing
planet Earth for the next generation," (12).
Currently, Hollandi has about 1,219 employees divided amongst five main groups: Investment,
Corporate Banking, Consumer Banking and Operations & Treasury. It operates 39 branches
throughout Saudi Arabia dedicated to serve about 130,000 and 1,250 retail and corporate customers,
respectively. It also operates about 135 ATMs and 2,660 POS terminals. Figure 7.3.1 portrays the
organisational structure ofHollandi.
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Figure 7.3.1 Hollandi's organisational chart (Hollandi survey 2003; Hollandi 2005)
The future, however, according to Al-Dukheil (1995), depends on Hollandi's ability to encourage
innovation and to introduce new products and services that meet the changing needs and expectation
of the customers. The question now is what are the implications of these key events, including the
sustainable development program on the emergence and evolution of Hollandi's e-banking products
and services? The following section aims to answer the question.
7.4 The development of the Hollandi e-banking constituency
This section discusses the evolution of Hollandi e-banking constituency by applying the conceptual
lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis is a two-
layered intra- and inter-organisational diamond, given that important features of the Hollandi's e-
banking constituency-building process are the result of intra- and inter-organisational interactions
between Hollandi and other organisations.
7.4.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
E-banking commands modest economic and strategic powers inside Hollandi. Hollandi's executives
are aware of the modest role played by e-banking in the emergence and evolution ofHollandi:
"At [Hollandi], I do not think there was a long-term ICT policy or strategy at the
time of first e-banking development. Our aim was to push the initiative to the
market as soon as possible without having a well-defined policy. Later, the policy
evolved while we were learning from e-banking. Moreover, we learned in this
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matter from our partner, ABN AMRO, on how to build a long-term ICT policy and
strategy," (Head of Corporate Banking Group).
In an attempt to modify the role of e-banking, Hollandi developed at the beginning of the millennium
a new IT strategy, IT Strategy Road Map, to fulfil the technological needs of Hollandi's long-term
objectives. The roadmap became one of the main roles of the Technology Steering Committee (TSC),
an executive committee that consists of all senior managers in addition to the CEO. Hollandi's
executives are proud of developing such strategy:
"We have an IT strategy road map which was built a couple of years ago and the
bank is moving to implementing it. This map is evergreen and very [flexible]. We
have also a Technology Steering Committee that governs the IT initiatives, IT
expenditures, and IT strategy... The idea behind TSC is to align the Technology
Services Division with the rest of the bank" (Head ofTechnology Services).
One of the consequences of the IT strategy roadmap was the formation of the e-Banking Department
in 2001 as a new organisational entity under the Corporate Banking Group. The purpose of the
department was to develop and enhance the business aspects of e-banking products and services. The
department started operations with about 5 employees and an initial annual budget of two millions
Saudi Riyals. The focus during the first two year of inception was on the development of the ICT
infrastructure.
"We did not spend too much on e-banking development. What we did was only
developing our infrastructure and launching Internet banking for both retails and
corporate clients. What we spent was only about SAR 5,000,000 only the
development and infrastructure. Our approach was to have a very focused and low
cost e-banking products and services," (Head ofCorporate Banking Group).
The emergence and evolution of e-banking products and services are usually based on Hollandi's
long-term ICT policy and strategy that are defined by the TSC. Although the task of defining such
policy and strategy is a top-down approach, the task of initiating an e-banking idea uses the reverse
approach. The e-Banking Head highlights the mechanism for implementing the long-term ICT's
policy and strategy:
"Projects are first initiated at the e-Banking Department. Then they are sent to the
TSC for strategic assessment...The committee studies the strategic issues of an
initiative and approve or disapprove the initiative for assessment. If the project is
approved for assessment by the committee, the initiative becomes a project. Then
the e-Banking Department develops the detailed feasibility study for the project and
returns it back to the committee for implementation approval. If the project is
approved for implementation by the committee, the committee assigns the resources
and allocates the budget and the e-Banking Department starts the project."
Table 7.4.1 provides ICT related information about Hollandi main departments as of end 2002.
Although Treasury commands the largest annual net profit, ICT's role and position are much strategic
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Table 7.4.1 ICT related information for Hollandi main departments as of the end 2002 (Hollandi
survey 2003)
The year 2004 was a challenging year for the e-Banking Department with the introduction of new
business propositions and the development of e-banking products and services for both corporate and
retail customers. The department has adopted the IT strategy roadmap to gain competitive advantage
over other banks. A major change in the department was the shift from the Corporate Banking Group
to the Operations Group and the merger with the Call Centre to form Remote Delivery Channels
(Hollandi 2005).
The main delivery channels under the new unit include Internet banking, POS terminals, and ATMs.
Many initiatives have also been taken to maximise the functionality of these delivery channels.
Currently, Hollandi offers many forms of e-banking products and services. The milestone are ATMs
in 1991, POS terminals in 1993, telephone banking in 2000, Internet corporate banking (Hollandi
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Online Corporate version) in 2001, B2B link with Saudi Aramco in 2001, Internet retail banking
(Hollandi Online Retail version) in 2003 and SMS service in 2003.
Such products and services exhibit the feature of straight-through processing (STP). Their main
performance specifications are speed of processing transactions and security. E-banking products and
services also imply a change for customers in relation to the conventional products and services. The
change mainly relates to the online interface and navigation and this is user-friendly and intuitive for
the customers. One of the reasons behind such achievement was the involvement of some corporate
customers during the analysis and piloting stages.
The e-banking products and services have evolved since the time of their launch to provide the feature
of STP and offer richer functionality. Meeting customers' demand was the main reason for such
evolution. E-banking products and services both complement and compete with conventional banking
products and services. Hollandi's e-banking is different from that offered by international banks as it
has been developed based on different technical and strategic points of view. On the other hand,
comparing Hollandi's e-banking with that of other Saudi and regional banks, it is not different as such
banks offer similar products and services. The Hollandi's executives perceive that e-banking is
basically automation of the conventional distribution channels:
"I would say that all of the Saudi e-banking products and services are in line with
each other. The reason for that is because we are providing functionality to basic
banking transactions, which are around account management, cash management,
and money transfer, and all other Saudi and regional banks are providing the same
services," (Head of TSD).
The technical aspects of e-banking are handled by the Operations Group, responsible for providing
and maintaining dependable infrastructural services to enable the business units to serve their
customers in the most efficient manner. One of the technical departments under the group is the
Technology Services Division (TSD). TSD focuses on the preparation for roll-out of the new core
banking system which includes the integration of the new core banking system with other banking
applications, establishing hardware/software architecture, data migration and consolidation, upgrade
and standardisation of Hollandi's PC infrastructure (Hollandi 2005).
TSD employs about 100 technical employees that are divided among five departments. Figure 7.4.1
portrays the organisational structure of TSD and the role of its departments.
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• Application Management holds the ICT's strategic issues (e.g., implementation or the IT strategy road inapt
• Technology Operations holds the operational aspects (e.g.. MIS reports!
• IC'T Infrastructure holds the physical ICT environment te.g, PCs, routers ... etc.!
• Information Security holds the security admmistrational and operational aspects.
• Service Management holds the cross-functional among other Hollandi's departments.
Figure 7.4.1 Operations Group's organisational structure (Head of TSD; Hollandi 2005)
The technical aspects of the e-banking products and services have been completed. However, such
products and services are still having some technical problems. One main problem is the assimilation
of different e-banking applications to serve e-channels (see Alignment 4-4i). Another main problem is
the e-banking operational cost as it is still higher than that of other Saudi banks (e-Banking Head).
The progress of the e-banking constituency inside Hollandi, the banking sector and the market
environments, is a mixture of remarkable and modest advances. Inside Hollandi, such aspects are
going well. The e-banking products and services are fully accepted and supported by the Corporate
Banking Group and the entire Hollandi. They have also built a good reputation among different
departments. Free subscription and internal marketing are two examples of the implemented
promotional activities of e-banking products and services.
The e-banking products and services have the necessary resources in terms of people, expertise,
funding, and facilities. And, the number of employees and departments using e-banking has grown
substantially. In the market, e-banking products and services have achieved modest progress, although
they have been performing more healthily on the corporate banking side than in retail banking. One of
the reasons for the healthy performance on the corporate banking side is the position of the e-Banking
Department under the Corporate Banking Group.
"Because the [e-Banking Department] was under the Corporate Banking Group, its
main tasks have been the development of e-banking for corporate clients. Therefore,
we have very advanced and mature e-banking products for corporate clients. I think
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now the e-Banking Department needs to be moved to the Retail Banking Group in
order to develop more e-banking products for retail clients...We believe that the
development in the future will be from retail clients rather than from corporate
clients," (Head ofCorporate Banking).
In fact, Hollandi is proud of the present achievements of e-banking products and services:
"Our corporate Internet banking product Hollandi Online won customer acceptance
in 2004 with a marked increase in the number of users subscribing to the service.
Further investment was made to enhance functionality thereby ensuring that it is
widely accepted as a convenient, quick and secure way of making payments and
trade transactions, and receiving information online," (Hollandi 2005: 17).
In practice, however, the number of customers using Hollandi's e-banking has grown rather
insignificantly. For example, the Internet banking service attracted on a yearly basis an average of
10% and 4% of corporate and retail customers, respectively. Such figures are expected to reach about
40% and 20% of corporate and retail customers, respectively, at the end of 2004 (Head of Corporate
Banking). Moreover, Table 7.4.II shows that not only is the Hollandi's share of ATMs in the sector
modest, its yearly growth is insignificant as well.
Year
No. of ATMs No. of cards No. of transactions on SPAN
issued Total Withdrawal
1999
No. 86 145,188 102,746 62,541
sector 4.33 3.12 0.22 0.22%
2000
No. 96 145,340 1,339,348 715,200
sector 4.32 3.04 1.83 1.44%
2001
No. 111 171,008 1,632,385 837,012
sector 4.33 3.07 1.56 1.36%
2002
No. 125 181,512 1,823,385 942,056
sector 4.02 3.23 1.39 1.20%
2003
No. 135 180,754 1,947,454 989,985










Table 7.4.II Hollandi's ATMs statistics, 1999-2003 (BTC 2004)
7.4.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
One of the main features that characterise Hollandi's e-banking technological system is that it has
been developed internally (i.e. in-house development). The major performance specifications of the
system are speed, capacity, and scalability of data processing. In relation to previous systems, such
major performance specifications not only imply major cost/performance improvements, but enable
the provision of completely new services, such as chip cards.
To cope with the anticipated increase in the volume of transactions that require a high-performance
and scalable network design, the TSD had to substitute in 2001 the existing X25 network design with
one based on IP. The WAN design is based on the Cisco's hierarchical model and uses Cisco high-end
routers as the network core. It also includes a disaster recovery node.
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The LAN design is based on Cisco's collapsed core model and uses core switches, layer-3 capability
and edge switches. Inter-virtual LAN routing has been used between switch trunks, and all traffic has
been load-balanced. To meet customers' need for high-availability, scalability and redundancy, the
design incorporated the concept of full bandwidth and redundancy for the LAN and WAN,
respectively.
The e-banking technological system consists of a group of mini-computers built on client/server
technology and run a group of both specially and ready-made applications. The entire hardware
components of the network architecture consists of about 150 devices and uses Cisco Works 2000 as a
network management tool for configuration, inventory and availability. Such network design not only
enhances the state of the e-banking constituency's readiness, but also allows the launch of modern e-
banking applications as they mostly require an IP platform to operate.
During 2003, the entire technological system had been upgraded to an advanced mature system. This
upgrade has enabled the gradual accumulation of many ICT applications as well as the elimination of
performance problems due to technical incompatibilities with other interacting systems (see
Alignment 4-4i). Table 7.4.Ill lists some of the new applications implemented as well as the
beneficiary departments.
IT Application Department/user
Asset Securitisation System Assets Management
B2B Application for Saudi Aramco Consumer Banking Group




Delinquent Monitoring System Consumer Loans Department
Electronic Remittances Application Corporate Banking Group
e-Salary Payment System (Rawateb) Financial Affairs
Expenses Accounting System (EAS) Human Resource







TEMENOS GLOBUS Technology Services Division
Table 7.4.III Some Hollandi's new IT systems and applications (Hollandi survey 2003)
The Head of TSD describes the main types of ongoing ICT projects driving the specification of such
applications:
"We have three types of projects. Mandated projects that are those mandated by
SAMA, such as Tadawul and SPAN. External mandated projects which includes all
of the SWIFT projects. Internal projects which include this year Direct Dept
Management, Hollandi Online for consumer, and Hollandi Online for corporate. We
also have a main project related to replacing our major core banking system.
Currently our core banking system is running on Kendel Span Master and we are
changing it to TEMENOS GLOBUS, which is a major project for us and started last
year and is expected to be completed by the middle of 2004."
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Most of the technologies used in the e-banking technological system are transparent. Full testing,
piloting, soft launch, and ethical hacking based on customers' feedback confirm the transparency of
the technologies. For example, the migration of the network to the IP design in 2001 included
usability testing and piloting during the implementation process.
The migration was carried out following a four-phase process:
□ Assessment of the existing network resources.
□ Pilot at a single branch to demonstrate the new network designs prior to full-scale migration.
□ Full-scale roll-out across the three zones within Saudi Arabia and the 39-branch network.
□ Monitoring, maintenance and evolution of the new designs.
The specifications of the e-banking technological system evolved in the course of its development as
new ideas were generated and gaps were identified in the market. This was due to the nature of e-
banking and the increasing awareness and demands of customers for high-availability, scalability and
redundancy of the service. An example of the system evolution was the launch of smart cards to
replace the traditional magnetic stripe cards to maximise the functionality of ATMs and POS
terminals (see Alignment 4-4i).
The technical specification of the e-banking technological system shows that not only does it use
standard mature technologies; it is also characterised by a good degree of innovativeness. Although
the system has not developed a new proprietary technology, it is technically very demanding,
especially in terms of maintaining security and 24X7 availability. The risk of failing to deliver in
terms of anticipated performance, cost and time translates into downtime, loss of transactions' income
and lack of internal support and resources. Regular training by technology vendors and appropriate
recruitment of technical people are in place to avoid such risks.
7.4.3 Alignment (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
The Head of Corporate Banking Group describes how the process of decision-making is highly
influenced by the culture ofABN AMRO:
"Our decision making process is based on arguments. Our bank is affected by its
partner's culture. In the Dutch culture, we do not care about whom that person is,
rather we care about arguments provided by that person. During our decision
making process we are always looking for arguments surrounding any decision and
the bottom line impact of the decision, are we making money? Or are we saving
money?"
A culture of participation characterises the decision-making process and influences the evolution of e-
banking. In addition to the TSC that governs the IT Strategy Road Map and aligns TSD with the rest
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of the bank, the e-Channel Committee defines e-banking products and services across all of the e-
channels (e.g., Internet banking) (Head of TSD). The third entity is the Sharia'h Committee, a new
entity formed in 2005 to ensure that all Islamic banking products and services provided by Hollandi
are compatible with Islamic banking. Another entity is the Bank Steering Committee (BSC), an
executive committee consisting of all senior managers, CEO, and representative from the BODs (E-
Banking Head).
All these entities come under the direct supervision of the CEO. Since e-banking decisions are made
by many organisational entities, the process has led to a fragmented chain of authorities that
negatively influences the achievement and implementation of e-banking products and services. The e-
Banking Head highlights the formal mechanism for e-banking decisions and suggests the need for a
change in the governance ofHollandi to facilitate the success of e-banking products and services:
"TSC must approve all decisions that require budget less than SAR 100,000 for
resources assignment and budget allocation. Other projects with higher budget than
SAR 100,000 must be approved by BSC...We need more authority and control at
our area. Because all initiatives must to be approved by TSC, a delay occurs during
the process of development. Therefore, we need to have the authority to approve a
certain amount of projects without the need to go to TSC for approval. For example
offering an SMS service to clients is becoming a trend in the industry. We would
like to offer such service to our clients but because TSC did not see feasibility in the
service, we could not offer such service."
Such a fragmented chain of authority has also resulted in a cultural difference in the vision and
perception of the role of e-banking and communication among e-banking entities (e.g., TSC, e-
Channel Committee). The Head of Corporate Banking Group highlights an issue raised during the
formation of the e-Banking Department in 2001:
"When we started our e-banking development there was a big fight between us, the
Corporate Banking Group, and TSD on which [group] will handle the development
and operations of e-banking channels. However, because of the top management's
re-arrangement of departments, we became the developer of e-banking through our
e-banking unit and TSD became the operator of our e-banking. Currently we are
working on a close relationship following the fighting phase at the beginning of e-
banking development."
Inter-organisationally, Hollandi's e-banking constituency has to align with the regulatory standards of
SAMA. The launch of smart cards, as the first Saudi bank to respond to SPAN-2, shows that the
constituency is able to adapt to technical inter-changes (see Alignment 4-4i). However, the lack of
legal framework governing e-banking in particular and e-business in general is a prime issue having a
direct influence on the achievements and implementation of e-banking products and services.
According to the e-Banking Head:
"The e-banking business still has no policy behind it in order to secure transactions
for both the banks and the clients. For example, if there is a dispute claim for e-
banking transactions from the client, and his bank rejected the claim; the client has
no legal authority to sue the bank. Therefore, I think for the growth and success of
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e-banking in Saudi Arabia, a legal framework that secures the right of the
participating parties is critically needed."
In addition to the legal framework, the Saudi Arabian society has a cash-based culture. It needs more
time to become a credit-based culture that facilitates the growth and success of e-banking. The
national ICT infrastructure is another change required to facilitate the growth and success of e-
banking as the e-banking penetration rate is still low (Head of Corporate Banking Group). In general,
e-banking products and services are playing the role of catalysers of change in the Saudi banking
sector. According to the Head of TSD:
"E-banking in a way is changing the way of doing banking business, and the more
people can do banking transactions electronically, the higher the chance that the
banking concept will change. This is mainly related to the main concept of e-
banking which is doing e-banking transactions 24x7 any day at any place."
7.4.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
Hollandi does not attempt to be an e-banking leader. Nor it does it attempt to be the best practitioner
(e-Banking Head). In this respect, the assessment of progress of the e-banking constituency-building
process suggests a mixture of remarkable and modest advances. For instance, the Hollandi's e-
banking constituency still wishes to bring more senior managers behind its products and services (see
Alignment 1-li). Although e-banking products and services are aligned with the interests of senior
managers, such as career progression, the perceptions of senior managers are still more favourable
towards activities other than e-banking, such as private banking. In order to enrol more senior
managers behind the e-banking constituency, the e-Banking Department is trying to align the interest
of senior managers with the benefits of e-banking through innovative private e-banking products and
services.
The e-banking constituency is facing important opposition from departments, in particular TSD. The
opposition reflects the fact that there are other projects with similar aims to e-banking competing for
the resources of Hollandi. An example of such opposition was the formation of the e-Banking
Department under the Corporate Banking Group (see Alignment 1-li). The opposition to e-banking is
unlikely to lead to the cancellation or failure of e-banking products and services. However, it forms a
barrier as the Corporate Banking Group has to prove to TSC the economic feasibility of the initiative,
a reasonable strategy used by the group to tackle the opposition. Although the business and
constituency-building aspects are making progress inside Hollandi, despite the opposition and
governance complexities, they are having more limited results in the market. The following is an
example of a promotional strategy implemented by Hollandi to promote e-banking:
"WCD Trade Sales and Advisory [ABN AMRO], in coordination with our Trade
Services Units, delivered several workshops and presentations to our commercial
customers, successfully leading them to use Hollandi trade facilities. WCD is
aligned and enjoyed greater rapport with the ABN AMRO corporate line of
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business, which resulted in cementing our relationships and added value to our
present services to our clients," (Hollandi 2005: 17).
In fact, e-banking has been partially promoted and not well resourced in the market, suggesting a
partial degree of e-banking's acceptance. There are two reasons behind such degree of acceptance.
The first reason is the modest promotional strategies and activities (e.g., mail campaigns). The second
reason is the fact that Hollandi offers no distinctive financial product or service over e-channels. This
provides no reason for potential customers to support e-banking.
In an attempt to enhance the acceptance rate, Hollandi is trying to reposition its e-banking service in
the market via some initiatives. For example, a new ATM Business Unit was established during 2004
with the objective of increasing revenue, reducing operating costs, and improving market image,
service excellence, and customer satisfaction. The new unit's strategy is to expand market share by
positioning ATMs in strategic locations, closing loss-making ATMs, increasing ATMs network
availability, and providing better service and support to branches and all ATMs customers (Hollandi
2005).
In addition to ATMs, POS terminals are also repositioned through both increasing utilisation of
terminals and implementing service level standards for problem resolution and financial settlement.
This resulted in a reduction in the number of incomplete transactions and an increase in both the
volume of business and revenue from POS terminals. For example, the acceptance rate of corporate
banking POS terminals grew to 16% as of 2004. Establishing the unit after almost 14 years from the
first launch of ATMs and repositioning POS terminals are two examples of initiatives that aim to
enhance the e-banking's acceptance rate.
The modest progress of the business and constituency-building aspects of e-banking at the market
goes hand in hand with the competitive position of Hollandi within the banking sector. Hollandi's
competitors provide similar e-banking products and services to that of Hollandi, in particular
corporate e-banking. The only difference is pricing as competitors offer e-banking free of charge.
Hollandi tackles this competition through a special sales force and a help desk to facilitate corporate e-
banking. Figure 7.4.II compares the daily reach of Hollandi's website with that of Banque Saudi
Fransi (AlFransi) during the period of October 2004 to September 2005. Clearly, the progress of the
Hollandi's website is much lower than that ofAlFransi.
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Figure 7.4.II A yearly comparison between the daily reach per million users of Hollandi's
website with that of AlFransi as of July 2005 (Alexa 2005)
The Head of Corporate Banking Group highlights the nature of e-banking competition and lists the
main competitors:
"For retail e-services, I think we do not have a real competition with other Saudi
banks. For corporate e-services, we are facing important competition form some
Saudi banks due to the fact that they just recently discovered the business
opportunity in the corporate business. We have gained some shares from our
competitors' shares and vies versa. Our main competitor is AlFransi, and then
Samba, Sabb and AlAhli."
Hollandi assumes that it is winning the competition and identifies two main factors for this success.
The first factor was that the development of e-banking has been handled by corporate banking people
rather than technical people as is the case with competitors. In another words, Hollandi invested its
knowledge and familiarity with the needs of corporate banking customers in developing more
richness, in terms of functionality and features, e-banking products and services than that of
competitors. The second factor was that Hollandi has gained the knowledge and experience of its
partner in the development of e-banking products and services.
The competition among Hollandi and its main competitors is one of formal competition and it does
not entirely depend on technology. Although it provides integration, accuracy, less operational errors
and straight-through processing (STP), it plays a modest role in the competition strategy. The Head of
Corporate Banking Group describes the common role of technology and financial products in creating
a competitive advantage:
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"Technology does not really matter. What matter is how you sell your products and
services? Technology more or less offers the same to every one and what matter is
how you deploy the technology to serve your needs. At the bank, we have a central
workflow tool with each corporate e-product. In another word, a financial
transaction of a corporate client is different from that of a retail client in a way that
it has many authorities' layers when it deals with funds transfer. Therefore, we have
incorporated such authority levels and mechanisms at each of our corporate e-
products. Therefore, technology helped us to such incorporation, but the main
campaign is our way of doing business."
7.4.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
The original vision of Hollandi's e-banking products and services is on course whilst the original
objectives have changed over time. The Head of TSD highlights that the evolution of the original
objectives was a response to the change in constituents of the e-banking constituency:
"Our e-banking vision was on course whilst our e-banking objectives have changed
over time. For the span of two years the business requirements, people,
technologies, costs have changed. Consequently, our objectives have changed too in
order to meet the new changes."
The vision of Hollandi's e-banking was "full-service alternative distribution channel" and the
objectives were to improve customer services, to decrease operational costs and to be competitive in
the market (Hollandi survey 2003). E-banking started at Hollandi during the first part of the 1990s
when it launched ATM in 1991 and POS terminals in 1993. This was followed by the launch of a
telephone banking service in the late 1990s. The Internet banking service started in 2001 and 2003 for
corporate and retail banking customers, respectively. The main reason behind the launch of such e-
banking products and services was competition.
The launch of both ATMs and POS terminals was supported by a well-defined vision and objectives
from the beginning as SAMA led the development, while that of the Internet banking service was
totally different. The Head of Corporate Banking Group describes the uncertainty surrounding the
vision and objectives of the Internet banking service and the evolution of the implementation strategy:
"There was no clear vision behind [Internet banking]. All we want is to have
[Internet banking] as of our competitors, a defensive strategy approach. However,
[during] the development, our approach has changed to an aggressive strategy
approach.... [Moreover, the objectives] were well defined within a small number of
people who were in charge of e-banking development, but this was not the case with
the whole bank. We started the development with a small team from the Corporate
Banking Group and a small team from the e-Banking Department with a strong
support from the top management. The vision within these two small teams was to
develop e-banking services in order to increase efficiency and reduce the
operational costs...Our strategy was not well defined from the beginning, but as we
approached the e-banking development it was evolving."
The strategy to achieve Hollandi's objectives was to provide customers, both corporate and retails,
with other delivery channels and to sell new products through those new channels. The development
approach to achieve such strategy was a combination of both: following the steps of ABN AMRO in
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e-banking development and taking a pioneering step with little existing precedent. The choice among
following the steps of others, taking a pioneering step or both involved many strategic decisions.
According to the Head ofCorporate Banking Group:
"The development of the application required from us to take three strategic
decisions. The first decision was to outsource the development of the application to
an IT development firm based in India. The cost/benefit analysis showed that
outsourcing would give the bank more chance to focus on the business. The second
decision was to include in our offering the trade businesses that are needed by
corporate clients. We were the first Saudi bank to include such business line. The
third decision was to upgrade our IT infrastructure and apply more sophisticated
security systems."
There were many benefits envisaged and promised from providing e-banking products and services.
From intra-departmental point of view, e-banking increased the efficiency of operations and enhanced
the accuracy of data via the elimination of data input and conflicts. From the bank point of view, e-
banking allowed better rationalisation of resources and improved the efficiency of branches. From an
inter-bank point, e-banking enhanced the reputation of Hollandi as is perceived to be embracing the
technological revolution.
The development and implementation of e-banking products and services required a reasonable
amount of resources and Hollandi's ability to deliver was not always immediately available. It has
indeed evolved with the challenges raised by the changing nature-of-the-target-problem. The journey
started in 2000 when the Corporate Banking Group initially allocated five people and two years to
develop and complete the project. Such people were grouped into a team (i.e. e-Banking Department)
and they are considered as the promoters of e-banking. The front-office applications, such as Internet
banking, cost the Corporate Banking Group about SAR 5 m of the operating budget. The build-up of
the e-banking technological system occupied about 30% of the operating budget of TSD.
The Corporate Banking Group, top management, and SAMA strongly authorised and supported the
process. In order to build the required support, the e-Banking Department, the promoter, started the
constituency-building journey via using the concept of team-working and an ambition to improve the
image of the bank. Encouragement was the initial tactic that the department used to achieve the goal.
The process of developing and implementing e-banking products and services faced some internal
challenges. Not only had this process started with a lack of technical capabilities, but it was also
demanding changes in the business requirements. According to the Head of Corporate Banking
Group:
"The normal way for developing e-banking services is to identify the business
requirements then allow the IT [department] to develop the services. However,
during the development of our e-banking services we faced the challenge of
changing business requirements after each phase. Such changes created a delay in
delivering the final products. Although the change in our business requirements is
one of the reasons for our late following in providing e-banking services to the
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market, we think that such changes were necessary to deliver services that can meet
clients' need."
Other internal challenges faced by the process of developing and implementing e-banking products
and services were related to skills and re-training of employees and re-engineering of existing
activities. From the point of view of skills and re-training of employees, some employees were
worried about their jobs being automated with consequent decrease of the need for their presence.
*
This case emerged after the re-allocation of some employees to different tasks or departments. From
the point of view of re-engineering existing activities, introducing e-banking required the modification
of some internal audit control. The Head ofTSD describes such challenge:
"The main challenge was related to what are the products and services you would
like to offer and how you want to offer them provided that you set all sort of
controls. This means how we will apply financial controls and regulations to our e-
banking products and services and at the same time provide seamless and smooth
integration services to our clients."
The process of developing and implementing e-banking products and services also faced external
challenges, in particular convincing customers to migrate to e-channels. The e-Banking Head
describes the challenge:
"Our clients used to perform their banking needs manually through the conventional
channels. Now the case has modified this to allow clients to perform their banking
transactions automatically through e-channels. Some clients prefer not to change
their ways of doing banking and prefer to stay with the conventional channels. We
faced the challenge of convincing them to start to use the e-channels. The challenge
still exists with corporate clients, which face difficulties trusting the e-channels."
In short, the e-banking constituency-building process at Hollandi has had a changing "nature-of-the-
target-problem" and this has led to substantial internal and external challenges. Such challenges were
not anticipated in the phases of design and strategy of e-banking and the ability to deliver has been to
an important extent, created along the way. One of the main implications of this approach was the
delay in bringing the products and services to the market.
7.4.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
The Hollandi's e-banking technological system establishes many types of intra- and inter-
organisational relations with other technological systems. From an intra-organisational point of view,
the e-banking technological system was blending during the period of 2001-2003 with the legacy
systems previously in place. The relationship was not technically well-established as the e-banking
system sacrificed performance. An example of the low performance is the case of launching the
Internet banking service in 2001. The e-Banking Department Head clarifies that the modest readiness
of the legacy systems at that time influenced the launch of the retail internet banking (Hollandi Retail
Online):
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"In May 2001 we completed the development of our Internet banking for retail
clients. However, because our infrastructure at that time could not handle the new
Internet banking application, we decided not to launch the service to clients. If we
had launched the serviced at that time, we would have been the second Saudi bank
to launch such service."
Not only had the interaction between the e-banking technological system and other intra-
organisational systems sacrificed performance, but it also limited the functionality of the existing e-
banking products and services. An example was the first two years of the Internet corporate banking
service (Hollandi Corporate Online). According to the e-Banking Head:
"Because we lacked the e-experience we launched the service off-line meaning that
the web-site received orders for transactions from clients and then forward them to
the Corporate Banking Group for manual processing. This was the case until
[November 2003] when we replaced our manual web site for corporate clients with
a transactional one that handles all transactions through straight-through processing
without any human intervention."
As a result, the number of customers using e-banking has grown insignificantly. For example, as we
saw in Dimension I-Ii, the Internet banking service attracted on a yearly basis an average of 10% and
4% of corporate and retail customers, respectively, although such figures were expected to improve.
During 2003, the entire technological system has been upgraded to an advanced mature system. The
upgrade improved the performance of the e-banking system as it no longer sacrifice performance. The
upgrade also allows the gradual provision ofmany new ICT applications (see Alignment II-Iii).
The existing relationship among the e-banking technological system and other systems that may be in
process of development and implementation is producing an integrated technological system.
Hollandi's executives are proud of such a relationship that reflects a tradition and culture of
innovativeness:
"We do have a tradition and culture of innovativeness because we could integrate
our old systems with new technologies, and produce an integrated IT environment
without migrating everything to new technologies," (Head of TSD).
The adoption of the e-banking technological system has incurred many changes. From the point of
view of skills and training, the system has required technical people from both the e-Banking
Department and TSD to learn new skills and attend training courses. From the point of view of
operations, the system has required a 24/7 support and a duplicate version (i.e. a disaster recovery site)
in case of emergency.
Hollandi's e-banking technological system establishes not only intra-organisational relations, but
inter-organisational relations as occurs with SAMA's inter-banking payment systems. The launch of
smart cards to replace the traditional magnetic stripe cards to maximise the functionality ofATMs and
POS terminals is an example. Although the replacement was one of the consequences of SAMA's
227
SPAN-2 project51, it shows that Hollandi's technology is frequently aligned with other technologies.
Hollandi's CEO highlights the objectives behind the launch of smart cards:
"Chip cards mark the beginning of a new revolution in the world of electronic
payments and we are delighted to be the first in making it a reality in Saudi Arabia.
As a mature market, the Kingdom is quick to embrace the latest in technologies,
which makes it increasingly important for us to deliver a sophisticated product to
suit modern payment needs. Chip cards have a definite edge over the traditional
magnetic stripe, most important of all being in combating any potential fraud. The
microprocessor embedded in the card, carries only encrypted data therefore making
it almost impossible to decipher when in wrong hands," (AME Info 2003).
Such inter-organisational relations face two main challenges related to the security of e-banking
transactions and the national ICT infrastructure, especially the standards for B2B business. The Head
of the Corporate Banking Group criticises the role ofSAMA in facing such challenges:
"Although SAMA is working in developing the security infrastructure for e-banking
through the development of an e-trust centre that deploys PKI as its standard, such
technology seems an old fashion one that cannot meet the new requirements of e-
banking. Technologies and the market are developing and the PKI is not the only
standard to have a secure e-banking environment."
The challenges of security and ICT infrastructure imply changes in the e-banking technological
system, in particular regarding the updating of its applications with tools and standards to meet the
regulatory standards required by SAMA. In 2004, for example, TSD upgraded part of the ICT
infrastructure to support the business expansion in branch, ATM, and shares trading lounge networks.
The upgrade included, but was not limited to installing new structured cabling and voice recording
systems in the major branches. In 2004, TSD also implemented a key critical and mandated business
initiative related to making telephone banking capable of offering more online financial services
(Hollandi 2005).
7.4.7 Summary
The assessment of the e-banking constituency-building process suggests that Hollandi has a great deal
to do to achieve a strong alignment across all the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995). Although efforts have been made in all dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995), the Hollandi's e-banking constituency-building process has achieved limited development.
Much of the progress is credited to Dimension 4 of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995),
interacting technologies/constituencies.
51 SPAN-2 is the new version of SPAN that built on the use of smart cards instead of magnetic stripe
cards. The project launched during the first quarter of 2005 and requires all Saudi banks to update
their ATMs and POS terminals to accept smart cards.
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7.5 Conclusion
The chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Hollandi. It provided a brief
overview of Hollandi and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 75 years of
existence. It then looked at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). Results indicate that Hollandi's e-banking constituency-
building process has developed in limited fashion, although some efforts have happened at all
dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). More specifically, while a great deal of
progress has occurred at Dimension 4, Dimensions 1, 2 and 3 have had only a modest evolution.
Hollandi has followed a mix of strategies to furnish the needs of its customers. A reassessment of its
mix of strategies in the context of the challenges facing Hollandi's e-banking constituency building
process is highly recommended. In this respect, modifying the bases of such a strategic set, to be on
the Saudi culture rather than that of the Dutch culture, is also recommended.
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Chapter 8: National Commercial Bank
8.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlAhli52. It provides a brief
overview of AlAhli and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 60 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 8.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at AlAhli53.
Interviewee Date
e-Banking Head January 2004
CIO January 2004
Head ofRemote Delivery Channels January 2004
e-Banking Head January 2006
Table 8.1.1 Interviews conducted at AlAhli
8.2 Brief overview
AlAhli was the first bank established in Saudi Arabia with a paid capital of SAR 30.23 m. It was
established as a joint liability partnership company on 13 May 1950 to carry out banking operations
both within and outside Saudi Arabia. AlAhli was constituted as a general partnership from its
founding in 1950 until 11 July 1977, when it was reconstituted as a joint-stock company as the first
step towards an initial public offering.
During the first half of the 1980s, AlAhli pursued a massive branch expansion as well as the adoption
of technology in some of its front-office operations. With the slow recovery of the Saudi economy
towards the end of the 1980s, AlAhli introduced certain key changes in management and developed
new strategies and procedures through increasing automation and offering new products and services.
However, it was unable to counteract the decline in operational revenues and other managerial
problems.
52 An initial version of AlAhli's case study has been accepted for presentation at Africa
Telecommunication and ICT Conference. Nairobi: Kenya. 17-21 May 2006. It also has been
accepted for presentation and publication at International Conference on Business and Information.
Singapore. 12-14 July 2006. An electronic copy from the paper is attached as a part of Appendix III
with permission from the co-author, Professor Alfonso Molina.
531 wish to express my deep thanks to AlAhli's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions. Also, I wish to thank AlAhli's Finance & Accounting Division for administering
the survey, and all other groups and divisions who responded to the survey.
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In order to meet such challenges, during the 1990s, AlAhli sought to implement radical changes in
terms of ownership. In 1992, AlAhli carried out a major restructuring exercise through the addition of
SAR 5,937 m to its capital to reach SAR 6,000 m, the largest capital both in Saudi Arabia and in the
Middle East. This was followed in 1997 by the changes that transformed AlAhli into a joint-stock
company as the first step towards initial public offering.
In 1999, PIF acquired a 79.3% holding in AlAhli, and subsequently sold 10% to GOSI. Currently, the
shareholders are PIF (69.3%), GOSI (10.0%) and 24 private investors (20.7%). Moreover, AlAhli
decided to change gradually its focus from conventional to Islamic banking before floating its shares
for public subscription. This has not only moved AlAhli from conventional to Islamic banking, but
also positioned it in direct competition with AlRajhi, AlBilad and AlJazira.
The 1990s witnessed crucial changes in the management as well. Following the change in ownership
in 1999, a BODs was elected, a new Managing Director was appointed, a large number of executives
were hired, and a modified organisational structure was implemented. Such managerial changes not
only reduced the operational revenues and other managerial challenges, but also marked for the first
time in history of AlAhli a clear separation between ownership and management. This also was the
beginning of a quantum improvement in the AlAhli's quality of customer services both in the breadth
of its product offering and in its financial performance indicators. Table 8.2.1 provides AlAhli's 5-year
market share position commencing 1983.
%
For years ended December 31
1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Branches 33 26 22 22 20
Total assets 37 36 23 NA 22
Total liabilities 38 37 23 NA 23
Share capital 2 1 53 43 24
Net income 24 0 11 NA NA
ATMs NA NA 20 22 23
POS terminals NA NA 7 20 17
e-Cards issued NA NA 18 17 21
Table 8.2.1 AlAhli market share positions (%), 5-year periods (Al-Duhkeil 1995; AlAhli 2005)
In June 2005, the BODs appointed a new Managing Director to take the lead for the coming new
period. This is due to the fact that AlAhli is on course to offer 30% of its share capital to the public
during the first quarter of 200654. The offering is the next step after the transformation of the entire
54 As of today, the process of privatising AlAhli has encountered a delay. Accordingly, I published an
article, entitled "The feasibility of AlAhli's privatisation?" at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No.
4533, Date: 10/03/2006). The article not only inquired about the reasons for the delay, but also
looked at the socio-economic implications of privatising commercial banks on the national
economy. It also summarised lessons from the evolution of AlAhli since the 1990s. The article is
positioned under the umbrella of advancing and disseminating the knowledge and understanding
among the public in Saudi Arabia. See Appendix IV.
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business focus towards Islamic banking. In a statement after his appointment, the new Managing
Director highlights the future direction of AlAhli:
"I will focus on completing a program to transfer all our branches to provide Islamic
banking services and introduce new banking services and products." (Hanware
2005)
This was followed in October 2005 by the announcement of AlAhli's modified corporate strategy that
aims to strengthen AlAhli's position within the Saudi market. The strategy focuses on three main
aspects: merger, Islamic banking dissemination, and Islamic banking innovation. AlAhli also
announce the establishment of AlAhli Takaful, an Islamic insurance company, as a subsidiary in the
insurance market.
Currently, AlAhli has about 4,200 employees dedicated to serve about one million retail customers
and one thousand corporate customers via 246 branches throughout Saudi Arabia, including 78
branches dedicated exclusively to Islamic Banking services. It also operates 792 ATMs, 4,304 POS
terminals, the largest dealing room in foreign exchange and money market in the Middle East and a
comprehensive array of alternative channels for services delivery, including telephone banking,
mobile banking, Internet banking, and local and international online brokerage services. Such
channels executed as of 2003 over 70% of customers transactions. Figure 8.2.1 portrays the
organisational structure ofAlAhli.
Figure 8.2.1 AlAhli's organisational structure (AlAhli survey 2003; AlAhli 2006)
The new emphasis on innovation has helped AlAhli to achieve a strong competitive position in the e-
banking segment. Accordingly, AlAhli has been acknowledged as the best retail bank and best e-
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banking service provider in Saudi Arabia. According to AlAhli's Corporate Banking Head (Infosys
2003):
"We have embarked on an exciting and challenging journey in which we reinvented
ourselves into a highly customer focused, and agile bank. Our sensitivity to the
needs and requirements of our customers allow us to deliver unique, personalised,
and highly effective solutions and services that help them achieve their objectives.
The bank has invested significantly in technology as a tool to transform its
business."
Having briefly looked at the story of AlAhli's development, the next section looks at the implications
of the key events on the emergence and evolution of AlAhli e-banking constituency and its products
and services.
8.3 The development of AlAhli e-banking constituency
AlAhli's adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) started at the beginning of the
1980s when many back-office operations were automated. A modest ICT literacy within the bank
characterised the use of such technology until the end of the 1990s when a new BODs was elected and
a new management team was appointed following the change in ownership structure. One of the main
technological issues which occurred during that time was the appointment of one of SAMA's
executives to lead the technological development at AlAhli.
In 1998, AlAhli appointed the former Banking Technology Head at SAMA as the Vice-President (VP)
of the Technology & Operations Group. The new VP played an important role in the development of
e-banking technology in Saudi Arabia as he led the development of many of SAMA's inter-bank
payment systems during the 1990s, including ACH, SPAN, ESIS, and SARIE as well as initiating
Tadawul. The appointment has moved AlAhli to the front line as a provider of innovative e-banking
products and services.
Today, the level of ICT's literacy at AlAhli is high compare to other Saudi banks. The ICT's long-
term policy and strategy are defined by the BODs, Managing Director, and heads of groups. AlAhli's
executives are proud of the culture of innovativeness that characterise AlAhli and highlight the main
factors for such behaviour:
"Understanding the business needs and following up with the progress of the most
recent technologies to choose the appropriate and suitable ones among them as well
as hiring the best resources to design, implement, and manage those technologies,"
(AlAhli survey 2003).
The Technology & Operations Group handles all aspects related to e-banking. The Technology
Development handles the technical aspects of e-banking. The operational and business aspects of e-
banking are handled by the Remote Delivery Channels. The Remote Delivery Channels Department
was formed in 1999 to provide effective and efficient alternative delivery channels for both financial
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and non-financial transactions. It has about 35 employees and an approximate annual budget of SAR
17 m.
The Technology & Operations Group commands strategic power and an economic role as it has
developed and launched almost all forms of e-banking products and services, including Interactive
Voice Response (IVR) telephone banking, AlAhliOnline, an Internet retail banking system, mobile
banking through WAP and SMS technologies. Figure 8.3.1 portrays the organisational structure of the
Technology & Operations Group.
Figure 8.3.1 Organisational structure of the Technology & Operations Group (AlAhli survey
2003: CIO)
In order to perform its tasks, the Technology & Operations Group makes extensive use ofmany ICT
applications, including specially developed applications, office automation, client/server, and DBMS.
It implements e-business transactions in many areas mainly in funds' transfer and investment. Table
8.3.1 provides ICT related information about AlAhli's main departments as of 2002. Clearly, AlAhli's
e-banking is predominantly retail banking as the share of the Retail Banking Group is the largest in
most areas.
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Group Retail Corporate Investment Treasury
Workforce (%) 47 2 2 2
Operating 762 NA 45 NA
expenses(approx
SAR m)
ICT applications Office e-mail and Word-processing, word-processing,
automation, ready banking e-mail and e-mail,
made applications customer and Bloomberg,
applications, portfolio software Reuters and
client services and treasury front and
DBMS back office
systems
Since 1994 NA 2002 2003
Areas ATMs, Call NA E-Banking FX spot and time
Centre, POS, & provides services deposits products
Internet so that Customers
can do entire
transactions
Table 8.3.1 Intra-organisational relationships at AlAhli with the Technology & Operations
Group (AlAhli survey 2003)
Many features characterise AlAhli's e-banking technological system, including security, integrity,
performance, stability, the ability of integration with other systems, minimum brand/product
dependency, and flexibility and ease of maintenance and upgrades. Its major performance
specification is the speed of access. This includes the session's establishment and termination time
and online/offline transaction time. Although such major performance specification does not enable
the provision of a completely new service, it implies a major cost-performance improvement in
relation to previous systems.
In 2003, the Technology & Operations Group started an integrated ICT project aiming to redefine the
ICT systems' architecture at AlAhli. This has been done through redefining the front-office systems
(i.e. e-channels & branches' ICT), back-office systems (i.e. core banking systems), the main support
components for these two systems, major databases (e.g., HRM & Finance), networks, and links with
external networks (e.g., SARIE, Swift, etc), security systems, and management systems for managing





















































Figure 8.3.II AlAhli's ICT systems' architecture (CIO)
The types of technologies used in the e-banking technological system are not limited to standard
mature technology. Custom-made applications are used as well. This integration allows the
development of a new proprietary technology. The hardware components of the system are based on a
client/server technology and run on Intel clustered small-scale servers. The software component
consists of a group of applications, including specially developed applications, office automation and
custom-made applications. Such hardware and software components are linked via LAN and WAN
networking technologies.
There is a strategic reason for taking this approach in the build-up of the e-banking technological
system. The group strategy in the gradual launch of tested and competitive e-banking products and
services requires the use of the best available technology, including the internal development of those
not available on the market. This produces a technological system that is not only very innovative in
terms of both technology and services, but also very demanding in achieving the anticipated
performance. The risk of failing to deliver the system in terms of cost is SAR 250 k while that of time
is three months.
The specifications of the e-banking technological system have evolved in the course of development
through the follow-up of the latest technologies and updates on the existing technologies. According
to CIO, the Technology & Operations Group has prioritised the e-banking technological components
as follows:
1. Core banking systems






b. E-Channels (ATMs, POS terminals, Internet banking, etc.)
3. Structured investment application, for example, is not a major application at the bank
because we are mainly a retail bank and such application is dedicated to service corporate
banks.
The adoption of the e-banking technological system required IT people to learn new technical skills,
such as software languages. To ensure that this happens, the department not only provides IT people
with training courses and on-the-job training, it also supports them to obtain technical certificates,
such as Cisco Certified Network Professional and Sun Certified Network Administrator. Table 8.3.II
lists AlAhli milestones toward modern e-banking.
Year System/Service Description
1991 ATMs Automated tellers machines
1993 POS terminals EFT at POS
1998 AlAhliPhone A telephone banking service via IVR
1999 AlAhliDirect A PC banking dial-up solution
2000 AlAhliOnline Retail Internet banking
2002 AlAhli Brokerage International stock trading service over Internet
2003 AlAhliMobile A mobile banking service via WAP technology
2003 AlAhliSMS A mobile banking service via SMS technology
2003 AlAhli eCorp Corporate Internet banking, final launch
2004 AlAhliTadawul Local stock trading service over Internet
2005 AlAhliPDA A mobile banking service via PDA technology
Table 8.3.II AlAhli e-banking milestones (e-Banking Head)
Most of the technologies used in the e-banking technological system are transparent to customers.
This can be tested during the process of updating the existing version of a certain technology with a
newer one. For example, when the department updated AlAhli Online, the Internet banking service,
with a new version to enhance the performance, online customers did not notice the change other than
the increase in performance. The actual updating process usually occurs after testing and piloting the
technology for usability purposes. Another example is AlAhliPhone. Figure 8.3.Ill shows the
achievements of the service as of 2001 (Al-Shaikh 2002).
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Figure 8.3.Ill Achievements of AIAhliPhone as of 2001 (Al-Shaikh 2002: 19)
Moreover, ATMs are also achieving healthy results. Table 8.3.Ill shows that the percentage of
AlAhli's active e-cards is higher than that of the sector. It also shows that AlAhli's ATMs provide











Sector 61 2,651 74
2000
AlAhli 66 1,035 76
Sector 68 1,253 77
2001
AlAhli 67 962 83
Sector 59 1,285 72
2002
AlAhli 66 1,940 94
Sector 60 1,414 80
2003
AlAhli 58 987 85
Sector 53 1,162 80
5-Year AlAhli 63 1,180 81
Average Sector 61 2,651 74
Table 8.3.III AlAhli's ATM usage trend (BTC 2004)
The IT strategic planning follows a formal mechanism. It consists of a chain of three inter-related
strategies: IT Strategic Business Plan, IT Operating Plan, and Plan of Unplanned IT projects. AlAhli's
CIO describes the mechanism of IT strategic planning:
"We have three types of plans. First plan is the IT Strategic Business Plan which is a
3-5 years plan. It includes what and how we will service the objectives of the bank.
Our group, with the input from the Executive Committee, writes this plan. Second
plan is the IT Operating Plan which is a 1-year plan that has been extracted from the
IT Strategic Business Plan. We write this plan and it is mainly related to IT projects
priority. The third plan is related to unplanned IT projects. Within a year, we usually
have urgent or unplanned projects. Therefore, we have to consider such projects in
the Operating Plan. In addition, to perform such tasks, we dedicated a portion of our
workforce and budget to furnish such projects."
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The story of e-banking development at AlAhli has gone through various stages. While during some
stages the achievements were significant, during other stages, the achievements have been more
mixed. The remainder of this section briefly discusses the current state of the AlAhli e-banking
constituency. The "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) selected for the analysis is a two-layered
intra- and inter-organisational diamond given that important features of the AlAhli e-banking
constituency-building process are the result of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between
AlAhli and other organisations.
8.3.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
The AlAhli e-banking constituency has grown in strength over the years and today counts on both a
strong presence inside the bank and a wide range of products and services in the market. A high level
of ICTs literacy at the bank reflects a culture of innovativeness that supports the e-banking
constituency. The Technology & Operations Group commands significant strategic powers and
economic roles as it develops and launches almost all forms of e-banking products and services. It
handles all aspects related to e-banking.
The Technology Development handles the technical aspects of e-banking. The operational and
business aspects of e-banking are handled by the Remote Delivery Channels. About 35 employees and
an annual budget of SAR 17 m have been allocated to the Remote Delivery Channels. The AlAhli e-
banking products and services have achieved very healthy results. Intra-organisationally, for example,
70% of transactions are now done through e-channels compare to 20% during the mid-1990s.
Many promotional activities have been implemented, including advertisements via Intranet and
Horizons Magazine, a monthly internal publication. While some e-services have achieved healthy
results, others have had a more mixed performance. For example, the average number of calls via
AlAhliPhone hit 200,000 compared to only 200 calls ten years ago (see Figure 8.3.III). ATMs are also
doing fine with the percentage of AlAhli's active e-cards higher than that of the sector and AlAhli's
ATMs providing more services than the sector's ATMs do at the ratio of withdrawal transactions to
total transactions. At the same time, AlAhliOnline has so far attracted only 10-15% of retail
customers.
8.3.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
Standard mature technologies and custom-made applications constitute the e-banking technological
system (see Figure 8.3.II). The hardware components are based on a client/server technology and mn
on Intel clustered small-scale servers. The software components consist of a group of applications,
including specially developed applications, office automation and custom-made applications. LAN
and WAN networking technologies link such components. The risk of failing to deliver the system in
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terms of cost is SAR 250 k while that of time is three months. The prioritisation of ICT development
is core banking systems, channels, and structured investment applications (see Alignment 4-4i).
8.3.3 Alignment (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
The IT decision-making process at AlAhli is a mixture of highly centralised management and a
culture of participation. The long-term ICT policy and strategy is defined by the BODs, Managing
Director, and heads of groups. The Technology & Operations Group participates with other groups
through the IT Strategic Business Plan and IT Operating Plan to plan for IT projects. Such intra-
organisational governance positively influences the development of the e-banking constituency. Inter-
organisationally, however, the lack of legislative rules and regulations on e-banking creates
undesirable obstacles to its development.
8.3.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
The original vision of e-banking is on course. Intra-organisationally, the remaining target constituents
continue to be approached by, for instance, the promotional activities that include advertisements via
Intranet and Horizons Magazine. Moreover, the appointment of the former Banking Technology Head
at SAMA as VP of Technology & Operations Group formed a "SAMA-to-AlAhli" human resources
shift as many SAMA's technical staff gradually became AlAhli's technical staff. For example, the
head of SAMA's Computer Department became the head of AlAhli's Technology Development. The
SPAN's Information Security Administrator became AlAhli's Information Security Consultant.
Additionally, SAMA's staffs have been appointed at different operational levels at AlAhli.
The inward trend of "SAMA-to-AlAhli" was parallel with an outward trend (i.e. "AlAhli-to-banks").
For example, the e-Banking Manager AlRajhi who lead the development of many components of
EBBDA-2 was formally AlAhli's e-Banking Business Analyst. An interesting story is behind the shift
from AlAhli to AlRajhi in 2002. According to AlAhli's Head of Remote Delivery Channels, the
initiative of AlRajhi's bill payment gateway was initiated at AlAhli via a negotiation between AlAhli
and STC. AlAhli appointed the former AlAhli's e-Banking Business Analyst to negotiate with STC on
the development of the project.
During the negotiation phase, AlRajhi suddenly acquired AlAhli's e-Banking Business Analyst to lead
the emerging e-Banking Department at AlRajhi. The acquisition was followed by an announcement
from AlRajhi about finalising an e-banking agreement with STC to furnish the market with a new e-
banking service (i.e. bill payment gateway). AlAhli, shocked with such announcement, started new
talks with utilities companies to provide similar e-banking services for electricity and water bills.
Although AlAhli managed to sign bill payment gateways contracts with utilities companies, the
accompanied amount from such contracts is much lower than that with STC.
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Inter-organisationally, however, the current figure of 10-15% of retail customers matches
expectations, but maintains the challenge of increasing market share by transforming target customers
into effective constituents. For example, the percentage of active e-cards increased by 12% per year
during 1999-2002. Such figures, however, decreased by 10% during 2002-2003 (see Table 5). It
seems that the e-banking constituency faces some challenges, such as the incorporation of new
technologies to reinforce the competitive performance of the overall system (see Figure 5 &
Alignment 4-4i).
8.3.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
E-banking started in 1999 with the target of improving the quality, quantity, efficiency, and accuracy
of banking services as well as generating revenue and increasing the market share. The development
approach was a combination of both following the steps or examples of other banks and taking
pioneering steps with little existing precedence. The initial estimated cost, time and people required
for the development and implementation were about SAR 1 m, three months and five people,
respectively.
At the introduction stage, however, funding and people increased to SAR 4 m and to 17 people,
increasing almost four-fold the constituency's resources to deliver. On this basis, the AlAhli e-
banking constituency has been making good progress towards its original target problem, especially as
its capacity to deliver has continued to grow (35 people and 17 m SAR), keeping abreast with the
progress of technology. Further increases in market share from the current 10-15% present a strong
target problem, but one that seems to be at the reach of the constituency.
8.3.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
Intra-organisationally, the e-banking technological system is blending with the legacy of systems
previously in place. The relationship is not completely efficient as the system is sacrificing
performance, in particular, as the new technologies accumulate. The e-banking technological system
also relates to other new systems in the processes of development and implementation through regular
co-ordination among different managers of projects, services, or channels. Inter-organisationally,
AlAhli e-banking technology operates within with SAMA's payment systems, such as SPAN. In
relation to other technologies, it is possible to say that, in general, the adoption of the e-banking
system increased the size of the overall AlAhli business and reduces the work load on branches (see
Alignment 3-3i).
8.3.7 Summary
The above discussion on the state of the AlAhli's process of sociotechnical suggests that AlAhli has
achieved a significant degree of alignment in some dimensions of the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995) and more mixed results in other dimensions. The progress of AlAhli in creating value
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through e-banking has been significant considering the bank's long period of decline that ended in the
1990s. Based on the above discussion, results reveal that the implementation of e-value creation
strategies at AlAhli is aligned with the bank's corporate policy of aiming to be the premier provider of
Islamic banking and investment.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlAhli. It provided a brief
overview of AlAhli and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 60 years of
existence. It then looked in some detail at the particular development of e-banking at AlAhli through
the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). Today AlAhli's performance in
both financial and technological terms is healthy and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
It is worth stressing that the implementation of the e-business strategic approaches requires high
degrees of alignment with the organisational and industrial corporate policies. The choice of e-
business strategic approaches by organisations depends not only on the capabilities of the
organisations, but also on the opportunities the industry provides.
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Chapter 9: Riyad Bank
9.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Riyad55. It provides a brief
overview of Riyad and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 60 years of
existence. It then looks at the particular development of e-banking through the conceptual lens of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation concludes the chapter. Table 9.1.1
provides information related to interviews conducted at Riyad56.
Interviewee Date
VP IT August 200357
Head of IT & Operations December 2003
Internet Banking Head December 2003
Head ofRemote Delivery Channels January 2006
e-Channels Quality Unit Head January 2006
Table 9.1.1 Interviews conducted at Riyad
9.2 Brief overview
"We will be the leading Saudi Bank, first in quality, first in value, first in caring for
our customers and responding to their needs by continuously improving our services
while enhancing our shareholders' value," (Riyad 2005: 2).
Based on this mission statement, Riyad started operations in 1957 as the first Saudi joint-stock
banking company. The initial capital of SAR 50 m was increased to SAR 4,000 m in 1994, to SAR
5,000 m in 2005, and finally to SAR 6,250 m in 2006, amounting to 14% of the sector capital. While
the Saudi government owns 29%, Saudi individuals own the remaining 71% ofRiyad's share capital.
55 The first initial version of Riyad's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2005d.
Beyond the resource-based view of the firm: The case of dynamic capabilities building at a Saudi
bank. In Proceedings of the 5lh IBIMA Conference on the Internet and Information Technology in
Modern Organisations. Cairo: Egypt. 13-15 December. 320-345. The second initial version of
Riyad's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2007. Resource-based or dynamic
capabilities: The case of Riyad Bank, in Soliman, K. S. (ed.) 2007. e-Business impact on supply
chain and business process: Analysis and Best Practice. IBIMA Press: New Your. Forthcoming
Spring 2007. Electronic copies from the papers are attached as a part of Appendix III with
permissions from both the publisher, International Business Information Management Association
(IBIMA), and the co-author, Professor Alfonso Molina.
56 I wish to express my deep thanks to Riyad's interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions. Also, I wish to thank Riyad's Finance Group for administering the survey, and
all other groups and divisions who responded to the survey.
57 Pilot Study
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During its life, Riyad has undergone several financial and technical changes that have shaped its
present form. In the early 1980s, Riyad embarked upon a massive expansion program, including
overseas expansion, in an effort to bring itself in line with developments in the world's financial
markets. With the signs of recovery in the Saudi economy towards the end of the 1980s, Riyad started
reaping some benefits and its net income position showed a slow upward movement. However, the
mounting costs of the branch expansion as well as the unsteady revenue position during this phase
forced Riyad to re-think its strategy.
During the 1990s, Riyad took the initiative by providing an extended range of services to retail and
corporate customers. It also expanded technical initiatives in its mandate to improve customer service
by standardising branch-banking procedures. However, according to Al-Dukheil (1995), Riyad was a
rather late starter in absorbing technology in operations and control.
Currently, Riyad has about 3,500 employees and operates about 200 branches throughout Saudi
Arabia dedicated to serve about 600,000 retail and 19,000 corporate customers. It also operates three
overseas offices in London, Houston, and Singapore that specialise in providing offshore banking
products to its corporate customers. Riyad furnishes customers with about 600 ATMs and 3,200 POS
terminals, in addition to many forms of modern e-banking products and services, including Internet,
telephone, and mobile banking (see Table 9.2.1).
For years ended December 31
% 1988 1993 1998 2003
Branches 17 16 17 16
Total assets 18 18 19 13
Total liabilities 17 18 19 13
Share capital 2 0 29 16
Net income 22 20 17 13
ATMs NA 12 15 16
POS terminals NA 1 10 13
e-Cards issued NA 14 14 14
Table 9.2.1 Riyad market share positions (%), 5-year periods (Al-Duhkeil 1995; Tadawul 2006)
9.3 Some key events
Riyad has faced many challenges since its creation. However, four key events required Riyad not only
to re-structure itself, but also to re-align its strategy. Such events are the government supervision,
technology, Islamic banking, and most recently a new look. The following gears the discussion on
these four events.
9.3.1 Government supervision
Riyad faced a crisis during the early years of the operation. Most of the BODs took loans from Riyad
and could not repay them. To restore confidence, SAMA appointed a new BODs and the Ministry of
Finance started to supervise Riyad directly. During the mid-1990s, Riyad achieved healthy financial
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performance and this led the government to stop its direct supervision. Consequently, Riyad's first
general meeting of shareholders in 33 years was held in October 1995, at which the shareholders
elected a new BODs (Riyad 1996). Riyad's Chairman highlights Riyad's direction after the end of the
government's supervision (Riyad 1996: 4-5):
"The decision by the government to end its supervision was a result of [Riyad]'s
excellent financial position as demonstrated by its substantial capital resources...
This development was well received by both our customers and shareholders as well
as by the banking community. It enabled [Riyad] to fully exercise its role as a
leading commercial bank managed by its shareholders... Riyad continued with the
development of its infrastructure and the implementation of sophisticated automated
systems. These will promote faster and more efficient delivery of quality banking
services and enhance work procedures to cope with the dynamic changes occurring
in the banking industry... I am please to see that some of these programs are already
bearing fruit and positively influencing many aspects of our business. The task is
not complete, but we are confident that we will be able to undertake the necessary
work to further develop and improve our products and services, leading to success
and prosperity for the benefit of our valued clients and shareholders."
9.3.2 Technology
As stated earlier, Riyad was a rather late starter in absorbing technology in operations and control. In
1999, Riyad implemented a new core banking system to blend with the legacy systems in place. The
new core banking system aimed "to provide customers with a faster service and to enhance staff
efficiency and productivity," (Riyad 2000: 11). This was followed in 2000 by two important
developments: "Journey to Excellence" program and Technology Strategic Plan. "Journey to
Excellence" was a comprehensive change program aiming at improving productivity through
accelerating development of staff skills and capabilities as well as enhancing customer service. Within
the "Journey to Excellence," Riyad has started to establish Staff Assessment Centres. The aims of
these centres are to identify the competencies and capabilities of staff, to develop their core skills, to
define the appropriate career path for them and to set up succession plans. Technology Strategic Plan
however was a three-year corporate policy designed to achieve an advanced position in the application
of banking technology. The plan identified the technological advancements until 2003 (Riyad 2001).
Table 9.3.1 lists the systems and applications launched under the umbrella of the plan.
Year System/application Description
1999 Core Banking System Back-office system
2000 RiyadLine A telephone banking service
2002 Payment Centre A payment and clearing centre that encompasses
SARIE, Swift and governmental operations
2002 International Operation A centre that handles treasury and investment
Centre operations
2002 RiyadNet Remote banking service providing combined remote
banking services for retail and corporate customers
2003 RiyadOnLine Retail Internet banking
2003 SMS and e-Mail Notification A notification service for fund transfer, time deposit
renewals and loan maturities
2003 Profitability Tracking System A system tracks the customers' profitability to improve
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cross-selling ratios and fee generation model
2003 Trade Finance Corporate Internet banking
2003 Automated Anti-Money A SAMA mandate
Laundering
2004 Branch Operations Support A communication and interaction application between
Centre Head-Office and branches
2003 RiyadMobile Mobile phone banking
2005 Riyad Tadawul Local stock trading service over Internet
Table 9.3.1 Systems & applications of Riyad's Technology Strategic Plan (Riyad 2001; 2003;
Riyad survey 2003)
9.3.3 Islamic banking
Riyad was a rather late starter not only in absorbing technology in operations and control, but also in
expanding the production lines to include Islamic banking. In 2002, Riyad introduced Islamic banking
through setting up the Sharia'h Committee and a specialised department of Islamic banking activities
(Riyad 2003). The main reasons for providing Islamic banking were to:
1. Address better customer base of Islamic banking needs.
2. Meet competitive markets locally and regionally.
3. Broaden the bank's products and services base.
4. Increase business and profitability.
9.3.4 A new look
Riyad is not only closely associated with the three essential elements of the Saudi economy (i.e. oil,
agriculture and industry), it had symbolised them in its logo. Riyad undertook a major restructuring
plan during 2004 aiming to attract new customers, to develop the quality of service and to increase
profits. Accordingly, Riyad started the plan with the launch of a new logo that reflects simplicity,
modernisation, building personal relationships and empowering customers with a better understanding
of their needs.
9.4 The development of Riyad e-banking constituency
Figure 9.4.1 Riyad's organisational chart (Riyad survey 2003; Riyad 2006)visualises the
organisational structure of Riyad. As we can see, the organisation is decentralised, as is the case at
many Saudi banks. The daily matters of e-banking are handled by the Operations Division through the
Remote Delivery Channels Department. The technical developments of e-banking, however, are
handled by the Technology Division. Both divisions are grouped into entity, Operations &
Technology Group. The Remote Delivery Channels Department is the organisational core of the
Riyad e-banking constituency. It operates all e-banking services, including ATM, POS terminals,
telephone, Internet, and mobile banking. The department also works horizontally across the
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organisational structure with other groups, such as Retail Banking Group, in all business aspects




Figure 9.4.1 Riyad's organisational chart (Riyad survey 2003; Riyad 2006)
Table 9.4.1 provides information about both the organisational background of Riyad's main groups
and the organisational relationships between the Remote Delivery Channels Department, and the main
groups. At present, the Remote Delivery Channels Department commands modest economic and
strategic roles. Its workforce and annual budget constitute about 3% and 2% of Riyad's total,
respectively. There are three reasons for this (a) that the technology has emerged only recently in
Riyad's groups, (b) most of the technology comes from outside vendors, and (c) the type of ICT
applications have been basically mature technology.
Group Retail Corporate Investment Treasury
Workforce (%) 60 5 2 1
Budget size 2nd 31-d 1st 4th
ICT since 1990 1998 1995 1995
ICT applications Desktop Desktop, Desktop Desktop &
CRM & Treasury
CREDIT
Interaction with Yes Yes No No
e-Banking
Department
Since 1997 2001 NA NA
Areas Most retail Internet NA NA
banking banking
Ways Products/servi Products/servi NA NA
ces delivery, ces delivery,
support & support &
maintenance maintenance
Table 9.4.1 Intra-organisational relationships at Riyad with Remote Delivery Channels
Department (Riyad survey 2003)
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The implementation of the core banking system as well as the gradual launch of e-banking products
and services has produced a largely fragmented IT system. The system is technically demanding in
terms of operation, support, enhancements and problem solving, hence there are risks of failing to
deliver in terms of cost and time. From the cost point of view, the nature of turn-key assignments to IT
vendors made the system's initial cost higher than traditional projects managed by the Technology
Division. Following the roll-out phase, however, the matters of cost have improved. Currently, the
system does not incur high permanent expenditure in resources and operational fees as most new
developments are outsourced at a semi-fixed price.
From the time point of view, however, the lack of knowledge in the development of e-banking
products and services translated into delays in delivery. This issue lasted until the Technology
Division finalised the e-services architecture and established the standards. From here onwards, the
































Figure 9.4.II Riyad's e-services architecture (Riyad survey 2003)
The Head Riyad's Internet Banking highlights Riyad's role in the process of the technology
development:
"I do not think the department has a tradition and culture of innovativeness. This is
because our strategy in IT development is to acquire ready made IT solutions rather
than developing new ones. We have strategic alliances with some IT vendors to
handle all the IT development tasks. Our role concentrates on integrating different
IT packages with each other and coordinating the IT development process."
The story of e-banking development at Riyad has gone through many stages. At some stages the
achievements were significant, for instance, the implementation of the unifying e-Services
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Architecture. At other stages, however, the achievements have been more mixed, for instance, the
market results of e-channels have not met expectations with a penetration rate of only 5%.
The remainder of this section briefly discusses the current state of the Riyad e-banking constituency.
The "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) selected for the analysis is a two-layered intra- and inter-
organisational diamond, given that important features of the Riyad e-banking constituency-building
process are the results of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between Riyad and other
organisations.
9.4.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
The Technology Strategic Plan has framed the evolution of the economic and strategic roles of the
organisational core of the constituency, namely, the Remote Delivery Channels Department. The
workforce and the annual budget of the department constitute about 3% and 2% of Riyad's total
workforce and budget, respectively. The use of many ICT applications and technologies are
widespread within the department, including ready-made and client/server applications. Although the
department does not implement any degree of e-transactions or e-commerce with other departments, it
does use its ICT applications and technologies to operate many e-banking products and services (see
Table 9.3.1). The department is characterised by a modest degree of innovativeness although it
pioneered some services, such as Traffic Payments Fines via ATMs.
The launch of the "national champion" strategy has enhanced the position. According to the Head of
e-Channels Quality Unit, the "national champion" is the new corporate policy of Riyad. It was
launched at the end of 2005 to become a base for Riyad's potential road map during the remainder of
the decade. It not only provides Riyad's vision and objectives, but also identifies the relationship
between Riyad's sections, departments, and divisions. The potential position ofRiyad is an additional
focus of the policy.
Beyond the borders of Riyad, the market results of e-channels have not met the expectations as the
penetration rate is only 5% and the launch of Riyad Tadawul incurred a two-year delay (see
Alignment 4-4i). Also, the nature of turn-key assignments to IT vendors and the lack of development
knowledge have meant additional development costs and delays in delivery.
9.4.2 (ll-lli) Nature and maturity of the technology
The e-banking technological system only uses standard mature technologies. Its hardware components
consist of a group of mini-computers that are based on client/server architecture. Such components
run a group of specially, ready-made and stand-alone applications. A secure extranet grants access to
the e-services network (see Figure 9.4.II). The system is rather technically demanding in terms of
operation, support, enhancements and problem solving. The infrastructure and e-services architecture,
in addition to individual channels technology were built mostly by IT vendors and consultants.
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9.4.3 Alignment (1-1i) - Organisational governance
A highly centralised management rules the IT decision-making process, even though the overall bank
structure is decentralised. The process is fundamentally based on the authority and trust of executive
management as well as on risk management, security management, financial management, and
business strategy. Such intra-organisational governance positively influences the development of e-
banking, although more risks should be taken in relation to e-banking initiatives. Inter-
organisationally, however, the lack of legislative rules and regulations create undesirable obstacles to
the development of e-banking. The collaboration with other banks in the e-banking area is an
example. The Internet Banking Head highlights the failure of collaboration with other banks in
providing e-banking products and services:
"In the past, we thought about collaborating with other banks in providing e-
banking services but [certain] issues prevented us from doing so. For example, we
had a discussion with one of the Saudi banks in providing a single Internet banking
channel for both of us. The other bank was reluctant to allow our systems to talk
with its system because of information security reasons. Therefore, I think
collaboration among banks does not exist without the supervision and control from
SAMA as in the case with SARIE and SPAN."
9.4.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
Given the modest market penetration of Riyad's e-banking products/services, it is clear that there is a
lot to do in relation to target users. In this respect, the launch strategy can be judged as conservative,
as it offered a single product or service via a single e-channel, then gradually, expanded it over to
other e-channels. For example, RiyadPhone started in 2001 with a simple accounts inquiry. The
development process involved some customers during the piloting stage only. Some promotional
strategies to tackle the issue of low penetration rate have been conducted through different media
channels. For example, Riyad activated a marketing campaign during January 2004 that gives a laptop
for e-customers drawn as winners. Table 9.4.II shows that the percentage of Riyad's active e-cards is
much lower than the sector's average. It also shows that Riyad's ATMs provide average services as










































2003 Riyad 52 1,126 52
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Sector 53 1,162 80
5-Year Riyad 61 1,544 45
Average Sector 61 2,651 74
Table 9.4.II Riyad's ATM usage trend (BTC 2004)
9.4.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
E-banking complements the traditional products and services and it does not include completely new
financial products or services. The vision behind e-banking was "to provide rapid, flexible,
convenient, and robust secured e-banking channels," (Riyad survey 2003). The challenge of the
bank's mission statement to be the leading Saudi bank is yet a target to be achieved as far as the e-
banking products of the Riyad constituency is concerned. Here it is important to consider that,
although the online interface and navigation of e-banking are user-friendly and intuitive for the
customers, e-banking implies a cultural change in relation to the traditional products and services.
Such change is one of the proposed objectives of the emerging e-Channels Quality Unit. According to
the Unit's Head, the unit will focuses on improving the quality of all e-channels as one of the
consequences of the "national champion" strategy.
9.4.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
The degree of interaction between the e-banking technological system and other IT systems fluctuates
between good and problematic. From one viewpoint, the system is blending with the legacy systems
in place. Some enhancement tools implemented lately have reduced the initial performance problems.
The implementation of the system has implied some changes in skills and training of employees. All
of the skills and training requirements are focused towards the operation and business support of the
e-services (see Alignment 2-2i). From another viewpoint, the e-banking technological system must
align with other new systems in the process of development and implementation. Such relationship
implies re-working the processes and procedures, designing new processes, going through a very
severe and stringent testing cycle and implementing several standards and rules relating to security,
risk management, and audit. For example, Riyad Tadawul started in 2005 although the system was in
place at the start of 2001.
9.4.7 Summary
The assessment of the e-banking constituency-building process suggests that Riyad has a great deal to
do to achieve a strong alignment across all the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995).
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Riyad. It provided a brief
overview of Riyad and some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 60 years of
existence. It then looked in detail at the particular development of e-banking at Riyad through the
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conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). The implementation ofe-value creation
strategies at Riyad is rather mixed from the point of view of the bank's declared mission of becoming
-
"the leading Saudi bank."
*
*
«&.- ■„ i ■
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Chapter 10: The Saudi Capital Market
10.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the emergence and evolution of the trading, clearing and settlements system
of securities in the Saudi Capital Market (i.e. Tadawul)58. It provides a brief overview of the Saudi
capital market, formally Saudi share market, and some of the key events shaping its developments in
almost 25 years of existence. It then looks at the particular development of Tadawul constituency
through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). A policy recommendation
concludes the chapter. Table 10.1.1 provides information related to interviews conducted at Tadawul,
CMA and SAMA59.
Interviewee Date
Tadawul Managing Director (MD) January 2004
Banking Technology Department (BTC) Manager, SAMA January 2004
SARIE Manager, SAMA September 2004
General Counsel, Capital Market Authority (CMA) January 2006
Tadawul R&D Manager January 2006
Table 10.1.1 Interviews conducted at the Saudi Capital Market and SAMA
10.2 Brief overview
Although the Saudi share market opened officially in 1984, its origins go back to 1935 when the
shares of the Arab Automobile Company were floated to handle the rising imports of automobiles.
The public offering of companies continued and the number of public companies reached 14 by 1975,
particularly cement and electricity companies.
58
An initial version of Tadawul's case study can be found at: Al-Jadeed, M. & Molina, A. 2006a.
Toward a taxonomy of strategic approaches to capabilities building and value creation: the case of
the Saudi Arabian Capital Market. In Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International
Association for Management of Technology (IAMOT 2006). Beijing: P.R. China. 22-26 May 2006.
An electronic copy from the paper is attached as a part of Appendix V with permissions from both
the publisher, International Association for Management of Technology (IAMOT), and the co¬
author, Professor Alfonso Molina. The Tadawul's case study also has been presented at the 13th
Global Finance Conference. Rio de Janeiro: Brazil. 26-28 April 2006. The abstract, entitled "e-
Capital capabilities building and value creation: The case of the Saudi Arabian Capital Market", is
available online at http://www.coppead.uffi.br/gfc/. Appendix III involves an electronic copy from
the abstract. It also has been accepted for presentation and publication at Africa Telecommunication
andlCT Conference. Nairobi: Kenya. 17-21 May 2006.
59 I wish to express my deep thanks to the interviewees for their positive and open attitude to the
research questions.
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The rapid economic development and Saudisation of foreign banks in the 1970s led to the
establishment of a number of large corporations and joint venture banks (Tadawul 2006). It also
provided an opportunity for independent share brokers to come in to handle secondary share market
transactions. The business was so profitable that the share market saw brokerage houses topping up 45
in 1978. Shares continued to be exclusively traded through share brokers until the end of 1984
(Banafe 1993).
During that time, the state of the informal share trading market was similar to that of the neighbouring
country, Kuwait. The Kuwaiti share market was established in 1978. As a result of the government
ban on the creation of public companies, Souk Al-Manakh, a parallel stock exchange, evolved in 1979
as a totally unregulated market for Kuwaiti-owned, Gulf-based companies that did not meet the
official exchange listing requirements. Following the authorities' relaxation of the ban on forward
trading in 1981, prices in both Souk Al-Manakh and Kuwait share market rose sharply. The market
continued to climb until it collapsed in mid-May 198260 (Hassan et al. 2003).
The collapse of Souk Al-Manakh had a startling impact on the Saudi share market and its momentum.
There has since been a continuous process of examining and improving the efficiency of the market
through improvements in trading and settlements (Banafe 1993).
In an attempt to avoid a similar case to that of the collapse of Souk Al-Manakh, the Saudi government
formed in 1984 a ministerial committee consisting of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy,
Ministry of Commerce and SAMA to regulate and develop the share market (Tadawul 2006). The
immediate decisions to regulate the market were:
1. SAMA was charged with the day-to-day regulation of the share market.
2. Share trading intermediation was restricted to banks61.
60 In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi
Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Souk Al-Manakh", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No.
4519, Date: 24/02/2006). The article summarised some lessons from the collapse of Souk Al-
Manakh. It also compared the market's situation of Souk Al-Manakh prior to the collapse with that
of the Saudi Capital Market prior to the February 2006's strong correction. See Appendix IV.
61 IT plays a vital role in extending trading hours, bypassing brokers and making listed shares widely
accessible to customers at low cost, generating enormous volumes (Westland & Clark 1999). In
order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi
Arabia, I published an article, entitled "The conflict of interests... a lesson from Moscow", at
Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No. 4526, Date: 03/03/2006). The article summarised major
operational challenges faced the Moscow Stock Exchange (MSE) during the mid-1990s when it
kept trading and settlement inaccessible to the average investor. The article made use of Westland
and Clark (1999) case study on MSE. See Appendix IV.
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During the period of 1984-87, trading and registration of shares were beset with procedural delays in a
segmented market with imperfect information on prices and lots. The traditional share brokers
continued to operate under the cover of Regulation 19(B) of trading rules. This permitted share
registration offices of companies to complete transfer procedures without the transaction going
through banks, provided that the transaction was direct between the buyer and the seller, without
intermediary and without payment to third parties. This option was used by bigger value block
transactions and reduced the role of banks.
Moreover, the bureaucratic procedures of share registration took several weeks rendering shareholders
unable to dispose of their shares. To overcome trading and registration delays, two options were
pursued:
1. The 11 existing banks established in 1985 and the Saudi Share Registration Company
(SSRC), a private limited liability company, to facilitate central registration for joint stock
companies and settled and cleared all share transactions.
2. This was followed by the launch of an automated system for share settlement processed by
SSRC in 1987, a remarkable year as it symbolises the birth of the first form of automation in
the share market. For the purpose of this thesis, this system is named SSRC-IT.
In 1990, SAMA, as the day-to-day regulator of the share market, introduced ESIS, an electronic share
trading and settlement system. ESIS aimed to centralise the fragmented market, narrow price spreads,
and improve market liquidity.
ESIS had evolved during the 1990s in accordance with the continuing evolution of the share market.
Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000), and Bekaert and Hearvey (2002) list some major economic
developments to the share market, commencing in the early 1990s:
1. 1990: The introduction of the Insider Trading Law.
2. 1997: SAMA authorised the establishment of a special fund, the country fund, to facilitate
indirect portfolio investments in Saudi Arabian Riyal securities, primarily the shares of Saudi
Arabian joint stock companies.
3. 1998: A stand-alone index of the International Finance Corporation Global (IFCG) was
launched for the Saudi share market.
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4. 1998: The Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB)62 re-balanced the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) indexes and the Saudi share market joined IFCG index for Europe, Middle
East and Africa (EMEA).
5. 1999: The Ministry of Finance announced the ground breaking decision to allow non-Saudi
investors to own shares in the share market through mutual funds.
The share market has witnessed continued evolution and SAMA decided in the late 1990s to enhance
its technological structure. In 2001, a technological advancement occurred when SAMA introduced
Tadawul, a new trading, clearing, and settlement system, to replace ESIS. Tadawul, as we shall see, is
considered a catalyser of technological and organisational change in the share market as it implied
changes, not only in technical aspects, but also in other aspects, such as structure, rules, features and
management (Tadawul MD).
SAMA was the day-to-day regulator of the share market and the developer and operator of Tadawul
until June 2003 when the government issued CML that established the Capital Market Authority
(CMA). The general implication of establishing the CMA on the share market was that the regulatory
role shifted from SAMA to CMA and the operational role was privatised.
Currently, Tadawul is on the way towards privatisation to become a private IT company dedicated to
perform the functions of the Securities Depository Centre and the Stock Exchange. These are new
organisations established by CML. It employs about 100 employees, mostly technical staff acquired
from SAMA, and contracts with CMA to perform the functions of the Securities Depository Centre
and the Stock Exchange. The contract is temporary until the official launch of both the Securities
Depository Centre and the Stock Exchange.
10.3 Some key events
In order to understand the evolution of the Tadawul constituency, it is necessary to look at some of the
key events that started 25 years ago and have influenced the shape of the present constituency. The
review focuses on the technological developments that have directly influenced the emergence and
subsequent evolution of the Saudi share market toward a modern stock exchange environment. Such
62
Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB) was launched by the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) in 1981 to collect data on emerging markets for in-house use. Over time, demand from the
financial community for this data increased. In 1987, IFC began offering its indices and underlying
data as commercial product. Using a sample of shares in each market, the indices proved to be
valuable performance benchmarks. The indices have helped investors overcome the difficulties of
comparing locally-produced indices with differing methodologies. EMDB was acquired by
Standard & Poor's in January 2000 (RAIMEX 2005).
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developments are the automation origins and the technological developments of the 1990s, first part of
2000s, and mid-2006.
10.3.1 Automation origins
The origins of share trading automation go back to the mid-1980s when SSRC launched in 1987
SSRC-IT. The launch of SSRC-IT occurred together with the opening of the first central share trading
hall at SSRC premises in Riyadh. The opening of the hall was faced with criticisms as trading would
conflict with Islamic trading principles. Accordingly, the hall has been closed after only three days of
operation while SSRC-IT continues serving the market (Tadawul R&D Manager).
The motivation for such development was to overcome share trading and registration delays that took
a period of two to three weeks. After the launch of SSRC-IT, the entire process of settlement and
change of ownership for share trades executed with banks took only two days and the buyer of shares
was given an Ishaar, a certificate evidencing the ownership of shares (Banafe 1993). Table 10.3.1
shows the evolution of share trading transactions pre- and post-SSRC-IT implementation.
End of No. of Value of Market No. of All Share
period shares shares value of transaction Index
traded (m) traded shares s(k) (TASI)
(SAR b) (SAR b)
1985 4 1 67 8 690.88
1986 5 1 63 11 646.03
1987 12 2 73 23 780.64
1988 15 2 86 42 892.00
1989 15 3 107 110 1,086.83
1990 17 4 97 85 979.8
Table 10.3.1 Share trading transactions handled by SSRC-IT, 1985-90 (SAMA 2006)
Although the SSRC-IT increased the efficiency of the process of share trading and registration, the
seal of the central share trading hall in 1987, the continuing floating of new companies and the
fragmented characteristic of the share market required a new means of automation. This drove SAMA
to contract with Accenture63 to participate in developing new means of share trading. In 1990, SAMA
introduced a major enhancement of the share market by unveiling ESIS (Tadawul R&D Manager).
ESIS aimed to centralise the fragmented market, narrow price spreads and improves market liquidity.
It linked the centralised trading unit (CTU) at each bank as well as the computer system of SSRC with
the central computer at SAMA. Figure 10.3.1 provides a schematic representation for share
transactions among all participant entities in the Saudi share market.
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Figure 10.3.1 Schematic representation of share transactions among all participated entities in
the Saudi share market as of 1990s (Banafe 1993: 181, modified; Tadawul R&D Manager)
ESIS provided better fairness and transparency of trading in terms of share prices and positions which
helped to speed up the execution of share trades and their settlements64. ESIS also provided an
efficient means by which customers' orders were executed and settled. ESIS attempted to match the
placed bid and offer orders with the best available bids and offers according to price/time priority.
Unmatched bids and offers were kept in the electronic market until either matched by ESIS or taken
out from the market by traders.
ESIS encouraged banks to open their vast branch network to investors who wished to trade in shares.
It also permitted two to three days settlement feature, next day clearance (NetBase) feature and a
paperless system where share certificates became obsolete. Over the next decade, the number of
shares traded and values traded grew in a geometric progression. Many new companies were floated
and existing companies tapped the share market (SAMA 2003). Table 10.3.II provides statistical data
on the evolution of transactions handled by ESIS.
End of No. of Value of Market No. of All Share
64 Fairness and transparency of trading are central to implementing IT in stock exchanges (Westland
& Clark 1999). In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the
public in Saudi Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Brokers and market... to avoid Santiago's
challenge", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No. 4511, Date: 16/02/2006). The article summarised
the ICT's fairness and transparency challenges faced the Santiago Stock Exchange (Bolsa de
Comercio de Santiago) during the mid-1990s. The article made use of Westland and Clark (1999)














1991 31 9 181 91 1,765.24
1992 35 14 206 272 1,888.65
1993 60 17 198 320 1,793.30
1994 152 25 145 357 1,282.90
1995 117 23 153 292 1,367.60
1996 138 25 172 284 1,531.00
1997 312 62 223 460 1,957.80
1998 293 52 160 377 1,413.10
1999 528 57 229 438 2,028.53
2000 555 65 255 498 2,258.29
Table 10.3.II Share trading transactions handled by ESIS, 1991-2000 (SAMA 2006)
10.3.2 Development and restructuring
ESIS satisfied the business needs of the share market during the 1990s. The business needs of the
2000s, however, would become more demanding and SAMA decided at the end of the 1990s to
replace ESIS with a more advanced system, Tadawul, an Arabic word meaning in trading. Tadawul
Managing Director (Tadawul MD) highlights the reason for replacing ESIS with Tadawul:
"At the late 1990s, there was a plan to launch new ideas to the [share] market. Such
new ideas were not possible with the existing features of ESIS. Therefore, we had to
choose either to continue enhancing ESIS or to develop entirely a new system to
furnish the new ideas. We have chosen to develop a new system, Tadawul."
One of the important implications of Tadawul on the share market is the dissemination of market
information beyond banks' branches65. Share traders and investors no longer need to search for listed
companies' financial data nor do they need to visit banks' branches to learn the most recent share
prices as such information is published on either Tadawul website or Tadawul Magazine, a free
quarterly magazine published in 2002 and focusing solely on the local share market.
The launch of Tadawul implied changes in organisational structure. All SAMA's departments and
sections related directly to the share market, such as the Shares Control Department and the Tadawul
Team, have been split from their parental divisions and departments and grouped under one entity,
65 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) represents an interesting example on the efficient use of IT in
stock exchanges. In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the
public in Saudi Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Average investors first", at Aleqtisadiah
Newspaper (Issue No. 4688, Date: 15/04/2006). The article summarised the ICT's build-up process
followed by SSE to extend trading hours, bypass brokers and make listed shares widely accessible
to customers at low cost, generating enormous volumes. The article made use of Westland and
Clark (1999) case study on SSE. The article is available online at
http://aleqtisadiah.com/article.phD?do=show&id=1707. An electronic copy from the article is
attached as a part of Appendix IV with permission from the publisher, Saudi Research & Marketing
Group.
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Tadawul Department. The SSRC has been closed and the role of settling and registering of shares has
been taken over by the Tadawul Department. Figure IV portrays SAMA's organisational structure.
Figure 10.3.II SAMA's organisational structure as of 1999 (SAMA 2003)
The Tadawul Department reports directly to SAMA's Deputy Governor and has been reallocated to an
external premises outside SAMA Head-Office. A SAMA technical employee who participated in the
development of SPAN and ESIS systems during the early 1990s and led the development team of
SARIE during the mid-1990s has been appointed as the Managing Director of the department. Table
10.3.Ill provides statistical data on transactions handled by Tadawul during the period 2001-2003.
End of No. of Value of Market No. of All Share






2001 691 84 275 605 2,430.11
2002 1,736 134 281 1,034 2,518.08
2003 5,566 597 590 3,763 4,437.58
2004 10,298 1,774 1,149 13,320 8,206.23
2005 12,281 4,139 2,423 46,608 16,712.64
Table 10.3.Ill Share trading transactions handled by Tadawul, 2001-03 (Tadawul 2006)
10.3.3 The Capital Market Law
SAMA had been the regulator of the share market and the developer and operator of Tadawul until
June 2003 when the government issued CML that established CMA. The following are the main
aspects ofCML (CML 2003):
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1. "An Authority to be named "The Capital Market Authority" is hereby established in the
Kingdom and shall directly report to the President of the Council ofMinisters. It shall have a
legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy. It shall be vested with all
authorities as may be necessary to discharge its responsibilities and functions under this Law.
The Authority shall enjoy exemptions and facilities enjoyed by public organisations. Its
personnel shall be subject to the Labour Law," (Article Four: A).
2. "A market shall be established in the Kingdom for the trading in Securities which shall be
known as the "Saudi Stock Exchange", and will have the legal status of a joint stock
company in accordance with the provisions of this Law. This Exchange shall be the sole
entity authorised to carry out trading in Securities in the Kingdom," (Article Twenty: A).
3. "The Authority shall establish a committee known as the "Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Disputes" which shall have jurisdiction over the disputes falling under the
provisions of this Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules and
instructions issued by the Authority and the Exchange, with respect to the public and private
actions," (Article Twenty Five: A).
4. "An Appeal Panel is to be formed by a Council of Ministers' decision... The Appeal Panel
shall have the discretion to refuse, to review the decisions of the Committee for the
Resolution of Securities Disputes, to affirm such decisions, to undertake a de novo review of
the complaint or suit based on the record developed at the hearing before the Committee and
to issue such decision as it deems appropriate in relation to the complaint or the suit. The
decisions of the Appeal Panel shall be final," (Article Twenty Five: G).
5. "The [BODs] of the Exchange shall establish a department to be known as the "Securities
Depositary Centre" which shall be the sole entity in the Kingdom authorised to practice the
operations of deposit, transfer, settlement, clearing and registering ownership of Saudi
Securities traded on the Exchange," (Article Twenty Six: A).
6. "Brokerage business is restricted to a person holding a valid license and who is an agent of a
joint stock company that is licensed to perform brokerage activities," (Article Thirty One: A).
Figure 10.3.Ill shows SAMA's organisation structure after the establishment of CMA and Table
10.3.IV compares among the main aspects of the share market pre- and post-CML.
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Figure 10.3.III SAMA's organisational structure after the establishment of CMA (SAMA 2006)
Aspect Pre-CML Post-CML
Governance SAMA CMA
Trading entity Share Market Stock Exchange
The role of executing of A fragmented task between Securities Depository Centre
securities trading transactions SAMA and SSRC
The role of settlement of SAMA via Banking Dispute CMA via:
securities disputes Committee Committee for the Resolution
of Securities Disputes
Appeal Panel
Performer of trading Commercial banks Securities brokers and
intermediation commercial banks
Definition of Tadawul A securities trading, clearing An operator to the functions of:
and settlements system The Stock Exchange
The Securities Depository
Centre
Owner of Tadawul SAMA An IT private company
The role of supervising pre- Ministry ofCommerce Ministry of Commerce and
floating companies Industry
The role of supervising floating Ministry of Commerce CMA
companies
The role of supervising post- Ministry of Commerce CMA
floating companies
Table 10.3.IV Main aspects of the Saudi share market pre- and post- CML (Tadawul
Manager; General Counsel)
10.3.4 OMX Contract
CMA announced in November 2005 a plan that will imply a big improvement in the technological
capabilities of the Saudi Share Market. CMA announced the expansion of the "share" market toward
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an integrated "capital" market that involves many securities markets, such as a parallel share market
for new and small companies. The expansion will not only be horizontal (e.g., secondary market66),
but will also be vertical to include additional securities, such as Islamic bonds (Sukuk)67, real estate
mutual funds68 and REPOs69.
In order to meet such expansion, CMA signed at the end ofMay 2006 a major contract with OMX, the
owner and operator of the largest integrated securities marketplace in Northern Europe and the
provider of technology solutions for financial and energy markets worldwide. The contract aims to
streamline the operations of CMA and to upgrade the existing technological infrastructures of the
share market to meet the expansion toward an integrated capital market.
As per the terms of the SAR 160 m contract, OMX will be the primary system integrator for the
design, implementation, and infrastructure of the Saudi Capital Market. CMA's Chairman highlights
the scope of such major evolution as well as its strategic implications of the evolution of Tadawul:
"This agreement was part of the strategy to upgrade the technical infrastructure of
our capital markets to meet the growing market expectations utilising best available
technologies... Tadawul is committed to providing the highest levels of services to
its customers, members, investors and data vendors," (Khan 2006).
Under the contract, OMX will also provide its platforms for trading and market data dissemination, a
smarts' market surveillance system and will also integrate a central securities depository solution from
Tata Consultancy Services Limited (TCS), a global IT consulting, services, and business process
66 In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi
Arabia, I published an article, entitled "A primary and secondary market ... differences in
mechanism, trading and investment", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Date: 25/11/2005). The article
compared and contrasted the technological system of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as a
primary market, with that ofNasdaq, as a secondary market. See Appendix IV.
67 Sukuk is the Arabic name for financial certificates. The international Islamic bond market is divided
into sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and Sukuk. These asset-based bonds ofmedium-term maturity have
been issued internationally by sovereign and corporate entities (e.g., central banks). In 2001, the
Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) was the first governmental entity in the GCC countries to issue
Sukuk (El Qorchi 2005). In 2006, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industrial Company (SABIC) became
the first corporate entity public Sukuk issuance in the Saudi Capital Market when it signed at the
end of July the underwriting agreement for its debut Sukuk issuance for a total amount of SAR
3,000 m (SABIC 2006).
68 The CMA Board of Commissioners approved in July 2006 the Investment Fund Regulations to
organise the market of real estate investment funds. Such regulations will allow CMA to supervise
the real estate sector. In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among
the public in Saudi Arabia, I published an article, entitled "Real estate on the path of stocks", at
Aleqtisadiah Newspaper (Issue No. 4624, Date: 09/06/2006). The article summarised the way
SAMA regulated the share market during the mid-1980s. It also predicted that the real estate sector
will be organised by CMA through the same mechanise used by SAMA to regulate the share
marked during the mid-1980s. See Appendix IV.
69 REPOs are contracts in which the seller of securities agrees to buy them back at a specified time
and price. It also called re-purchase agreements or buy-back (Westland & Clark 1999).
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outsourcing company. It is expected that the development of such technological systems will take 11
months commencing June 2006. Accordingly, Tadawul is looking to be replaced by OMX during the
first quarter of 2007.
The automation of the Saudi Share Market started in 1987 and the technological developments of the
1990s, first part of 2000s, and mid-2006 are key events influencing the shape of the present Tadawul
constituency. The above discussion briefly looked at such events and highlighted the technological
evolution associated with each event. The next section looks at the processes leading to the rise of the
Tadawul constituency. How has it been built?
10.4 The development of the Tadawul constituency
The emergence of the Tadawul constituency finds its historical origins in the ESIS constituency that
developed during the 1990s. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the build-up of the ESIS
constituency70. Table 10.4.1 provides a brief assessment of the state of the ESIS constituency as of
late-1990s through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995). This is followed
by a brief discussion of the state of the process of sociotechnical alignment at ESIS.
70 In order to advance and disseminate the knowledge and understanding among the public in Saudi
Arabia, 1 published an article, entitled "The next market mechanise", at Aleqtisadiah Newspaper
(Issue No. 4638, Date: 23/06/2006). The article reviewed the ESIS's build-up process and
summarised the influences ESIS had on the ICT's infrastructure of the share market during the first
part of the 1990s. See Appendix IV.
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(I-Ii) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
ESIS had been developed and operated by the Banking Technology Department (BTC) of SAMA
through a technical team named ESIS's team. The team consisted of about 40 technical staff
possessing a mix of expertise in software engineering, networking, and systems analysis. In order to
cover the development and operation costs, SAMA charged banks and the Saudi Share Registration
Company (SSRC) a small fee on any clearance and settlement transaction (see Figure 10.3.1). ESIS's
team consisted of three groups. The first group was Accenture's staff to provide technical consultancy.
The second group consisted of some technical experts acquired from other SAMA's technical
departments, such as the Computer Department, to manage the development process. The third group
consisted of fresh technical graduates recruited from universities to perform the actual development.
The team was in direct contact with SSRC and CTU at each bank during the development process.
Members of the team frequently received technical training courses mainly from Accenture. Members
of both CTU at each bank and SSRC participated in some courses.
(II-IIi) Nature and Maturity of the Technology
ESIS was a network system linking with the centralised trading unit (CTU) at each bank. Each CTU
was linked with all share trading centres at some banks' branches. By 1999, ESIS had connected 500
branches (i.e. 49% of working branches) in addition to the computer system of SSRC. It had been
heavily developed on C++ programming language and devoted to perform the features of two to three
days settlement and next day clearance (NetBase).
Alignment (1-li) - Organisational governance
ESIS's team was one of BTC's team directly linked to the Banking Control Department of SAMA (see
Figure 10.3.II). Because SAMA, via BTC, sponsored during the 1990s the development of major IT
projects, including ESIS, BTC received direct support and authority from SAMA's Deputy Governor
to furnish the banking sector with its technical needs (Tadawul survey 2003). Such support and
authority positively influenced the development of ESIS as BTC had the power to directly contact
banks and SSRC with regard to technical and administrative issues related to the development of ESIS.
Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
ESIS had enrolled many entities behind its constituency. Intra-organisationally, ESIS's team evolved
during the first part of the 1990s to form its three groups: an external IT developer, technical experts,
and fresh technical graduates. Inter-organisationally, ESIS had directly targeted CTU at each bank and
indirectly, bank branches, which by 1999 reached 49% of working branches connected with ESIS.
However, the most important entities that ESIS could not target was investors and traders as ESIS has
no direct contact with such entities. This challenge prevented ESIS from transforming trading culture
beyond bank branches.
Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
SAMA unveiled ESIS in 1990 with the aim of centralising the fragmented market, narrowing price
spreads and improving market liquidity. It linked the centralised CTU at each bank as well as the
computer system of SSRC with the central computer at SAMA (see Alignment 4-4i & Figure 10.3.1).
The main envisaged benefits of ESIS were the features of two to three days settlement, next day
clearance (NetBase) and a paperless system where share certificates became obsolete. The capabilities
of ESIS were well aligned with the nature of the target problem and the constituency was able to
deliver on the requirements for most of the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, however, it had become
clear that the target problem was becoming more demanding and the ESIS system would not be able to
satisfy the demands of the 2000s. In other words, "there was a plan to launch new ideas to the [share]
market. Such new ideas were not possible with the existing features of ESIS," (Tadawul MD).
Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
ESIS had a complementary relation with the Saudi banking sector's traditional systems, such as
SPAN. Technically, however, SAMA kept ESIS isolated from other systems. The main reason was to
smooth out the process of data synchronisation since such data were not directly related to that of other
systems. Another reason was the nature of the programming language used by the ESIS constituency.
Indeed, ESIS, the SSRC computer application and CTU at each bank were C++ applications dedicated
to perform the features of two to three days settlement and next day clearance (NetBase). Such a
feature helped achieve a swifter execution of trades and their settlements and provided an efficient
means by which customers' orders were executed and settled (see Alignments 2-2i & 3-3i). |
Table 10.4.1 The state of alignment of ESIS constituency as of the end of 1990s
Since its origins, the ESIS constituency developed gradually in a close interplay between intra- and
inter-organisational relations. Not only had a great deal of ICTs expertise extended outside. Also the
need for alignment between the new means of automation and the corporate strategy of the share
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market influenced and shaped the characteristics and evolution of the ESIS constituency. As ESIS
became mis-aligned with the nature of the target problem by the end of the 1990s, the constituency
lost momentum and opened the way to the rise of the new Tadawul constituency. The following
discussion deals with the development of Tadawul which dates from the late 1990s until today.
10.4.1 (l-li) Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions and resources
According to the Tadawul R&D Manager, security infrastructure, and business continuity and
contingency for both Tadawul and banks are drivers behind the development of Tadawul. Tadawul's
executives are proud ofTadawul's strategic and economic roles in the Saudi share market:
"For the first time in the history of the [share] market, all technical, supervision and
administrative affairs related to the [share] market are centralised at a single entity,
which is Tadawul," (Tadawul MD).
The issue of the CML and the establishment of CMA in 2003 implied a major organisational change
for Tadawul. It was separated from SAMA and became a private IT company contracting only with
CMA to perform the functions of the Stock Exchange and the Securities Depository Centre. Part of
the function of the Securities Depository Centre had, in the past, been performed through SSRC. The
contract is however temporary until the official launch of both the Securities Depository Centre and
the Stock Exchange.
The business and constituency-building aspects of Tadawul are going well inside both the former and
existing governances, SAMA and CMA, respectively. Tadawul has been fully accepted and supported.
Although it did not implement any promotional activities inside SAMA or CMA, Tadawul has built a
good reputation among different inter-bank technological systems, such as SARIE. It has also
received the necessary resources in terms of people (e.g., Tadawul's team), expertise, funding, and
facilities. Tadawul's main departments are Market Control, Companies Information, Systems
Development, and Market Information and Marketing Department. It employs about 100 employees
who were mostly acquired from SAMA and has been allocated an average annual budget of SAR 35
m and external premises out with SAMA's Head-Office. In addition, Tadawul charges for the
provision of the settlement and clearance service of shares. Tadawul MD explains Tadawul's main
revenue model:
"All transactions related to trading [shares] at the Saudi Stock Exchange are
processed by Tadawul... Banks charge their clients a percentage from the total
value of a [share] trade. We at Tadawul charge banks 10% of that percentage.
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SAMA specifies a maximum percentage that banks can charge their clients for
performing a [share] trade71."
Tadawul's personnel, particularly technical staff and executive management are motivated to be part
of the constituency. This is because their interests and activities, such as career progression, receive
careful attention. The decision of the Council ofMinisters in June 2005 is a revealing example of the
strong alignment existing between Tadawul and its constituent personnel. The Council decided to
equalise the financial promotions (e.g., salaries and bonuses) of employees in governmental agencies
(e.g., General Investment Authority, SAGIA) with that of ministries (e.g., Ministry of Finance)72.
Employees of CMA and its related entities, such as Tadawul, have been exempted from this decision
due to the fact that they are not allowed by the Insider Trading Law, introduced in 1990, to trade
shares. This example also highlights that Tadawul offers high wages and bonuses to its employees as a
strategy to motivate them behind the development of the constituency.
Tadawul is also characterised by a tradition and a culture of innovativeness. It is a major user of ICT
applications and technologies, including specially developed applications, ready made applications,
office automation, client/server, networking, DBMS, and web applications. The motivation for such
innovative behaviour is the "creation of revenue streams and improvement of services offered"
(Tadawul survey 2003).
Regarding investors in the share market, Tadawul furnishes them with two main services: equity
trading and settlement, and dissemination of market information (Tadawul survey 2003). Tadawul's
website, for example, presents different types of financially-related information about listed
companies, including announcements that have impact on the share price (e.g. proposed projects),
financial statements, and background information. Figure 10.4.1 presents a screen-shot of Tadawul
website.
71 The trade fee is based on the value of shares traded, with a minimum fee of 0.12% or SAR 12,
whichever is higher. Since the inception of the Saudi Share Market, such fee evolved many times.
Before CML (i.e. before October 2003), the minimum fee was SAR 25. The scale of the fee was
0.50% for up to SAR 10,000, 0.25% for SAR 10,001-100,00, 0.15% for SAR 100,001-500,000 and
0.10% for amounts over SAR 500,000 (Banafe, 1993). Alter CML (i.e. October 2003-June 2006),
the trade fee was adjusted to 0.15% or SAR 15, whichever is higher.
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Employees of governmental agencies, such as the General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and the
Supreme Commission for Tourism, receive much higher financial promotions that those of
ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Higher Education. The main reason
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Figure 10.4.1 Tadawul website
The main services of Tadawul are to provide the same day trading and settlement (t+0) feature. It is
"real-time settlement of trades with gateways linking to the banks' order management systems. Price
and company information are disseminated to banks, information vendors and on the website,"
(Tadawul survey 2003). Another feature of Tadawul is that it is "the only trading system in the world
that include trade revocable feature" (Tadawul R&D Manager). The website traffic is one of the main
performance specifications of Tadawul. During 2002, the website accounted for almost 80% of all
internal Internet traffic in Saudi Arabia (Tadawul 2003).
In addition to customers, banks which are the existing share brokers, are another entity that deals with
Tadawul. Tadawul classifies the degree of acceptance from the banks' point of view as full
satisfaction. The main reason for this was the involvement of banks at the initial stage of Tadawul
constituency-building process, particularly during the development stages of analysis, testing, and
piloting. This early involvement helped Tadawul to promote the banks' alignment with the system. In
addition, Tadawul has implemented effective promotional strategies and activities, such as
presentations, training and one-to-one discussions with banks. Such promotional strategies and
activities have encouraged banks to favourably perceive Tadawul.
One of the main promotional activities is the Tadawul Certificate. In 2000, Tadawul made an alliance
with IOB to develop and provide a training program for all share brokers. The general aim of the
program is to increase the ability and efficiency of share brokers. It mainly focuses on compliance
with share market regulations. The program started in 2001 via two courses: the basic investment
examination preparation course and Tadawul exam preparation course. Obtaining the certificate is a
must for all banks' employees involved in share trading. During the first two years of Tadawul life,
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478 employees from banks were provided with training, passed the trader examination, and obtained
the certificate (Tadawul 2003).
Tadawul's MD highlights the importance of the quality of services and competitiveness offered by
Tadawul:
"Tadawul has no competition but still pushes to improve the services to encourage
investing in the share market... Tadawul provides all banks with the same data
fields of stock trading transactions as well as interface specifications. Now it is up to
each bank to take the data from these fields and create new stock trading services,
such as screens to present these data to their clients. For example, if you go to Bank
A, it will be different from what you will see in Bank B although both of them have
the same data that come from the same source, which is Tadawul.... The services
provided by banks on top of Tadawul, such as Islamic financing products provided
by some banks are based on Tadawul, infrastructure. This is because we provide
them with the infrastructure that they can use and utilise. This is what I mean by
creating a competitive environment for banks."
Tadawul's position within the share market is obviously supported by the fact that Tadawul is the sole
securities trading, clearing, and settlements provider in Saudi Arabia. This position however is
sustained by delivering value. For instance, Tadawul offers information on market activities, such as
share prices and mutual funds performance analysis. Its online interface and navigation are user-
friendly and intuitive for share brokers (Saudi banks), making it easy to use. One of the reasons for the
user-friendly and intuitive character of the online system was precisely the early involvement of share
brokers during the stages of analysis, testing and piloting of the system.
Tadawul has evolved since its initial launch in 2001 through continued enhancements aiming at
boosting performance and introducing new functionalities to share brokers, traders, and investors. The
main reasons for such evolution have been the customers' demand and trades volume expectations.
10.4.2 (ll-lli) Nature and Maturity of the Technology
Tadawul has an integrated technological system that centralises all technical, supervision, and
administrative affairs relating to the share market. The initial technical specifications of the Tadawul
constituency-building process were completed after eliminating most major technical problems. The
present technical progress is mainly related to the significant increase in trading volumes and
awareness of the share market match expectations. For example, in 2003, the Tadawul technological
system achieved more than 26 transactions per second (see Alignment 4-4i). The system also has a
tightly coupled trading, order matching, and settlement feature in order to achieve real-time
settlement.
Such characteristics imply a major change for share brokers in relation to ESIS. According to Tadawul
(2003), the settlement and clearance feature of Tadawul increases the efficiency of the Stock
Exchange as:
269
1. The transmission process of shares' ownership from one investor to another requires no
physical documents.
2. The duration of settlements has become short as settlements are performed on the same day.
3. The chances of error have been reduced to zero.
4. The provision of e-certificates for shares' ownership has replaced Ishaars, physical
certificates that had been in place during the 1990s.
Compared to ESIS, the system enables the provision of completely new services, mainly related to
dissemination of the share market to the public. For example, Tadawul contracted with Reuters at the
end of 2003 to disseminate the share market to its customers' base. It also launched personal digital
assistance (PDA), a bilingual service on mobile phones and introduced a new streaming quote
technology, Tadawul Streaming Quotes, to present share prices more efficiently and to allow share
traders and investors to track the Tadawul All-Share Index (TASI) (see Figure 10.4.II and Alignment
4-4i).
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Figure 10.4.II A screen shot for Tadawul Streaming Quotes service (Tadawul 2005)
Moreover, Tadawul contracted with the National Technology Group, a Saudi communication
company, to launch Mubasher service, a real-time share market information dissemination service.
Mubasher allows share traders and investors to watch real-time price movements in the share market
from the comfort of their homes or offices on their PC's or Laptops over the Internet. This service is
the only one of its kind in Saudi Arabia. While Tadawul's Streaming Quotes service is offered for free
and presents price movements with 20 minutes delay, the Mubasher service is a subscription-based
service and offers real-time price movements (see Figure 10.4.III).
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Figure 10.4.Ill A screen shot for Mubasher service (Mubasher 2005)
The build-up and running of Tadawul's technological system is not without risks. It is innovative and
technically demanding, although Tadawul employs only stable and proven technologies. The risk of
failing to deliver in terms of anticipated performance and cost may be significant in terms of loss of
credibility and potential revenues. Indeed the Tadawul website experienced breakdowns particularly
during the second quarter of 2005, raising the issue of whether Tadawul will be able to meet the
expected sharp increase in share trading orders. Giving that the system's specifications did not evolve
in the course of its development, this suggests the need for some technological enhancements in order
to overcome the breakdown problems (see Alignments 2-2i & 4-4i). Table 10.4.II shows that Tadawul
experienced a marked increase in the number of transactions during April and May 2005.
















Table 10.4.II Share trading transactions, January-July 2005 (Tadawul 2006)
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Not only did Tadawul respond to the capacity challenge, but all banks as well. Tadawul's R&D
Manager describes Tadawul's reaction toward the capacity challenge:
"Tadawul has been continuously upgrading its systems to cope with the increase in
volumes and new listings. In 2005, Tadawul made major upgrades for its hardware,
network, and application components. The hardware was completely replaced and
all the banks with more powerful hardware to cope with the volumes. The upgrades
in Tadawul were done for the trading and CSDR73 systems. The network bandwidth
capacity between Tadawul and SAMA Joint network was doubled in terms of leased
lines and new communication technology, such as ATM and broadband, were
installed but not activated yet. Several changes to the application have been done to
optimise its performance but the most significant has been upgrading the trading
engine to be multi-threaded and settlement to be done much more efficiently."
10.4.3 Alignment (1-1 i) - Organisational governance
The implementation and achievements of Tadawul since 2001 have been positively influenced by
many national and industrial directives and legislation. Before the provision ofCML in October 2003
(see Figure 10.3.Ill & Table 10.3.IV), the Tadawul Department received strong power and authority
from SAMA's governance. This was symbolised in the grouping of all SAMA's departments and
sections related directly to the share market (e.g., Shares Control Department) into the Tadawul
Department. Such organisational changes in the governance of SAMA were of prime importance in
facilitating the initial success of Tadawul as it allowed Tadawul to establish a direct contact with share
brokers (e.g., banks) with regard to any technical, administrative, and financial issue related to the
development of Tadawul. "SAMA being a sponsor of major projects and using its influence with
banks has made it much easier to implement large infrastructures," (Tadawul survey 2003).
Tadawul has also been positively influenced by some international and national legislative changes.
Internationally, the Saudi share market joined the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)74, reflecting
the share market's increased significance amongst its peers (Tadawul 2003). Nationally, SAMA
issued the Anti-Money Laundering Law, requiring substantial re-engineering of existing activities and
a virtual link between Tadawul and SARIE (see Alignment 4-4i).
The evolution of the national and industrial legislation, and directives has continued influencing the
development of Tadawul even after the provision of the CML. Figure 10.4.IV portrays the
73 CSDR is a technical term stands for clearing, settlement, depository and registration (Tadawul R&D
Manager).
74 The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) is the trade organisation for regulated securities and
derivative markets, settlement institutions and related clearing houses, and their diverse services to
capital markets. WFE is a private international organisation comprised of the operators of the
world's leading markets. It provides a forum for communication, analysis, and debate among
members. Its purpose is to facilitate the representation, development of organised and regulated
markets, and to meet the needs of evolving capital markets in the best interests of their users (WFE
2005).
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organisational structure ofCMA and the relationships among entities of the Saudi capital market. The
establishment ofCMA has meant not only the official transfer of the regulatory role of the day-to-day
operation of the share market from SAMA to CMA, but also the initial steps towards an international
stock exchange environment.

























Figure 10.4.IV The organisational structure of the Saudi capital market
Now, Tadawul is on the way towards privatisation while performing the functions of the Securities
Depository Centre and the Stock Exchange. The contracting of such functions is temporary until the
official launch of both the Securities Depository Centre and the Stock Exchange. Figure X portrays
the existing organisational relationships for securities transactions amongst all participating entities in
the Saudi capital market. Clearly, the logic of the relationship is similar to that of the 1990s (see
Figure 10.3.1). The changes are:
1. The possibility of trading all types of securities, including shares.
2. The organisations involved with the market. For example, the Stock Exchange is playing
SAMA's role in trading, clearing, and settling transactions during the 1990s, while the























Figure 10.4.V Schematic representation of securities transactions among all participating
entities in the Saudi capital market as of today
One issue concerning the growth and success of Tadawul is the privatisation of the Stock Exchange.
"We are undergoing privatisation. In the future Tadawul is not going to be a SAMA
service. It is going to be the Stock Exchange. The challenge is then to convert the
culture from a governmental sector to a private sector... [The investment regulatory
structure is another issue as] there will be a change in the regulatory structure in
Saudi Arabia for the investment business. Tadawul as any other one involved in this
business is going to be impacted by such change" (Tadawul MD).
In addition to the privatisation of the Stock Exchange and the restructuring of investment regulations,
CMA's governance has also influenced the development and achievements of Tadawul. For example,
during the last quarter of 2004, CMA issued a group of internal rules, instructions and procedures
aimed to framework the provisions of CML. Such regulatory standards are related to the
administrative, financial and human resources affairs ofCML and its related entities. They include:
1. Market conduct regulations.
2. Offers of securities regulations.
3. Listing rules.
4. Glossary of defined terms used in the regulations and rules ofCMA.
The implications of such regulatory standards on the growth and success of Tadawul are explained by
Tadawul's MD:
"Tadawul is growing. Tadawul has seen an incredible growth during 2003 and we
expect the growth to continue in 2004. With the new rules and regulations of the
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stock market you will see more IPOs and listed companies that will increase the
growth of Tadawul."
Although Tadawul plays an important role in the evaluation and emergence of the share market, it did
not play the role of catalyser of change in the Saudi banking sector. Tadawul's MD highlights the
macro role of Tadawul:
"I think we started to look at banks from a different angle than before. We are a
service provider and our clients are banks. So we have to listen to them to see what
they want. I do not think we will drive banks. We are trying to lead in certain things
through providing certain services comparable to other markets. But I do not think
we will drive changes within banks."
In summary, the governance of the Saudi capital market is very much in a state of continuing change
with increasing demands on the capital market services of Tadawul. This is shaping the evolution of
the technology and organisation of the Tadawul constituency.
10.4.4 Alignment (2-2i) - Target constituents' perceptions and pursuits
A mixed progress characterises the Tadawul constituency-building process. While the achievement of
some objectives is on course, the success with others is more mixed. Tadawul's MD highlights how
some objectives have changed:
"When you achieve something you probably establish a new target or objective. For
example, the Service of information dissemination has turned out to be a good
source of income for us. So we capitalise the investment as a source of income for
the Stock Exchange. Moreover, based on the concept of being the only provider of a
gateway to banks, we keep enriching that data fields with additional services that the
banks can use. Also based on the feedback that we get from banks, we have added
new services to support the requirements of investors that came out during the
period of development."
The Tadawul constituency-building process has yet to succeed in aligning important target
constituents. In particular, Tadawul considers customers as the most important entities it needs to
bring increased numbers into the constituency. In this respect, Tadawul believes that their efforts are
going well. Thus, the marketing of Tadawul is well resourced. Public relation campaigns have been
designed and executed, including press articles and awareness material. Additionally, Tadawul
published in 2002 a free publication named Tadawul Magazine, the first periodical in Saudi Arabia to
focus solely on the local capital market. The magazine not only provides market information, news,
and articles, but also specialises on the capital market and issuers of securities. The magazine also
includes analysis of Arab and international stock markets (Tadawul 2003).
This was followed by the provision of the magazine through Internet in the first quarter of 2003. More
information dissemination channels have been launched since then, such as Reuters, Mubasher and
PDA services in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. Tadawul executives argue that the reason for
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customers not supporting Tadawul, so far, is that some of them are not aware of the distinctiveness of
services provided by Tadawul.
Figure 10.4.VI compares the website traffic of Tadawul's website with that of the Kuwait Stock
Exchange (KSE) via three criteria: page viewed, reach, and traffic rank trend. Although the number of
transactions, investors and traders are much larger than that of KSE, Figure 10.4.VI does show that
the awareness of Tadawul's investors and traders have sharply increased recently. Services offered by
Tadawul's website, such as My Portfolio, a training tool for share traders and investors prospects (see
Figure 10.4.VII), and Tadawul Magazine might be the reason for such a sharp increase as there are not
enough dissemination channels for market information beyond banks' branches.
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Figure 10.4.VI Website's traffic comparative charts between the stock exchanges of Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait (Alexa 2005: 1 June 2005)
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Figure 10.4.VII A screen shot for My Portfolio's trading tool at Tadawul website
The number of investors use Tadawul, indirectly via banks, exceeded two million by the end of 2004.
The floating of new companies in the share market has influenced such number during 2005. By the
end of January 2006, the number of investors linked to Tadawul has exceeded four million, an 81%
increase from 2004. Moreover, while male investors accounted for 87% of the total number of
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investors in the share market, female investors account for the remaining 13%. Figure 10.4.VIII shows
the increased number of investors as well as investment accounts during 2005.
Figure 10.4.VIII New investors and investment accounts during 2005 (Tadawul R&D Manager)
During 2005, the number of investors in the share market has almost doubled. One of the main drivers
behind such a sharp increase was the floating of new companies. During the previous two years, the








Sahara May 2004 500,593 71,525 6
Etihad October 2004 3,669,433 607,394 20
NCCI December 2004 796,866 22,176 7
AlBilad February 2005 7,669,833 1,031,235 30
Sadafco April 2005 1,031,108 12,253 1.76
Almarai July 2005 1,678,755 21,590 4.5
Yansab December 2005 8,499,103 360,826 39.38
Table 10.4.III IPOs at the Saudi share market during 2004-2005 (Tadawul R&D Manager)
Regarding banks (share brokers) Tadawul's is in the favourable position of virtually not having "target
constituents" since, at present, it is a monopoly service to share brokers. This means the banks have
little option but to be members of the Tadawul constituency if they wish to have access to services
that encourage investments in the share market. This does not mean that Tadawul takes for granted the
banks' custom. Thus, as Tadawul's MD made clear, "Tadawul has no competition, but still pushes to
improve the services to encourage investing in the share market."
Investors have to open investment accounts with Saudi banks in order to become members of the
Tadawul constituency. As at the end of January 2006, the total number of investment accounts has













Figure 10.4.IX Banks share of investment accounts as of January 2006 (Tadawul R&D)
In the future, the favourable position of the Tadawul constituency in the Saudi share market is
expected to change. Today, Tadawul has a single contract with CMA to perform the functions of the
Securities Depository Centre and the Stock Exchange. However, the contract to perform such
functions is temporary until the official launch of both the Securities Depository Centre and the Stock
Exchange. This may open up the share market to a competitive challenge as the CMA contract might
be performed by more than one IT company.
10.4.5 Alignment (3-3i) - Nature of target problem
By and large, the capacity of the Tadawul constituency has been well aligned with the nature of its
target problem. Thus, there were two main objectives behind the launch of Tadawul in late 2001. One
of objectives was to enhance services and capacity. Tadawul's MD describes the drivers behind
enhancing services and capacity:
"At the late 1990s, there was a plan to launch new ideas to the [share] market. Such
new ideas were not possible with the existing features of ESIS. Therefore, we had to
choose either to continue enhancing ESIS or to develop entirely a new system to
furnish the new ideas. We have chosen to develop a new system, Tadawul."
The Tadawul constituency-building process started with the vision of promoting "the development of
the capital market in Saudi Arabia," (Tadawul survey 2003). The aim was to establish a modern
market that can run independently and enhance the investment environment at the local share market.
Tadawul's MD describes the mechanism in achieving such vision:
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"The mechanism to achieve our vision was to develop an open system that allows
banks to compete. In the past, SAMA was providing everything to banks, such as
screens, workstations, reports ... etc. Now we moved to a more open system
architecture where we provide data fields to banks and banks develop their own
systems to interface with our systems. Banks then present data in different ways so
they can compete in the services they provide to their clients."
Well defined objectives have, from the beginning, characterised the Tadawul constituency's approach
to the target problem implied in its vision. According to Tadawul's MD, such objectives were:
1. To develop an interactive environment for local investors as well as international investors
2. To allow banks to compete in providing services based on the infrastructure of Tadawul.
3. To provide local investors with additional services comparable to international markets.
The development of the Tadawul system took a pioneering step with little existing precedent. The
technical experience gained during the development of ESIS in the 1990s was successfully used in the
development of Tadawul. The benefits envisaged and realised by the operation of the new system
have been large. From an intra-departmental point of view, Tadawul lowered the cost of operating and
maintaining the share market, as all technical, supervisory, and administrative affairs related to the
share market have been centralised at Tadawul.
From SAMA and CMA point of views, Tadawul furnishes the share market with a new infrastructure
that helps "the development of the capital market in Saudi Arabia," For instance, the provision of
market information beyond banks' branches would have not been possible without the new
infrastructure. Banks have also received many benefits from the operation of Tadawul. On one hand,
banks now have the ability to service their customers and provide improved products and services (see
Alignment 4-4i). On the other hand, banks have lowered their operational costs via automating many
share market activities. For example, SambaTadawul, the local share trading service provided from
Samba, reduced the cost of operating share-trading halls. Table 10.4.IV provides the time of the















Table 10.4.IV Millstones of banks' Tadawul channels
Available technical capabilities, human, and financial resources have been well matched to the
envisaged objectives. The initial cost consumed a large portion of the annual budget of SAR 35 m, the
initial development time extended to about 18 months since early 2000. Tadawul's initial team
grouped 40 people entrusted with introducing Tadawul. Later, the team grew to about 100 people. The
Tadawul constituency has also counted on a strong authority from SAMA and a strong support from
both SAMA and the banks. Although banks played a major role in the emergence of Tadawul, the
main driver was SAMA. Tadawul's MD acknowledges SAMA's role in driving Tadawul:
"One of the advantages that we have in Saudi Arabia is the close relationship
between SAMA and banks. SAMA plays a leadership role in developing banking
ICT infrastructures, such as Tadawul. Other regional countries have much lower
developed infrastructures than what we have. Therefore, a lot off credit goes to
SAMA. The willingness of Saudi banks in taking the lead in providing advanced
products and services to their clients also should not be ignored. I think we have to
be just proud of it."
However, the alignment between the capabilities of the Tadawul constituency and the technical
requirements for the timely delivery of the new system's performance has not been without
difficulties. First, the main difficulty was to meet the project's deadline. Two factors explain it. The
first factor was the selection of a rather tight deadline to force banks to have their technological
systems ready to absorb Tadawul (see Alignment 4-4i). The second factor was the relation with IT
vendors. For example, the main software supplier went bankrupt shortly after the launch of Tadawul.
This delayed the development process as many applications required regular maintenance and update
(see Alignment 2-2i). Later, Tadawul faced the challenge of launching a new version of the Tadawul's
website during the third quarter of 2004, as the market required Tadawul to add new services (e.g.,
Tadawul Streaming Quotes). Tadawul spend about eight months to develop an entirely new website.
Another difficulty was the substantial re-engineering of the existing activities. Organisationally,
restructuring the share market (e.g., the development of the Tadawul Department in 2001) as well as
modifying the technical logic of share trading transactions (e.g., the provision of e-certificates for
shares' ownership) required re-programming the share trading procedures. Such re-engineering also
required significant change in skills and re-training of employees (e.g., Tadawul certificate). The
positive aspect was that this was anticipated in the design and strategy of Tadawul.
The following case of the time and transparency feature before and after the introduction of Tadawul
highlights the complex challenge of re-engineering. According to Tadawul Magazine (2002), time and
transparency of financial information are major factors in the investment decision-marking process.
The role of presenting financial information about listed companies had been difficult with ESIS. Data
had been obtained via fax or newspapers. This required the Banking Technology Department (BTC)
to enter them into the ESIS in order to produce financial reports about the performance of the share
market. Tadawul eliminated this challenge through presenting live financial information on Tadawul's
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web site. Listed companies enter their financial data to Tadawul that presents such information to the
public.
The introduction of Tadawul enhanced the share trading and investment environment:
"Tadawul implied changes at the [share] market not only at the technical aspect, but
also at other aspects. The structure of the [share] market has been changed. New
trading rules and features have been introduced. A new management has been
introduced. The relationship with SAMA has changed," (Tadawul MD).
Undoubtedly, the Tadawul constituency will continue to face new challenges as it strives to fulfil its
broad target problem of developing the capital market in Saudi Arabia through enhanced services and
capacity. So far the Tadawul constituency has responded demonstrating it has good dynamic
capabilities. It will need them in the evolving environment of e-banking. Thus, Tadawul's MD
highlights how objectives change:
"When you achieve something you probably establish a new target or objective. For
example, the service of information dissemination has turned out to be a good
source of income for us. So we capitalise the investment as a source of income for
the Stock Exchange. Moreover, based on the concept of being the only provider of a
gateway to banks, we keep enriching that data fields with additional services that the
banks can use. Also based on the feedback that we get from banks, we have added
new services to support the requirements of investors that came out during the
period of development."
10.4.6 Alignment (4-4i) - Interacting technologies/constituencies
The Tadawul technological system is intrinsically an interacting technology. It has open system
architecture with an application program interface (API) facilitating interface to banks' internal
systems. Such architecture was one of the reasons behind the launch of Tadawul. Tadawul's MD
highlights the drivers behind the movement to open system design and the benefits envisaged from
such movement:
"One of the new services that were not available in the past is the real-time
settlement. Now trading orders are settled immediately when the matching occurred,
a feature which is called t+0. This adds more liquidity and efficiency to the market
as it gives investors more control over their portfolios. It also adds a lot of
information dissemination tools. Now we give access to Reuters and other
information providers to take the market information and disseminate it to their
users' base. Moreover, thorough our website we disseminate a lot of data.
Companies can access our systems through the website and published stock trading
related data, such as financial analyses and price sensitivity announcements. All
these are done through Tadawul systems."
A smooth relationship characterises the interaction between Tadawul technological system and other
technological systems at both intra- and inter-organisational levels. Intra-organisationally, the
migration from ESIS to Tadawul in October 2001 simply meant that Tadawul rapidly replaced ESIS.
The added technical features of Tadawul, such as the real time settlement of share transactions,
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enhanced the performance of settlement and clearance service of shares. For example, in 2003 the
Tadawul technological system achieved in 2003 more than 26 transactions per second.
Whilst the case at the intra-organisational level occurred rapidly, its situation at the inter-
organisational level was more mixed. Some banks, such as Saib, displaced their ESIS's settlement and
clearance systems (i.e. ESIS constituent) with entirely new Tadawul systems (i.e. Tadawul
constituent). Others, such as Samba, have chosen to blend their Tadawul's settlement and clearance
systems (i.e. Tadawul constituent) with ESIS's settlement and clearance systems (i.e. ESIS
constituent). The perfonnance in both cases was also mixed. One possible reason for such variation is
that the performance of a settlement and clearance system is based on other factors in addition to the
technological ones.
The relationship and interaction between the Tadawul technological system and other technological
systems caused some difficulties. A prime issue was to force banks to have their technological
systems ready to absorb Tadawul. While some banks took early steps commencing in 2001 to enhance
or replace their systems to cope with Tadawul (e.g., AlRajhi), others are still behind (e.g., Sabb).
The Tadawul technological system also has relationships with other existing or under-developed
systems. Each relationship has its own implications on Tadawul technological system. The first
example of the existing relationship is with SARIE. The most important objective from linking
Tadawul with SARIE is to perform the clearance function of the capital market (see Figure 10.4.V).
Such function is done through exchanging online messages between SARIE and Tadawul. Moreover,
the fact that Tadawul was developed to perform t+0 feature requires SARIE to make Tadawul's
messages the most important received messages. Another objective from the link between Tadawul
and SARIE is coupled with the Anti-Money Laundering Law that monitored cash flow to and from
the share market. Such a link has no implication on the performance of Tadawul's technological
system as the synchronisation of data occurs overnight (see Alignment 1-li) (Tadawul R&D
Manager).
A second example of Tadawul technological system's existing relationship concerns dissemination
systems such Reuters, PDA, and Mubasher services. "Companies can access our systems through the
website and published stock trading related data, such as financial analyses and price sensitivity
announcements," (Tadawul MD).
In addition to such existing relationships, Tadawul has important not-yet-well-developed relationships
with SARIE, from one hand, and securities trading, clearing and settlements systems at some regional
stock exchanges, from the other hand. The trading of REPOs is currently a closed security trading
market between SAMA and banks. Such trading is done through SARIE. CMA's announcement
during November 2005 about the plan for opening REPOs trading for all investors requires the
migration of such technical facility from SARIE to Tadawul. Until now, the migration process is faced
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with technical challenges, in particular real delivery vs. payment feature (DVP), that delay REPOs
public trading (Tadawul R&D Manager).
Another not-yet-well-developed relationship is with regional share markets. An initiative is being
developed aiming to link securities trading, clearing, and settlements systems of GCC counties (e.g.,
UAE, Oman) with each other. Such an initiative is one of the consequences of the efforts to unite
stock exchanges in GCC countries (SAMA 2002). The OMX's contract has been signed at the same
time as OMX signed a similar contract with Dubai Financial Market (DFM), in UAE, to provide a
new trading system in order to enhance the DFM's IT infrastructure. Such trend toward alliances with
OMX might be under the same umbrella of uniting GCC's stock exchanges.
From a technical viewpoint, Tadawul is not different from those systems operated in GCC counties as
similar applications are used in such systems. However, Tadawul, as a share clearance and settlement
system, has many advanced features compared to similar systems in other share markets.
"From a system point of view, Tadawul is not very different. Our main feature is the
real time settlement. The other thing is that our trading volume is much higher than
any other GCC stock exchange," (Tadawul MD).
Whatever the status of the relationship and interaction between Tadawul's technological system and
other technological systems, the migration from ESIS to Tadawul implied modifications in skills and
training. A massive training was provided not only to Tadawul's team of SAMA, but to members of
the Tadawul constituency at each bank as well. Tadawul's certificate and training courses at IOB are
examples of such training.
10.4.7 Summary
The process of Tadawul constituency-building shows a more mixed degree of alignment with
dimension 3, nature of target problem. It comes between the degrees of alignment with dimensions 1
and 2, on the one side, and that with dimension 4, on the other side. A significant alignment
characterises some aspects, such as the use of ESIS's technical experience into Tadawul's
development and the new open technical infrastructure. However, a weak alignment occurred in some
aspects, such as meeting the delivery deadline and the bankrupt of the main software supplier. The
challenge of the substantial re-engineering of existing activities (e.g., time and transparency feature) is
another example of weak alignment.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the emergence and evolution of the securities trading, clearing, and
settlements systems in Saudi Arabia. It provided a brief overview of the Saudi capital market and
some of the key events shaping its developments in almost 25 years of existence. It then looked at the
particular development of the Tadawul constituency through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995). The discussion showed that the performance of the Saudi capital market
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through the Tadawul constituency is healthy in both financial and technological terms. However, in a
changing world, it is worth stressing that the implementation of the Saudi capital market strategic
approaches requires high degrees of alignment with organisational and industrial corporate policies.
The choice of the Saudi capital market strategic approaches by organisations depends not only on the
capabilities of the organisations, but also on the opportunities the sector provides.
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Chapter 11: Discussion on value creation in Saudi e-
banking
11.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to compare and contrast the emergence and evolution of e-banking among
the seven case studies discussed earlier. It focuses on the main questions of this thesis: (1) how do
banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies? (2)
How have e-banking capabilities been built? (3) What role has e-banking played in shaping the
strategic direction of banks?
The discussion makes use of instruments associated to the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) namely, the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM) (Molina 2005) of e-banking constituency-building processes.
The combined use of the tools produces a detailed (quantitative) assessment of the current state of the
process of sociotechnical alignment for each of the e-banking constituencies ("alignment web")
(Molina 2003). In addition, in the case of three e-banking constituencies (i.e. AlAhli, Riyad, and
Tadawul) a deeper quantitative assessment of strategic priorities is conducted through the "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), although restricted only to the present situation (not
evolutionary). The latter is important because a broad understanding of strategy approaches reveals
the directions but not the many specific aspects that make up the broad strategy in each particular e-
banking constituency.
Thus, if we consider broad value-creation strategies, such as Porter's generic and positioning
strategies, it is clear that they can be pursued by combining in many alternative ways the many
detailed ingredients having an incidence in the generation of broad strategies. The unpacking of these
detailed ingredients and the specific combinations they show for the strategies of different
constituencies are what the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) is all about. Only in
this manner would it be possible to clarify, for instance, why two constituencies that may be classified
as following "cost leadership" or "differentiation" strategies (Porter 1985) in the same market may
have different results. In addition, once this unpacking is done, then one can make a sound judgement
and characterisation as to which of the "generic" (Porter 1985) and/or "positioning" strategies (Porter
1996) a constituency-building process is pursuing, has pursued, or is intending to pursue.
The discussion in this chapter also takes a comparative perspective, highlighting the differences and
similarities among the seven case studies.
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The chapter starts with the application of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) to analyse quantitatively
the current state of the process of sociotechnical alignment for each of the Saudi e-banking
constituencies. This assessment deepens the more qualitative assessment conducted in the previous
chapters with the cases studies. It is also complementary since the content of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995) table was developed by the author75 as a summary interpretation of the
constituency-building story, while the markings of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) are given by
key players in each of the e-banking constituency-building processes.
This is then supplemented by the application of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina
2005) in the case studies of three e-banking constituencies (i.e. AlAhli, Riyad, and Tadawul),
illustrating a much more detailed characterisation of the broad value-creation strategies.
11.2 Alignment web of e-banking's constituency-building
process
The previous chapters on the case studies have looked in detail at the evolution of the various
processes of e-banking sociotechnical alignment in most of the Saudi banks. The aim of this section is
to assess the current degree of sociotechnical alignment in a more quantitative fashion by using
"alignment web" (Molina 2003) at each case study (i.e. Samba, AlRajhi, Saib, Hollandi, AlAhli,
Riyad and Tadawul). This is followed by placing the evaluations of the seven case studies onto a
single "alignment web" (Molina 2003). I start with the case study of Samba.
11.2.1 Samba Financial Group (Samba)
The current state of alignment in the Samba e-banking constituency-building process shows a great
deal of strength. Figure 11.2.1 positions the current state of the process of sociotechnical alignment at
Samba within the "alignment web" (Molina 2003).
75 The development of the table relied heavily on Molina (2003).
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Main dimension Sub-dimension Mark
Alignment (1-1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 3
-Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 4
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork 3
• Developers' collaboration and teams 2
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 3
• Customers' participation in development 5
Average 3.33
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 2
Target • Target customers 3
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and » Technical personnel 2
pursuits e Administrative personnel 3
• Executive management 2
Average 2.17
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2
Nature of target • Very important to bank 2
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 3
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 3
• Well inside space and time resources available 1
• Well inside financial/material resources available 2
Average 2.17
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 2
Interacting » Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 3
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 3
tituencies . High presence of useful complementary technologies 2
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 3
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 1
Average 2.33
Figure 11.2.1 Samba's "alignment web" as of today (Source: Samba's e-Banking Analyst)
Figure 11.2.1 shows that the alignment with "target constituents" received the highest mark (i.e. 2.17).
The most difficult "target constituents" are in fact "target customers" and "administrative personnel"
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while the "CEO" is given the top mark of 1, reflecting the fact that he is firmly supportive of the
constituency (i.e. a "constituent" rather than a "target constituent"). For "target customers" in
particular, the marking is interesting. Although the current penetration rates of most e-banking
products and services are encouraging, Samba is looking forward to enhancing such rates to reach a
stronger degree of alignment (i.e. mark 1) rather than the present lower degree of 3. Good examples of
this effort are SambaOnline, SambaDirect, SambaTadawul and SambaPhone which achieved 1700%,
300%, 122% and 41% increase on average number of transactions per day, respectively. All others
"target constituents" are in-between with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2).
The alignment dimension "nature of the target problem" received an average marking similar to that
of "target constituents" (i.e. mark 2.17). Figure 11.2.1 reveals that the weakest areas are "highly
motivating to leaders/innovators" and "very important to banks' developers and customers". The
behaviour of the Samba constituency following the end of the technical management agreement with
Citibank is an example. The scope of the behaviour included a wide range of technical dependencies
that had been built over the last two decades, such as Citibank's proprietary tools, processes and
communication networks segregation. Such technical dependencies created technical challenges that
negatively influenced the degree of alignment (i.e. insignificant) with the areas of "highly motivating
to leaders/innovators" and "very important to banks' developers and customers". In turn, Figure 11.2.1
also reveals that the strongest area is "well inside space and time resources available", with a strong
degree of alignment (i.e. mark 1). An example of the availability of space is the allocation of modern
premises for the Technology Group outside Samba's Head-Office while an example of the availability
of time is the launch of SambaOnline six month earlier than the schedule.
In turn, the assessment of key factors in the dimension of "interacting technologies" also reveals that
"easy with displacement of obsolete practices", "high presence of required complementary
technologies" and "low opposition from competing ICT-based system" are processes that still require
effort at Samba. The technical accumulation of different technologies brought from Citibank helped to
enhance the degree of alignment. The migration from DEFINE to the open back-office system to
enhance the systematic interaction also enhanced the degree of alignment. However, the marking of
"effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies" is different. For example, the
informative content at SambaOnline and the payment mechanism of SambaConnect show that such
area of "interacting technologies" plays a very effective role.
Finally, Figure 11.2.1 reveals that the alignment with Samba' organisational "governance" received
the lowest average mark of 3 (i.e. insignificant alignment). Within the "governance" dimension, the
strongest area is "developers' collaboration and teams", with a significant degree of alignment (i.e.
mark 2). Examples that support this achievement include the alignment with standards imposed by
CTG on e-banking development, the participation in IT decision-making processes through e-Board,
the high acceptance rate of many departmental systems, such as e-Procurement & Travel and
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Expenses. In turn, the weakest within the "governance" dimension is "customers' participation in
development", with a strong degree of mis-alignment (i.e. mark 5). This degree of alignment as well
as that of the "target customers" of Dimension 2 (i.e. mark 3) raise a concern about the role of
customers during the e-banking development process.
In summary, the current state of alignment in the Samba e-banking constituency-building process
shows a great deal of strength. The weakest areas were identified inside "governance". The
constituency has work to do on these weak areas in order to improve its future development.
11.2.2 AIRajhi Bank (AIRajhi)
Unlike that of Samba, the evolution of the process of sociotechnical alignment at AIRajhi has
followed a fluctuation pattern. Figure 11.2.II positions the state of the process of sociotechnical
alignment at AIRajhi within the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) as of today, at the end of the present
phase (i.e. 2001-2006).
Alignment (1-1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 3
- Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 2
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork 4
• Developers' collaboration and teams 2
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 3
• Customers' participation in development 5
Average 3.17
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 1
Target • Target customers 3
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and • Technical personnel 2
pursuits . Administrative personnel 2
Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Main dimension
Nature & maturity oftechnology
Sub-dimension Mark
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• Executive management 1
Average 1.67
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2
Nature of target • Very important to bank 2
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 3
• Well inside space and time resources available 3
• Well inside financial/material resources available 3
Average 2.50
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 4
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 2
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 4
tituencies . High presence of useful complementary technologies 3
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 3
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 5
Average 3.50
Figure 11.2.II AlRajhi's "alignment web" as of today (Source: AlRajhi's e-Banking Manager)
Dimension (2) "target constituents" shows the highest average degree of alignment (i.e. mark 1.67) of
the AlRajhi constituency-building process, with a fundamental influence brought by the areas of
"target developers", "CEO" and "executive management". All of these three areas received a strong
degree of alignment (i.e. mark 1). An example for "target developers" is the acquisition of AlAhli's e-
Banking Analyst to launch bill payment gateway, in particular, and EBDDA-2, in general (see
Dimension 3 below).
These are followed by the areas of "technical personnel" and "administrative personnel", with both
achieving a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2). An example is the interaction between
operational staff at the branches and technical staff at the Head-Office prior to the launch of EBDDA-
2. Prior to the launch ofEBDDA-2, there was a concern raised by the branch staff that the deployment
of new e-banking products and services might threaten their jobs. However, the technical staff at the
Head-Office started open talks with branch staff with the aim of clarifying such misunderstanding
about the implications of e-banking.
The most problematic area at the "target constituents" is "target customers", with an insignificant
degree of alignment (i.e. mark 3). An example that supports "target customers" receiving an
insignificant degree of alignment is the low acceptance rate of AlMubasher. Almost 2 years after the
first launch, only 2% of retail customers are using AlMubasher.
Figure 11.2.II also assesses the constituency's alignment with "nature of target problem" and reveals
that the categories: "very important to banks' developers and customers", "well inside space and time
resources available" and "well inside financial/material resources available" require attention at
AlRajhi, with all achieving an insignificant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 3).
In turn, the remaining three areas of Dimension 3 (i.e. "nature of target problem"): "well inside
expertise/capabilities of constituency", "very important to bank" and "highly motivating to
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leaders/innovators" received a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2). The acquisition of
AlAhli's personnel is an example of a significant alignment with the area of "well inside
expertise/capabilities of constituency". Such acquisition provided AlRajhi's constituency with the
required expertise to launch the bill payment gateway.
Figure 11.2.II also assesses the constituency's alignment with "organisational governance" and
reveals that, in common with Samba, the weakest area is "customers' participation in development".
The AlRajhi constituency assumes that the investment decisions of local customers are based on
recommendations received from their trusted colleagues or friends rather than scientific reading and
analysis of market trends. Such an assumption encouraged the constituency to focus on the issue of
customer retention more than attracting new customers. Results for the acceptance rates were modest
(e.g., Tadawul and AlMubasher eCorp were 10-15%).
In turn, the areas of "rewards for ICT-based innovators" and "developers' collaboration and teams"
are the strongest areas. An example of the former area is the monthly meeting of top management with
the e-banking initiative's host department to review the progress and take decisions on emerging
issues. Such regular meetings constitute an emotional reward mechanism symbolised in a culture of
developers' participation in decision-making. An example of the latter area is the formation of the
managing team for each e-banking product and service.
Finally, Figure 11.2.II clearly reveals that the most problematic dimension is Dimension 4 of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "interacting technologies/constituencies"), with an
alignment mark of 3.50 (i.e. weak-insignificant). Inside, the most difficult area is "effective
mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies". An example that negatively influenced the
degree of alignment with the area of "effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies"
is the case of deploying Oracle's CRM application during 2004. AlRajhi aimed during 2004 to
improve the customer service function through the deployment of Oracle's CRM application.
However, the entire features of Oracle CRM work more efficiently if it operates within Oracle e-
Business Suite (Oracle 2006). Accordingly, AlRajhi deployed Oracle e-Business Suite although there
was no crucial need for the other applications within the suite, increasing the operational cost of the
customer service function.
The areas of "easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system" and "high presence
of required complementary technologies" are also problematic at AlRajhi, with an insignificant degree
of alignment (i.e. mark 3). An example is the relationship with Farabi. The virtual link between the
mainframe and AlMubasher's host server required the use of Farabi's HostFront and HostFront
Publishing to synchronise data. The precise difficulty here was the use of complementary technologies
(i.e. Farabi products) to make the virtual channel (i.e. Mainframe-AlMubasher's host server)
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operational. This not only expanded the path of data synchronisation, but also increased the
transaction processing time.
In turn, the strongest area inside "interacting technologies/constituencies" is "easy with displacement
of obsolete practices". Two examples support such an area receiving a significant degree of alignment.
The first example is the interaction between AlRajhi and STC constituencies via the bill payment
gateway. The second example is the interaction between the components of EBDA-2 and the legacy
systems.
The present state of alignment of the AlRajhi e-banking constituency-building process shows its
strongest marking with regard to the dimension "target constituents", and the highest and lowest
average markings are more marked than those of Samba, implying that in AlRajhi the areas of higher
alignment weakness are stronger than for Samba, while the areas of higher alignment strength are also
stronger than for Samba.
11.2.3 Saudi Investment Bank (Saib)
The evolution of the process of sociotechnical alignment at Saib as a small bank in terms of financial
indicators provides additional insights to that provided by Samba and AlRajhi as large banks. The
origins of Saib e-banking constituency developed gradually, in a close interplay between intra- and
inter-organisational relations. For instance, a great deal of ICTs expertise came from outside. Figure
11.2.Ill places the current overall state of alignment of Saib's e-banking constituency-building process
within the "alignment web" (Molina 2003).




Alignment (1 -1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 2
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- Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 4
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork 3
• Developers' collaboration and teams 3
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 3
• Customers' participation in development 5
Average 3.33
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 3
Target • Target customers 4
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and a Technical personnel 2
pursuits , Administrative personnel 2
• Executive management ]
Average 2.17
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2
Nature of target • Very important to bank 4
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 2
• Well inside space and time resources available 2
• Well inside financial/material resources available 3
Average 2.50
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 2
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 2
technologies/cons . High presence of required complementary technologies 3
tituencies a High presence of useful complementary technologies 2
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 2
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 3
Average 2.33
Figure 11.2.III Saib's "alignment web" as of today (Source: Saib's E-Commerce Head)
Figure 11.2.Ill reveals that the best average state of alignment occurred with Dimension 2 of the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "target constituents"). Within this dimension, the most
difficult "target constituent" is in fact "target customers". The penetration rate of Saib's e-banking
products and services is still lower than the expectations of BIT's objectives of maintaining the
customer base or offering a cross-selling channel for Amex, Orix, or both. The area of "target
customers" is followed by the area of "target developers". An example is the four-month delay caused
to Saib by InfoSys during the development of Equation. In turn, the strongest "target constituents" are
"CEO" and "executive management". The flat organisational relationship between the IT Group and
CEO helped to achieve such a strong degree of alignment.
The assessment of the constituency's alignment with "interacting technologies" reveals that "high
presence of required complementary technologies" and "effective mechanisms for socialising new
mix of technologies" are processes that require attention at Saib. An example is the unsuccessful
negotiation with STC to provide a 2 G-bit bandwidth line to fulfil the technical need of some e-
banking product and services. In turn, the significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2) for the
remaining four areas shows that they play very effective roles. Thus, alignment with "easy technical
integration between new and existing legacy system" received a significant degree of alignment due to
some practices, such as the smooth integration of TI with Equation. Alignment with both "easy with
293
displacement of obsolete practices" and "low opposition from competing ICT-based system" showed
similar good practice. Equation, for instance, helped Saib to launch its Internet banking service, which
was not technically possible with the capabilities ofMYDES.
Figure 11.2.Ill also assesses the constituency's alignment with the "nature of the target problem" and
reveals that the weakest area is in fact "very important to bank", with a weak degree of alignment (i.e.
mark 4). A possible reason for such a modest progress at this area might be the evolution of Saib e-
banking's objectives in response to the change in Saib corporate policy, which aims to extend Saib's
focus to include retail banking in addition to corporate and investment banking. This can be clearly
seen from the net income by business segments (i.e. investment & treasury, corporate and retail)
during 2003-05. The net income from retail banking has increased from 47% in 2003 to 66% in 2005.
However, such increase has coincided with a rather slow launch of e-banking products and services.
For example, e-bill payments via ATM, Saib Internet, Saib SADAD and AswaqNet were launched in
August 2003, April 2004, December 2004 and December 2005, respectively. Such conflict in trends
between the net income from retail banking and the launch of retail e-banking supports the weak
degree of alignment with the area of "very important to bank".
The degree of alignment with the area of "well inside financial/material resources available" is
slightly better than that with "very important to bank", with an insignificant degree (i.e. mark 3). The
20% increase in the development cost and the four-month delay in delivery of the Internet banking
service presented difficulties to this area of Dimension 3. The degree of alignment with the remaining
four areas shows that they play very effective roles, with all achieving a significant degree of
alignment (i.e. mark 2).
Finally, Dimension (1) "governance" shows the lowest average degree of alignment (i.e. mark 3.33) of
the constituency-building. The weakest area is "customers' participation in development", with a
strong degree of mis-alignment (i.e. mark 5). In turn, the strongest area within Dimension (1) (i.e.
"governance") is "flat decision-making structure", with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2).
The degrees of alignment with the remaining four areas are in-between. The areas of "encouragement
to new ways of work", "developers' collaboration and teams" and "assessment appropriate to new
banking methods" received an insignificant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 3) while the area of
"rewards for ICT-based innovators" received a weak degree of alignment (i.e. mark 4).
11.2.4 Saudi Hollandi Bank (Hollandi)
Hollandi is another small bank in terms of financial indicators. Figure 11.2.IV positions the overall
state of the process of sociotechnical alignment at Hollandi within the "alignment web" (Molina
2003). The assessment of the e-banking constituency-building process suggests that Hollandi has a
great deal to do to achieve a strong alignment across all the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995).
294
Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Nattire &maturity oftechnology
Main dimension Sub-dimension Mark
Alignment (1-1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 4
-Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 3
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork 2
• Developers' collaboration and teams 2
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 1
• Customers' participation in development 3
Average 2.50
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 2
Target • Target customers 4
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and . Technical personnel 2
pursuits « Administrative personnel 3
• Executive management 2
Average 2.33
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 4
Nature of target • Very important to bank 2
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 3
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 3
• Well inside space and time resources available 3
• Well inside financial/material resources available 4
Average 3.17
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 1
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 2
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 3
tituencies . High presence of useful complementary technologies 3
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 3
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 4
Average 2.67
Figure 11.2.IV Hollandi's "alignment web" as of today (Source: Hollandi's E-Banking Head)
Figure 11.2.IV shows that the best average alignment is credited to Dimension 2 of the "diamond of
alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "target constituent"). And similarly to the previous cases, the most
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difficult "target constituent" is in fact "target customers". Indeed, the modest evolution in "target
customers" is related to the ambiguity regarding the customer segment (i.e. retail, corporate, or both)
the constituency is trying to target.
Being mainly a corporate bank, Hollandi finds it easier to provide corporate e-banking products and
services, such as Hollandi Online (corporate version), rather than retail e-banking. Although the
constituency established the ATM Business Unit and repositioned many POS terminals, it has
implemented inappropriate promotional strategies and activities. Such strategies and activities are
more appropriate to corporate banking customers than retail ones (e.g., mail campaigns).
Another problematic "target constituent" is the "administrative personnel". For example, the
important opposition on available resources from TSD and the debate with TSD on approving e-
banking initiatives negatively influenced the evolution of the Dimension 2. Next come "target
developers", "technical personnel" and "executive management" with a significant degree of
alignment (i.e. mark 2). Finally, the best "target constituent" is "CEO" who is firmly behind the e-
banking constituency.
Regarding alignment with "governance" (i.e. Dimension 1), the weakest area is "flat decision-making
structure". The e-banking initiative, for instance, has to approach a fragmented chain of authority
consisting of the e-Channel Committee, TSC and BSC for approval and support. If the initiative is an
Islamic e-banking product or service, then the approval of the Shark'h Committee is also a requisite.
In turn, the strongest area is "assessment appropriate to new banking methods". The entire chain is
pervaded by ABN AMRO's culture. On the one hand, such flow helped the executive entities at
Hollandi to absorb ABN AMRO's vision and perception. On the other hand, however, the flow of
ABN AMRO's culture met with a cultural difference when it moved to the lower entities (e.g., e-
banking). A good example of a cultural difference among e-banking entities is the heated debate that
took place during the formation of the e-Banking Department between TSD and the Corporate
Banking Group. Such difference of opinion not only influenced the absorption between the vision and
perception of the role of e-banking, but also affected communication among the e-banking entities.
However, while e-banking has developed, the cultural difference between e-banking entities has been
eliminated. This progress supports the strong assessment for the area of "assessment appropriate to
new banking methods".
The remaining areas of Dimension 1 either have been marked 2 (i.e. "encouragement to new ways of
work" and "developers' collaboration and teams") or 3 (i.e. "rewards for ICT-based innovators" and
"customers' participation in development"). This reveals an environment where stimulus for
innovation as well as the inputs from customers, can be improved, especially in the light of the low
marks given to alignment with target customers. In addition, the constituency has faced some
difficulties at the inter-organisational level of "governance". Thus, it launched smart cards to replace
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the traditional magnetic stripe cards and improve information security. However, these efforts have
had a modest reach as the constituency did not participate in the development of the national legal e-
banking framework or the B2B standards. This suggests the need to modify the formal mechanism for
e-banking decisions as well as increasing the inter-organisational participation of various Saudi e-
banking constituencies.
The assessment of the alignment with "interacting technologies" reveals that "effective mechanisms
for socialising new mix of technologies" is the process that requires most attention at Hollandi. An
example is the development of both versions of Hollandi Online (i.e. retail and corporate). The e-
banking technological system was blended with the legacy systems previously in place. From a
technical point of view, the blending was carried out well so that it enhanced the e-readiness of the e-
banking technological system. From a social point of view, however, the blending was much more
mixed. Such difference of view negatively influenced the initial launch of the Hollandi Online
versions. Not only a two-year delay in launching Hollandi Online (retail version), but also a two-year
off-line service in the provision ofHollandi Online (corporate version).
An insignificant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 3) is then given to "high presence of required
complementary technologies", "high presence of useful complementary technologies" and "low
opposition from competing ICT-based system". The markings, however, of "easy technical integration
between new and existing legacy system" and "easy with displacement of obsolete practices" show
that these factors play very effective roles. The positive results of the technical upgrades to Hollandi's
e-banking system commenced in 2003 bear witness to this. Such efforts have included the entire
upgrade of the technological system to enhance the e-banking operational efficiency and the gradual
accumulation ofmany ICT applications. These efforts have also extended to the branches, ATMs and
share-trading lounges
Finally, Figure 11.2.IV shows that the constituency's alignment with the "nature of the target
problem" received the lowest average mark of 3.17, with the weakest category being "well inside
expertise/capabilities of constituency" and "well inside financial/material resources available" and the
strongest being "very important to bank". The remaining areas are in-between, with a mark of 3.
Particularly limiting here was the uncertainty that surrounded the vision and objectives of the Internet
banking service during the early 2000s and that limited the allocation of resources (e.g., SAB. 5 m as
development budget) and requirements (e.g., 5 people).
In summary, the assessment of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) has revealed that Hollandi's e-
banking constituency-building process has suffered from problems of resources, organisation and
marketing. These problems will have to be addressed if Hollandi is going to pursue and achieve a
stronger competitive position in the Saudi e-banking market. Such efforts should start by taking care
primarily of the local market culture (i.e. Saudi culture).
297
11.2.5 National Commercial Bank (AlAhli)
Having assessed the state of alignment of e-banking constituency-building processes at Samba,
AlRajhi, Saib and Hollandi, the discussion now looks at the state of alignment at AlAhli. Figure
11.2.V positions the current state of alignment at AlAhli e-banking constituency-building process
within the "alignment web" (Molina 2003). The average results of AlAhli's assessment are the highest
so far, with the marks of three dimensions under or equal to 2.
Constituents' perceptions, goals, actions & resources
// .i,
Nature & maturity oftechnology
Main dimension Sub-dimension Mark
Alignment (1-1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 2
- Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 1
governance • Encouragement to new ways of work 1
• Developers' collaboration and teams 2
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 2
• Customers' participation in development 3
Average 1.83
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 2
Target • Target customers 3
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and • Technical personnel 2
pursuits . Administrative personnel 2
• Executive management 1
Average 1.83
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2
Nature of target • Very important to bank 1
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 2
• Well inside space and time resources available 3
• Well inside financial/material resources available 2
Average 2.00
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 2




• High presence of required complementary technologies
• High presence of useful complementary technologies
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system






Figure 11.2.V AlAhli's "alignment web" as of today (Source: AlAhli's e-Banking Head)
For instance, Figure 11.2.V shows that alignments with both "organisational governance" and "target
constituents" are the best states of alignment, with an equal high mark of 1.83 (strong-significant).
The strongest categories are "rewards for ICT-based innovators" and "encouragement to new ways of
work" at the "governance" dimension, and "CEO" and "executive management" at the "target
constituents" dimension.
Interestingly, like the other banks, the areas related to customers at both Dimension 1 and Dimension
2 (i.e. "customers' participation in development" and "target customers") are perceived as the weakest
alignments (i.e. mark 3). The fact that only 10-15% of retail customers bank online shows that more
efforts are required in order to increase revenue and market share. At the same time, AlAhli e-banking
constituency lost the contract of STC on telephone bills but won that of utilities companies on
electricity and water bills. Although AlAhli has implemented different promotional strategies and
activities, such strategies and activities might have to be reassessed in order to better meet the
demands and interests of target customers. This means that there are still a lot of "target constituents"
that need to be aligned to become customers or members ofAlAhli e-banking constituency.
In turn, the areas of "assessment appropriate to new banking methods" and "target developers" in
Dimensions 1 and 2, respectively, also received a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2). For the
area of "target developers", in particular, the initial assessment suggested that it should receive a
strong degree of alignment (i.e. mark 1) as AlAhli e-banking constituency managed to acquire many
SAMA technical staff (e.g., VP of Technology & Operations and Information Security Consultant).
However, due to the fact that AlAhli e-banking constituency lost the STC contract as a consequence to
the acquisition of its former e-Banking Analyst against AlRajhi e-banking constituency, the degree of
alignment with "target developers" has been downgraded to a significant degree of alignment (i.e.
mark 2).
The assessment of the alignment with the dimension "nature of target problem" reveals that "very
important to bank" is the strongest area (mark 1) while "well inside space and time resources
available" is the weakest area (mark 3). The remaining four areas are perceived as playing a positive
part, with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2). For instance, the fact that the available
financial and human resources have evolved during the development and implementation of e-banking
has played a positive part in the capacity of the constituency to deliver.
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Finally, Dimension (4) "interacting technologies/constituencies" shows the most challenging area,
with the lowest average mark of 2.17. Inside this dimension, the weakest areas (mark 3) are "high
presence of useful complementary technologies" and "effective mechanisms for socialising new mix
of technologies", while the strongest area is "high presence of required complementary technologies".
The area of "easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system" is given a significant
degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2), although this is at a cost given that, at AlAhli, the e-banking
technological system is sacrificing performance by blending with legacy systems, while it is
establishing a well-coordinated relationship with other new systems in the process of development and
implementation.
Riyad is the last Saudi bank to be assessed through the "alignment web" (Molina 2003). Figure
11.2.VI positions the current overall state of alignment at Riyad e-banking constituency-building
process within the "alignment web" (Molina 2003).
11.2.6 Riyad Bank (Riyad)
Constituents'perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Main dimension





• Flat decision-making structure
• Rewards for ICT -based innovators
• Encouragement to new ways ofwork
• Developers' collaboration and teams
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods

















• Administrative personnel 3
• Executive management 1
Average 2.33
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2
Nature of target • Very important to bank 1
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 2
• Well inside space and time resources available 2
• Well inside financial/material resources available 3
Average 2.00
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 3
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 3
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 2
tituencies • High presence of useful complementary technologies 4
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 2
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 3
Average 2.83
Figure 11.2.VI Riyad's "alignment web" as of today (Source: Riyad's Remote Delivery
Channels Manager)
Figure 11.2.VI shows that alignment with Dimension 3 (i.e. "nature of target problem") is the
strongest with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2). Inside, "very important to bank" is the
strongest area with the top mark of 1. Nevertheless, until 2004, the mission of being the leading Saudi
bank was still far from having been reached. Getting close to fulfilling this overall "target problem"
will require innovativeness and determination as e-banking implies a cultural change in relation to
Riyad's traditional products and services. However, the recent development in corporate strategy (i.e.
the "national champion") has reinforced the degree of alignment with Dimension 3. Now, the quality
of e-banking products and services is monitored and improved by the emerging unit, e-Channels
Quality Unit. In turn, alignment with "well inside financial/material resources available" is felt to be
the most problematic in this dimension with a mark of 3. The remaining four areas have been marked
equally with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. mark 2).
Regarding the e-banking constituency's alignment with "target constituents", the best state of
alignment occurred with the categories of "CEO" and "executive management", confirming strong
support from top Riyad authorities. Alignment with "target customers" is again the most problematic
with a mark of 4. For instance, the percentage of Riyad's active e-cards is much lower than the
sector's average. Moreover, Riyad's ATMs provide average services, as the ratio of withdrawal
transactions to total transactions is almost the same as that of the sector. The remaining three areas of
Dimension 2 have been marked in-between although the category of "target developers" is in better
shape than the other two.
The conservative approach followed by the e-banking launch strategy has influenced the market
penetration rate of Riyad's e-banking products/services as a relatively small number of customers
have been enrolled behind the constituency. The launch of RiyadPhone in 2001 and Riyad Tadawul in
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2005 are revealing examples. Although Riyad started to tackle the penetration rate via some
promotional strategies (e.g., a laptop for e-customers), more effective efforts are required.
Next the assessment of Dimension 1 "organisational governance" reveals, like in other banks, that
"customers' participation in development" is the weakest category with a mark of 4, while the
marking of "developers' collaboration and teams" is seen in a very positive light with a top mark of 1.
The remaining four factors are in-between (marking of 2 or 3) with a higher degree of alignment in
"flat decision-making structure" and "rewards for ICT-based innovators", whereas "encouragement to
new ways ofwork" and "assessment appropriate to new banking methods" are given a mark of 3.
The latter may be a reflection of the fact that, at Riyad, although the IT decision-making process is
fundamentally based on strategic criteria (e.g., risk management, business strategy), this has yet to be
reflected in a governance that stimulates, for instance, e-risk taking. However, the development of
"the national champion" is having a positive alignment effect with "governance". Now, many groups
and divisions have a clearer path to progress as the strategy highlights the new roles of all groups and
departments. Inter-organisationally, Riyad has made modest efforts to establish collaborations with
other Saudi banks to create a flexible regulatory framework for e-banking, suggesting a degree of
misalignment with the needs of the e-banking constituency.
Finally, Dimension (4) "interacting technologies/constituencies" shows the most challenging area,
with an average alignment marking of 2.83. Within Dimension (4), the weakest area is "high presence
of useful complementary technologies" while the strongest areas are "high presence of required
complementary technologies" and "low opposition from competing ICT-based system". The markings
for the remaining three areas are in-between. The lowest average marking given to dimension 4 is
largely a reflection of the low performance of the e-banking technological system. Moreover, the
limited impact of e-banking products and services in relation to traditional ones and the substantial re-
engineering of existing activities to offer new services (e.g., Riyad Tadawul) also indicate a higher
degree of difficulty associated with Dimension 4.
11.2.7 The Saudi Capital Market (Tadawul)
Expanding the discussion toward Tadawul and the implications Tadawul has on the socio technical
constituency-building process at Saudi banks provides an external view of the emergence and
evolution of e-banking at Saudi Arabia. Such a view provides more insights as the Tadawul
constituency involves important constituents spread across all Saudi banks.
Figure 11.2.VII presents an evaluation of the current state of the sociotechnical constituency-building
process at Tadawul. Clearly, Dimension 3 (i.e. "nature of target problem") exhibits the best state of
alignment with an average mark of 1.67, while the most challenging alignment occurs at Dimension 4
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of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "interacting technologies/constituencies"), with an
average mark of 2.17.
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Constituents:' perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Nature & maturityoftechnology
Main dimension Sub-dimension Mark
Alignment (1-1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 2
- Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 2
governance • Encouragement to new ways ofwork 2
• Developers' collaboration and teams 1
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 1
• Customers' participation in development 3
Average 1.83
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 1
Target • Target customers 3
constituents' • CEO 1
perceptions and a Technical personnel 2
pursuits , Administrative personnel 3
• Executive management 2
Average 2.00
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 1
Nature of target • Very important to the capital market 1
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2
• Very important to the capital market' developers and customers 2
• Well inside space and time resources available 2
• Well inside financial/material resources available 2
Average 1.67
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 3
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 2
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 3
tituencies . High presence of useful complementary technologies 2
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 2
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 1
Average 2.17
Figure 11.2.VII Tadawul's "alignment web" as of today (Source: Tadawul's R&D Manager)
For instance, Dimension 4 "interacting technologies/constituencies" shows the most challenging area,
with a degree of below significant alignment (i.e. mark 2.17). Within Dimension 4, the weakest
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categories are "easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system" and "high
presence of required complementary technologies". This reflects the substantial technical challenge
associated with both forcing banks to have their technological systems ready to absorb Tadawul and
the fluctuation in launching the Tadawul's service via banks. The initiatives of migrating REPOs
trading from SARIE to Tadawul and linking Tadawul with regional stock exchanges are still facing
technical challenges. Such challenges bear witness to a difficult process of alignment with other
technologies and constituencies.
In turn, the strongest area at Dimension 4 is "effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of
technologies". The smooth relationship between Tadawul, on the one side, and Reuters, PDA and
Mubasher services, on the other sides, to disseminate market information is an example of a strong
alignment. Another good example of a strong alignment is the relationship between Tadawul and
SARIE to perform the online functions of shares trades clearance (i.e. "t+0" feature) and cash-flow
monitor (e.g., anti-money laundering). Such examples bear witness that the category of "effective
mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies" is playing a healthy role.
As noted, the alignment with "nature of target problem" is the strongest with an average mark of 1.67.
Inside this dimension the strongest categories are "well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency"
and "very important to bank", with top marks of 1 while the remaining four categories have been
marked 2. This reflects some aspects, such as the use of ESIS's technical experience in Tadawul's
development, the new open technical infrastructure and OMX contract. However, in spite of the high
marking, it musty be noted that a weak alignment occurred in some aspects, such as meeting the
delivery deadline and the bankruptcy of the main software supplier. The challenge of the substantial
re-engineering of existing activities (e.g., time and transparency feature) is another example of a
problematic area.
Figure 11.2.VII also shows that the constituency's alignment with Dimension 1 "organisational
governance" is given an average marking of 1.83, with the categories of "developers' collaboration
and teams" and "assessment appropriate to new banking methods" as the strongest with top marks of
1, while "customers' participation in development" takes a relative low mark of 3. The remaining
three areas have been equally marked 2.
This perception of strong degree of alignment is supported, for instance, by the grouping of all SAMA
share market's departments into Tadawul Department and the direct contact with banks. loining WFE
in 2002 is an external example of strong degree of alignment. Even after the establishment ofCMA in
2003, the alignment kept a strong degree. An example is the modified organisational relationships
among the capital market entities and the privatisation of the capital market. Rules and regulations
issued to restructure the investment regulatory, such as Market Conduct Regulations, are also
examples of a strong degree of alignment at the inter-organisational level.
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Regarding alignment with dimension "target constituents", Figure 11.2.VII shows an average mark of
2. On the one hand, the alignment with the areas of "developers" and "CEO" is the strongest. The
recent contract with OMX contract supports this marking. On the other hand, the areas of "customers"
and "administrative personnel" are the most problematic. Although there has been a sharp increase in
investors and investment accounts during the last two years, the current acceptance rate is still under
the target figures. Even though Tadawul has offered Tadawul Magazine, new services (e. g.,
Mubasher, PDA), Tadawul Certificate, such services need more effort at Tadawul. The markings for
the remaining two categories, "technical personnel" and "executive management", are in-between.
Overall, the Tadawul constituency-building process is successfully creating value at the Saudi Capital
Market. Its progress is healthy and well aligned with the sector, market and corporate policy of the
Saudi investment environment. Nevertheless, the results from the "alignment web" (Molina 2003)
assessment identify areas to pay attention to, particularly in those areas marked 3.
11.2.8 Comparative discussion for all case studies
The evaluation of the current state of the sociotechnical constituency-building process at the seven
case studies highlights the areas of strengths and weaknesses. It is time now to look at the general
image of the sociotechnical constituency-building process at Saudi e-banking. Figure 11.2.VIII places
the evaluations of the seven case studies onto a single "alignment web" (Molina 2003).
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Constituents'perceptions, goals, actions & resources
Main dimension Sub-dimension Average
Mark
Alignment (1 -1 i) • Flat decision-making structure 2.57
- Organisational • Rewards for ICT-based innovators 2.57
governance • Encouragement to new didactics 2.57
• Developers' collaboration and teams 1.86
• Assessment appropriate to new banking methods 2.29
• Customers' participation in development 4.00
Overall average 2.64
Alignment (2-2i) - • Target developers 1.86
Target Target customers 3.43
constituents' • CEO 1.00
perceptions and Technical personnel 2.14
pursuits • Administrative personnel 2.57
• Executive management 1.43
Overall average 2.07
Alignment (3-3i) - • Well inside expertise/capabilities of constituency 2.14
Nature of target • Very important to bank 1.86
problem • Highly motivating to leaders/innovators 2.29
• Very important to banks' developers and customers 2.43
• Well inside space and time resources available 2.29
• Well inside financial/material resources available 2.71
Overall average 2.29
Alignment (4-4i) - • Easy technical integration between new and existing legacy system 2.43
Interacting • Easy with displacement of obsolete practices 2.29
technologies/cons • High presence of required complementary technologies 2.71
tituencies • High presence of useful complementary technologies 2.71
• Low opposition from competing ICT-based system 2.43
• Effective mechanisms for socialising new mix of technologies 2.86
Overall average 2.57
Figure 11.2.VIII Saudi e-banking's "alignment web" as of today
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For instance, Figure 11.2.VIII shows that alignment with "target constituents" is the best state of
alignment, with a significant degree of alignment (i.e. average 2.07). Areas inside can be divided
according to their average marking into four groups. The first group includes areas with a strong
degree of alignment. It involves "CEO" as the strongest constituent, with an average marking of 1.
This reflects the fact that "CEO" is firmly supportive of the constituency, that is, a "constituent" rather
than a "target constituent".
The second group includes areas with a strong-to-significant degree of alignment. It involves
"executive management" and "target developers", with an average marking of 1.43 and 1.86,
respectively. The third group includes areas with a significant-to-insignificant degree of alignment. It
involves "technical personnel" and "administrative personnel", with an average marking of 2.14 and
2.57, respectively. The most problematic group is group four. It includes area with an insignificant-to-
weak degree of alignment that involves "target customers", with an average marking of 3.43.
Alignment with "target constituents" is followed by that with "nature of target problem" (i.e.
Dimension 3). Figure 11.2.VIII shows that the constituency's alignment with the "nature of target
problem" is given an average marking of 2.29. Areas inside can be divided according to its average
marking into two groups. The first group includes areas with a strong-to-significant degree of
alignment. It involves "very important to bank", with an average marking of 1.86. The second group
includes areas with a significant-to-insignificant degree of alignment. It involves all of the remaining
five areas, with "well inside financial/material resources available" being the lowest mark of 2.71.
Alignment with "nature of target problem" is followed by that with "interacting
technologies/constituencies" (i.e. Dimension 4). Figure 11.2.VIII shows that the constituency's
alignment with the "interacting technologies/constituencies" is given an average marking of 2.57. All
of the areas inside fall into the significant-to-insignificant degree of alignment, with "easy with
displacement of obsolete practices" being the highest (i.e. average 2.29) and "effective mechanisms
for socialising new mix of technologies" being the lowest (i.e. average 2.86). This indicates that the
process of sociotechnical constituency-building faces a challenge in aligning its capabilities with the
target functionality and cost in both the market and banking sector. Such a challenge opposes the
technical capacity of the e-banking constituency to deliver within the available resources and in
competitive time.
Finally, Figure 11.2.VIII clearly reveals that the lowest degree of alignment is credited to Dimension 1
of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) (i.e. "governance"), with an average alignment mark of
2.64 (i.e. insignificant-weak). Areas inside can be divided according to its average marking into three
groups. The first group includes areas with a strong-to-significant degree of alignment. It involves
"developers' collaboration and teams", with an average marking of 1.86.
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The second group includes areas with a significant-to-insignificant degree of alignment. It involves
"assessment appropriate to new banking methods", "flat decision-making structure", "rewards for
ICT-based innovators" and "encouragement to new didactics", with an average marking of 2.29, 2.57,
2.57 and 2.57, respectively. The most problematic group is group three. It includes areas with a weak
degree of alignment. It involves "customers' participation in development", with an average marking
of 4. This fact together with that from Dimension 2 stresses the need for customers' involvement in e-
banking development.
In conclusion, the assessment of the e-banking constituency-building process at Saudi e-banking
through the lens of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) has highlighted areas of strengths and
weaknesses in the process of sociotechnical alignment. It suggests that the Saudi e-banking'
constituency-building process is evolving with mixed roles played by all dimensions of the "diamond
of alignment" (Molina 1995) and shaped the existing constituency. While Dimension 2 (i.e. "target
constituents") exhibits the best state of alignment with an average mark of 2.07, Dimension 1 (i.e.
"governance") shows the most challenging alignment with an average mark of 2.64. This assessment
may be used to inform the future alignment strategy pursued by each Saudi e-banking constituency.
11.3 Dynamic strategy mapping in e-banking sociotechnical
constituencies
The aim of this section is to deepen the degree of detail in the assessment and understanding of the
value creation strategies pursued by the various Saudi e-banking constituencies. It makes use of the
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) already introduced in Chapter 2, with two
limitations due to available information (1) the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) is
applied to three case studies only - AlAhli, Riyad and Tadawul; and (2) it is applied to the current
phase of development only.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the application of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
(Molina 2005) is important because broad value-creation strategies, such as Porter's generic and
positioning strategies (Porter 1985; 1996), may be pursued by combining in many alternative ways the
many detailed ingredients having an incidence in the generation of broad strategies. The "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) helps to unpack the priorities given at the different
ingredients and this helps clarify, for instance, why two constituencies that may be classified as
following "cost leadership" or "differentiation" strategies in the same market may show different
results.
11.3.1 National Commercial Bank (AlAhli)
Figure 11.3.1 identifies the priorities (marked with percentages) given to the different strategic
















Figure 11.3.1 Priorities given to dimensions constituting the first layer of AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Source: AlAhli's e-Banking Head)
The assessment of current priorities identifies the dimension of "distinctive product/service attributes"
as the overall most important with a mark of 24%. This means that AlAhli focuses primarily on
features that give the bank competitive advantage to its e-banking products and services. Moving
deeper into the specific features of the dimension "distinctive product/service attributes", the
assessment finds that the "quality" feature receives the highest priority, followed by "bundle", while
the "physical characteristics" feature (e.g., size, weight) is the least important, something to be
expected for products that are largely intangible in nature. The remaining features are in-between,
with the evolutionary aspect of e-banking products and services, being the next feature after "bundle".
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Figure
The second most important overall dimension at AlAhli is the "distinctive value to users", with a mark
of 21%. Indeed, during the e-banking development process, AlAhli clearly focuses on finding e-
banking features that can add distinctive value to customers. At the deeper layer of detail, three
features are identified as receiving similar priority: "functionality", "performance" and "availability".
In turn, the "price" feature has been identified as a less important feature from the point of view of
adding distinctive value to AlAhli's customers.
Edition
11.3.II Priorities of features within the "distinctive product/service attributes" of









Figure 11.3.III Priorities of features within the "distinctive value to users" of AIAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
Next, Figure 11.3.IV identifies the dimension of "tactical techniques" as the third most important with
a mark of 17%. Tactical approaches are important to ensure the successful diffusion of e-banking
products and services among customers. At AlAhli, such techniques can be clustered into two groups.
The first group is the most important and includes "product", "alliances", "diversification",
"launches" and "defensive entry-barriers". The case of initiating the bill payment gateway with
utilities companies after losing the STCs contract is an example. The second group of tactical
techniques is given less importance and includes "market development", "physical/virtual",













Figure 11.3.IV Priorities of features within the "tactical techniques" of AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
Two overall dimensions are next in order of marking, both with 13%. These are "resource and
competence acquisition" and "process technology". The former reveals the preferred approaches
followed by AlAhli's e-banking constituency to acquire resources and capabilities for the e-banking
development process. It is apparent that the "loans" and "donations" approaches do not exist at
AlAhli's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) as the bank is not an organisation that
would accept loans and donations. The approaches of "investments", "off-the-shelf' and "in-house
development" are given the lowest priorities, while "outsourcing" and "training" receive the highest
priority, followed not far behind by "partnership" and "licensing". An example is the acquisition of




Figure 11.3.V Priorities of features within the "resource and competence acquisition" of
AlAhli's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
"Process technology" focuses on the technology used during the e-banking development process.
Selecting only the most important factor, the assessment finds that "competitive character",
"techniques", "intellectual property" and "cost" are the factors that AlAhli gives highest priority to in







Figure 11.3.VI Priorities of features within the "process technology" of AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
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The "governance (in-house)" dimension (Figure 11.3.VII) has been placed sixth in the "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) sequence of overall priorities with a mark of 8%. Written
and unwritten "rules" governing the behaviour and practices of AlAhli's staff, sections, departments
and groups in the e-banking development process receive low priority within AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM). Inside "governance (in-house)", "competitive attitude", in particular the
"defensive" one has been identified as the most important dimension. This is followed by
"organisation" (with the absence of both "hierarchical" and "hollow" organisations), "reward system"
and "focusing drivers".
Fo rusing Drivers
Rewin d System Competitive Attitude
Organisation
Figure 11.3.VII Priorities of features within the "governance (in-house)" of AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
At the overall "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)'s first layer, the least important dimension at
AlAhli is "user (market) target", with a priority of 4%. This is explained by the fact that, although
expanding the customer base is an important area, AlAhli focuses more on the present base rather than
the prospective one. Surprisingly, the "geography" dimension is not accorded any importance in
AlAhli's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), although AlAhli holds over 20% of the sector's
branches. Likewise, "education", "age", and "behaviour" are not considered important. In turn,
"offensive entry-barriers", in particular "flank attack", "current status" and "characteristic" have been
identified as the most important dimensions. These are followed by both "ambition" and "income".
315
Current Status
Figure 11.3.VIII Priorities of features within the "user (market) target" of AlAhli's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
11.3.2 Riyad Bank (Riyad)
The second "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) to discuss is that of Riyad. Unlike
AlAhli's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) shows
that this e-banking constituency is paying more attention to governance issues of strategy. Figure
11.3.IX identifies priorities for the dimensions of the first layer of the "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM) (Molina 2005). These priorities are associated with the progress of Riyad's e-banking
constituency-building process (see Figure 11.2.VI).
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User (Market)
Figure 11.3.IX Priorities of the dimensions constituting the first layer of Riyad's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) (Source: Riyad's Remote Delivery Channels Manager)
While the AlAhli's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) placed governance well down the strategic
priorities (6th place), at Riyad the "governance (in-house)" dimension has been identified as the top in
importance. The first possible explanation for this finding is the fact that the government exercises
direct supervision of Riyad's operations and this has lasted for decades. Although the direct
supervision was concluded in the mid-1990s, its influence still persists at Riyad as shown by the
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM). This strategic concern is also confirmed by the top marking
given inside governance to the sub-dimension "organisation", and even deeper in the detail to the sub-
sub-dimension "autocratic-hierarchical" inside organisation. The second possible explanation behind
the top priority given "governance (in-house)" dimension is the development of the "national
champion" as well as the e-Channels Quality Unit. These changes imply governance in a state of flux.
Following "governance", Figure 11.3.X shows "reward system" as the sub-dimension receiving the
lowest priority at Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), while inside this sub-dimension
"vision and leadership" receives the highest importance. The governance sub-dimensions of "focusing
drivers" and "competitive attitude" are given similar high priority, with their respective deeper-layer
sub-categories of "cost" driver and "offensive" attitude identified as the most important.
The differences in the degree of priority shown by AlAhli's and Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM) regarding "competitive attitude" (inside "governance (in-house)" dimension) raises questions
about the way banks pursue e-banking competition. Thus, Yakhlef (2001) found that banks are using
the Internet to achieve two main purposes. The "followers" seem to be adopting a "defensive"
strategy, using the Internet as a means to improve interactivity with their customers, offering them the
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opportunity to carry out transactions, personalise their offerings, etc. The "first-movers" seem to be
adopting an "offensive" strategy, taking the Internet more innovatively as a device for redefining their
core business and transforming it altogether. Similar conclusions have been found by Willcocks and
Plant (2001) and Bensebaa (2004). The point that can be made here is that AlAhli implements an
"offensive" strategy, while Riyad implements a "follower" strategy.
Organisation
Figure 11.3.X Priorities of features within the "governance (in-house)" of Riyad's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
Unlike at AlAhli's, at Riyad's the second most important dimension at the first layer of the "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) is "resource and competence acquisition". This dimension focuses on
approaches followed by Riyad's e-banking constituency to acquire resources and capabilities for the
e-banking development process. Inside this dimension, Figure 11.3.XI shows that, as for the case of
AlAhli, the "loans" and "donations" approaches do not exist at Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM). However, unlike AlAhli, Riyad's DSM has excluded the "investments" approach. Three
mechanisms have been identified as the most important for acquiring resources and capabilities: "total
outsourcing", "partnership" and "unlimited licensing". These are followed by lower priorities of
"training", "off-the-shelf' and "in-house development". The large difference of priority given to "total
outsourcing", as the most important approach, and "in-house development", as the least important
approach, raises a concern regarding Riyad's own acquisition capabilities in the future.
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Figure 11.3.XI Priorities of features within the "resource and competence acquisition" of
Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
The third dimension by order of importance at Riyad's DSM is "process technology", focusing on the
technology used during the e-banking development process. Here the key priority factors that Riyad
considers in choosing the appropriate mix of e-banking development technologies are, first and
foremost, "cost", followed in importance by "strategic or pacing competitive character",
"communication techniques" and "proprietary intellectual property". In addition, within the sub-
dimension "intellectual property", the options of "free and open" do not exist at Riyad's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM). In other words, technologies, such as free and open source software, are of
no consequence for the bank.
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Property
Figure 11.3.XII X Priorities of features within the "process technology" of Riyad's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
The strategic dimension of "distinctive product/service attributes" has been identified as fourth in
importance at Riyad, in contrast to AlAhli where it came first. As Figure 11.3.XIII shows, the most
important attributes that Riyad focuses on to add value to its e-banking product/services are first
"bundle", then "commodity edition" and third "quality". In turn, "continuous improvement





Figure 11.3.XIII Priorities of features within the "distinctive product/service attributes" of
Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
Fifth in importance at Riyad's DSM is the dimension "distinctive value to users" (this was second at
AlAhli), that is, e-banking features that can add distinctive value to customers. At a deeper layer, the
various strategic ingredients in this dimension can be arranged into three groups, starting with those
ingredients that received the highest importance: "average price", "related bundle" and "unique
functionality". The second group with middle-of-the-way markings is constituted by "performance",
"availability" and "multi purpose", whereas the group with the lowest marking is made up of




Figure 11.3.XIV Priorities of features within the "distinctive value to users" of Riyad's
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
Next, sixth in priority is the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) dimension "tactical techniques",
with the mixes of tactical market approaches used by the bank for diffusion of its e-banking products
and services among customers. Here, an equal priority has been accorded to the sub-dimensions
"defensive entry-barriers" (particularly its "reinforce lock-in" expression), "product" and
"penetration" techniques. These are followed in importance by "market development", "related
diversification" and "opportunist tactical pricing". "Single launch", "price fixing alliance" and



















Figure 11.3.XV Priorities of features within the "tactical techniques" of Riyad's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
As AlAhli's DSM does, Riyad's DSM also prioritises "user (market) target" as the least important
strategic dimension. Riyad focuses more on the present customer base rather than on a prospective
one, although expanding the customer base is an important area. The sub-dimensions of "education"
"age" and "behaviour" are not given any importance at Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM).
In turn, the ingredients "current status", "offensive entry-barriers" and "local geography" have been
identified as the most important dimensions. These are followed by "mass broad characteristic",













11.3.3 The Saudi Capital Market (Tadawul)
The third "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) to discuss is that of Tadawul. It is
obvious from Figure 11.3.XVII that the shape of Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) is
different from that of both AlAhli and Riyad. To an important extent, this is because of the different
organisational nature of Tadawul, as a capital market, and the banks AlAhli and Riyad. Such nature
implies a difference in the competition status of the banks' constituencies and the Tadawul's
constituency. The competition status of AlAhli and Riyad is much more open than that of the
Tadawul's constituency as Saudi banks compete against each other76, while Tadawul is the sole
operator of the share market. As indicated earlier by the Tadawul's MD, "Tadawul has no competition
but still pushes to improve the services to encourage investing in the share market". Consequently, it
is expected that in many respects Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) will be different
from that of AlAhli and Riyad. In effect, Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) has different
priorities regarding strategic dimensions than those of AlAhli and Riyad. Figure 11.3.XVII identifies
the priorities given to the dimensions of the first layer of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) at
Tadawul.
76 The fact that SAMA pursues a collaborative rather than a competitive approach among Saudi banks
to the development of a common payments infrastructure (Al-Suhaimi 1998) does not mean
extending such approach to the other functions such as operations, logistics, marketing, etc. The
case of AlRajhi acquiring the e-Banking Analyst of AlAhli to pioneer the STC's bill payment
gateway in the sector bears witness to this point.
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Figure
A major immediate difference shown by Figure 11.3.XVII is that the dimension "distinctive
product/service attributes" is excluded from Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM). In turn,
the most important dimension at Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) is "process
technology", but, interestingly, inside this dimension there is no sub-dimension "competitive
character" since Tadawul has no competition. The most important sub-dimensions inside "process
technology" are "collective learning", "knowledge management" and "brainstorming" techniques.








11.3.XVII Priorities of the dimensions constituting the first layer of Tadawul's "dynamic
















Figure 11.3.XVIII Priorities of features within the "process technology" of Tadawul's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
The second most important strategic dimension at Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) is
"tactical techniques", something that reflects the fact that Tadawul seeks to encourage investment in
the capital market. At the same time, the fact that Tadawul faces no competition implies the exclusion
of many tactical techniques from Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), including "market
development", "diversification", "alliances", "tactical pricing" and "defensive entry-barriers". Instead,
"penetration", "product", "frequent major launches" and "phyrtual" are the most important techniques.
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Figure 11.3.XIX Priorities of features within the "tactical techniques" of Tadawul's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM)
The third strategic priority shown by Tadawul's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) is "distinctive
value to users", that is, finding electronic trading and investment features that can add distinctive
value to traders and investors. Again, the fact that Tadawul has no competition implies the exclusion
of a number of options: "branding", "price", "style and image" and "purpose". In contrast, "multiple
functionality", "availability" and "performance" are, in the same order, identified as the most
important sub-dimensions. These are followed by both "support" and "related bundle".
327







Figure 11.3.XX Priorities of features within the "distinctive value to users" of Tadawul's
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
Rather surprisingly, "resource and competence acquisition" has been identified as the fourth most
important dimension. An explanation for such a finding is that Tadawul has the ability to acquire
resources (e.g., human resources) from SAMA or any other capital market players, such as banks.
Such ability helps Tadawul to focus more on other dimensions than "resource and competence
acquisition". Within this dimension, however, "total outsourcing" (e.g., OMX), "long-term contracts
partnership" (e.g., CMA), and training (e.g., Tadawul Certificate) have been identified as the most
important sub-dimensions. These are followed by "unlimited licensing", "in-house development" and
"off-the-shelf'. Like AlAhli's and Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), "loans", "donations"












Figure 11.3.XXI Priorities of features within the "resource and competence acquisition" of
Tadawui's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
The "governance (in-house)" dimension is fifth in importance at Tadawul's "dynamic strategy
mapping" (DSM). Again, "competitive attitude" has been excluded due to Tadawul's lack of
competition. On the other hand, the fact that Tadawul is going to be privatised in the near future is
certainly behind the selection of the sub-dimension "organisation" as the most important within the
"governance (in-house)" dimension, with "heterarchical organisation" being the most important and
both "hierarchical" and "hollow" organisations given no consideration. Inside "governance", the
ingredient of "organisation" is followed in importance by "focusing drivers" (in particular in its
expressions of "product driven", "long-term time scope" and "user driven"). The least important sub-
dimension of "governance" is "reward system", which shows "vision and leadership" and
"achievement and productivity" as most important.
329
Competitive Attitude
Figure 11.3.XXII Priorities of features within the "governance (in-house)" of Tadawul's
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
In common with AlAhli's and Riyad's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), Tadawul's "dynamic
strategy mapping" (DSM) has also prioritised "user (market) target" as the least important strategic
dimension. An interesting issue is that while Tadawul "pushes to improve the services to encourage
investing in the capital market" (Tadawul MD), it focuses more on present traders and investors rather
than on prospective ones (similar to the approach of AlAhli and Riyad with respect to their user
strategy).
An explanation for this issue is that CMA encourages financial intermediaries to become connectors
between traders and investors, on one hand, and Tadawul, on the other hand. Consequently, Tadawul
pays more attention to those customers directly related to Tadawul (e.g., financial intermediaries)
rather than to those indirectly related (e.g., traders and investors). Within this dimension, the priority










Figure 11.3.XXIII Priorities of features within the "user (market) target" of Tadawul's
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
Application of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) to the cases of AlAhli, Riyad
and Tadawul shows that each sociotechnical constituency has its own combination of strategic
ingredients. The "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) now allows for a deeper
characterisation of these broad strategies.
Thus, the AlAhli's constituency focuses more on features that give competitive advantage to its e-
banking products and services. AlAhli's performance in both financial and technological terms is
healthy and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. In turn, Riyad's top strategic priority was
identified as the "governance (in-house)" dimension. Riyad's performance is not as healthy as that of
AlAhli as shown by the average markings in most dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995). Riyad's average markings were behind those of AlAhli in all alignment dimensions with the
exception of Dimension 3 (i.e. "nature of target problem").
For this reason, it seems advisable for Riyad to make a critical examination of its combined value
creation strategies. In this respect, one should take into account that the achievements of the Riyad's
"national champion" may go a long way in helping to improve Riyad's overall performance. Finally,
the Tadawul's constituency regards "process technology" as the most important feature while it
entirely excludes the strategic importance of "distinctive product/service attributes". Tadawul is a
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capital market and not a bank like AlAhli and Riyad. This different organisational nature explains
much of the unique mix ofTadawul's value-creation strategy.
11.4 Conclusion
This chapter compared and contrasted the emergence and evolution of e-banking among the seven
case studies discussed earlier. It focused on the main questions of this thesis: (1) how do banks
implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies? (2) How have
e-banking capabilities been built? (3) What role has e-banking played in shaping the strategic
direction of banks?
The discussion made use of tools associated to the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina
1990; 1993) namely, the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
(Molina 2005) of e-banking constituency-building processes. The integral use of the tools produced a
detailed (quantitative) assessment of the current state of the process of sociotechnical alignment for
each of the e-banking constituencies ("alignment web") (Molina 2003). In addition, in the case of
three e-banking constituencies (i.e. AlAhli, Riyad, and Tadawul) a deeper quantitative assessment of
strategic priorities was conducted through the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005),
although restricted only to the present situation.
The discussion highlighted the differences and similarities among the seven case studies, clarified the
results, and presented explanations of the major findings. The chapter demonstrated the usefulness of
the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) in the




The aim of the thesis is to look at the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, with
particular emphasis on the processes of how banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities and
create new value strategies. Questions have been raised about the banks' efficiency in utilising the
unique features of e-banking for improving their competitive positions and images. There is a growing
concern that e-banking is not yielding the anticipated results (Frei & Harker 1999; Amit & Zott 2001;
Simpson 2002). This has thrown a spotlight onto the problem of change from one particular delivery
channel to another. In practice, an appropriate mix of delivery channels will be determined by a
number of factors on the supply and demand sides of the market (Daniel 1999; Lang & Colgate 2003;
Bughin 2004). This process was the concern of the thesis.
12.2 Questions of the thesis
The research started with a broad area of inquiry related to understanding and providing an account of
the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. The inquiry, next, was inductive and
aimed to explore and describe the actions of those banks based on what they were doing rather than
verifying any hypotheses. The research started the inquiry with an open mind rather than a closed one.
The literature that it had reviewed preceding the fieldwork helped to view the empirical world more
effectively.
The research process focused on understanding (1) how banks implement e-banking to build their
capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-banking capabilities have been built,
and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic direction of banks. This required
understanding of a variety of aspects (i) the value created by e-banking products and services within
different banks, (ii) the process of e-banking development within the different banks, (iii) how banks
approach e-banking products and services, and (iv) how the banks align the demand and supply
factors surrounding e-banking products and services.
12.3 Structure of the thesis
The aim of this section is to briefly explain the way the thesis has been stmctured to respond to its
questions. The thesis was organised into twelve chapters, with Chapter 1 dedicated to introducing the
thesis. Chapter 2 looked at literature relevant to understanding and dealing with the matter of this
thesis, that is, the emergence and evolution of e-banking with particular emphasis on (1) how banks
implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-
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banking capabilities have been built, and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic
direction of banks.
The literature review covered a wide range of material on the subject and is believed to be
comprehensive and up-to-date. It defined the term "e-banking" and looked briefly at the emergence,
evolution, nature, products and services of e-banking. The review then explored the focus of e-
banking research through distinguishing among factors influencing the adaptation of e-banking into
supply and demand side factors. The demand side factors of e-banking research included marketing,
acceptance, usage, quality and trust while that of supply side included competition, resources,
implementation, efficiency and productivity.
This was followed by a discussion on the theoretical foundations of value creation and capabilities
building in e-banking. It briefly discussed some views on value creation and capabilities building
according to Schumpeter's conventional theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942), resource-
based view of the firm (Penrose 1959), transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975), value-chain
analysis (Porter 1985), dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al. 1997), strategic network theory
(e.g., Dyer & Singh 1998), and accelerating capability building (Hagel & Brown 2005). This was
followed by a discussion on a group of emerging theoretical value creation frameworks in e-business
(e.g., Willcocks & Plant 2001; Amit & Zott 2001). The section concluded the discussion by looking at
the applicability of these theories in the context of e-banking (e.g., Colgate 1998; Mole 1999;
Hensmans et al. 2001), which were enabled us to provide answers to the key questions raised by this
thesis regarding how banks create e-banking value.
The discussion, next, looked in details to the technology implementation literature, with particular
emphasis on the processes of implementing network technologies and e-businesses. It discussed the
term "implementation" and looked briefly at the relation between implementation, innovation and
diffusion, the dynamics of the implementation process, and its different stages/phases. It also looked
at the implementation challenges, success and failure, implementers' responsibilities and broad
implementation approaches, before ending with a brief review of empirical studies related to the
implementation of e-banking products and services, as well as a case study on the implementation of
the EFTPOS in the UK during the late 1980s.
The findings of the implementation literature provided the background for the identification of
structured process approaches useful to analyse in detail and comparatively the emergence and
evolution of concrete e-banking experiences in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Chapter 2 continued with
a discussion on the sociotechnical approach with particular focus on the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) that seemed to offer a more structured framework to
organise the comparative study of concrete e-banking experiences, particularly through its associated
analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005).
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The aim was not only to use the approach to reveal how banks build their e-banking capabilities and
create new value strategies, but also to test critically the applicability of the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools (Molina 1995; 2003;
2005) for understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building. Accordingly, Chapter 2
provided a brief positioning of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) in
social theory and a review of early "social theory" approaches stressing the interaction between social
and technical factors during the development of technology. This was followed by (a) comparing the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) with such theoretical approaches and
(b) introducing a group of studies that have attempted to use the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach. A justification to the potential applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) to analysing the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia
concluded the critical analysis, before proceeding to the introduction of the "alignment web" (Molina
2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005), the recent gave the most recent
conceptual instruments of the "sociotechnical constituency" approach (Molina 1990; 1993).
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology and the path the research process followed in
conducting the empirical work and analysis. The discussion highlighted the research strategy, which
was the case study strategy (Yin 2003), together with the reasons for choosing such a strategy among
other research strategies (e.g., experiment). Such reasons were (1) the questions posed by the thesis
were "how" and "why" types of questions, (2) the research process would not be able to control
behaviour, and (3) the thesis needed to focus on a contemporary event.
Chapter 3 also discussed the research design to develop the logic that linked the collected data to the
questions posed by the thesis. The thesis questions led to favouring the e-banking sociotechnical
constituency-building process (a case) as the primary unit' of analysis, and the bank as the secondary
unit of analysis. The research design also used a multiple-case embedded design as a case-study
design. Looking at several units of analysis helped not only in understanding the dynamics in
operation, but also in enhancing insights to the single case. The data analysis strategy concluded
Chapter 3. In Yin (2003: 33)'s words:
"The use of theory, in doing case studies, is not only an immense aid in defining the
appropriate research design and data collection, but also becomes the main vehicle
for generalising the results of the case study."
The data analysis strategy of this thesis implemented the theoretical propositions strategy via the
utilisation of the "sociotechnical constituencies' approach" (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated
analytical tools of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005). The data analysis strategy also utilised a group of
methodological strategies and techniques, including pattern-matching, explanation building, logic
models, coding, pattern coding, cross-case synthesis, and stacking comparable cases. Such
methodological combinations helped to draw sound findings.
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To provide insights about the possible approaches to the thesis, the research process conducted two
pilot studies during August 2003 in Saudi Arabia with AlRajhi and Riyad. These pilot studies were
initial and of an exploratory role. The findings of the pilot studies were critically important in
formatting the data collection process, in particular, and the entire research, in general. The findings
led to the use of three sources of evidence: (1) a survey that was distributed to all Saudi banks, (2)
semi-structured interviews, and (3) archival records of e-banking transactions provided by SAMA.
The main fieldwork was conducted during three rounds: September-October 2003, December 2003-
March 2004, and December 2005-January 2006.
The structure of the thesis then moved to investigating the emergence and evolution of e-banking at
six Saudi banks as well as an inter-bank technological system at the Saudi Capital Market, providing
an external view of the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia. This made up a total of
seven case studies, with each case study making up a single chapter (i.e. Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10) and following a largely common structure.
Such common structure started with a brief overview of the organisation (e.g., the bank) and some of
the key events shaping the organisation's developments since inception. It then looked at the
particular development of e-banking at the organisation through the conceptual lens of the "diamond
of alignment" (Molina 1995). The diamond selected for the analysis was a two-layered intra- and
inter-organisational diamond, given that important features of the organisation's e-banking
constituency-building process were the result of inter-organisational interactions between the
organisation and other organisations. A section with policy implication concluded each of the seven
chapters.
Following such systematic structure, Chapter 4 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking
at Samba. The discussion distinguished two distinctive periods in the evolution of the Samba e-
banking constituency. The first period goes from the beginnings of Samba to the late 1990s when the
merger with USB occurred. This was followed by the second period that extends until today and in
which the Internet plays a major role. To highlight the differences between the two periods, the
"diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) was applied separately to each of the two periods.
Chapter 5 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlRajhi. The discussion
distinguished three phases in the evolution of AlRajhi e-banking constituency: origins (1987-1995),
development (1996-2000), and present state (2001-2006). To highlight the differences between the
three phases, the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), was applied separately to each phase.
Chapter 6 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Saib. The discussion briefly
assessed the state of Saib's e-banking constituency prior to the implementation of BIT. It was then
geared toward the implications of the implementation of BIT, which went from the late 1990s to
today.
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Chapter 7 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Hollandi. The discussion focused
on the evolution of the Hollandi e-banking constituency as well as its implications for Hollandi today.
Chapter 8 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at AlAhli. The discussion focused
on the evolution of the AlAhli e-banking constituency as well as its implications for AlAhli today.
Chapter 9 investigated the emergence and evolution of e-banking at Riyad. The discussion focused on
the evolution of the Riyad e-banking constituency as well as its implications for Riyad today.
Expanding the discussion toward an inter-bank technological system and the implications it has on the
sociotechnical constituency-building process in Saudi banks provided an external view of the
emergence and evolution of e-banking at Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Chapter 10 investigated the
emergence and evolution of the trading, clearing and settlements system of securities in the Saudi
Capital Market (i.e. Tadawul). Such view generated more insights as the Tadawul constituency
involves important constituents spread across all Saudi banks.
The emergence of the Tadawul constituency found its historical origins in the ESIS constituency that
developed during the 1990s. Therefore, it was necessary to assess the build-up of the ESIS
constituency before looking at the particular development of the Tadawul constituency, which goes
from the late 1990s until today, through the conceptual lens of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina
1995). Again, the diamond selected for the analysis was a two-layered intra- and inter-organisational
diamond, given that important features of the Tadawul's constituency-building process are the result
of intra- and inter-organisational interactions between Tadawul and other organisations.
Following the investigation of the emergence and evolution of e-banking at each of the six Saudi
banks as well as at the Saudi Capital Market, the thesis next looked at, in Chapter 11, an integrative
picture of Saudi e-banking. The discussion compared and contrasted the emergence and evolution of
e-banking among the seven case studies. The discussion made use of conceptual tools associated with
the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993), namely, the "alignment web"
(Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) of e-banking constituency-
building processes. The discussion also took a comparative perspective, highlighting differences and
similarities among the seven case studies.
It started with the application of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) to analyse quantitatively the
current state of the process of sociotechnical alignment for each of the Saudi e-banking constituencies.
This assessment related to the more qualitative assessment conducted in the previous chapters with the
case studies. It was indeed complementary since the content of the "diamond of alignment" table
(Molina 1995) was developed by the author as a summary interpretation of the constituency-building
story, while the markings of the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) were given by key players in each of
the e-banking constituency-building processes.
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This was then supplemented by the application of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina
2005) in the case studies of three e-banking constituencies (i.e. AlAhli, Riyad, and Tadawul). The
"dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) was however applied only to the current phase of
development of the e-banking constituencies of the three e-banking constituencies. The combined use
of the tools produced a detailed assessment of the current state of the process of sociotechnical
alignment for each of the e-banking constituencies.
Chapter 12, that is, this chapter, concludes the thesis by highlighting its empirical contribution,
strategy-policy recommendations, and assessment of the thesis. In addition, this concluding chapter
provides the results of testing the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
(Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools (Molina 1995; 2003; 2005) for understanding
e-banking value creation and capability-building, as well as suggestions for further research.
Additional material supportive to the argument in the thesis is given in the appendices.
12.4 Empirical contribution
Yin (2003: 10) highlights the fashion for generalisation from case studies:
"Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not
to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does
not represent a 'sample', and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and
generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies
(statistical generalisation)."
This thesis contributes to providing a rich insight into the emergence and evolution of e-banking in
Saudi Arabia. The majority of the literature in the field of e-banking has been written with reference to
the industrial world. This thesis fills a gap in the literature as it provides an understanding of this
phenomenon in a part of the developing world which has not been studied in this respect before.
More, specifically, the thesis provides a rich insight on the emergence and evolution of e-banking at
six banks among eleven Saudi banks as well as at an inter-organisational technological system
involving five inter-bank payment systems. The study of the latter technological system helped give
an external insight about the evolution of e-banking products and services in Saudi Arabia.
The results showed an important distinctive characteristic that distinguishes the Saudi Arabian e-
banking development from these at western banking sectors. Such characteristic is the dissemination
of Islamic banking products and services through e-channels. The discussion on the emergence and
evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia showed that Islamic banking was provided during the 1980s
by only ARCCEC. This evolved during the 1990s when many conventional banks (e.g., Samba and
Saib) offered Islamic banking produces and services (e.g., Samba's AlSunbula Investment Fund).
The 2000s witnessed evolutions of Islamic banking when not all Saudi banks established Sharia'h
Committees, but also many conventional banks have been transformed to wholly Islamic banks (i.e.
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AlAhli, AlJazira Bank, AlBilad). The 2000s also witnessed the dissemination of Islamic banking
through e-channels when many Saudi banks offered Islamic e-banking products and services (e.g.,
Salam card ofAlRajhi and Sukuk of Tadawul). Such trend seems to continue, distinguishing the Saudi
Arabian e-banking development from these at western banking sectors.
12.5 Strategy-policy implications
The aim of this section is to lay out the strategy-policy implications of the thesis. Such implications
are divided into two groups. The first group lays out specific policy implications toward the
development of each bank being studied (i.e. Samba, AlRajhi, Saib, Hollandi, AlAhli, and Riyad) as
well as the Saudi Capital Market (i.e. Tadawul). This is followed by the second group that lays out
general policy implications toward the development of the entire Saudi Arabian banking sector.
12.5.1 Specific strategy-policy implications
Specific strategy-policy implications toward the development of each of the seven e-banking
constituencies being studied are as follows.
12.5.1.1 Samba Financial Group (Samba)
Samba's healthy performance in financial and technical terms reveals that the broad value-creation
strategy is successful. The capabilities of the e-banking constituency-building process have evolved
since commencement of the first phase (i.e. before 1997). The current state of alignment in the e-
banking constituency-building process shows a great deal of strength. The weakest areas however
were identified inside the "governance" dimension of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995).
Moreover, challenges at both the inter-organisational dimension of the process, in particular the
customers' constituent, and the intra-organisational dimension of the process, in particular the rewards
for ICT-based innovators' constituent, still exist. This suggests the need for closer examination of the
e-positioning strategy with the objectives of not only improving such areas of challenge, but also
improving its future development.
12.5.1.2 AlRajhi Bank (AlRajhi)
AlRajhi's healthy performance in financial and technical terms reveals that the strategies implemented
are successful. The capabilities of the e-banking constituency-building process have evolved since the
initial phase. However, a challenge at the intra-organisational dimension of the process still exists, in
particular with regard to "effective mechanisms for socialising a new mix of technologies". On the
one hand, this suggests the requirement for further efforts to eliminate present weaknesses in the value
creation and capabilities building strategies.
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On the other hand, it converges with Porter's (1996) suggestion that an organisation needs to rethink
its existing competitive advantage strategy every decade. The ORP has been in place since mid-1995,
accordingly AlRajhi would do well to re-examine its strategy in order to secure its competitive
position. Given that AlRajhi is getting ready to expand internationally, starting with its new branches
in Malaysia, the future is bound to bring new challenges that will surely influence its development.
Consideration of the findings presented here might help AlRajhi's positioning strategy in the sector.
12.5.1.3 Saudi Investment Bank (Saib)
While Saib progressed substantially in some efforts, in others the results were more mixed. The e-
banking constituency-building process has developed since the late 1990s, with combined efforts at
both intra- and inter-organisational levels which have shaped the characteristics of the present e-
banking constituency. While the process has progressed substantially in some efforts, in others the
results have been more mixed. Investing in innovative e-banking products and services is
recommended to strengthen not only the strategic positioning but also the accelerating capability
building strategies of the e-banking constituency.
12.5.1.4 Saudi Hollandi Bank (Hollandi)
Although the broad value-creation strategy has helped Hollandi to protect its position within the
sector, the corporate banking performance, and particularly the e-banking performance, is modest
compared to its rivals. The e-banking constituency-building process has developed in a limited
fashion. Although some efforts had been made on the technological side, on other sides, the efforts
have had only modest advance.
Hollandi's e-banking process has suffered from problems of resources, organisation and marketing.
These problems will have to be addressed if Hollandi is going to pursue and achieve a stronger
competitive position in the e-banking market. Such efforts could start by taking care primarily of the
culture of the local market (i.e. Saudi culture). This could be followed by a reassessment of the broad
value-creation strategy in the context of the challenges facing Hollandi's e-banking constituency
building process.
12.5.1.5 The National Commercial Bank (AlAhli)
The progress of AlAhli in creating value through e-banking has been significant, considering the
bank's long period of decline that ended in the 1990s. The performance in both financial and
technological terms is healthy and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. It is worth stressing
that implementation of the broad value-creation strategy requires high degrees of alignment with the
organisational and industrial corporate policies.
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12.5.1.6 Riyad Bank (Riyad)
Implementation of the broad value-creation strategy at Riyad has been rather mixed from the point of
view of Riyad's declared mission to become "the leading Saudi bank". The performance in financial
terms is healthy, while in technological terms it is not as strong as required by an increasingly
competitive environment. The broad value-creation strategy would benefit from a close critical
review.
12.5.1.7 The Saudi Capital Market (Tadawul)
The performance of the Saudi Capital Market through the Tadawul constituency is healthy in both
financial and technological terms. The constituency-building process has developed significantly since
the late 1990s, involving efforts at both intra- and inter-organisational levels. The implementation of a
broad value-creation strategy has been well aligned with the market's corporate policy. However, it is
worth stressing that implementation of the optimal strategic approaches require high degrees of
alignment with organisational and industrial corporate policies.
12.5.2 General strategic-policy implications
Having laid out specific policy implications for the development of each e-banking constituency being
studied as well as the Saudi Capital Market, it is time now to lay out general strategic-policy
implications for the development of the entire Saudi Arabian banking sector. Figure 12.5.1 visualises
the sectoral positions of the existing banks in Saudi Arabia as of July 2006.
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Figure 12.5.1 Existing positions of banks within the Saudi banking sector as of November 2006
The horizontal axis in Figure 12.5.1 divides banks according to the type of ownership (i.e. national,
European joint venture and non-European joint venture) and the size of total assets (small, medium,
and large). In turn, the vertical axis divides banks according to the type of products and services (i.e.
Islamic only, conventional-Islamic and conventional only) and the type ofmain target customers (i.e.
retail, corporate and retail-corporate). For example, Saib and AlJazira are similar in terms of the size
of total assets. However, Saib furnishes customers with both Islamic and conventional banking
products and services while AlJazira furnishes customers with only Islamic banking.
12.5.2.1 Important developments
Figure 12.5.1, however, does not tell the complete story and two important developments in the Saudi
banking sector must be taken into consideration. The first development is the arrival of non-Saudi
banks that are commencing or will commence operations in the sector. As of November 2006, SAMA
has issued operating licences for ten non-Saudi banks. While some licences allow banks to provide
both retail and corporate banking products and services, others allow banks to provide corporate
banking products and services only.
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Banks that have already started operations are Gulf International Bank (GIB), since July 1999,
Emirates Bank, since August 2004, BNP Paribas, since October 2005, Deutsche Bank, since April
2006 and National Bank of Kuwait, since May 2006. The remaining five banks that have obtained
operating licenses but have not yet commenced operations are J.P. Morgan Chase N. A., Muscat
Bank, National Bank of Bahrain, National Bank of Pakistan and State Bank of India.
The second development is the establishment of a national mega bank, AlEnmaa Bank (AlEnmaa).
The Council ofMinisters approved at the end ofMarch 2006 the launch of a new national bank with a
share capital of SAR 15 billion. AlEnmaa Bank will carry out both banking and investment activities.
PIF, PF and GOSI will have a 30% stake in AlEnmaa, with each holding 10% of its shares. The
remaining 70% will be sold in an initial public offering at the end of this year.
Having highlighted the two important developments in the Saudi banking sector, it is possible to lay
out general strategic-policy implications toward the development of the Saudi Arabian banking sector.
12.5.2.2 Customers' constituent
The Saudi e-banking constituency-building process is evolving with a mixed role played by all
dimensions of the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) in the shaping of the new constituency.
While the alignment with the dimension "target constituents" exhibits a strong state of alignment, the
alignment with the dimension "governance" represents a challenge. The common factor between these
two alignments is the area of customers, which reveals a difficulty of approach by the constituencies.
Accordingly, it is recommended to give customers more opportunities to participate in the process of
e-banking constituency-building.
12.5.2.3 Strategic priorities
The discussion on the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) of AlAhli, Riyad, and
Tadawul shows that at more detailed levels of strategy each e-banking sociotechnical constituency has
its own evolutionary way. AlAhli's constituency focuses more on features that give competitive
advantage to e-banking products and services than other features. AlAhli's performance in both
financial and technological terms is strong.
In turn, the "governance (in-house)" feature has been identified as the most important one within
Riyad s "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM). The combined value-creation strategies implemented by
Riyad are worth a close critical review. Tadawul's constituency, however, regards "process
technology" as the most important feature while entirely excluding the "distinctive product/service
attributes". However, given the recent important developments (e.g., new entrances), re-examining the
strategic dimensions of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) (Molina 2005) is recommended.
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12.6 Assessment of the thesis
This section aims to provide a general assessment of this thesis by identifying three strengths as well
as three weaknesses.
12.6.1 Strengths
This section introduces three strengths of this thesis, namely the logic replication, narrative writing,
and validating procedure.
12.6.1.1 Logic replication
The first strength of this thesis is its logic replication. This was done through the implementation of a
largely common structure to write the case studies (i.e. Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). As indicated
earlier, such common structure started with a brief overview of the organisation (e.g., the bank) and
some of the key events shaping the organisation's developments since inception. It then looked at the
particular development of e-banking at the organisation through a single conceptual instrument (i.e.
the "diamond of alignment", Molina 1995). A section with policy implication concluded each case
study. The replication logic helped to either "(a) predict similar results (a literal replication) or (b)
predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)," (Yin 2003: 47). The
following paragraph discusses the first issue.
Replication of knowledge is an important criterion in reporting a case study, as indicated by Yin
(2003: 47), "only with such replications would the original finding be considered robust and worthy of
continued investigation or interpretation." For instance, Samba case study (i.e. Chapter 4) provided an
in depth understanding of the Saudi e-banking value creation and capability-building during the 1990s
and 2000s through separately applying the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995) to each of the two
periods.
This was followed by AlRajhi case study (i.e. Chapter 5) that applied the "diamond of alignment"
(Molina 1995) to three periods: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The last two periods replicated the
understanding of the Saudi e-banking value creation and capability-building with that of Samba while
the first period produced a new phenomenon (i.e. during 1980s) about Saudi e-banking value creation
and capability-building. The following case studies (i.e. Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) either added more
replication, provided new phenomenon, or both.
12.6.1.2 Narrative writing
The second strength of this thesis is its narrative writing form. The implementation of a largely
common structure to report the case studies on Saudi e-banking not only helped replicating the logic,
but also allowed contrasting results through following a question-and-answer form. Yin (2003: 148)
defines the term "question-and-answer form" and highlights its benefits:
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"[The question-and-answer narrative form is] a series of questions [that] can be
posted, with the answers taking some reasoning length - for example, three or four
paragraphs each. Each answer can contain all the relevant evidence and can even be
augmented with tabular presentations and citations... the same question-and-answer
format [is] used in each case, so that the interested reader could do his or her own
cross-case analysis by following the same question across all of the cases. The
format allows hurried readers to find exactly the relevant portions of each case."
Such a narrative form allows readers to conduce a cross-case analysis by looking at the same question
across all of the seven case studies. For instance, all case studies looked at the role of "governance" in
e-banking development. Within this issue, the question of what is the role of bank governance was
answered at each case study. Therefore, if readers would wish to know the role of Saudi bank
governance during the e-banking development, they have the opportunity to look under the heading
"organisational governance" at each case study.
Another example is the separation of periods of e-banking development. If readers would like to
explore the influences on the e-banking implementation during the 1990s, they have the opportunity to
look under the origins of each e-banking socitechnical constituency. The issue of narrative question-
and-answer form facilitated the development of a cross-case analysis that acknowledges readers'
varieties of interests (Yin 2003).
12.6.1.3 Validating procedure
The third strength is the procedure that has been followed to strengthen the validity of the overall
quality of the thesis. Yin (2003: 159-160) describes the sequence of the validity procedure and
highlights its consequences:
"A major way of improving the quality of case studies and ensuring their
constructive validity is to have the draft cases reviewed by those who have been the
subject of the study.... The procedure is to have the draft report reviewed, not just
by peers (as would be done for any research manuscript) but also by the participants
and informants in the case... The informants and participants may still disagree with
an investigator's conclusions and interpretations, but these reviewers should not
disagree over the actual facts of the case.... From a methodological viewpoint, the
corrections made through this process will enhance the accuracy of the case study,
hence increasing the construct validity of the study... When the process has been
given careful attention, the potential result is the production of a high-quality case
study."
Although longitudinal studies are costly, time-consuming, and difficult to implement, the thesis
applied a longitudinal approach to gather the information necessary to evaluate phase models of
strategy development. This has been conducted in two ways: contacts with Saudi banks (i.e. a review
by the subject of the study) and presentation and publication at international academic conferences
(i.e. a review by academic and research peers).
The continued contact with Saudi banks, either during the three rounds of the main field work, or
during the following span of time, helped to improve the overall quality of the thesis. For instance, the
criticisms received from Riyad's Vice CEO about the conclusion of the qualitative analysis of the
Riyad's e-banking constituency as well as from Saib's CEO about the interpretation of the role of Saib
within the Saudi Arabian banking sector not only helped to clarify many issues, but also supported the
validity of the findings and strength of the conclusion. Another example came from Tadawul's third
round when additional recent statistics about share transactions have been obtained to help
triangulating the sources of evidence.
The continued presentation and publication of the research at international academic conferences
helped to improve the overall quality of the thesis as it offered an academic review, either during the
acceptance process or during the presentations at the conferences, to the initial version of the
qualitative analysis of the e-banking constituencies. For example, the first version of the qualitative
analysis of the Samba's e-banking constituency received critiques by some audience during the 4th e-
Business Research Forum (Tampere, Finland, 20-22 September 2004) on the relationship between
Islamic banking and e-banking development. Also, the first version of the qualitative analysis of the
AlRajhi's e-banking constituency was criticised by some audience during the 4th IB IMA Conference
on Information Management in Modem Enterprise (Lisbon, Portugal, 5-7 July 2005) on the scientific
validity of integrating a number of theoretical concepts78. These critical comments led to improving
the content of the thesis.
In conclusion, the logic replication, narrative writing, and validating procedure conducted by this
thesis represent three strengths. Next, I discuss three weaknesses of this thesis.
12.6.2 Weaknesses
This section introduces three weaknesses of this thesis, namely theoretical awareness, chronological
approach, and quantitative assessment.
12.6.2.1 Background theory
The first weakness relates to the demonstration of the full professional grasp of the background theory
necessary to understanding and dealing with the matter of this thesis. Phillips and Pugh (2002: 59)
describe the theoretical requirements for the full professional standards required to demonstrate the
background theory:
"[Background theory] is the field of study within which you are working and which
you must know well ... The standard way of demonstrating this is through a
literature review ... You are doing [this] in order to demonstrate that you have a
fully professional grasp of the background theory to your subject... So organising
the material in an interesting and useful way, evaluating the contributions of others
(and justifying the criticisms, of course), identifying trends in research activity,
78 See Appendix VII for more details.
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defining areas of theoretical and empirical weakness, are all key activities by which
you would demonstrate that you had a professional command of the background
theory."
Although this thesis made all possible efforts to demonstrate the full professional grasp of the
background theory necessary to understanding and dealing with its matter, the wide range of theories
that have relevance to such a complex problem as the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi
Arabia makes it difficult to cover all of them with the same degree of depth. In this thesis, the
mechanism to build the background theory was to look at the keywords of the questions of the thesis
(e.g., technology implementation, capabilities building, value creation, strategy formulation) as well
as its different aspects (e.g., e-banking development, alignment) as a guide to explore related
theoretical literature. Then, it made informed choices about the topics to be dealt with in greater detail.
Thus, while the background theory looked in greater detail the technology implementation literature as
well as process approaches, it looked rather briefly to many theoretical foundations of value creation
and capabilities building in context of e-business and e-banking.
12.6.2.2 Chronological structure
The second weakness of this thesis is the chronological approach followed to write the case studies
(i.e. Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). Yin (2003) suggested six illustrative structures to write a case
study: linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, theory-building, suspense, and sub-sequenced. Yin
(2003: 153-154) describes the norm of the chronological structure and its pitfall:
"[Chronological structure] is to present the case study evidence in chronological
order... [It] can serve an important purpose in doing explanatory case studies
because presumed causal sequences must occur linearly over time.... [However,]
disproportionate attention is usually given to the early events and insufficient
attention to the later ones.... To avoid this situation, one recommendation ... is to
draft the case study backward."
Although the largely common structure followed by this thesis to write the case studies helped to
replicate the logic as well as to contrast results through following a question-and-answer narrative
form, it negatively influenced the balanced treatment of the case study's events. For instance, Saib and
Tadawul case studies (i.e. Chapter 6 and 10, respectively) assessed briefly the origins of the e-banking
soctiechncial constituencies, while it assessed deeply the current state of the e-banking sociotechncial
constituencies.
Moreover, the assessment of some case studies looked at more than one period in the development of
the e-banking constituency (e.g., Samba and AlRajih case studies looked at two and three periods,
respectively), while it only looked at a single period in the development of other e-banking
constituencies (e.g., AlAhli and Riyad case studies looked only at the current period).
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12.6.2.3 Quantitative assessment
The third weakness of this thesis is the accuracy of the quantitative assessment (i.e. Chapter 11) that
followed the qualitative assessment (i.e. Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). In the case studies of
AlRajhi, Riyad and Tadawul, for instance, the interviewees during the first round of the semi-
structured interviews (i.e. during December 2003-January 2004) were different from those during the
second round of the semi-structured interviews (i.e. during December 2005-January 2006). This was
due to the unavailability of the former interviewees for both rounds of interviews because of a change
of position inside or outside the bank. Such limitations created follow-up challenges while
investigating the evolution of the e-banking constituency.
Moreover, the initial plan of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)'s assessment was to conduct an
evolutionary assessment of all the seven case studies. After approaching the second round of the semi-
structured interviews (i.e. during December 2005-January 2006), however, achieving such an
objective was found to be difficult. This was for two reasons. First, the time offered by interviewees
was quite limited so that only the "alignment web" could be assessed. Second, the "dynamic strategy
mapping" (DSM)'s is so deep that extra time is needed not only to think about all its dimensions, but
also to understand each one. Accordingly, the assessment of the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM)
was limited to the current state of the e-banking constituency-building process at AlAhli, Riyad and
Tadawul.
The strength of the quantitative assessment is another issue related to the accuracy. For instance, the
fact that the markings for the "alignment web" (Molina 2003) and "dynamic strategy mapping"
(DSM) were given by just one person weakens the strength of the assessment through the potential
introduction of biases. Accordingly, if the assessment would have been conducted by more than one
person, it would have increased the strength of the result.
In conclusion, the theoretical awareness, chronological approach, and quantitative assessment
followed by this thesis represent three weaknesses.
Next, I discuss the results of testing the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach
and its associated analytical tools for understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building.
12.7 The applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach
The aim of this section is to present some important results obtained from testing the potential of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990; 1993) and its associated analytical tools
(Molina 1995; 2003; 2005) in the analytical and comparative treatment of the concrete e-banking
experiences of Saudi Arabia. The "sociotechnical constituencies" approach complements many
insights from the literature review on value creation and capability-building perspectives,
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implementation process, and "social theory" frameworks, which identify value-creation and
capability-building as complex technological and organisational processes.
The first strength of the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach is that it features
a systematic analytical approach for the interaction of different social and technological factors during
the development of e-banking constituencies. This thesis demonstrated the applicability of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tool of the "diamond of
alignment in the systematic analytical and comparative treatment of the concrete e-banking
experiences of Saudi Arabia.
For instance, the emergence and evolution of the AlRajhi's e-banking sociotechnical constituency
process (i. e. Chapter 6) was one of the complex and complicated processes among the processes
discussed in this thesis. However, utilising the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its
associated "diamond of alignment helped to look at three different periods of AlRajhi's e-banking
sociotechnical constituency process: 1990-1995, 1996-2000, & 2001-2006. Such utilisation also
helped not only to arrange systematically the sequence of e-banking evolution, but also to question
logically the causal proposition of such evolution. This result is consistent with that of Kinder and
Lancaster (2001), who suggested that the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated
analytical tool of the "diamond of are appropriate tools in analysing the processes of implementation
where a particular outcome is privileged.
The second strength of the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach (Molina 1990;
1993) is that it offers specific tools to structure the dynamic understanding of the evaluation of
processes of technological innovation and value-creation strategies. These tools are the "diamond of
alignment", "alignment web", and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM). The structure of the survey
(see Appendix I), for instance, was grounded on the dimensions of the "diamond of alignment".
On the one hand, this helped to capture the dynamics of the e-banking socitechncial constituency
process as well as to organise the way of thinking about the evolution of such process. On the other
hand, the analytical tools helped lay the ground to build the "question-and-answer form" narrative
writing as well as to structure the case studies. The analytical tools were also valuable to present in a
consistent visual way the state of alignment harmony of the capability-building processes. Such visual
capability not only allows an immediate understanding and communication of the strengths and
weaknesses of a specific value creation and capability-building process, but also highlights those
strategic areas requiring greater attention to secure the success of the constituency-building process.
This result is consistent with that of Kinder (2000), who suggested that the "sociotechnical
constituencies" approach acts as a conceptual instrument for the understanding and guidance of
processes of innovation and implementation.
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At the same time, this thesis counters the argument raised by Gilbert et al. (2001), who argued that the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach does not allow one to study and understand the dynamic
behaviour of innovation networks. The theoretical ground of such judgement excluded Molina's work
on the "diamond of alignment" (Molina 1995), while the judgement of this thesis is based on all of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach's available analytical tools. This makes the judgment of this
thesis theoretically more sound than that ofGilbert et al. (2001).
The third strength of the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach is the usefulness
of its recent tools, namely, the "alignment web" and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) for the
analysis of value-creation strategies in e-banking constituency-building processes. Although the
assessment process for such recent tools (Molina 2003; 2005) faced some difficulties related to the
accuracy and strength of the responses, it helped to provide deeper insights about the e-banking
constituency-building process.
The "alignment web" helped visualise the alignment gaps in the e-banking constituency-building
processes, while the "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) enabled not only the identification of the
combination of specific ingredients making up the value-creation strategies of different constituency-
building processes, but also the assessment of the different priorities given to these specific
ingredients by key constituents.
The work reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g., Klaes 1997; Kinder et al. 1999; Molina & Michilli 1999;
Molina & Kinder 2002; Molina & Gregson 2002;) has lent support to the applicability of the
"sociotechnical constituencies" approach in highlighting practical issues and choices facing policy
makers and implementers in terms of the alignments necessary for the deployment of innovation.
However, this work has been primarily concerned with its strengths in dealing with processes of
technology innovation and implementation, and did not seek to identify weaknesses in the approach or
its applicability.
In order to fill such gap in the literature, the experience of this thesis identifies a major weakness in
the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tools for
research in the understanding of technology implementation, in general, and e-banking value creation
and capability-building, in particular. Such weakness is that the "sociotechnical constituencies"
approach and its associated analytical tools are highly complex with the result that a great deal of
effort and caution are needed to optimally utilise them in understanding the empirical world.
For instance, the development of the survey (see Appendix I) and the methodological procedures
followed to customise the "alignment web" and "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM) to the specific
problem of the thesis faced significant challenges. Such challenges were mainly related to the process
of simplifying the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated analytical tools to banks
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and interviews in order for them to respond clearly. Therefore, both the data collection and analysis
consumed more time than anticipated at the beginning of the research process.
12.8 Suggestions for further research
This section lays out some directions for further research. Such directions are as follows:
□ Impact ofnew arrivals: A line of further research is to study the impact that the arrival of all
new banks (e.g., AlEnmaa, Deutsche Bank, State Bank of India) will have in the
development of the e-banking sector in Saudi Arabia.
□ Non-banking financial e-business: The argument of the entire thesis was based on e-
banking with a portion based on e-investment (i.e. Tadawul). The thesis provided a rich
insight into the emergence and evolution of such a type of e-business. A possible direction
for further research is to look at the emergence and evolution of e-business at non-banking
financial institutions (e.g., insurance). This would help provide a comparative view among
different financial e-businesses.
□ Product-based e-business: An additional possible direction for further research is to look at
the emergence and evolution of a product-based e-business (e.g., petrochemical sector). This
would also help provide a comparative view among different e-businesses.
12.9 Summary Conclusion
The aim of the thesis was to look at the emergence and evolution of e-banking in Saudi Arabia, with
particular emphasis on the processes of how banks implement e-banking to build their capabilities and
create new value strategies. Specific questions addressed through the thesis were (1) how banks
implement e-banking to build their capabilities as well as to create new value strategies, (2) how e-
banking capabilities have been built, and (3) the role played by e-banking in shaping the strategic
direction of banks. This required understanding of a variety of aspects (i) the value created by e-
banking products and services within different banks, (ii) the process of e-banking development
within the different banks, (iii) how banks approach e-banking products and services, and (iv) how the
banks align the demand and supply factors surrounding e-banking products and services.
This chapter concluded the thesis by highlighting its empirical contribution, strategy-policy
recommendations, and assessment of the thesis. In addition this concluding chapter provided the
results of testing the applicability of the "sociotechnical constituencies" approach and its associated
analytical tools for understanding e-banking value creation and capability-building, as well as
suggestions for further research.
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The overall result of the investigation conducted by this thesis found that the Saudi Arabian e-
banking' constituency-building process shows distinctive processes of sociotechnical alignment by
each one of the specific Saudi Banks' e-banking constituencies in the study. In addition, the use of
Molina's "alignment web" to assess the state of each of the specific e-banking constituency-building
processes helped identify the areas of strengths and weaknesses in these processes of sociotechnical
alignment. For instance, the alignment with "target constituents" exhibits a strong state of alignment
while that with "governance" represents a significant challenge. The common factor between these
two alignments is the area of customers, which reveals a difficulty of approach by the constituencies,
suggesting the importance of giving customers more opportunities to participate in the process of e-
banking constituency-building.
The distinctiveness of development by each sociotechnical constituency was also highlighted by the
application of the Molina's "dynamic strategy mapping" (DSM), showing that each constituency has
its own combination of strategic ingredients. Indeed, each e-banking sociotechnical constituency has
its own evolutionary way of focusing on certain features that give competitive advantage to e-banking
products and services. While some Saudi banks focus more on inter-organisational features, others
focus more on intra-organisational ones, suggesting the importance of not only investing in banking
technologies, but also importing such technologies from outside to enhance the performance of the e-
banking constituency-building process.
Overall, this thesis contributes to provide a rich insight into the emergence and evolution of e-banking
in Saudi Arabia. Such contribution may be used to inform the future alignment strategy pursued by
each the Saudi Arabian e-banking constituencies.
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